Powell v. Williams

[Cite as Powell v. Williams, 2022-Ohio-526.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
SOPHIA POWELL, ET AL., :
Plaintiffs-Appellants, :
No. 110536
v. :
ERIC BRANDON WILLIAMS, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellees. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 24, 2022
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Probate Division
Case No. 2020 ADV 251913
Appearances:
Joseph Lewandowski, for appellants.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
Plaintiffs-appellants, Sophia Powell and Tiffany Powell
(“appellants”), appeal the probate court’s denial of their motion for genetic testing
and dismissal of their will-contest complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Larry Williams (“decedent”) died, testate, on August 14, 2019. The
decedent’s Last Will and Testament, dated May 29, 2018 (hereinafter “will”),
specified that he had four children — defendant-appellee, Eric Brandon Williams
(“Williams”), who is an adult, and three minor-aged children. The will appointed
Williams to serve as executor and identified him as the sole primary beneficiary of
the decedent’s estate. The will further designated the decedent’s minor children and
Williams’s children, if any, as contingent beneficiaries.
On September 26, 2019, Williams applied to the probate court to
probate the decedent’s will and to administer his estate. As part of that application,
Williams identified appellants as the decedent’s “alleged daughters.” The probate
court subsequently appointed Williams as executor and issued him letters of
authority to administer the estate.
On May 21, 2020, appellants filed an action contesting the decedent’s
will, contending that they were the decedent’s daughters and alleging that the
decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will or was under undue
influence and duress by Williams in executing the will. As such, appellants
requested that the probate court set aside the will, declare that the decedent died
intestate, and award them a share of the decedent’s estate. Appellants further
requested that if Williams contested that appellants were, in fact, the decedent’s
natural-born children, that the court order genetic testing of Williams or that the
decedent’s remains be exhumed for genetic testing. Williams filed an answer,
denying the allegations, including that appellants are the decedent’s daughters.
After several pretrials and discovery, appellants filed a motion for
genetic testing to determine whether they are, in fact, the decedent’s natural-born
children. The motion requested that the court order DNA genetic testing on
Williams and sought permission to request the voluntary consent of their mother
and the decedent’s brother to submit to DNA genetic testing. Appellants asserted
that as their “first step” in contesting the decedent’s will, they must establish that
they are the biological children of the decedent. They claimed that in addition to an
affidavit from their mother, birthday cards from the decedent, “beneficiary
designations,” and their inclusion in the decedent’s obituary, the genetic testing
would conclusively prove that they are the decedent’s children. Appellants generally
asserted that “illegitimate children” are entitled to inherit under the laws of intestate
succession and any deprivation of that right violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Appellants appeared to argue that the trial court’s failure to order genetic testing
would violate their constitutional right to equal protection under the law.
Williams did not file any opposition to appellants’ motion, and the
probate court did not conduct a hearing.
On April 29, 2021, the probate court denied appellants’ motion for
genetic testing, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over any parentage action
pursuant to R.C. 3111.381 because the statute of limitations in determining the
existence or nonexistence of a parent-child relationship had expired. Consequently,
the court determined that because the appellants are not “interested persons” as
required under R.C. 2107.71(A), they lacked standing to contest the decedent’s will.
Accordingly, the court dismissed appellants’ complaint.
Appellants now appeal, raising the following sole assignment of error:
Ohio’s statutory scheme denying an illegitimate child who is now an
adult, (over 23), the right to inherit by intestate succession from the
child’s natural father unless the natural father has married the mother,
the illegitimate child has been acknowledged in a court proceeding by
the natural father[,] or the illegitimate child has been adopted by the
natural father constitutes a violation of the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s
guarantee to the “Equal Protection of the Laws.”
I. Appeal1
Appellants raise a constitutional argument challenging Ohio’s
statutory scheme regarding adult illegitimate children (i.e., natural-born children),
and their ability to initiate proceedings to recognize a parent-child relationship after
the alleged father’s death for the purpose of inheriting under the laws of intestate
succession.
