State v. Wilkins

[Cite as State v. Wilkins, 2014-Ohio-983.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 17-13-13
v.
TEVYN NEVADA WILKINS, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 13CR000041
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 17, 2014
APPEARANCES:
Sheryl Trzaska for Appellant
Melissa L. Wood for Appellee
Case No. 17-13-13
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tevyn Nevada Wilkins (“Wilkins”), appeals the
Shelby County Court of Common Pleas’ judgment entry of sentencing. We
affirm.
{¶2} On February 28, 2013, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted
Wilkins on four counts: Counts One and Two of aggravated robbery, violations of
R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), first-degree felonies; Count Three of burglary in violation of
R.C. 2911.12(A)(1), a second-degree felony; and, Count Four of receiving stolen
property in violation of R.C. 2913.51, a fourth-degree felony.1 (Doc. No. 3). The
indictment included a firearm specification as to Count One. (Id.).
{¶3} The trial court held an arraignment hearing on March 6, 2013, at
which Wilkins, represented by counsel, entered pleas of not guilty. (Mar. 6, 2013
Tr. at 7); (Doc. No. 11).
{¶4} On April 26, 2013, the parties reached a negotiated plea agreement,
and the trial court held a change-of-plea hearing. (Doc. No. 30); (Apr. 26, 2013
Tr. at 3). As part of the plea agreement, Wilkins agreed to plead guilty to Counts
One and Two, and plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, agreed to dismiss Counts
Three and Four and the firearm specification. (Id.); (Id.). The trial court accepted
Wilkins’ guilty pleas and found him guilty of Counts One and Two. (Apr. 26,
1
Because Wilkins was 16 years old at the time of the charged offenses, the charges originated in the trial
court’s Juvenile Division, and jurisdiction was transferred to the trial court’s General Criminal Division so
Wilkins could be prosecuted as an adult. (See Doc. Nos. 1, 2).
-2-
Case No. 17-13-13
2013 Tr. at 13); (Doc. No. 31). The trial court ordered a presentence investigation
and scheduled a sentencing hearing. (Apr. 26, 2013 Tr. at 13); (Doc. Nos. 31, 36,
54).
{¶5} The trial court held the sentencing hearing on July 1, 2013. (July 1,
2013 Tr. at 3); (Doc. No. 66). In the written plea agreement, the parties agreed to
jointly recommend an aggregate term of five years imprisonment. (See Doc. No.
30). The trial court sentenced Wilkins to four years imprisonment on each count,
with the sentences to be run concurrently. (July 1, 2013 Tr. at 10-11); (Doc. No.
66). The trial court also ordered that Wilkins pay restitution to the victim in the
amount of $21,281, as well as all costs of prosecution, the costs of court-appointed
counsel, and any fees permitted under R.C. 2929.18(A)(4). (Id.); (Id.). The trial
court filed its judgment entry of sentencing on July 5, 2013. (Doc. No. 66).
{¶6} On August 5, 2013, Wilkins filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 83).
He raises three assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. I
The trial court committed plain error when it imposed an
amount of restitution without competent, credible evidence
linking that amount to the actual economic loss suffered by the
victim. R.C. 2919.18(A)(1). (July 1, 2013 T.pp. 10-11; July 5,
2013 Judgment Entry of Sentencing.)
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Wilkins argues that the trial court
committed plain error by ordering him to pay $21,281 in restitution, because there
-3-
Case No. 17-13-13
is insufficient information in the record to support the restitution order.
Specifically, while Wilkins acknowledges that the victim impact statement
contained a handwritten list of the property stolen and their corresponding values,
he argues that there was no testimony, receipts, or other documentation offered to
support those values and that the amount of restitution is not supported by
competent, credible evidence linking that amount to the actual economic loss
suffered by the victim.
{¶8} Wilkins concedes that he did not object to the restitution ordered by
the trial court. “‘A failure to object to the trial court’s award of restitution waives
all but plain error.’” State v. Miller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-32, 2009-Ohio-6157,
¶ 5, quoting State v. Stewart, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-08-11, 2008-Ohio-5823, ¶
7. “In order to have plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), there must be an error, the
error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings, and the error must have
affected ‘substantial rights.’” Stewart at ¶ 7, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d
21, 27 (2002). “Plain error exists only in the event that it can be said that ‘but for
the error, the outcome of the trial would clearly have been otherwise.’” Id.,quoting State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 431 (1997). “Plain error is to be used
‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a
manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Id., quoting Barnes at 27. “[I]mposition of a
sentence not authorized by statute constitutes plain error.” Id., citing State v.
