In re Adoption of C.N.A.

[Cite as In re Adoption of C.N.A., 2018-Ohio-897.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY
IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF:
CASE NO. 17-17-20
C.N.A.
OPINION
[BRENT L. ANDERSON - APPELLANT]
Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court
Probate Division
Trial Court No. 2017 ADP 00005
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 12, 2018
APPEARANCES:
Jay M. Lopez for Appellant
Jeremy M. Tomb for Appellee
Case No. 17-17-20
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Petitioner-appellant, Brent L. Anderson (“Brent”), appeals the
September 18, 2017 decision of the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas, Probate
Division, concluding that the consent of respondent-appellee, Nathaniel T. Parker
(“Nathaniel”), to Brent’s petition to adopt C.N.A. is necessary. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
{¶2} C.N.A. was born in March 2011 to Nathaniel and Amanda Sue Brooks
Anderson (“Amanda”). (Doc. No. 1). After Amanda and Brent were married in
2015, Brent filed a petition to adopt C.N.A. on February 21, 2017. (Id.). In his
petition, Brent asserted that Nathaniel’s consent to the adoption is not necessary
because: (1) Nathaniel “failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de
minimis contact with the minor for a period of at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the adoption petition”; and (2) Nathaniel “failed without
justifiable cause to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as required
by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the
filing of the adoption petition.” (Id.). Also on February 21, 2017, Amanda filed her
consent to Brent’s adoption of C.N.A. (Doc. No. 3). Brent filed an amended
petition to adopt C.N.A. on March 13, 2017. (Doc. No. 5).
{¶3} On April 10, 2017, Nathaniel filed a motion “to stay this matter pending
a determination from the Juvenile Court regarding [his] Motion to Establish Parental
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Rights and Responsibilities, Motion for Interim Parenting Time, and Motion for
Shared Parenting, or in the alternative, Parenting Time. (Doc. No. 9). Brent filed
his memorandum in opposition to Nathaniel’s motion to stay the adoption
proceeding on April 28, 2017. (Doc. No. 13). After a hearing on May 22, 2017, the
trial court the next day denied Nathaniel’s motion to stay the adoption proceeding.
(Doc. No. 20).
{¶4} After hearings on July 27 and August 3, 2017, the trial court filed on
September 17, 2017 its judgment entry that is the subject of this appeal. (Doc. No.
32). In it, the trial court concluded that Nathaniel’s consent is required because
Brent failed to prove that Nathaniel “failed without justifiable cause to provide more
than de minimis contact with the child” and “failed to provide for the maintenance
and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least
one year immediately preceding either [sic] the filing of the adopting petition.”
(Id.).
{¶5} Brent filed a notice of appeal on October 2, 2017. (Doc. No. 33). He
raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred and acted contrary to law when it
determined that Appellee, Nathaniel Parker’s, consent was
necessary for the step-parent adoption.
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{¶6} In his assignment of error, Brent argues that the trial court erred by
concluding that Nathaniel’s consent to Brent’s adoption of C.N.A. is necessary. In
particular, Brent argues that the trial court erred by concluding that he failed to prove
that Nathaniel failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis
contact with C.N.A. Brent also argues that the trial court erred by concluding that
he failed to prove that Nathaniel failed to provide for the maintenance and support
of C.N.A. as required by law or judicial decree during the year immediately
preceding the date on which Brent filed his petition to adopt C.N.A.
{¶7} “‘Ordinarily, the written consent of a minor child’s natural parents is
required prior to adoption, but R.C. 3107.07 provides exceptions to this
requirement.’” In re Adoption of H.R., 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-15, 2014-Ohio-
5390, ¶ 23, quoting In re Adoption of K.C., 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-03, 2014-Ohio-
3985, ¶ 20. Specifically, R.C. 3107.07 states:
Consent to adoption is not required of any of the following:
(A) A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption petition
and the court, after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable
cause to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor or to
provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by
law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately
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preceding either the filing of the adoption petition or the placement of
the minor in the home of the petitioner.
