Lance v. Boldman

[Cite as Lance v. Boldman, 2018-Ohio-44.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WAYNE )
ROGER LANCE, et al. C.A. No. 16AP0032
Appellants
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
PEGGY BOLDMAN, et al. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO
Appellees CASE No. V-68303-10
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 8, 2018
CALLAHAN, Judge.
{¶1} Appellants, Roger Lance, Todd Lance, David Lance, Joel Lance, Gregory Lance,
Charles Lance, Gary Lance, and Melodie Kinzel (“the Complainants”)1 appeal the judgment of
the Wayne County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division which found Appellee, Peggy
Boldman, not guilty of concealing and/or embezzling the assets of the estate of Raymond Lance
(“the Estate”). For the reasons set forth below, this Court affirms in part and reverses in part.
I.
{¶2} Raymond Lance (“Uncle Bill”) never married and did not have any children. He,
however, had siblings, nieces, nephews, and great nieces. Ms. Boldman was one of Uncle Bill’s
nieces.
1
The notice of appeal indicated it was filed by the “Complainants” but failed to individually
identify which of the eight “Complainants” were bringing the appeal. Based on the wording of
the notice of appeal, it is deemed that all eight of the “Complainants” have filed the instant
appeal.
2
{¶3} Uncle Bill resided by himself on the family farm. Following a fall at home, Uncle
Bill was placed in a nursing home where he remained until his death. Prior to his admission to
the nursing home, Uncle Bill appointed Roger Lance as his attorney-in-fact. Despite this
appointment, Ms. Boldman was handling Uncle Bill’s financial affairs.
{¶4} Shortly after Uncle Bill’s admission to the nursing home, some of his family
members filed an application for a guardianship, which Ms. Boldman contested on Uncle Bill’s
behalf. Following a family meeting, it was agreed that Ms. Boldman would handle Uncle Bill’s
affairs, he would remain in the nursing home, and the guardianship application was withdrawn.
{¶5} Six months after his admission to the nursing home, Uncle Bill revoked the earlier
power of attorney appointing Roger Lance as his attorney-in-fact, and executed a general durable
power of attorney appointing Ms. Boldman and Mr. Johnson2 as his attorneys-in-fact. He also
executed a new will the same day.
{¶6} As his attorney-in-fact, Ms. Boldman assisted Uncle Bill with his finances. She
facilitated the payment of the nursing home invoices through long term care insurance, income
from social security and workers’ compensation, Uncle Bill’s own funds, and Medicaid. Prior to
Uncle Bill passing away, Ms. Boldman closed his checking account and used the funds to pay his
bills. The Complainants asserted that Ms. Boldman kept the monies from the insurance
proceeds, refunds from the nursing home, and the funds from the closed checking account for her
own use.
2
The Complainants agree that Mr. Johnson did not take any action under the general durable
power of attorney.
3
{¶7} Additionally, Ms. Boldman facilitated Uncle Bill’s directives to gift a guitar and
mandolin to his great nieces, Ms. Boldman’s daughters, J.W. and J.C. Upon Uncle Bill’s
placement in the nursing home, Ms. Boldman removed the guitar and mandolin from his home to
ensure they were not damaged or thrown out while the house was being cleaned. According to
Ms. Boldman and her daughters, during the preceding 20 years Uncle Bill had expressed to them
on various occasions his desire to give the guitar to J.W. and the mandolin to J.C., he was aware
that the guitar and mandolin were given to the great nieces, and he did not object.
{¶8} The eight Complainants filed a complaint against Ms. Boldman for concealing
and/or embezzling the assets of the Estate, challenged Uncle Bill’s competency to execute the
general durable power of attorney, and claimed Mr. Johnson failed to file an inventory. A
hearing was held on the complaint. Ms. Boldman, her daughters, J.W. and J.C., and Melodie
Kinzel, one of the Complainants, testified at the hearing.
{¶9} The probate court dismissed the claim against Mr. Johnson because an inventory
was filed subsequent to the complaint. Additionally, the probate court dismissed the claims of
Joel Lance, Gregory Lance, Charles Lance, and Gary Lance for failure to prosecute, and they do
not challenge that portion of the judgment. Accordingly, this Court declines to address the
assignments of error as they relate to these Appellants and the probate court’s dismissal of these
Appellants’ claims for failure to prosecute is affirmed.
