State v. Harris

[Cite as State v. Harris, 2018-Ohio-1329.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 17CA011109
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
LEONDRE HARRIS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 16CR094756
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: April 9, 2018
TEODOSIO, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Leondre Harris, appeals from his convictions for kidnapping and
abduction in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} One night in August of 2016, Mr. Harris and his girlfriend (“A.W.”) were staying
at the Days Inn in Elyria to celebrate their friend’s birthday. There was testimony at trial from
several witnesses that Mr. Harris repeatedly referred to A.W. throughout the evening as his wife
and noted that she was pregnant. A group of six workers from Indiana were also staying at the
same hotel that night in two separate rooms, and they left their rooms “latched open” so they
could enter and exit each room freely without being locked out. At one point, A.W. accidentally
walked into one of the workers’ rooms. She apologized, but asked if they wanted to share her
bottle of vodka. They politely declined and she left.
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{¶3} Later, some of the workers talked to Mr. Harris and A.W. in the parking lot while
smoking and drinking together. Mr. Harris and A.W. soon began to bicker and argue with each
other, and Mr. Harris got in his car to leave. A.W. attempted to get into the car as well, but Mr.
Harris locked the doors and drove off without her. At some point, A.W. also left the parking lot
by herself.
{¶4} Mr. Harris later returned to the hotel, confronted some workers in the parking lot,
and demanded their room key so he could make sure A.W. was not in their room. The workers
refused to hand over their room key and Mr. Harris left the area again. The workers encountered
A.W. again and she appeared to be shaken, scared, and concerned for her safety. The men
allowed her to stay in one of their rooms to keep her safe and calm while she called friends for a
ride and a place to stay.
{¶5} Mr. Harris returned to the hotel once again and knocked on both of the workers’
hotel doors, demanding that A.W. come outside. In the second room, the workers and A.W. all
remained silent and did not open the door, but instead called 911. Mr. Harris began either
banging loudly on the door or trying to kick it in, but he also decided to call 911. The police
soon arrived, spoke to everyone involved, and de-escalated the situation. They determined that
A.W. wished to stay with the workers and did not want to be with Mr. Harris. Mr. Harris
apparently left the area once the police told him he was no longer welcome at the Days Inn that
night.
{¶6} After the police left, about a half hour passed before Mr. Harris came back to the
hotel with more friends. Mr. Harris encountered A.W. somewhere in the hotel, and forcefully
pulled her out of the hotel and into a parked minivan. Some of the workers witnessed Mr. Harris
“dragging” A.W. down the hallway. One of the workers called 911 again, while some of the
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other men went out to the parking lot and were able to free A.W. from the minivan. The police
soon arrived and Mr. Harris was arrested.
{¶7} Mr. Harris waived his right to a jury trial and instead proceeded to a bench trial in
this matter. Based on the lack of evidence presented regarding whether Mr. Harris actually
shared a residence with A.W., the trial court granted Mr. Harris’ Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal
as to one count of felony-five domestic violence. Based on the dismissal of the felony domestic
violence charge and thus the lack of evidence presented regarding whether Mr. Harris committed
these acts to facilitate the commission of a felony, the trial court also granted Mr. Harris’
Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal as to one count of kidnapping. The court denied Mr. Harris’
Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal as to the three remaining counts. After deliberation, the trial
court found Mr. Harris guilty of one count of kidnapping and two counts of abduction. At
sentencing, the two abduction counts merged into the kidnapping count and the trial court
sentenced Mr. Harris to five years in prison for kidnapping. Because Mr. Harris had previously
been convicted of a felony-one aggravated robbery in Cuyahoga County, the trial court ordered
the five-year sentence in this case to be mandatory prison time.
{¶8} Mr. Harris now appeals from his convictions and raises two assignments of error
for this Court’s review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF
“GUILTY” AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WITH RESPECT TO
COUNTS II, III AND IV OF THE INDICTMENT, THE KIDNAPPING AND
TWO ABDUCTION CHARGES, THOSE CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST
THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
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{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Harris argues that his convictions were based
on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree with both
propositions.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶10} “A sufficiency challenge of a criminal conviction presents a question of law,
which we review de novo.” State v. Spear, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28181, 2017-Ohio-169, ¶ 6,
citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 386 (1997). “Sufficiency concerns the burden of
production and tests whether the prosecution presented adequate evidence for the case to go to
the jury.” State v. Bressi, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27575, 2016-Ohio-5211, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins
at 386. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus. However, “we do not resolve evidentiary conflicts or assess the
credibility of witnesses, because these functions belong to the trier of fact.” State v. Hall, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 27827, 2017-Ohio-73, ¶ 10.