It is well established that a party cannot raise a constitutional issue
for the first time on appeal. See State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 489 N.E.2d 277(1986), syllabus (“Failure to raise at the trial court level the issue of the
constitutionality of a statute or its application, which issue is apparent at the time of
trial, constitutes a waiver and therefore need not be heard for the first time on
appeal.”) Moreover, even if appellants had properly raised and argued the
1 The appellants’ brief contains facts that are not included in the appellate record.
This court will only review those facts that can be found in the appellate record. Although
the trial court conducted multiple pretrials, appellants have not provided any transcript
of those proceedings to this court.
constitutional issue with the probate court, this case can be decided without
reaching the constitutional issue. Reviewing courts should avoid reaching
constitutional issues “when ‘other issues are apparent in the record which will
dispose of the case on its merits.’” In re D.S., 152 Ohio St.3d 109, 2017-Ohio-8289,
93 N.E.3d 937, ¶ 7, quoting Greenhills Home Owners Corp. v. Greenhills, 5 Ohio
St.2d 207, 212, 215 N.E.2d 403 (1966); State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-
Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 9.
Although appellants generally argued in the probate court that
denying a natural-born child her right to inherit under intestate succession violates
the constitutional right of equal protection under the law, they failed to set forth
specific challenges to Ohio’s Parentage scheme, including its statute of limitations
to bring such an action, and how Ohio’s statutory scheme deprives appellants equal
protection under the law. Accordingly, because appellants did not raise the equal
protection issues in the probate court that they now raise on appeal, those
arguments are waived for purposes of appeal.
Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court has previously determined
that Ohio’s statutory scheme, which only allows natural-born children to inherit
from their natural fathers under certain circumstances, is constitutional and does
not violate natural born children’s rights to equal protection of the law as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment or Article I, Section 2, of the Ohio Constitution.
White v. Randolph, 59 Ohio St.2d 6, 11, 391 N.E.2d 333 (1979); Brookbank v. Gray,
74 Ohio St.3d 279, 287, 658 N.E.2d 724 (1996) (differentiating the equal protection
analysis regarding illegitimate rights in wrongful death actions and those in
inheritance cases — “Even if the Parentage Act were interpreted to preclude
illegitimate children from claiming inheritance rights from and through their
natural fathers absent an adjudication of paternity inter vivos, it is clear that the
Ohio intestate succession scheme would nevertheless be constitutional.”); Rushford
v. Caines, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-1072, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1512, 9-10
(Mar. 30, 2001).
II. Probate Court’s Jurisdiction
Appellants focus their appeal on the constitutional challenges to
Ohio’s statutory scheme regarding illegitimate children, but do not make any
specific argument challenging the probate court’s denial of their motion for genetic
testing or dismissal of their will contest complaint. Nevertheless, we find no error.
Although appellants brought this matter as a will-contest action, it
morphed into a parentage action when appellants requested that the probate court
order Williams and other nonparty individuals to submit to genetic testing. The
probate court, in its well-written opinion, properly dismissed the complaint, finding
that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed.
It is well-settled that proceedings in probate court are restricted to
those actions permitted by statute and by the Constitution because the probate court
is a court of limited jurisdiction. Corron v. Corron, 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 531 N.E.2d
708 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus, citing Schucker v. Metcalf, 22 Ohio St.3d
33, 488 N.E.2d 210 (1986). Pursuant to R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(p), the probate court is
vested with exclusive jurisdiction involving will-contest actions.
Additionally, the probate court retains jurisdiction to determine the
existence of a parent-child relationship in certain circumstances.2 When the alleged
father is deceased, the probate court retains jurisdiction of a parentage action under
R.C. 3111.381(E). That statute provides that
[i]f the alleged father of the child is deceased and proceedings for the
probate of the estate of the alleged father have been or can be
commenced, the court with the jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings shall retain jurisdiction to determine the existence or
nonexistence of a parent and child relationship between the alleged
father and any child.
