State v. Hall

[Cite as State v. Hall, 2021-Ohio-983.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-19-084
Appellee Trial Court No. 2017-CR-0503
v.
Jonathan W. Hall DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: March 26, 2021
*****
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and
David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Jonathan W. Hall, pro se.
*****
ZMUDA, P.J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} This matter is before the court on appeal from the judgment of the Wood
County Court of Common Pleas denying his pro se post-sentence motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. For the following reasons, we affirm.
II. Background and Procedure
{¶ 2} On October 19, 2017, appellant was indicted in Wood County case No.
2017-CR-0503 on one count of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2) and (D), a
felony of the second degree. This indictment included a repeat violent offender
specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A). Appellant was arraigned on this charge on
October 30, 2017, and entered a plea of not guilty. Later, he was indicted in Wood
County case No. 2018-CR-0340 on one count of escape in violation of R.C.
2921.34(A)(1) and (C)(2)(a), a felony of the second degree. This indictment included a
repeat violent offender specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A). On July 26, 2018, he
was arraigned on the escape charge and entered a plea of not guilty.
{¶ 3} On September 17, 2018, appellant withdrew his not guilty pleas and pled
guilty to one count of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2) and (D) with a repeat
violent offender specification in case No. 2017-CR-0503 and one count of escape in
violation of R.C. 2921.34(A)(1) and (C)(2)(a) with a repeat violent offender specification
in case No. 2018-CR-0340. The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate ten-year
prison sentence which included eight years in case No. 2017-CR-0530 and two years in
case No. 2018-CR-0340. Appellant filed no direct appeal.
{¶ 4} On April 19, 2019, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in
case No. 2017-CR-0503. He did not file a motion to withdraw his plea in case No. 2018-
CR-0340. On July 1, 2019, the trial court denied his motion to withdraw his plea in case
No. 2017-CR-0503. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 15, 2019, but this appeal
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was dismissed on September 18, 2019, as it was captioned and filed in this court and not
the trial court. On October 17, 2019, appellant again filed a notice of appeal along with a
motion for delayed appeal in case No. 2017-CR-0503. This court granted the motion for
delayed appeal on December 10, 2019.
III. Assignments of Error
{¶ 5} In challenging the trial court’s judgment, appellant asserts the following
assignment of error:
I. The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the
appellant to withdraw his plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 when the appellant
demonstrated a manifest injustice when his trial counsel failed to
investigate the “likely to be present” element of 2nd degree burglary, and
failed to inform the appellant to his prejudice.
II. The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the
appellant to withdraw his plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 when he
demonstrated a manifest injustice when counsel failed to review the
sentencing guidelines for the repeat violent offender specification, and
failed to inform the appellant to his prejudice.
IV. Analysis
{¶ 6} We address appellant’s two assignments of error together, as the same
analysis applies to both. Appellant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R.
32.1, which provides “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made
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only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence
may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her
plea.” On a motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing, the defendant has the burden of
showing the existence of a manifest injustice. State v. Davis, 2020-Ohio-4539, 159
N.E.3d 331, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 7} This court has held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to motions filed
pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. Id. at ¶ 24. The doctrine of res judicata provides that “‘a final
judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from
raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense
or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the
defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or an appeal from the
judgment.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Miller, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2016-08-057,
2017-Ohio-2801, ¶ 18 (additional citation omitted.). In the context of post-sentence
motions made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, this doctrine bars claims that were raised or could
have been raised in a prior proceeding. Id. at ¶ 27. Res judicata does not act as a complete
bar to consideration of a motion to withdraw a plea under Crim.R. 32.1, rather, if the court
determines that the claim is not barred by res judicata, then the court should proceed with
the analysis.
{¶ 8} The standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is abuse of discretion. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 7154.
(1992). The trial court’s attitude must have been unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable
to constitute an abuse of discretion. Davis at ¶ 21.