{¶11} Mr. Harris was convicted of kidnapping under R.C. 2905.01(A), which states in
relevant part: “No person, by force * * * shall remove another from the place where the other
person is found or restrain the liberty of the other person, for any of the following purposes: * * *
(3) To terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim * * *.” “‘Force’ means any
violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or
thing.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(1). “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention
to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a
certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s
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specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “Terrorize” is not
defined in the Revised Code, but Ohio courts have defined it according to its common usage,
which is “‘to fill with terror or anxiety.’” State v. Suggs, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27812, 27865, &
27866, 2016-Ohio-5692, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Chasteen, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-12-308,
2009-Ohio-1163, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Eggleston, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-047, 2008-Ohio-
6880, ¶ 30, fn. 1.
{¶12} Mr. Harris was also convicted of abduction under R.C. 2905.02(A), which states
in relevant part: “No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly * * * (1) [b]y force * *
*, remove another from the place where the other person is found [or] (2) [b]y force * * *,
restrain the liberty of another person under circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to
the victim or place the other person in fear * * *.” “A person acts knowingly, regardless of
purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result
or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶13} As to his kidnapping conviction, Mr. Harris argues that the State did not introduce
any evidence of a purpose to terrorize or to inflict serious physical harm, as there was no
evidence of physical harm and A.W. stood by Mr. Harris’ vehicle after the second disturbance.
Mr. Harris claims that he simply wanted A.W. to leave the hotel with him and their friend, while
she wanted to remain and “party” with the workers. As to his abduction convictions, he argues
that the State did not introduce any evidence of force or threat, as the surveillance video does not
show Mr. Harris dragging A.W. away, but instead only shows Mr. Harris with his arm around
A.W. as they walked into the parking lot together. He further argues that there was no evidence
of physical harm, as the police officers who responded to the scene did not testify that they
observed any injuries on A.W.
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{¶14} Upon review of the record, we conclude that the State presented sufficient
evidence at trial, if believed, to establish that Mr. Harris committed the offenses of kidnapping
and abduction. One of the workers (“David”) testified that when some of the men were in the
parking lot smoking and drinking with Mr. Harris and A.W., Mr. Harris made some crude
comments about how he would make A.W. perform oral sex on all of the men and how he would
make them all pay to have sexual intercourse with her. David testified that these comments
upset A.W. and she began bickering and arguing with Mr. Harris. Mr. Harris got into his vehicle
and A.W. tried to join him, but he locked the doors and drove off without her. The workers’
supervisor (“Matthew”) testified that, on his way back to his room, he encountered A.W., who
was scared, nervous, worried, twitching, shaking, and crying hysterically. Matthew offered to let
her stay in his room or to drive her to wherever she would like to go. Another worker (“Aaron”)
testified that when A.W. arrived at the hotel room, she was scared and crying with makeup
running down her face. Aaron testified that “she was like, please hide me, please hide me, he’s
going to kill me this time.” He also testified that A.W. said she was scared and “not feeling
safe.” Matthew testified that, once inside the room, A.W. would pace back and forth, then sit up
against the door, then look out the window. Aaron testified that A.W. was scared, “freaked out,”
and “looked like she was fearing for her life.”
{¶15} Several workers testified that when Mr. Harris returned again to knock on the
doors to their rooms and demand that A.W. come outside, everyone in the second room remained
quiet and did not answer him. Matthew called 911 and Aaron testified that Mr. Harris began
“kicking the crap out of the door.” The 911 call was entered into evidence at trial. Loud
banging noises can be heard in the background and are acknowledged by both Matthew and the
911 dispatcher in the call. The police soon arrived and Officer Joseph Figula Jr. testified that
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A.W. was shaking, frightened, and extremely nervous. A.W. indicated to the officer that she did
not want to go with Mr. Harris and wished to stay with the workers instead. Officer Figula told
Mr. Harris and his friend that A.W. wanted to be left alone and she did not want to be bothered
by them anymore. After speaking to hotel staff, he also informed Mr. Harris and his friend that
they were no longer welcome at the Days Inn that night and they needed to leave.