{¶10} As to the claims of Roger Lance, Todd Lance, David Lance, and Melodie Kinzel
(“the Heirs”), the probate court found Uncle Bill competent to execute the power of attorney and
Ms. Boldman not guilty of concealing/embezzling the Estate’s assets. The Heirs have timely
appealed this judgment by asserting two assignments of error. To facilitate the analysis, this
Court will address the assignments of error out of order.
4
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE PROBATE COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE ESTATE []
BY ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF
[UNCLE BILL], THE DECEDENT.
{¶11} In the second assignment of error, the Heirs argue that the probate court erred
when it admitted certain testimony of Ms. Boldman and her two daughters, J.W. and J.C.,
regarding Uncle Bill’s statements as to his intention to gift the guitar to J.W. and the mandolin to
J.C. Specifically, they argue that the statements were hearsay and not subject to admission under
Evid.R. 804(B)(5). For the reasons that follow, this Court agrees.
{¶12} The decision to admit or exclude evidence lies in the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St. 3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, ¶ 79. Accord Drew v. Marino, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 21458, 2004-Ohio-1071, ¶ 8-9, 16 (abuse of discretion standard applied to
court’s exclusion of decedent’s statements under Evid.R. 804(B)(5)). “A trial court will be
found to have abused its discretion when its decision is contrary to law, unreasonable, not
supported by evidence, or grossly unsound.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Tustin v.
Tustin, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27164, 2015-Ohio-3454, ¶ 21.
{¶13} The first witness was Ms. Boldman and she was initially examined by the Heirs.
As to the guitar and mandolin, the Heirs limited their examination of Ms. Boldman to her and her
daughters’ possession of the musical instruments, their lack of payment for the instruments, and
the value of the instruments. The Heirs did not make any inquiry as to why Ms. Boldman and
her daughters possessed the instruments or Uncle Bill’s intentions as to the instruments.
{¶14} After the Heirs’ examination of Ms. Boldman she was questioned by her attorney.
With regard to the guitar and mandolin, Ms. Boldman’s attorney specifically asked her why she
5
gave the guitar and mandolin to her daughters, if Uncle Bill was aware of the gifting of the
instruments, what Uncle Bill’s intentions and wishes as to the disposition of the guitar and
mandolin were, and if his intentions ever changed. Ms. Boldman testified that “Uncle Bill had
always said, [J.W.] was the only one in the family that” he wanted to give the guitar to and it was
his intention to give J.C. the mandolin. According to Ms. Boldman’s testimony, Uncle Bill made
his intentions regarding these instruments known on different occasions during the 20 years
before his death and his intentions never changed. Ms. Boldman testified that Uncle Bill was
aware that the instruments had been given to his great nieces and he did not object.
{¶15} Ms. Boldman’s counsel asked similar questions to both of her daughters during
their examinations. Both of the daughters’ testimony mirrored Ms. Boldman’s testimony as to
Uncle Bill’s donative intent relative to the instruments.
{¶16} The Heirs repeatedly asserted hearsay objections to this line of questioning
directed to Ms. Boldman and her daughters. The probate court sustained the first objection, but
overruled the remaining objections. At the conclusion of Ms. Boldman’s examination by all of
the parties, the probate court clarified its position regarding her testimony concerning Uncle
Bill’s statements: “there were a series of objections to statements made by the deceased
regarding his intentions and as [the court] said, [it would] admit those and assign [the]
appropriate weight and [the court] believe[s] that falls within [Evid.R.] 804(B)(5).”
{¶17} In its decision, the probate court held that Ms. Boldman’s testimony regarding
Uncle Bill’s statements was admissible because the testimony was derived while she was on
cross-examination to rebut the assertion that she concealed assets. The probate court’s ruling,
however, is not supported by the law or the record.
6
{¶18} “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C).
“[S]tatements made by a decedent would fall under the general prohibition against hearsay.”
Mancz v. McHenry, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24728, 2012-Ohio-3285, ¶ 27.