R.C. 3107.07(A). “‘R.C. 3107.07(A) is written in the disjunctive.’” In re Adoption
of H.R. at ¶ 23, quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 21. “‘Therefore, a failure without
justifiable cause to provide either more than de minimis contact with the minor or
maintenance and support for the one-year time period is sufficient to obviate the
need for a parent’s consent.’” (Emphasis sic.) Id., quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at
¶ 21, citing In re Adoption of A.H., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010312, 2013-Ohio-
1600, ¶ 9.
{¶8} “Because cases such as this one may involve the termination of
fundamental parental rights, the party petitioning for adoption has the burden of
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent failed to provide more
than de minimis contact with the minor or failed to provide for the maintenance and
support of the minor during the requisite one-year period and that there was no
justifiable cause for the failure.” Id. at ¶ 24, citing In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 24,
citing In re R.L.H., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25734, 2013-Ohio-3462, ¶ 9. “‘“Once
the petitioner has established this failure, the burden of going forward shifts to the
parent to show some facially justifiable cause for the failure. * * * The burden of
proof, however, remains with the petitioner.”’” Id., quoting In re R.L.H. at ¶ 9,
quoting In re A.N.B., 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2012-04-006, 2012-Ohio-3880, ¶ 10.
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Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof
which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not
to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable
doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.”
Id., quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the
syllabus, and citing In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 24.
{¶9} “‘The Supreme Court of Ohio has articulated a two-step analysis for
probate courts to employ when applying R.C. 3107.07(A).’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting In
re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, citing In re Adoption of M.B., 131 Ohio St. 3d 186, 2012-
Ohio-236, ¶ 23. “The first step involves deciding a factual question—in this case,
whether the parent failed to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor
or failed to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor for a period of at
least one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition.” Id., citing
In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, citing In re R.L.H. at ¶ 12, citing In re Adoption of
M.B. at ¶ 23. See also In re Adoption of S.J.M.H., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130683,
2014-Ohio-3565, ¶ 29. “‘“A trial court has discretion to make these determinations,
and in connection with the first step of the analysis, an appellate court applies an
abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a probate court decision * * *.”’” Id.,
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quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, quoting In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 25. See
also In re Adoption of S.J.M.H. at ¶ 29. “In the second step of the analysis, if a
probate court finds the parent failed to provide more than de minimis contact or
failed to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor, the court then
determines ‘whether justifiable cause for the failure has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence.’” Id., quoting In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 23. See also In re
Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23. “‘A probate court’s decision on whether justifiable cause
exists will not be disturbed on appeal unless the determination is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.’” Id., quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, citing
In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 24 and In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St. 3d 163 (1986),
paragraph two of the syllabus.
In determining whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, we must review the entire record, weigh the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility and
determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of
fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that there must be a reversal of the judgment and an order for
a new trial.
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In re Adoption of N.T.R., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-589, 2017-Ohio-265, ¶ 11,
citing In re Adoption of E.E.R.K., 2d Dist. Miami No. 2013 CA 35, 2014-Ohio-
1276, ¶ 18.
{¶10} As an initial matter, we must address Brent’s failure to comply with
the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure by omitting any argument illustrating the
reasons in support of his challenge to the trial court’s decision. “[A]n appellate
court may disregard an assignment of error pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2): ‘if the
party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of
error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief, as required
under App.R. 16(A).’” Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91412,
2009-Ohio-3456, ¶ 4, quoting App.R. 12(A); Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St. 3d 157,
159 (1988). App.R. 16(A)(7) requires that Brent include in his brief: “An argument
containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error
presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies. The
argument may be preceded by a summary.” “‘It is not the duty of an appellate court
to search the record for evidence to support an appellant’s argument as to any
alleged error.’” Rodriguez at ¶ 7, quoting State v. McGuire, 12th Dist. Preble No.
CA95-01-001, 1996 WL 174609, *14 (Apr. 15, 1996). “An appellate court is not a
performing bear, required to dance to each and every tune played on an appeal.” Id.,
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citing State v. Watson, 126 Ohio App. 3d 316, 321 (12th Dist.1998) and McGuire at
*14.