{¶16} When Mr. Harris and his friends returned to the Days Inn again later that night,
the workers soon became aware that Mr. Harris had found A.W. Matthew testified that while he
was trying to call 911 again, he saw Mr. Harris dragging A.W. out of one of the hotel entrances
and into the parking lot. He further testified that A.W. was struggling, wiggling, panicking, and
trying to get away, but she could not move very much because Mr. Harris had a hold of her hair.
The 911 call was played at trial and entered into evidence. Matthew testified that the woman
heard screaming in the background of the phone call is A.W. Aaron and David also testified that
they saw Mr. Harris dragging A.W. Aaron testified that he could hear A.W. yelling, “[S]top,
stop, stop, you’re hurting me, stop” and “[D]on’t, don’t do this, don’t do this.” David testified
that Mr. Harris was “basically manhandling her” and was forcing her to go against her will.
{¶17} A surveillance video from a hallway inside of the Days Inn was introduced as
evidence at trial. The video does not depict, as Mr. Harris suggests, innocuous footage of him
with his arm around his girlfriend as the couple walk out of the hotel consensually together. The
video footage is much more chilling than Mr. Harris would have us believe, and instead shows
him restraining A.W. in some type of headlock with his right arm as he forcibly pulls or drags
her alongside of him down the hallway and through the doorway leading to the parking lot. Mr.
Harris’ left arm may also be possibly involved in his restraint of A.W., but it cannot be
completely seen from the security camera’s vantage point. Although A.W. is able to remain on
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her feet while being forced down the hallway, she is unmistakably resisting Mr. Harris as she
struggles against him to no avail. She appears to make a couple futile efforts to grab the stair
railing banisters and the door as she is forced out of the hotel and into the parking lot. During
their intense struggle down the hallway, the two manage to kick over the entire end of a long
doormat as they pass over it. Furthermore, upon viewing the video during his direct examination
at trial, Aaron testified: “Actually, that was a little bit nicer than what [Mr. Harris] was doing
when I saw him in the [other] hallway.”
{¶18} Aaron also testified that, once in the parking lot, he could see Mr. Harris dragging
and hitting A.W. while she was kicking, screaming, and telling him to let her go. David testified
that Mr. Harris shoved A.W. into the van and Matthew testified that “[s]he was drug (sic) into
the van.” Some of the workers went into the van and brought her back out. Matthew testified on
cross-examination that A.W. was yelling at Mr. Harris and telling him to leave her alone.
{¶19} After a series of heated incidents in the parking lot, in which the workers
managed to separate A.W. from Mr. Harris, A.W. is seen on the hallway surveillance video re-
entering the hotel alone. Ten seconds later, Mr. Harris is seen running into the hotel after her,
immediately followed by one of the workers. Mr. Harris is seen pulling A.W. by her arms back
toward the door to the parking lot before several workers intervene. The police soon arrive and
Officer Paige Mitchell enters the hallway. Officer Mitchell testified that when she arrived on
scene, she observed A.W. backing away from Mr. Harris when he approached her in the hallway,
and that A.W. was upset, frustrated, crying, and pacing. Officer Figula also testified that A.W.
was visibly upset, distraught, and appeared terrified at the scene. While Mr. Harris is correct that
no police officers testified as to observing any physical injuries on A.W., the existence of
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physical injuries is not an element of either kidnapping or abduction that the State needs to
prove. See State v. Browder, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99727, 2014-Ohio-113, ¶ 23.
{¶20} After reviewing the evidence contained in the record in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, we conclude that the State satisfied its burden of production and presented
sufficient evidence, if believed, that Mr. Harris committed the offenses of kidnapping and
abduction. We further conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found all of the
essential elements of those offenses proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as ample evidence was
presented to prove that Mr. Harris forcibly removed A.W. from the Days Inn hotel and restrained
her liberty to terrorize her and place her in fear and in risk of physical harm.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶21} Mr. Harris also argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. This Court has stated:
In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.