{¶19} Hearsay statements are inadmissible except as otherwise provided in the Ohio
Rules of Evidence or other relevant constitutional or statutory provision. Evid.R. 802. One such
hearsay exception is found in Evid.R. 804(B)(5), the “[s]tatement by a deceased or incompetent
person” provision, which excepts from the hearsay rule admissions of the statements of one who
is now deceased. Evid.R. 804(B)(5) states as follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable
as a witness:
***
(5) Statement by a deceased or incompetent person. The statement was made by a
decedent * * *, where all of the following apply:
(a) the estate or personal representative of the decedent’s estate * * * is a party;
(b) the statement was made before the death * * *;
(c) the statement is offered to rebut testimony by an adverse party on a matter
within the knowledge of the decedent * * *.
{¶20} The purpose of Evid.R. 804(B)(5) is to benefit a decedent’s representative by
allowing the decedent to “‘speak from the grave’” and rebut testimony by an adverse party.
Murray v. Carano, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 17-COA-005, 2017-Ohio-8235, ¶ 23, quoting Bobko v.
Sagen, 61 Ohio App. 3d 397, 409 (8th Dist.1989), quoting Bilikam v. Bilikam, 2 Ohio App. 3d
300, 305 (10th Dist.1982). This hearsay exception, however, “is not intended to apply to the
party opposing the decedent[, but] [r]ather, it applies to the party substituted for the decedent.”
Bilikam at 305. “The above case law indicates that in proceedings brought pursuant to R.C.
2109.50, testimony of the decedent is considered hearsay and does not fall within the hearsay
exceptions set forth in Evid.R. 804(B)(5).” Mancz at ¶ 28.
7
{¶21} Ms. Boldman was before the probate court pursuant to a R.C. 2109.50 proceeding
as the respondent who was accused of concealing the Estate’s assets. Thus, Ms. Boldman was an
adverse party opposing the Estate and not a party representing the Estate. Contrary to Ms.
Boldman’s argument, she was not Uncle Bill’s representative because 1) she had resigned as the
executor of the Estate and 2) her authority under the power of attorney ended upon Uncle Bill’s
death. See Lessee of Wallace v. Saunders, 7 Ohio 173, 178 (1835); Bacon v. Donnet, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 21201, 2003-Ohio-1301, ¶ 28. Because Ms. Boldman was an adverse party and not
the Estate’s representative, the Evid.R. 804(B)(5) hearsay exception is not applicable to her
testimony regarding Uncle Bill’s statements. See Bilikam at 305.
{¶22} Moreover, Ms. Boldman, as an adverse party, offered Uncle Bill’s statements to
establish his donative intent and thereby to defend against the concealment claim. Ms.
Boldman’s purpose is inapposite to the hearsay exception, which only permits the Estate to offer
Uncle Bill’s statements to rebut the testimony of the adverse party to protect the Estate’s assets.
Because of the nature of a R.C. 2109.50 proceeding, Evid.R. 804(B)(5) does not apply. See
Mancz at ¶ 28. Accordingly, Ms. Boldman’s testimony about Uncle Bill’s statements regarding
his donative intent as to the guitar and mandolin constituted inadmissible hearsay.
{¶23} Additionally, the probate court classified Ms. Boldman’s testimony as being on
cross-examination and inferred she did not have any control over the line of questioning and was
compelled to answer the questions posed to her. The record and the law do not support such a
conclusion.
{¶24} In In re Estate of Fife, 164 Ohio St. 449 (1956), the Ohio Supreme Court
addressed the scope and form of a concealment proceeding. R.C. 2109.50 provides for a special
statutory proceeding to discover concealed assets of an estate. Id. at 453. A concealment
8
proceeding is classified as an inquisitional discovery proceeding. Id. at 453-454. Because it is a
discovery proceeding, the action does not proceed in the same fashion as an ordinary civil action
between two or more parties wherein there is a complaint and an answer. Id. at 454. Rather, a
concealment action notifies the probate court of alleged misconduct, upon which the court must
investigate the charge and make a finding of guilt or innocence based on the evidence presented.
Id. at 453-454; see R.C. 2109.50.
{¶25} The court conducts the required investigation by examining, under oath, the
respondent and any witnesses. R.C. 2109.50. The statute provides the court with the power to
compel the respondent by citation or other judicial order to appear before the tribunal to be
examined as to the matters alleged in the complaint. Id. Because it is the court that calls the
respondent to appear before it, it is the court that controls the examination of the respondent.