{¶ 9} A three-step analytical framework, taken from a First District case and an
Ohio Supreme Court case on point for this issue, is appropriate here. In State v. Tekulve,
188 Ohio App.3d 792, 2010-Ohio-3604, 936 N.E.2d 1030 (1st Dist.), the First District
Court of Appeals examined whether a trial court may consider a post-sentence motion to
withdraw a guilty plea where the defendant does not file a direct appeal of his conviction.
The court stated:
[W]hile there is no jurisdictional bar to a trial court’s entertaining a
postsentence Crim.R. 32.1 motion where there has been no appeal, the
doctrine of res judicata does bar a defendant from raising in that motion
those matters that “could fairly [have] be[en] determined” in a direct appeal
from his conviction, without resort to evidence outside the record. Thus
“the doctrine of res judicata is applicable only where issues could have
been determined on direct appeal without resort to evidence outside the
record.” But a defendant who has not taken a direct appeal from his
conviction is not barred from raising in his motion matters that depend for
their resolution upon outside evidence.
Id. at ¶ 5 (footnotes and citations omitted).
{¶ 10} This approach has been followed by at least one other court. See State v.
Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25482, 2014-Ohio-1764. Additionally, this approach
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adheres to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v.
Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 378 N.E.2d 162 (1978). In that case,
the court held that a post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea under Crim.R. 32.1 could
not be considered by a trial court once the defendant’s conviction has been affirmed on
appeal. Id. at 97-98.
{¶ 11} A three-step analytical framework crafted from the above case law is
applicable to the instant case. In step one, the court must determine whether the
defendant’s conviction was appealed and affirmed on appeal. If the answer is yes, the
trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the post-sentence motion to withdraw under
Special Prosecutors. If the answer is no, the court proceeds to step two. Here, it is
apparent that appellant did not file a direct appeal of his conviction. Therefore, the
analysis proceeds to step two.
{¶ 12} In step two, the court must determine whether the defendant relies upon
evidence contained within the trial court record to support the post-sentence motion to
withdraw. If the answer is yes, then the motion is barred by res judicata under Tekulve
and its progeny. If the answer is no, the court proceeds to step three.
{¶ 13} The instant case can be compared to other cases in which this court held
that res judicata barred claims made in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. In Davis,
2020-Ohio-4539, 159 N.E.3d 331, at ¶ 29, this court found that appellant could have
raised the claims in his motion to withdraw his plea on direct appeal or in other previous
proceedings and therefore those claims were barred by res judicata. In State v. Phillips,
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6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1145, 2019-Ohio-3707, appellant was appealing the denial of
his second motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In holding that his arguments were barred
by the doctrine of res judicata, this court noted that his claims could have been raised in
his first motion to withdraw his plea, in a direct appeal of his conviction, or on appeal of
the denial of his first motion to withdraw the plea. Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶ 14} Here, appellant argues trial counsel’s failures led to his guilty plea and that
those failures support a finding of manifest injustice. Specifically, appellant argues that
counsel should have investigated aspects of the burglary charge more in depth and that
counsel overstated his possible prison exposure due to the repeat violent offender
specification. However, the evidence appellant relies upon is contained in the trial court
record and appellant does not rely on evidence outside of that record. Thus, these
arguments could have been raised in a prior proceeding and the doctrine of res judicata
acts as a bar. Tekulve, 188 Ohio App.3d 792, 794-795, 2010-Ohio-3604, 936 N.E.2d
1030.
{¶ 15} Based on appellant’s reliance on evidence not outside the record, we need
not address the third step of the analysis for the instant case. In order for step three to be
applicable, the defendant must have failed to appeal his conviction and relied on evidence
outside the trial record in support of his post-sentence motion. Accordingly, we need not
address appellant’s motion on its merits to ascertain whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea post-sentence, to correct
manifest injustice as provided in Crim.R. 32.1.
7.
{¶ 16} In this case, res judicata fully bars consideration of appellant’s motion to
withdraw his plea, and we find no abuse of discretion in denying appellant’s post-
sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, appellant’s assignments of error
are found not well-taken.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Wood County
Court of Common Pleas. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, P.J.
_______________________________
Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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