-4-
Case No. 17-13-13
Rhoda, 135 Ohio App.3d 21, 25 (3d Dist.1999) and State v. Samuels, 4th Dist.
Washington No. 03CA8, 2003-Ohio-6106, ¶ 9.
{¶9} R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) governs restitution orders and “permits a trial
court to order a convicted felon to make restitution to the victims of his crime ‘in
an amount based on the victim’s economic loss.’” State v. Halcomb, 3d Dist.
Seneca No. 13-12-13, 2013-Ohio-1301, ¶ 31, quoting R.C. 2929.18(A)(1).
“Economic loss is defined by R.C. 2929.01(L) as, ‘any economic detriment
suffered by a victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of an
offense and includes any loss of income due to lost time at work because of any
injury caused to the victim, and any property loss, medical cost, or funeral expense
incurred as a result of the commission of the offense.’” Id., quoting R.C.
2929.01(L).
{¶10} “‘In an order of restitution, the amount of restitution must bear a
reasonable relationship to the loss suffered.’” State v. Estes, 3d Dist. Seneca No.
13-11-14, 2011-Ohio-5740, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Marbury, 104 Ohio App.3d 179,
181 (8th Dist.1995). See also R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). “There must be competent and
credible evidence in the record from which the court may ascertain the amount of
restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty.” Id. The trial court may base the
amount of restitution it orders on any of a number of sources:
-5-
Case No. 17-13-13
an amount recommended by the victim, the offender, a presentence
investigation report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of
repairing or replacing property, and other information, provided that
the amount the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the
amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and
proximate result of the commission of the offense.
R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). See also State v. Kline, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-12-03, 2012-
Ohio-4345, ¶ 10 (affirming the trial court’s restitution order, which was based on
an amount recommended by the victim in his victim impact statement, and which
represented the economic loss suffered by the victim). If the offender or the
victim disputes the amount of restitution, the trial court must hold a hearing on
restitution. State v. Lamere, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-07-11, 2007-Ohio-4930, ¶ 10,
citing R.C. 2929.18(A)(1); State v. Lalain, 136 Ohio St.3d 248, 2013-Ohio-3093, ¶
22-23.
{¶11} We conclude that it was not plain error for the trial court to order
Wilkins to pay restitution in the amount of $21,281. As Wilkins points out, no
testimony or evidence concerning the amount of restitution was presented at any
of the hearings. However, the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) contains a
victim impact statement with copies of handwritten lists itemizing economic losses
attached to it. (PSI). The lists detail the victim’s stolen property items, including
-6-
Case No. 17-13-13
a bulletproof vest, two firearm holsters, two loaded magazines, a brand new HP
Pavilion laptop, jewelry, a coin pouch containing silver dollars, cash, an iPad,
three televisions, a Nintendo Wii, an iPod classic, ammunition, two shotguns, a
Kershaw knife, and a handgun. (Id.). Alongside the property items listed are
dollar amounts totaling $21,281. (Id.). That total is reflected on the victim impact
statement. (Id.). The victim impact statement also states that the victim did not
have insurance. (Id.).
{¶12} The amount of restitution ordered by the trial court—$21,281—bears
a reasonable relationship to the loss suffered. R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) allows a trial
court to base the amount of restitution it orders “on an amount recommended by
the victim” and “a presentence investigation report.” The victim impact statement
within the PSI contains information concerning the economic detriment—namely,
property loss in the amount of $21,281—suffered by the victim as a direct and
proximate result of Wilkins’ offenses. At the sentencing hearing and in the
judgment entry of sentencing, the trial court said it considered the PSI and victim
impact statement. (July 1, 2013 Tr. at 9); (Doc. No. 66). Wilkins did not dispute
or object to the amount of restitution, so the trial court was not required to hold a
hearing. Lamere at ¶ 10.
-7-
Case No. 17-13-13
{¶13} For these reasons, it was not plain error for the trial court to order
that Wilkins pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $21,281. See Kline,
2012-Ohio-4345, at ¶ 10.
{¶14} Wilkins’ first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. II
The trial court committed plain error when it imposed
restitution without determining Tevyn’s ability to pay. R.C.
2929.19(B)(5). (July 1, 2013 T.pp. 10-11; July 5, 2013 Judgment
Entry of Sentencing.)