Fife at 454. However, the court may delegate the examination of the respondent to the attorneys.
Id. The respondent “is therefore in reality the witness of the court, and the character and extent of
[the respondent’s] examination rest largely in the court’s discretion.” (Internal citations omitted.)
Id. Further, because a concealment action is “a special remedy wherein the court cites the
suspected person to appear before it and is in control of [the] examination, * * * [R.C.] 2317.07,
[which] authoriz[es] as a matter of right the examination of an adverse party as if under cross-
examination, is not applicable.” (Emphasis deleted.) Id.
{¶26} In this case, the probate court deferred the examination of Ms. Boldman to
counsel. Ms. Boldman was examined first by the Heirs and then by her counsel. The line of
questioning eliciting Uncle Bill’s statements was posed by Ms. Boldman’s attorney, and not the
Heirs’ attorney. Despite the leading nature of the questions by Ms. Boldman’s attorney, she was
not in fact on cross-examination. See Fife at 455 (subject to the court’s discretion, cross-
9
examination of the respondent is conducted by either the complainant or the court). Because Ms.
Boldman was being questioned by her own attorney and she was not an adverse party, she and
her attorney were in control of the testimony being elicited. This line of questioning by Ms.
Boldman’s counsel induced the hearsay testimony by Ms. Boldman as to Uncle Bill’s statements.
{¶27} The Heirs objected each time Ms. Boldman’s attorney asked about Uncle Bill’s
statements and intent. The Heirs did not induce Ms. Boldman to provide this inadmissible
hearsay evidence and, therefore the Heirs’ hearsay objections should have been sustained.
Contra Murray, 2017-Ohio-8235, at ¶ 25-26, 29 (The appellate court affirmed the overruling of
the hearsay objection because the executor induced the respondent to provide the decedent’s
hearsay statement when the executor asked the respondent “[w]hy” she transferred the money to
her savings account.); Gorby v. Aberth, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28021, 2017-Ohio-274, ¶ 7-11
(Relying on the invited error doctrine, this Court affirmed the probate court’s use of hearsay
evidence because the beneficiaries induced the trustee and a financial advisor to provide the
decedent’s hearsay statements regarding the decedent’s concerns about his trust and who he
wanted as the trust’s financial advisor.).
{¶28} Additionally, because the Heirs did not induce the hearsay evidence, the probate
court lacked discretion to allow Ms. Boldman’s attorney to present her daughters’ hearsay
testimony regarding Uncle Bill’s donative intent as to the instruments in an attempt to bolster
Ms. Boldman’s earlier hearsay testimony. See contra Murray at ¶ 31 (Under the theory of
curative admissibility, the probate court had discretion to permit the respondent to offer
inadmissible hearsay evidence to rebut or explain the hearsay previously induced by the
executor.).
10
{¶29} Based on the foregoing, the probate court abused its discretion when it classified
Ms. Boldman’s testimony as being on cross-examination and admitted the inadmissible hearsay
evidence. The Heirs’ second assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE JUDGMENT OF THE PROBATE COURT HOLDING [MS.] BOLDMAN
NOT GUILTY OF CONCEALING AND/OR EMBEZZLING ASSETS OF THE
ESTATE [] IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶30} In the first assignment of error, the Heirs argue the probate court’s judgment that
Ms. Boldman was not guilty of concealing or embezzling the Estate’s assets is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, the Heirs challenge the probate court’s not guilty
finding as to the following Estate assets: the guitar, the mandolin, monies from a closed checking
account, various nursing home insurance checks and refunds, and a car insurance payment.
{¶31} R.C. 2109.50 allows any person “interested in the estate” to file in the county
probate court with jurisdiction over the estate a complaint seeking the return of any “moneys,
personal property, or choses in action,” believed to belong to the estate that the claimant suspects
to have been “concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away or of being or having been in the
possession of” the individual named in the complaint. The respondent is compelled to appear
before the probate court “to be examined, on oath, touching the matter of the complaint.” R.C.