{¶11} Brent failed to make any argument as to how the trial court specifically
erred in concluding that he failed to prove that Nathaniel failed without justifiable
cause to provide more than de minimis contact with C.N.A. and that Nathaniel failed
to provide for the maintenance and support of C.N.A. Rather, Brent appears to
imply that this court should conduct a de novo review of his statement of facts and
decide the case in his favor. That does not comport with Ohio’s system of appellate
review.
{¶12} Applying the appropriate standard of review, we begin by addressing
whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Brent failed to prove that
Nathaniel failed to provide more than de minimis contact with C.N.A. In making
that finding, the trial court stated, “The record is replete with instances of
[Nathaniel] communicating or attempting to communicate with the child over the
last year or more, including making direct contact by attending the child’s sporting
events.” (Doc. No. 32).
{¶13} As this court has previously discussed, “‘[t]he Legislature amended
the statute to require a finding that the parent failed to “provide more than de
minimis contact” with the minor child for a period of one year.’” In re Adoption of
H.R., 2014-Ohio-5390, at ¶ 32, quoting In re Adoption of K.C., 2014-Ohio-3985, at
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¶ 22. “‘The prior version of the statute required a finding that the parent failed to
“communicate” with the minor child for a period of one year.’” Id., quoting In re
Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 22. “‘“By changing the standard from ‘communicate,’ which
could imply a single contact, to ‘more than de minimis contact,’ which seems to
imply more than a single contact, the Legislature indicated its intent to require more
effort from the parent to have contact and communication with the child.”’” Id.,
quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 22, quoting In re J.D.T., 7th Dist. Harrison No.
11 HA 10, 2012-Ohio-4537, ¶ 9.
{¶14} Based on our review of the record, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Brent failed to prove that Nathaniel failed to have more
than de minimis contact with C.N.A. Nathaniel testified that he attended C.N.A.’s
wrestling meet in January 2017. (July 27, 2017 Tr. at 17-18). Nathaniel “talked to
[C.N.A.] throughout the entire meet in between matches” when C.N.A. would
“come up, sit with [Nathaniel] in the stands and then after the meet, [Nathaniel]
talked to him for about forty minutes.” (Id. at 18). Nathaniel also testified that he
had four phone conversations with C.N.A. between February 21, 2016 and February
21, 2017. (Id. at 19). In addition, Nathaniel Skyped with C.N.A. when C.N.A.
visited Nathaniel’s parents. (Id. at 20-21). Further, Nathaniel testified that he
consulted an attorney in June 2016 “regarding custody and visitation” with C.N.A.
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(Id. at 38). Nathaniel then relocated to Ohio from Texas in December 2016 “to be
with [C.N.A.]” (Id. at 37-38).
{¶15} On appeal, Brent offers no authority contradicting the trial court’s
conclusion that Nathaniel’s conduct constituted more than de minimis contact.
Instead, Brent urges this court to reach the conclusion of the trial court in In re
Adoption of K.C. that the father failed to provide more than de minimis contact with
K.C. because he “failed to seize upon various opportunities to facility [sic] his
contact with K.C.” (Appellant’s Brief at 10). See In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 17. In
re Adoption of K.C. is entirely distinguishable from the facts of this case. In this
case, unlike In re Adoption of K.C., the trial court concluded that Brent failed to
meet his burden of proving that Nathaniel failed to have more than de minimis
contact with C.N.A. Accordingly, Brent’s argument is erroneous with respect to the
appellate review of a trial court’s de minimis contact determination under R.C.
3107.07(A). That is, it is the job of an appellate court to review the trial court’s de
minimis contact determination for an abuse of discretion, not to replace the trial
court’s decision with its own.
{¶16} We conclude Nathaniel made more than de minimis effort to have
contact with C.N.A. Stated another way, the record reflects that Nathaniel made
more than a minimal effort to contact C.N.A. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that Brent failed to prove that Nathaniel failed to have
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more than de minimis contact with C.N.A. for the one-year period preceding Brent’s
petition for adoption.
