State v. Sturgill

[Cite as State v. Sturgill, 2017-Ohio-2736.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ATHENS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 16CA21
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
vs. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
NATHANIEL D. STURGILL :
:
Defendant-Appellant. : Released: 05/01/17
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Nathaniel D. Sturgill, Lancaster, Ohio, Pro Se Appellant.
Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and Merry M.
Saunders, Athens County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Athens, Ohio, for
Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, J.
{¶1} Nathaniel D. Sturgill appeals the “Entry Overruling
Jurisdictional Motion,” dated September 21, 2016, in the Athens County
Court of Common Pleas. In 2009, Sturgill was indicted on six counts which
included rape and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. In 2010, he
pleaded to two counts of rape, R.C. 2907. 02(A)(2), felonies of the first
degree, and was sentenced to a five-year mandatory prison term. He served
his term and was released in 2014. On appeal, Sturgill asserts because he
has served his prison sentence and has been released from custody, the trial
Athens App. No. 16CA21 2
court did not have jurisdiction to hold a sex offender reclassification hearing,
pursuant to the dictates of Megan’s Law. However, we find no merit to
Sturgill’s sole assignment of error. Accordingly, we overrule the assignment
of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
{¶2} Appellant was indicted by the Athens County Grand Jury in Case
Number 09CR0296, as follows: two counts of rape, in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b), and felonies of the first degree; three counts of rape, in
violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), and felonies of the first degree; and one
count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of R.C.
2907.04(A), and a felony of the fourth degree.
{¶3} On March 30, 2010 Appellant pleaded to two counts of rape,
R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).1 In exchange for his guilty plea, the State of Ohio
dismissed the remaining counts and there was a joint recommendation that
Appellant be sentenced to a mandatory term of five (5) years in prison; that
Appellant be ordered to register as a Tier III sexual predator with
community notifications; and that Appellant have no direct or indirect
1
According to the Athens County Clerk of Courts’ website, Appellant was previously indicted on July 27,
2009 of two counts: unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, R.C. 2907.04(A), and rape, R.C. 2907.02(A)(2),
Athens County Common Pleas Court case number 09CR0265. However, this indictment was dismissed on
March 31, 2010. An appellate court can take judicial notice of public records accessible from the internet.
See State v. Bailey, 4th Dist. Highland No. 16CA1, 2016-Ohio-7249, Fn. 4, citing In re Helfrich, 5th Dist.
Licking No. 13CA20, 2014-Ohio-1933.
Athens App. No. 16CA21 3
contact with the victims or victims’ family.2 Appellant served his five-year
prison sentence and was released from the custody of the Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Corrections on September 4, 2014.
{¶4} On September 25, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Remove
Void Sex Offender Classification. Within the motion, Appellant argued that
his sex offender classification as a Tier III sexual predator with community
notification is void because his offenses occurred prior to the enactment of
the Adam Walsh Act (S.B. 10).3 He further argued that once an offender has
been released from prison, he cannot be subjected to another sentencing to
correct a trial court’s flawed imposition of the sex offender classification.
{¶5} On October 25, 2015, the State filed its response. The State
conceded that Appellant was incorrectly classified under the Adam Walsh
Act, but argued that the trial court did have jurisdiction to vacate his Tier III
prior classification and advise him that he was now classified under Megan’s
Law.4 On February 2, 2016, Appellant filed an objection to jurisdiction.
The State filed a response and the trial court ultimately denied Appellant’s
objection.
2
On April 2, 2010, the judgment entry of sentence was journalized.
3
The Adam Walsh Act, or S.B. 10, was enacted in 2007 creating the three tier sex offender classification
system.
4
Megan’s Law was in effect at the time of Appellant’s offenses.
Athens App. No. 16CA21 4
{¶6} On September 20, 2016, Appellant appeared for a sex offender
classification hearing. The trial court proceeded to inform Appellant of his
requirements to register, pursuant to Megan’s Law, as a habitual sex
offender subject to community notification. On September 21, 2016, the
court journalized its entry overruling Sturgill’s jurisdictional motion. This
timely appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY FINDING THAT IT POSSESSED
JURISDICTION TO PROCEED WITH A SEX OFFENDER
CLASSIFICATION HEARING UNDER MEGAN’S LAW
TWO YEARS AFTER APPELLANT WAS RELEASED
FROM PRISON.”
LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶7} Ohio's current sex offender registration requirements are codified
in R.C. Chapter 2950. State v. Straley, 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA30,
2014-Ohio-5110, ¶ 16. In 1996, the General Assembly enacted Megan's
Law, which revised R.C. Chapter 2950 and established a comprehensive
system of classifying sex offenders into three categories: sexually oriented
offenders, habitual sex offenders, and sexual predators. Former R.C.
2950.09, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2618; In re Von 146 Ohio St.3d 448, 2016
Ohio-3020, 57 N.E.3d 1158, ¶ 14.
{¶8} Then, in 2007, the General Assembly enacted S.B. 10, also
Athens App. No. 16CA21 5
known as the “Adam Walsh Act,” which repealed Megan's Law, effective
January 1, 2008, and replaced it with new standards for sex-offender
classification and registration pursuant to the federal Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act, Section 16901 et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code. In re
Von, supra, at ¶ 15, quoting Bundy v. State, 143 Ohio St.3d 237, 2015-Ohio-
2138, 36 N.E.3d 158, ¶ 5. This scheme, which the General Assembly
codified in R.C. Chapter 2950, divides sex offenders into Tier I, Tier II, and
Tier III sex or child-victim offenders. R.C. 2950.01(E) through (G). State v.
Stidam, 4th Dist. Adams No. 15CA1014, 2016-Ohio-7906, ¶ 12.
{¶9} Then, in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374,
952 N.E.2d 1108, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether the Adam
Walsh Act could constitutionally be retroactively applied to an offender who
committed a sex offense prior to its enactment. Id. at 16. The High Court
concluded that the Adam Walsh Act, part of which was expressly made
retroactive, is punitive, and “as applied to defendants who committed sex
offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio
Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive
laws.” Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, at
¶ 16 and at the syllabus. The Court subsequently clarified that only persons
who commit their underlying offense on or after the effective date of the
Athens App. No. 16CA21 6
Adam Walsh Act can be constitutionally subjected to its requirements.
Williams, at ¶ 17; In re Bruce S., 134 Ohio St.3d 477, 2012-Ohio-5696, 983
N.E.2d 350. State v. Straley, at ¶ 16.
{¶10} In the sole assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to hold the sex offender classification hearing due to the
fact he has served his sentence and his been released from incarceration for
approximately two years. In particular, Appellant argues that the trial court
must have classified him as a sex offender “before or at the time of
sentencing.” Former R.C. 2905.09(B)(1) directed a court to hold a sex
offender classification hearing prior to or at the time of sentencing.
{¶11} The jurisdictional question was raised in State v. Miller, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100768, 2014-Ohio-4568. There, Miller was convicted
in May 2009 of five counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of
kidnapping with a sexual motivation. The convictions stemmed from
multiple incidents occurring in August, 2007. He was sentenced to
concurrent sentences and was classified as a Tier II sex offender under the
Adam Walsh Act. Miller completed his sentences and was released from
custody in 2011.
{¶12} In 2012, Miller filed motions to correct and amend the
registration requirements. He argued that the trial court’s classification of
Athens App. No. 16CA21 7
him as a Tier II Sex Offender was void because his crimes were committed
prior to the effective date of the Adam Walsh Act. Based on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Williams, supra, the Miller court ordered that a sex-
offender reclassification hearing be conducted.
{¶13} During his hearing Miller objected to reclassification as a sex
offender because he had completed his prison sentence for the underlying
offenses. As such, he argued the court was without jurisdiction to conduct a
reclassification hearing. The State, however, argued that Miller’s status as a
sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law attached by operation of law
and therefore the court had the authority to notify him of this status. The
trial court agreed and advised he would be classified as a sexually oriented
offender by operation of law under the version of Megan’s law that was in
effect at the time of the offense. The court proceeded to provide the
pertinent notification and registration requirements.