2109.50. The probate court, either by jury or bench, must make a finding of guilty or not guilty
and, if guilty, assess damages or order the return of the property and impose sanctions, including
a ten percent penalty. R.C. 2109.52. Thus, these proceedings are quasi-criminal. Fife, 164 Ohio
St. at 453; see Ukrainiec v. Batz, 24 Ohio App. 3d 200, 202 (9th Dist.1982).
11
{¶32} This Court has held that
[t]he purpose of R.C. 2109.50 is to provide a speedy and effective method of
discovering assets belonging to the estate and securing their recovery. The statute
is not intended as a substitute for a civil action to collect a debt, obtain an
accounting, adjudicate rights under a contract or recover judgment for money
owing an executor or administrator.
(Internal citation omitted.) Wozniak v. Wozniak, 90 Ohio App. 3d 400, 407 (9th Dist.1993); see
Fife at 453 (“Its purpose is to facilitate the administration of estates by expeditiously bringing
into such estates those assets which rightfully belong there.”). Nor does the statute “involve the
litigation of a criminal act.” Wozniak at 411.
{¶33} While R.C. 2109.50 is a quasi-criminal special statutory proceeding, this type of
action is controlled by the laws governing civil proceedings in the probate court. Wozniak at
411. Thus, the complainant must prove the elements of a R.C. 2109.50 claim by a preponderance
of the evidence. Kasick v. Kobelak, 184 Ohio App. 3d 433, 2009-Ohio-5239, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.); see
Murray, 2017-Ohio-8235, at ¶ 36.
{¶34} Because of the quasi-criminal nature, “[w]rongful or culpable conduct on the part
of the person accused is an element of the offense, which must be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence.” Kaforey v. Burge, 9th Dist. Summit No. 17050, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2030, *6
(May 10, 1995), citing Ukrainiec at 202. Thus, the complainant must prove more than “mere
possession” of the estate assets. See Longworth v. Childers, 180 Ohio App. 3d 162, 2008-Ohio-
4927, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.); Ukrainiec, 24 Ohio App. 3d at 202. “[T]he inquiry under R.C. 2109.50
focuses on the ownership of the asset and whether possession of the asset is being impermissibly
concealed or withheld from the estate.” Wozniak at 407.
12
Transactions/gifts by an attorney-in-fact
{¶35} “A power of attorney is a written instrument authorizing an agent, known as an
‘attorney[-]in[-]fact,’ to perform specific acts on the principal’s behalf.” Rasnick v. Lenos, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2004-02-033, 2005-Ohio-2916, ¶ 20, citing Testa v. Roberts, 44 Ohio
App.3d 161, 164 (6th Dist.1988). The power of attorney creates a fiduciary relationship between
the attorney-in-fact and the principal. Bacon, 2003-Ohio-1301, ¶ 29, quoting In re Scott, 111
Ohio App. 3d 273, 276 (6th Dist.1996). In a fiduciary relationship a “‘special confidence and
trust is reposed in the integrity and fidelity of another and there is a resulting superiority or
influence, acquired by virtue of this special trust.’” Stone v. Davis, 66 Ohio St. 2d 74, 78 (1981),
quoting In re Termination of Emp. of Pratt, 40 Ohio St. 2d 107, 115 (1974). Thus, “[t]he law is
zealous in guarding against abuse of such a relationship.” Bacon at ¶ 30, citing Pratt at 115.
{¶36} A gift inter vivos is an immediate, voluntary, and gratuitous transfer of property
by a competent donor to another. Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio St. 108, 113 (1887). Generally,
property passed by inter vivos gift is not property of the estate and thus not subject to R.C.
2109.50. Goldberg v. Maloney, 111 Ohio St. 3d 211, 2006-Ohio-5485, ¶ 34. However, the Ohio
Supreme Court has recognized that “concealment actions under R.C. 2109.50 and 2109.52 could
be applicable to recover certain assets wrongfully concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away
before the creation of the estate.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 33. Thus, the “probate court has
jurisdiction over an action brought pursuant to R.C. 2109.50 to recover funds passed to a third
party by inter vivos transaction when the validity of the underlying transfer is challenged.” State
v. Harmon, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2016AP080042, 2017-Ohio-320, ¶ 20.