{¶17} Further, the trial court’s alternative conclusion that any failure by
Nathaniel to provide more than de minimis contact with C.N.A. was also justified
is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. “‘“Ohio courts have held that
justification of a parent’s failure to communicate with his or her child is shown when
there has been ‘significant interference’ with a parent’s communication with a child
or ‘significant discouragement’ of such communication.”’” In re J.P.E., 11th Dist.
Trumbull No. 2016-T-0113, 2017-Ohio-1108, ¶ 17, quoting In re M.E.M., 11th
Lake No. 2010-L-020, 2010-Ohio-4430, ¶ 29, quoting In re Kr.E., 9th Dist. Lorain
No. 06CA008891, 2006-Ohio-4815, ¶ 21, citing In re Holcomb, 18 Ohio St. 3d 361
(1985), paragraph three of the syllabus. “In determining whether a natural parent’s
failure to have more than de minimis contact was justified, the central question is
whether there was a significant interference with visitation and communication and
not whether it was possible for the natural parent to have done more to overcome
the interference with visitation and communication.” Id. at ¶ 26, citing In re S.B.D.,
2d Dist. Miami No. 2006-CA-25, 2006-Ohio-5133, ¶ 37.
{¶18} The trial court concluded that Amanda “elected to take a number of
actions to limit access to or communication with her or [C.N.A.]”—that is,
Amanda’s “conduct was admittedly and intentionally designed to make
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[Nathaniel’s] contact with [C.N.A.] more difficult.” (Doc. No. 32). Again, Brent
makes no argument as to how the trial court’s alternative conclusion is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Based on our review of the record, we conclude
that the trial court’s alternative conclusion is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Stated differently, we conclude that the weight of the evidence supports
the conclusion that Amanda significantly interfered with Nathaniel’s visitation and
communication with C.N.A. Compare In re J.P.E. at ¶ 32.
{¶19} Nathaniel testified that he placed “a hundred and ten phone calls”
between February 21, 2016 and February 21, 2017 to contact C.N.A. (July 27, 2017
Tr. at 19). According to Nathaniel, “out of the hundred and then [sic] phone calls
during that time period, [Amanda] answered the phone one time and called
[Nathaniel] back four other times * * * where [he] would’ve spoke to [C.N.A.]”
(Id.). He testified that Amanda eventually “blocked [his] number in June” 2016 to
prevent him from contacting C.N.A. (Id.). Nathaniel testified that Amanda
informed Nathaniel’s parents “that they weren’t allowed to have anything other than
supervised visits” after Amanda learned that Nathaniel’s parents were permitting
C.N.A. to Skype with Nathaniel. (Id. at 21). Nathaniel also testified that he
purchased a plane ticket “for Easter to come up and see [C.N.A.] for Easter [and to]
take him to the zoo” but Amanda “just ignored” Nathaniel and did not permit him
to see C.N.A. (Id. at 37).
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{¶20} Amanda testified that, other than the wrestling meet, Nathaniel did
“not ha[ve] any other contact” with C.N.A. (Id. at 49). However, she testified that
“[t]here would have been one phone conversation in March of 2016. It was right
before [C.N.A.’s] birthday” but that “it was not the best conversation that he had
with [C.N.A.] because he would try to cut jabs.” (Id. at 50).
{¶21} Amanda testified that she blocked Nathaniel in June 2016 from being
able to call her because Nathaniel was being “derogatory through phone
conversations” and because Nathaniel “had [] an argument * * * with Brent.” (Id.
at 56). In particular, she testified that Nathaniel threatened her in December 2015
when he stated to her “[t]hat he [did] not want[] to move to Ohio in fear that he
would want to slit [her] throat.” (Id. at 52). According to Amanda, she sought
“legal advice through an attorney” but was advised “not to [] file anything” since
Nathaniel lived in Texas at the time. (Id. at 53-54). However, Amanda admitted
that she continued to communicate with Nathaniel after that incident. (Id. at 54).
After Amanda blocked Nathaniel from being able to call her, she communicated
with Nathaniel through Facebook Messenger. (Id. at 56-57). Amanda testified that
she did not permit C.N.A. to communicate with Nathaniel over the phone or through
Facebook Messenger because of Nathaniel’s December 2015 threats and “the * * *
comments that he had made in June.” (Id. at 57, 62).