{¶22} State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App. 3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). “[W]hen reversing a
conviction on the basis that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court
sits as a ‘thirteenth juror,’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting
testimony.” State v. Tucker, 9th Dist. Medina No. 06CA0035-M, 2006-Ohio-6914, ¶ 5. This
discretionary power “should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence
weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387 (1997),
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). See also Otten at 340.
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{¶23} Although Mr. Harris claims that his convictions are against the manifest weight of
the evidence, he does not present or develop any meaningful argument in support of his claim.
He only states: “Even assuming arguendo that the evidence presented at trial concerning all of
the essential elements of those three charged offenses was somehow sufficient, an independent
re-weighing of the same evidence demonstrates that the evidence weighs heavily against the
convictions.” “[S]ufficiency and manifest weight are two separate, legally distinct arguments.”
State v. Vincente-Colon, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009705, 2010-Ohio-6242, ¶ 20. Mr. Harris
has not challenged the evidence set forth by the State as “unreliable or lacking credibility.” See
State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27877, 2016-Ohio-7278, ¶ 16. Accordingly, this Court will
not develop a manifest weight argument on his behalf. See State v. Sadeghi, 9th Dist. Wayne
No. 14AP0051, 2016-Ohio-744, ¶ 32. See also Cardone v. Cardone, 9th Dist. Summit Nos.
18349 and 18673, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2028, *22 (May 6, 1998) (“If an argument exists that
can support this assignment of error, it is not this [C]ourt’s duty to root it out”).
{¶24} Mr. Harris’ first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, WHERE IT
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH R.C. 2938.11(F) BY NOT ANNOUNCING IN
OPEN COURT THE VERDICT, OR FINDINGS DETERMINED BY THE
JUDGE, IN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S BENCH TRIAL WHICH
CONCLUDED ON NOVEMBER 16, 2016.
{¶25} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Harris argues that the trial court violated
his due process rights by failing to comply with R.C. 2938.11(F), and announcing its verdict in a
journal entry instead of in open court. We disagree.
{¶26} A trial court’s application of a statute involves a question of law, which this Court
reviews de novo. State v. West, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008554, 2005-Ohio-990, ¶ 33.
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“When applying the de novo standard of review, this Court gives no deference to the trial court’s
legal determinations.” Id.
{¶27} At the conclusion of Mr. Harris’ bench trial on November 16, 2016, the trial court
stated on the record: “I will be reviewing [the exhibits] this afternoon and then proceeding with
deliberations this afternoon. * * * I should be able to have a decision by the end of the afternoon,
and I’ll send entries to counsel.” Mr. Harris did not object to the trial court’s comment that it
intended to announce its verdict by journal entry. On the following day, November 17, 2016, the
court filed a journal entry finding Mr. Harris guilty of the one kidnapping charge and two
abduction charges and further setting a status hearing for November 21, 2016, to determine a
sentencing date. Nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Harris, at any time, objected or filed
any motion for the verdict to be announced in open court. At his sentencing hearing on January
9, 2017, Mr. Harris read a prepared, written statement to the trial court, in which he mentioned
for the first time on the record the court’s failure to comply with R.C. 2938.11(F), along with
numerous other issues, and made an oral motion to dismiss the case. The trial court denied the
oral motion to dismiss, restated its verdicts, and proceeded with sentencing.
{¶28} R.C. 2938.11(F) states:
Any verdict arrived at by the jury, or finding determined by the judge or
magistrate in trial to the court, shall be announced and received only in open court
as soon as it is determined. Any finding by the judge or magistrate shall be
announced in open court not more than forty-eight hours after submission of the
case to him.
{¶29} “[T]he purpose of [R.C. 2938.11(F)] is to provide for the prompt disposition of
criminal cases where there is a bench trial.” Sheffield v. Nieves, 52 Ohio App. 2d 187, 188 (9th
Dist.1976). Nevertheless, R.C. 2938.11(F) is not mandatory in nature, but only directory. Id.,
citing State ex rel. Turrin v. Tuscarawas Cty. Court, 5 Ohio St. 2d 194, 196 (1966). “R.C.