13
Analysis of R.C. 2109.50 claim
{¶37} The analysis of a R.C. 2109.50 claim begins with whether the complainant has
established a prima facie case of concealment by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re
Estate of Black, 145 Ohio St. 405, 412 (1945); Murray, 2017-Ohio-8235, at ¶ 36; Kasick, 184
Ohio App. 3d 433, 2009-Ohio-5239, at ¶ 13. If so, then, the respondent may rebut and overcome
the prima facie case of concealment by presenting clear and convincing evidence of “a present
intention on the part of the donor to make a gift” to the suspected person. Brooks v. Bell, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-970548, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1476, *13 (Apr. 10, 1998), citing Fife, 164
Ohio St. at 455-456. See Kaforey, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2030, at *6. In order to establish the
transfer of the asset as an inter vivos gift, the donee must prove: “‘(1) an intention on the part of
the donor to transfer the title and right of possession of the subject property; and (2) the delivery
of the property to the donee along with the relinquishment of ownership, dominion and control
over it.’” Kaforey at *7, quoting Maggio v. Maggio, 9th Dist. Medina No. 2283-M, 1994 Ohio
App. LEXIS 2724, *4 (June 22, 1994).
{¶38} With regard to the validity of gratuitous property transfers made in a fiduciary
relationship involving a power of attorney, “a general, durable power of attorney does not
authorize attorneys-in-fact to transfer the principal’s property to themselves or to others, unless
the power of attorney explicitly confers this power.” MacEwen v. Jordan, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
C-020431, 2003-Ohio-1547, ¶ 12. This rule applies to both transfers made to the attorney-in-fact
and gifts to third parties. See Estate of Short v. Ward (In re Blackburn), 4th Dist. Scioto No.
05CA3014, 2006-Ohio-406, ¶ 19. In the absence of such an express provision, the transfer of
property from a principal to an attorney-in-fact is regarded with suspicion that undue influence
may have been exerted upon the principal by the attorney-in-fact and is thereby presumptively
14
invalid. See Brooks at *12-13. See also Bacon, 2003-Ohio-1301, at ¶ 30, citing Studniewski v.
Kryzanowski, 65 Ohio App. 3d 628, 632 (6th Dist.1989). The attorney-in-fact bears the burden of
proof that the transfer was fair and there was no undue influence upon the principal. Testa, 44
Ohio App. 3d at 166; Bacon at ¶ 30, citing In re Scott, 111 Ohio App. 3d at 276.
{¶39} While the donee bears the burden of proving the validity of the transfer, “the party
attacking the gift retains the ultimate burden of proving undue influence by clear and convincing
evidence” on rebuttal. Brooks at *13-14. The elements of undue influence are: (1) a susceptible
party, (2) another’s opportunity to influence the susceptible party, (3) the actual or attempted
imposition of improper influence, and (4) a result showing the effect of the improper influence.
West v. Henry, 173 Ohio St. 498, 501 (1962).
{¶40} This Court has defined prima facie and clear and convincing evidence as follows:
Prima facie evidence * * * denotes evidence which will support, but not require, a
verdict in favor of the party offering the evidence. Clear and convincing evidence
is defined as that measure or degree of proof which * * * will produce in the mind
of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Kaforey, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2030, at *7. Clear
and convincing does not mean “clear and unequivocal.” (Emphasis sic.) Fife, 164 Ohio St. at
456.
{¶41} When reviewing the manifest weight of the evidence in a civil case, this Court
weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
[finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
(Citations and quotations omitted.) Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St. 3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶
20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App. 3d 103, 115 (9th Dist.2001). “In weighing the
evidence, however, we are always mindful of the presumption in favor of the trial court’s factual
15
findings. [T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily
for the trier of the facts.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) T.S. v. R.S., 9th Dist.
Summit No. 27955, 2017-Ohio-281, ¶ 4.
Guitar and Mandolin
{¶42} The Heirs argue that the power of attorney did not contain an express provision
granting Ms. Boldman the authority to make gifts to herself or others. This Court agrees.
Because Ms. Boldman was Uncle Bill’s attorney-in-fact, the gifting of the guitar and mandolin
were presumed invalid and she must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Uncle Bill
intended to gift the guitar to J.W. and the mandolin to J.C. and that the transfer of the instruments
was fair. See Brooks, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1476, at *13; Bacon, 2003-Ohio-1301, at ¶ 30.