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{¶22} On cross-examination, Amanda testified that she did not permit
C.N.A. to Skype with Nathaniel despite Nathaniel’s request to Skype with C.N.A.
(Id. at 66-69). She admitted that she did not respond to Nathaniel’s request to see
C.N.A. when Nathaniel was in Ohio. (Id. at 92-93). Amanda also testified that
Nathaniel came to her residence in January 2017 to see C.N.A. but she instructed
him “[t]o stay off [her] property.” (Id. at 100-102). (See also Aug. 3, 2017 Tr. at
61-62). Amanda admitted that she did not respond to Nathaniel’s inquiry about the
date and location of C.N.A.’s wrestling meet; however, Nathaniel “on his own went
and found that schedule” and showed up to C.N.A.’s wresting meet. (July 27, 2017
Tr. at 105). After Nathaniel showed up at C.N.A.’s wrestling meet, Amanda did not
take C.N.A. to his three remaining wrestling meets that season. (Id.).
{¶23} Nathaniel denied that he threatened Amanda. (Id. at 45); (Aug. 3, 2017
Tr. at 59). According to Nathaniel, after Amanda alleged that he threatened her,
they had “a ton of conversations after that. She, she called [him] and texted [him],
[they] have texts about her * * * miscarriages, her problems with Brent, this and
that, * * * so [he doesn’t] understand how she * * * didn’t cut contact off after [the
alleged threat].” (July 27, 2017 Tr. at 45). Rather, Amanda “didn’t cut contact off
until after [C.N.A.’s] last birthday conversation.” (Id.).
{¶24} The trial court found Amanda’s explanation for blocking Nathaniel’s
communication to be disingenuous. Indeed, Amanda’s explanation is ultimately a
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credibility determination, which is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. “‘A
trial court is “free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness who
appears before it.”’” In re Adoption of K.C., 2014-Ohio-3985, at ¶ 26, quoting In
re Adoption of M.C., 4th Dist. Jackson No. 11CA5, 2011-Ohio-6527, ¶ 19, quoting
Rogers v. Hill, 124 Ohio App. 3d 468, 470 (4th Dist.1998). See also In re J.P.E.,
2017-Ohio-1108, at ¶ 39 (“The trial judge was in the best position to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and was entitled to believe the testimony of appellee and
Mr. Grifa over Brent Erb.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence supporting
that Amanda significantly interfered with Nathaniel’s communication and visitation
with C.N.A. is weightier than the evidence that she did not. As such, the trial court’s
alternative conclusion that any failure by Nathaniel to provide more than de minimis
contact with C.N.A. was justified is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶25} Finally, Brent challenges the trial court’s conclusion that he failed to
prove that Nathaniel failed to provide for the maintenance and support of C.N.A.
for the one-year period preceding Brent’s petition for adoption. Again, Brent makes
no argument as to how the trial court abused its discretion in making that conclusion.
{¶26} The Supreme Court of Ohio defined “the maintenance and support
required by R.C. 3107.07(A) [as] that which is specifically ‘required by law or
judicial decree.’” In re Adoption of M.B., 131 Ohio St. 3d 186, 2012-Ohio-236, at ¶
20. Under Ohio law, “[t]he biological or adoptive parent of a minor child must
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support the parent’s minor children out of the parent’s property or by the parent’s
labor.” R.C. 3103.03(A). “‘Such duty of support is not dependent upon the
presence or absence of court orders for support.’” In re Adoption of K.L.M., 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-118, 2015-Ohio-3154, ¶ 12, quoting In re Adoption of
B.M.S., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-236, 2007-Ohio-5966, ¶ 23, citing Nokes v.
Nokes, 47 Ohio St. 2d 1, 5 (1976). “‘[A] parent of a minor, has the common-law
duty of support as well as a duty of support decreed by court. The judicial decree
of support simply incorporates the common-law duty of support.’” Id., quoting In
re Adoption of McDermitt, 63 Ohio St. 2d 301, 305 (1980).