{¶14} On appeal, Miller again made the jurisdictional argument. The
appellate court observed at ¶ 8:
“Ohio courts have consistently held that a sex-offender
classification proceeding under Megan's Law is civil in nature
and ‘distinct from the proceedings governing a defendant's
underlying criminal conviction and sentence.’ Id. at ¶ 8, quoting
State v. Williams, 177 Ohio App.3d 865, 2008-Ohio-3586, 896
N.E.2d 725, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio
St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, syllabus; see
also State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, 982
Athens App. No. 16CA21 8
N.E.2d 684, ¶ 12 (describing Megan's Law as ‘a civil, remedial
law’).”
{¶15} Citing State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169,
773 N.E.2d 502, ¶ 18, the Miller court went on to find that Miller’s
classification as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law
retroactively attached to his conviction in 2009 by operation of law.5 The
Miller court found no merit to his argument that the court lacked jurisdiction
to impose his classification.
{¶16} In the case sub judice, the State has also directed us to a recent
decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, State v. Bell, 12th Dist.
Clermont No. CA2015-10-077, 2016-Ohio-7363. Bell, a foster parent
convicted of sexual battery and imposition of two teenage boys committed to
his care, was sentenced to a five-year prison term in April 2008. He was
also designated a Tier III sexual offender pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act.
Given the sentencing date, the trial court followed the sexual classification
requirements set forth in S.B. 10 rather than applying the prior version,
known as Megan’s Law, in effect at the time of Bell’s crimes.
{¶17} However, prior to Bell’s release from prison, he was
“automatically” reclassified as a sexually-oriented offender pursuant to
5
Hayden held that “if a defendant has been convicted of a sexually oriented offense as defined in R.C.
2950.01(D) and is neither a habitual sex offender nor a sexual predator, the sexually oriented offender
designation attaches as a matter of law [,] and a hearing to make that determination was not required.
Athens App. No. 16CA21 9
Megan’s Law, but did not receive a hearing before his reclassification.6
Approximately one year after Bell’s release from prison, the State moved to
reclassify him a sexual predator, asserting his prior classification pursuant to
S.B. 10 was an improper retroactive application. Bell opposed
reclassification and argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction reclassify
him once he was released from prison. Ultimately, the trial court determined
jurisdiction was proper and the trial court held a hearing at which time both
parties presented evidence and the trial court concluded by designating Bell
a sexual predator.
{¶18} On appeal, Bell raised the jurisdictional argument.
Recognizing that Bell’s initial classification was invalid by virtue of the
Supreme Court’s determination in Williams, the appellate court, however,
disagreed with Bell’s argument that the trial court lost jurisdiction at the
moment he completed his prison sentence. Acknowledging the Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Holdcraft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014,
1 N.E.3d 382, which held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to
correct a void sentence once the prison term is complete, the Bell court
found at ¶ 12:
6
In Bell, the State suggested to the court that Bell was “essentially reclassified” by the Ohio Attorney
General’s Office once he was to be released from prison. However, the appellate court found it clear that
Bell was not judicially classified by the attorney general’s office as the trial court never reversed the
application of S.B. 10 and never classified Bell pursuant to Megan’s Law.
Athens App. No. 16CA21 10
“[U]nlike correcting a sentence already served, addressing
classification and registration requirements according to
Megan's Law is different because such requirements are
‘collateral consequence[s] of the offender's criminal acts rather
than a form of punishment per se.’ State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio
St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, ¶ 34. As such, and unlike S.B. 10,
the Ohio Supreme Court noted several times that the
registration and classification requirements pursuant to Megan's
Law were remedial and civil in nature. Williams, 2011-Ohio-
3374; Ferguson, 2008-Ohio-4824; and State v. Raber, 134 Ohio
St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636.”
{¶19} The Twelfth District Court of Appeals further held at ¶ 13:
“The classification requirements inherent in Megan's Law were
determined by the Ohio Supreme Court to be civil and
remedial, and thus are not a punishment within the defendant's
sentence. Therefore, the disposition of Bell's challenge to the
trial court's jurisdiction to reclassify him must be determined
upon rules specific to classification pursuant to Megan's Law,
rather than rules that pertain to sentencing or punishment. As
such, and because the trial court never classified Bell according
to Megan's Law and its civil and remedial classification
requirements, the trial court had jurisdiction to hold the hearing
despite Bell's release from prison.”
{¶20} The Bell court cited various decisions in which court had
addressed reclassification issues despite the defendant having been released
from prison. See State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424;
State v. Ogden, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-640, 2011-Ohio-1589; and
State v. Ortega-Martinez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95656, 2011-Ohio-2540.