{¶43} The power of attorney granted Ms. Boldman the authority “[t]o take possession of
and exercise control over any and all moneys, goods, chattels and effects and all other property []
belonging to [Uncle Bill] wheresoever found.” Ms. Boldman testified and her answers to the
requests for admission confirm that she removed the guitar and mandolin from Uncle Bill’s
home when it was being cleared out by the other family members and gave the instruments to her
daughters. Thus, Ms. Boldman initially “[took] possession of and exercise[d] control over” the
guitar and mandolin pursuant to the authority granted to her by the power of attorney.
{¶44} As to the subsequent gifting of the guitar and mandolin to J.W. and J.C., the Heirs
contend that “[Ms.] Boldman presented no evidence that [Uncle Bill] made a gift.” The Heirs
assert the self-serving statements of Ms. Boldman and her two daughters with respect to Uncle
Bill’s statements are inadmissible hearsay. Based on the analysis above, this Court agrees.
{¶45} The probate court held that “even if * * * the statements made to Ms. Boldman
[and her daughters] by the decedent constitute inadmissible hearsay, the evidence does support
16
the position that Ms. Boldman gave [her daughters] the instruments with the intention of carrying
out the wishes of the decedent.” The probate court, however, did not identify any of the
evidence that it relied upon to support its conclusion. While this Court agrees with the probate
court that Uncle Bill retained the power to gift these instruments, a review of the hearing
transcript and the admitted exhibits do not reflect any evidence beyond the inadmissible hearsay
evidence offered by Ms. Boldman and her daughters as to Uncle Bill’s donative intent.
Accordingly, Ms. Boldman has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
Uncle Bill intended to gift the guitar to J.W. and the mandolin to J.C. and that the transfer of the
instruments was fair.
Checking Account
{¶46} The Heirs argue that Ms. Boldman closed Uncle Bill’s checking account and kept
the balance of $665.88. Because Ms. Boldman does not have any written records to support the
disbursement of the $665.88, the Heirs allege without further support, that Ms. Boldman
concealed and/or embezzled the funds for her own use.
{¶47} Ms. Boldman testified that she did not keep the funds for her own personal use,
and instead used the funds from the closed checking account to pay Uncle’s Bill’s outstanding
debts, such as the nursing home and credit cards. Additionally, Uncle Bill received funds for his
own spending needs. While Ms. Boldman did not produce receipts or records of these debt
payments and the money provided directly to Uncle Bill, she was able to testify as to what debts
were paid. The Heirs, however, were unable to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Ms. Boldman kept the money from Uncle Bill’s closed checking account for herself.
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Insurance Checks and Nursing Home Refunds
{¶48} The Heirs allege that while Uncle Bill was a resident at the nursing home, Ms.
Boldman received a total of $22,826.85 in checks from AF&L Insurance Co. made payable to
Uncle Bill, but she only applied $9,572.00 of those insurance funds to the payment of the nursing
home costs. Thus, the Heirs assert Ms. Boldman has kept the remaining $13,254.85 in insurance
proceeds for her own use. Because Ms. Boldman does not have any written records to support
the disbursement of the $13,254.85, the Heirs allege without further support, that Ms. Boldman
concealed and/or embezzled the funds for her own use.
{¶49} The Heirs contend that Ms. Boldman deposited the insurance checks, including
one in the amount of $13,718.85, directly into her checking account, but only paid $9,572.00 to
the nursing home. As to this insurance check, the Heirs argue that the “balance [of] $4,146.85
was not accounted for” from an insurance check issued by AF&L Insurance Co. While the Heirs
have made two separate arguments on appeal regarding the insurance proceeds, the record
reflects the $4,146.85 alleged to have been embezzled/concealed is included in the total amount
of $13,254.85.
{¶50} The Heirs also complain that Ms. Boldman did not deposit the insurance checks
into Uncle Bill’s checking account. Ms. Boldman testified that Uncle Bill’s checking account
had been closed because his income from social security and workers’ compensation was being
sent directly to the nursing home and there was no need for a checking account.