{¶15} In his second assignment of error, Wilkins argues that the trial court
committed plain error by ordering him to pay $21,281 in restitution without
determining his ability to pay. Specifically, he argues that the trial court should
not have ordered him to pay $21,281 in restitution when the PSI report reflected
that he was in eighth grade and unemployed, and when the trial court found him
indigent.
{¶16} As with Wilkins’ first assignment of error, we apply the plain-error
standard of review because Wilkins did not object to the restitution ordered by the
trial court.
{¶17} R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) requires a trial court to “consider the offender’s
present and future ability to pay the amount of the sanction” before imposing a
financial sanction, such as restitution, under R.C. 2929.18. R.C. 2929.19(B)(5).
See also State v. Parker, 183 Ohio App.3d 431, 2009-Ohio-3667, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.).
-8-
Case No. 17-13-13
“The trial court is not required to hold a hearing on ability to pay, nor are there any
specific factors to consider or findings to make.” Parker at ¶ 13, citing State v.
Clifford, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-04-06, 2005-Ohio-958, ¶ 14, reversed on other
grounds in In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 109 Ohio St.3d 313,
2006-Ohio-2109. “The court must merely consider the offender’s ability to pay.”
Id., citing Clifford at ¶ 14. “Furthermore, ‘a trial court need not explicitly state in
its judgment entry that it considered a defendant’s ability to pay a financial
sanction. Rather, [appellate] courts look to the totality of the record to see if the
requirement has been satisfied.’” State v. Crish, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-08-13, 2008-
Ohio-5196, ¶ 50, quoting State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Ross No. 06CA2893, 2007-
Ohio-1884, ¶ 42.
{¶18} “‘If the record shows that the court considered a presentence
investigation report that provides pertinent information about the offender’s
financial situation and his ability to pay the financial sanction, it has met its
obligation under R.C. 2929.19(B)(5).’” State v. Bulstrom, 4th Dist. Athens No.
12CA19, 2013-Ohio-3582, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Petrie, 4th Dist. Meigs No.
12CA4, 2013-Ohio-887, ¶ 5. See also Crish at ¶ 50 (“When the trial court
considers information in the [PSI] relating to the defendant’s age, health,
education, and employment history, that is sufficient to comply with R.C.
-9-
Case No. 17-13-13
2929.19(B)[(5)].”);2 State v. Shaffer, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-09-06, 2009-Ohio-
4804, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Troglin, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-06-57, 2007-Ohio-
4368, ¶ 38 (stating that, generally, R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) is “satisfied where a trial
court considered a PSI, which typically contains pertinent financial information”).
{¶19} We once again conclude that it was not plain error for the trial court
to order that Wilkins pay restitution. We note that while the plea agreement
Wilkins signed did not mention an amount of restitution, it did provide that
“[c]ourt costs, restitution, and other financial sanctions may also be imposed.”
(Doc. No. 30). Therefore, to the extent Wilkins argues in his second assignment
of error that the trial court committed plain error by ordering any restitution, we
summarily reject that argument. See State v. Terrell, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-04-
16, 2005-Ohio-2253, ¶ 9 (summarily rejecting the defendant’s argument that not
paying restitution was part of his plea agreement, which stated that “[r]estitution,
Court costs, and other financial sanctions may be imposed in my case”).
{¶20} As for Wilkins’ argument that the trial court failed to consider his
ability to pay, the trial court stated at the July 1, 2013 sentencing hearing that it
considered the PSI and the comments of Wilkins and his counsel:
2
The ability-to-pay requirement formerly located in R.C. 2929.19(B)(6) is now located in R.C.
2929.19(B)(5). Bulstrom at ¶ 14, fn. 2.
-10-
Case No. 17-13-13
But, again, Mr. Wilkins the Court has reviewed the case file and the
pre-sentence investigation in this case, takes into consideration your
comments today as well as those of your Counsel.
(July 1, 2013 Tr. at 9). In its judgment entry of sentencing, the trial court said it
“considered the record, oral statements, any victim impact statement and
presentence report prepared * * *.” (Doc. No. 66).
{¶21} The PSI contains information concerning Wilkins’ age, health,
education, and employment status. (PSI). Specifically, the PSI states that Wilkins
was 16 years old, had no “serious health issues,” was “in good physical health,”
earned his GED, and was unemployed. (Id.). In an April 30, 2013 letter to the
trial court judge, included in the PSI, Wilkins emphatically stated, “i GOT MY
G.E.D.!” (Capitalization and underlining sic.) (Id.). In the same letter, Wilkins
said he planned “to attend college classes.” (Id.).