{¶27} “Maintenance and support, in the adoption context, do not simply refer
to child support payments or other monetary contributions.” Id. at ¶ 15, citing In re
Adoption of McNutt, 134 Ohio App. 3d 822, 829 (4th Dist.1999). “Maintenance and
support, ‘may mean any type of aid to feed, clothe, shelter, or educate the child;
provide for health, recreation, travel expenses; or provide for any other need of the
child. * * * Supplying shoes, diapers, or any other clothing can constitute support
and maintenance.’” Id., quoting In re Adoptions of Groh, 153 Ohio App. 3d 414,
2003-Ohio-3087, ¶ 20 (7th Dist.2003), citing In re Adoption of McNutt at 830. “De
minimis monetary gifts from a biological parent to a minor child do not constitute
maintenance and support, because they are not payments as required by law or
judicial decree as R.C. 3107.07(A) requires.” In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 20.
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{¶28} The trial court concluded that (1) “[t]here is no judicial order for
support” because Amanda “elected to make no application for support” and (2)
Amanda and Nathaniel “are co-owners of a certain piece of rental real estate and
that, during the applicable period in question, she has been receiving the full rental
payment for the property” as “support for [C.N.A.]” (Doc. No. 32). The record
supports the trial court’s findings.
{¶29} Indeed, the parties testified that Nathaniel provided money to Amanda
to purchase homes in Springfield, Ohio for use as rental properties to generate
income for Amanda while Nathaniel was in prison. (July 27, 2017 Tr. at 31, 77-
79); (Aug. 3, 2017 Tr. at 45-51). The parties testified that the rental income was
used as support for C.N.A. (July 27, 2017 Tr. at 31-32); (Aug. 3, 2017 Tr. at 51,
54, 62-63). (See also July 27, 2017 Tr. at 81). That evidence alone demonstrates
that Nathaniel provided for the maintenance and support of C.N.A. as required by
law. See In re Adoption of McNutt at 829-830 (“Moreover, a ‘meager’ amount of
support is sufficient to avoid a finding that the parent’s consent is not required.”),
citing In re Bryant, 4th Dist. Washington No. 97CA635, 1997 WL 766460, *6 (Dec.
9, 1997), Celestino v. Schneider, 84 Ohio App. 3d 192, 197 (6th Dist.1992) (“father’s
payment of $36 to CSEA precluded a finding of failure to provide maintenance and
support”), Vecchi v. Thomas, 67 Ohio App. 3d 688, 691 (2d Dist.1990) (“father’s
payment of $130 to CSEA precluded a finding of failure to provide maintenance
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and support”), In re Adoption of Salisbury, 5 Ohio App. 3d 65, 67 (10th Dist.1982);
In re Adoption of Dea, 11th Dist. Lake No. 92-L-120, 1994 WL 102390, *2 (Mar.
25, 1994), and In re Adoption of Mills, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA93-04-036, 1993
WL 430473, *2 (Oct. 25, 1993). See also In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 26.
{¶30} Moreover, Nathaniel testified that he
offered to give [Amanda] money, * * * and every time [he made] any
kind of offer, * * * it was met with we don’t need it. But there was
multiple offers made for soccer cletes [sic], for Halloween costumes,
* * * there was multiple offers.
(July 27, 2017 Tr. at 36). (See also Aug. 3, 2017 Tr. at 55-56, 60). Amanda admitted
that Nathaniel offered to buy shoes and offered to pay for school for C.N.A. (July
27, 2017 Tr. at 57, 71, 97). (See also July 27, 2017 Tr. at 91-92).
{¶31} The above evidence demonstrates that Nathaniel “made a financial
contribution that comports with the requirements of R.C. 3107.07(A) to contribute
maintenance and support” for C.N.A. In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 23. Therefore,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Brent failed to prove
that Nathaniel failed to provide for the maintenance and support of C.N.A. for the
one-year period preceding Brent’s petition for adoption.
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{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in
concluding that Nathaniel’s consent to Brent’s adoption of C.N.A. is required under
R.C. 3107.07(A).
{¶33} Brent’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶34} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
/jlr
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