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2938.11(F) which states a court shall announce any verdict in open court does not proscribe
mandatory procedure by the court but, rather, it is just a directory guideline suggested by the
legislature.” City of Cleveland v. Criss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 72862, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS
5900, *27-28 (Dec. 10, 1998). See also State ex rel. Martin v. Mannen, 113 Ohio St. 3d 373,
2007-Ohio-2078, ¶ 6 (“The time requirement in R.C. 2938.11(F) * * * is directory, not
mandatory”). “[T]he statute itself provides no sanction or consequences for the failure to comply
with it.” State v. McBride, 7th Dist. Harrison Nos. 360 & 361, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 11965,
*19 (Oct. 6, 1981); but see Sheffield at 188 (holding that a defendant is entitled to a judgment
within a reasonable time, and a judgment of guilt approximately seven months after the
defendant rests his case is a denial of due process). “Although ‘judges should strive to comply
with these directory guidelines,’ R.C. 2938.11(F) does not provide a clear legal right to the
vacation of convictions based on noncompliance with that provision.” State v. Doughman, 4th
Dist. Adams No. 16CA1023, 2017-Ohio-4253, ¶ 12, quoting Martin at ¶ 6.
{¶30} As R.C. 2938.11(F) has repeatedly been held by courts to be directory in nature,
we cannot say that the trial court committed reversible error in this particular instance. The trial
court sufficiently complied with the statute and promptly announced its verdict one day after Mr.
Harris’ trial concluded. Mr. Harris has failed to show how he suffered any prejudice by being
informed of the court’s verdict in a journal entry rather than in open court. See State v. Cuiksa,
7th Dist. Belmont No. 84-B-5, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 5462, *3 (Jan. 17, 1985) (concluding that
appellants suffered no prejudice resulting from the trial court not announcing its findings in open
court). See also State v. Camp, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-78-3, 1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 8638, *5
(May 5, 1978) (“[I]n the absence of a legislative sanction for failure to comply with R.C.
2938.11(F), and in the absence of evidence indicating that the delay herein was unreasonable or
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prejudicial, we cannot say that defendant wa[s] denied her due process rights”). The trial court
also set an additional status hearing five days after trial concluded, but Mr. Harris never objected
or demanded oral pronouncement of his verdict at any time prior to, during, or after that status
hearing. See State v. Deckard, 5th Dist. Stark No. 1999CA00276, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2683,
*5 (June 19, 2000) (“If the accused does not demand a decision by filing an objection or a
motion, then the accused should not be permitted to appeal on the grounds of a late judgment
entry”). See also Martin at ¶ 6. It was only at his sentencing hearing, 53 days after his trial
concluded, that Mr. Harris first brought this issue to the court’s attention. Even then, Mr. Harris
did not demand oral pronouncement of the verdict in open court, but only informed the court that
it failed to comply with the statute. After some discussion at the sentencing hearing, the court
reiterated its guilty verdicts in open court:
THE COURT: Defendant appeared in [c]ourt for sentencing after having pled not
guilty to and been found guilty by the [c]ourt after a court trial of the following
charges:
Count Two, kidnapping, a Felony 1.
Count Three, abduction, a Felony 3.
And Count Four, abduction, a Felony 3.
{¶31} We conclude that, in this particular case, Mr. Harris suffered no prejudice
resulting from the trial court’s failure to initially announce its verdict in open court. See Cuiksa
at *3; Camp at *5. Moreover, by failing to object, failing to motion the court, and failing to
demand in any way that the court orally announce its verdict in open court, Mr. Harris effectively
acquiesced to the trial court’s method of announcing its verdict via journal entry and setting a
status hearing. See Deckard at *5. Even if we determined that the trial court erred by first
announcing its verdict in a journal entry, any such error was plainly rectified when the court
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orally announced its verdict in open court at the sentencing hearing. See Criss at *27-28
(concluding that the court did not err under R.C. 2938.11(F) when it announced each decision
and sentence at the sentencing hearing). Consequently, as the trial court sufficiently complied
with R.C. 2938.11(F), we cannot conclude that it committed reversible error in this matter.
{¶32} Mr. Harris’ second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶33} Mr. Harris’ first and second assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of
the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
FOR THE COURT
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SCHAFER, P. J.
CALLAHAN, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JOSEPH F. SALZGEBER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATASHA RUIZ GUERRIERI, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.