{¶22} At the sentencing hearing, Wilkins stated, “I’m sorry for what I’ve
done,” and, “I’ve earned by [sic] GED.” (July 1, 2013 Tr. at 5). Wilkins’ counsel
then expressed his hopes and ambitions for Wilkins:
I still think there’s a lot of hope for – for my client due to
partly his age. The other part is his intelligence. He’s quite
intelligent. I’ve gotten to know him over the last several weeks, and
he can do whatever he wants as long as he stays off alcohol, stays off
-11-
Case No. 17-13-13
the streets, and actually pursues his education or pursues a trade.
And I mean that.
***
Moving forward after a prison sentence obviously is gonna
happen today, he would like to definitely change his life and be a
hardworking, law-abiding citizen, Your Honor.
(Id. at 6-7).
{¶23} The trial court did not explicitly state at the sentencing hearing or in
its judgment entry that it considered Wilkins’ ability to pay a financial sanction,
but it was not required to do so. See Crish, 2008-Ohio-5196, at ¶ 50. Rather, the
trial court stated that it considered the PSI and the oral statements of Wilkins and
his counsel, which addressed Wilkins’ age, health, education, employment status,
intelligence, and future ambitions upon his release from prison. By considering
that information, the trial court satisfied its obligation under R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) to
consider Wilkins’ present and future ability to pay the amount of restitution
ordered by the trial court. See id.{¶24} We reject Wilkins’ argument that the trial court committed plain
error by ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of $21,281 after finding him
indigent and appointing him counsel. “[F]inding that an offender is indigent for
purposes of appointment of counsel does not shield an offender from imposition of
-12-
Case No. 17-13-13
a financial sanction.” Clifford, 2005-Ohio-958, at ¶ 14, citing State v. Kelly, 145
Ohio App.3d 277, 283 (12th Dist.2001).
{¶25} For these reasons, the trial court satisfied its statutory obligation to
consider Wilkins’ ability to pay restitution, and it was not plain error for the trial
court to order Wilkins to pay restitution. See Crish at ¶ 51.
{¶26} Wilkins’ second assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. III
Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
object to the improper imposition of restitution. R.C. 2929.18;
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
(July 1, 2013 Tr.pp. 10-11)
{¶27} In his third assignment of error, Wilkins argues that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to the trial
court’s restitution order because the record did not include competent, credible
evidence to support the amount and because the trial court did not consider
Wilkins’ ability to pay. Wilkins argues that had his counsel objected, the trial
court would not have imposed the restitution order.
{¶28} A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
must establish: (1) the counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable under
the circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.
-13-
Case No. 17-13-13
State v. Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
{¶29} In order to show counsel’s conduct was deficient or unreasonable,
the defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent
representation and must show that counsel’s actions were not trial strategies
prompted by reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673,
675 (1998). Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not
generally constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247,
255 (1991). Rather, the errors complained of must amount to a substantial
violation of counsel’s essential duties to his client. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio
St.3d 136, 141-142 (1989), citing State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396 (1976).
{¶30} In this case, Wilkins has not satisfied Strickland’s first prong. His
argument that his counsel’s performance was deficient is based on his beliefs that
the amount of restitution is not supported by the record and that the trial court
failed to consider his ability to pay. However, as we concluded above, the record
supports the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, and the trial court
satisfied its statutory obligation to consider Wilkins’ ability to pay. Therefore,
Wilkins’ cannot demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient or
-14-
Case No. 17-13-13
unreasonable under the circumstances. See State v. Jarrett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 90404, 2008-Ohio-4868, ¶ 24 (“The restitution imposed was based upon the
exact economic loss suffered and substantiated by the victims whom requested it.
Therefore, counsel’s failure to object or dispute the amount of restitution imposed
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the first prong
of Strickland.”).
{¶31} Because Wilkins cannot demonstrate that his counsel’s performance
was deficient or unreasonable under the circumstances, he cannot satisfy the
Strickland test, and we need not proceed to Strickland’s prejudice prong. See
State v. Hay, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-2000-24, 2000 WL 1852725, *5 (Dec. 19,
2000).
{¶32} Wilkins’ third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶33} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ROGERS, J., concur.
/jlr
-15-