The Bell court recognized that in those cases, the appellate court reversed
retroactive application of S.B. 10 and instead reinstated the prior judicial
Athens App. No. 16CA21 11
classification. However, Bell had never been judicially classified according
to Megan’s Law, and was entitled to a hearing at which the court would
consider various statutory factors in making its determination as to whether
Bell was a sexual predator.
{¶21} The Bell court also recognized that, as cited by Appellant
herein, former R.C. 2905.09(B)(1) directed a court to hold the hearing prior
to or at sentencing. However, the Bell court did not find the language
jurisdictional and referenced the Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Bellman, 86 Ohio St.3d 208, 209, 1999-Ohio-95, 714 N.E.2d 381, finding
“the statutory requirement regarding the timing of a sexual predator hearing
is not jurisdictional and a defendant may waive it.”7 The Bell court cited
other decisions in which classification hearings were heard after appellants
had been released from prison. State v. Wyant, 12th Dist. Madison No.
CA2003-08-029, 2005-Ohio-6663; State v. Wilson, 1123 Ohio St.3d 282,
2007-Ohio-2202; and In re Von, supra. Bell concluded:
“We find no statutory authority that divested the trial court’s
jurisdiction to hold this required hearing, and the fact that Bell
had been released from prison does not change the analysis.”
7
In the context of jurisdictional matters of the juvenile courts, Bellman has been distinguished by State ex
rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697, 983 N.E. 2d 302, wherein the Supreme
Court held that the Scioto County juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a juvenile-offender
registration hearing after the alleged juvenile had turned 21 and had been released from disposition.
Athens App. No. 16CA21 12
{¶22} Turning to the case sub judice, we adopt the reasoning set forth
by our sister districts in Miller and Bell. First, we reiterate our previous
finding in State v. Straley, supra, that sexual offender classifications are civil
in nature, State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d
1264, syllabus, and thus constitute separate proceedings when not coupled
with an initial conviction and sentence. Straley, supra, at ¶ 10; State v.
Garabrandt, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L–06–1400, 2008-Ohio-4128. The sexual
offender classification proceedings are separate and distinct from the
criminal conviction and sentence. See State ex rel. Culgan v. Collier, 132
Ohio St.3d 394, 972 N.E.2d 579, 2012-Ohio-2916, ¶ 1, and State v. Gibson,
2nd Dist. Champaign No.2009CA47, 2010-Ohio-3447, ¶ 25 (appeal from
sex-offender classification is legally distinct from an appeal from the
underlying sentence).
{¶23} As in Bell, “the disposition of [Appellant’s] challenge to the
trial court’s jurisdiction to reclassify him must be determined upon rules
specific to classification pursuant to Megan’s Law, rather than rules that
pertain to sentencing or punishment.” Bell, at 13. And as in Bell, because
the trial court had not classified Appellant according to Megan’s Law, the
trial court had jurisdiction to hold the classification hearing. Like Bell, we
find no statutory authority that divested the trial court’s jurisdiction to hold
Athens App. No. 16CA21 13
the required hearing, despite Appellant’s release from prison over two years
ago.
{¶24} Further, based on the Bell court’s interpretation of the decision
in State v. Bellman, we agree with the Bell court’s finding that the language
of former R.C. 2905.09(B)(1), directing the court to hold the classification
hearing “prior to or at the time of sentencing,” and cited by Appellant herein,
is not language that is jurisdictional. Bell stated at ¶ 19:
“There is no indication in the statute regarding sexual predator
designation hearings that the legislature intended to limit the
court’s authority, and rather, the purpose of holding the hearing
before or during sentencing was to ensure procedural
efficiency. As such, nothing in the statute divested the trial
court of its jurisdiction simply because the required hearing did
not occur prior to or at sentencing.”
{¶25} For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit to Appellant’s
argument that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to conduct the
reclassification hearing after he had served his prison sentence and had been
released for approximately two years. As such, we hereby overrule the sole
assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Athens App. No. 16CA21 14
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that costs be
assessed to Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into
execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE
UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to
exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a
continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio
an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If
a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the
expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a
notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date
of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ______________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.