In this case, the alleged father has a pending estate action subject to
the jurisdiction of the probate court. Accordingly, under R.C. Chapter 3111, the
probate court could also retain jurisdiction to determine the existence or
nonexistence of a parent and child relationship between the decedent and
appellants, if properly commenced.
A. Will Contest Action
Only a person with standing can bring an action or continue to
prosecute an action. State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas,
35 Ohio St.2d 176, 178, 298 N.E.2d 515 (1973). Under to R.C. 2107.71(A), a party
challenging the will of a decedent must be a “person interested” in the will. A
2Under R.C. 2105.25, a probate court also has authority to review and determine
actions by a man alleging himself to the father of an adult child (a person over the age of
23). This statute does not apply in this case because the alleged father is deceased.
“person interested,” as defined by the statute, is one who has a “‘direct, immediate
and legally ascertained pecuniary interest in the devolution of the testator’s estate
as would be impaired or defeated by the probate of the will, or be benefitted by
setting aside the will.’” York v. Nunley, 80 Ohio App.3d 697, 610 N.E.2d 576 (8th
Dist.1992), quoting Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46, 49-50, 84 N.E. 604 (1908); see
also In re Estate of Scanlon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95264, 2011-Ohio-1097, ¶ 12.
In this case, appellants cannot claim to be “person[s] interested”
under the decedent’s will because they are not named as beneficiaries. Accordingly,
to have standing to bring a will-contest action as a “person interested,” appellants
would have to establish that they could inherit under the laws of intestate succession
if the decedent’s will was declared invalid.3 To do this, the appellants must establish
the existence of a parent-child relationship.
B. Parentage Action
Prior to 1982, an illegitimate child could inherit from her natural
father only through certain means. The father had to: (1) marry the mother and
acknowledge the child as his; (2) formally acknowledge in probate court that the
child was his with the consent of the mother; (3) designate the child as an heir-at-
law; (4) adopt the child; or (5) make a provision for the child in his will. See White
3 Pursuant to R.C. 2105.06, when a person dies intestate, his property is distributed
according to laws of intestate succession. Relevant to this case, under R.C. 2105.06(A), a
decedent’s property would pass “if there is no surviving spouse, to the children of the
intestate or their lineal descendants, per stirpes.”
v. Randolph, 59 Ohio St.2d 6, 11, 391 N.E.2d 333; Garrison v. Smith, 55 Ohio App.3d
14, 15, 561 N.E.2d 1041 (6th Dist.1988).
Currently, however, a child born out of wedlock can also inherit from
her natural father by alternate means under the Ohio Parentage Act, promulgated
under R.C. Chapter 3111. This chapter provides procedures for the judicial
establishment of the parent-child relationship.
Relative to this appeal, an action to determine the existence or
nonexistence of the father and child relationship may be brought by the child under
R.C. 3111.04(A)(1).4 However, pursuant to R.C. 3111.05, such action must be
brought within five years after the child reaches the age of majority. The statute
provides:
An action to determine the existence or nonexistence of the father and
child relationship may not be brought later than five years after the
child reaches the age of eighteen. Neither section 3111.04 of the
Revised Code nor this section extends the time within which a right of
inheritance or a right to a succession may be asserted beyond the time
provided by Chapter 2105., 2107., 2113., 2117., or 2123. of the Revised
Code.
R.C. 3111.05.5
4 R.C. 3111.03 also sets forth presumptions of paternity wherein a man is presumed
to be the natural father of a child under certain circumstances. Appellants do not contend
that any of these presumptions apply.
5 Based on the plain language of the statute, it is apparent that the General
Assembly contemplated the laws of inheritance when drafting and implementing this
limitation period. Accordingly, any change is the law must be done by the General
Assembly; this court cannot legislate from the bench.
In this case, no assertion has been made that either of the appellants
are 23 years old or younger. Accordingly, even if appellants properly brought a
parentage action through the will-contest proceeding, their parentage action is time-
barred under the applicable statute of limitations. As such, no determination could
be made by the probate court regarding whether the decedent is the natural father
of the appellants so as to allow appellants to inherit under the laws of intestate
succession.