{¶51} Further, Ms. Boldman testified that upon closing Uncle Bill’s checking account
she deposited Uncle Bill’s funds into her own bank account and wrote checks to pay Uncle Bill’s
debts. Ms. Boldman testified that she used the insurance proceeds to pay Uncle Bill’s nursing
home costs. Ms. Boldman asserted that whenever she received an invoice from the nursing
18
home she would pay it immediately to ensure Uncle Bill’s continued occupancy at the nursing
home.
{¶52} The Heirs concede the nursing home invoices were paid in full and in fact, were
overpaid resulting in refunds. The Heirs allege Ms. Boldman, in her capacity as the attorney-in-
fact and first executor of the Estate, “[was] the only person that could have received the refunds
totaling $2,315.49” from the nursing home and that she has concealed these refunds.
{¶53} Ms. Boldman also testified that the insurance monies were used to pay Uncle
Bill’s extensive credit card debt. Ms. Kinzel confirmed that Ms. Boldman paid over $10,000 of
Uncle Bill’s credit card debt. Ms. Boldman affirmed that she did not keep any of the insurance
money for herself.
{¶54} The Heirs attempted to show that Ms. Boldman converted Uncle Bill’s funds to
pay off his car and then gave the car to her daughter, J.C. However, Ms. Boldman testified that
she used her own credit card to loan her daughter the funds to pay off Uncle Bill’s car.
Additionally, when asked if she used Uncle Bill’s money to pay for an addition to her home, Ms.
Boldman testified that the addition to her home was completed 20 years earlier and the garage
was completed five years before she was appointed as the power of attorney.
{¶55} Accordingly, the Heirs were unable to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that Ms. Boldman kept the money from the insurance proceeds and nursing home refunds for
herself.
1999 Buick Car Insurance Payment
{¶56} In addition to the arguments above, the Heirs argue, for the first time on appeal,
that Ms. Boldman should have been found guilty because she paid $72.58 for car insurance on
the 1999 Buick while it was being used by her daughter, J.C. While evidence was presented at
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the hearing as to this issue, the Heirs did not include any arguments or request relief on this basis
in their written closing argument and memorandum of law. Despite Ms. Boldman bringing this
to the Heirs’ attention, they did not seek leave to add any argument regarding Uncle Bill’s car in
their reply to Ms. Boldman’s written closing argument.
{¶57} “Generally, an issue need not be considered on appeal when it was apparent at the
time of trial but not raised.” Bauer v. Georgeff, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APE03-313, 1998
Ohio App. LEXIS 4144, *25 (Sept. 1, 1998) (Plaintiff was found to have waived punitive
damages on her malpractice claim because she did not request punitive damages on that claim at
trial despite the presentation of such evidence.). Because this instance of alleged concealment
and/or embezzlement was apparent during the hearing but not raised in the Heirs’ written closing
argument, this argument is waived and this Court will not consider this issue for the first time on
appeal. See id; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Burden, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27104, 2014-
Ohio-2746, ¶ 12 (“Arguments that were not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.”). See also Gregory v. Martin, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 15 JE 17, 2016-Ohio-650,
¶ 22 (trial court did not err in failing to award a specific damage when such damage had not been
requested).
Conclusion
{¶58} Upon review of the record and deferring to the probate court as to issues of
witness credibility and the weight to be given to the evidence, this Court cannot say that the
probate court’s finding that Ms. Boldman was not guilty of concealing and/or embezzling assets
of the Estate was against the manifest weight of the evidence as it pertains to the checking
account funds, insurance proceeds, and nursing home refunds. The Heirs’ first assignment of
error is overruled as to those Estate assets.
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{¶59} However, with respect to the guitar and the mandolin, the probate court’s finding
that Ms. Boldman was not guilty of concealing and/or embezzling assets of the Estate was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Heirs’ first assignment of error is sustained as
to those Estate assets.
III.
{¶60} The first assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part, and the
second assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Wayne County Common Pleas
Court, Probate Division is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed equally to between Appellants and Appellee Peggy Boldman.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
FOR THE COURT
SCHAFER, P. J.
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
CHARLES A. KENNEDY, Attorney at Law, for Appellants.
CRAIG R. REYNOLDS, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
DANIEL J. HOSTETLER, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.