Insofar as appellants contend that the limitation period in R.C.
3111.05 violates their constitutional rights, the Ohio Supreme Court in Wright v.
Oliver, 35 Ohio St.3d 10, 517 N.E.2d 883 (1988), applied this five-year statute of
limitations in deciding a parentage action between a mother and an alleged father,
and unquestionably found that R.C. 3111.05 is constitutional.
There is no question regarding the constitutionality of this statute. The
R.C. 3111.05 limitations period avoids the equal protection infirmities
of shorter limitations periods, which the United States Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional in Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91,
and Pickett v. Brown (1983), 462 U.S. 1. It also recognizes a child’s
right to paternal support throughout his or her minority and protects
the state’s interest in enforcing a father’s duty to support illegitimate as
well as legitimate children. See Johnson v. Norman (1981), 66 Ohio St.
2d 186, 20 O.O. 3d 196, 421 N.E. 2d 124; Franklin v. Julian (1972), 30
Ohio St. 2d 228, 59 O.O. 2d 264, 283 N.E. 2d 813.
Id. at 11, fn 1. Accordingly, until otherwise determined, the statute of limitations
contained in R.C. 3111.05 is constitutional.
III. Conclusion
Because appellants are not named as beneficiaries under the
decedent’s will, and they would not inherit under the laws of intestate succession,
the probate court properly found that appellants are not “persons interested” to have
standing to bring a will contest action. As such, the court lacked jurisdiction over
the matter and properly dismissed the case.
The facts of this case are quite concerning, and unfortunately, this
court cannot afford appellants the relief they are requesting. This court sympathizes
with appellants, but until the General Assembly either changes the statute of
limitations or creates an avenue to allow alleged natural-born children who have
been socially recognized and known to the decedent or his heirs to obtain or
establish the parent-child relationship beyond the existing statute of limitations, this
court is bound by the laws as written.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellants costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., CONCURS;
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent with the majority opinion. I would find that R.C.
3111.05, the Ohio Parentage Act’s statute of limitations, is fundamentally unfair to
natural born children who wish to legally establish a parent-child relationship.
Specifically, children born out of wedlock who want to establish a legally recognized
parent-child relationship with their biological father need an extended statute of
limitations beyond the current threshold of five years after the age of majority.
I propose that Ohio’s Parentage Act, R.C. 3111, et seq., places
unreasonable expectations on persons under the age of 23. These individuals are
expected to have the wherewithal and mental acuity to understand the merits of
legally declaring a parent-child relationship and to have the financial means to
secure counsel that will help them facilitate the proceedings. Further, the current
statute of limitations ignores that some children may not learn the identity of their
biological parent prior to the children turning 23 years of age. Young individuals
need additional time within which they can legally establish the parent-child
relationship. Such a mechanism is employed in the juvenile context to provide
minor victims of sexual abuse an extended statute of limitations, and I recommend
adopting a similar extension of time here. See R.C. 2305.111(C) (a claim of childhood
sexual abuse shall be filed within 12 years after the child reaches the age of majority).
Here, appellants offer an affidavit from their mother, birthday cards
from the decedent, and their names listed in the decedent’s obituary to support their
parentage claim. Additionally, the decedent named the appellants as beneficiaries
to his supplemental State Teachers Retirement System’s pension. It is argued that
the appellants were held out publicly as the biological daughters of the decedent.
Yet, because the appellants did not legally establish a parent-child relationship
before the age of 23, the current law prevents them from potentially inheriting their
rightful shares of their father’s estate. It is difficult to accept that the current law is
in the best interest of the appellants and the large pool of similarly situated natural
born children who must demonstrate a certain level of savviness at a relatively young
age or forever be blocked from seeking and establishing a legally binding parent-
child relationship.6
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
6Our parentage laws have a potentially wide-sweeping impact since in 2019 forty
percent of the children born in the United States of America were born out of wedlock.
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 70, No. 2, March 23, 2021, p.6.