State v. Owens

[Cite as State v. Owens, 2022-Ohio-160.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
PREBLE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2021-07-007
: OPINION
- vs - 1/24/2022
:
TERRY CURTIS OWENS, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM PREBLE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 19 CR 012945
David A. Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Andrea K. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, for
appellee.
CiceroAdams, LLC, and Jay A. Adams, for appellant.
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Terry Owens, appeals the decision of the Preble County Court of
Common Pleas denying his Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea to first-degree
felony rape. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Preble CA2021-07-007
Indictment, Plea Agreement, and Owens' Guilty Plea
{¶ 2} On March 4, 2019, the Preble County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Owens with single counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and
aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11, both first-degree felonies. Owens entered
a not guilty plea and Attorney Kevin Lennen was appointed as Owens' counsel. There is
no dispute that the state was represented by a special prosecutor from the Ohio Attorney
General's Office due to concerns regarding the familiarity and close friendship between the
victim, D.G., and members of the Preble County Sheriff's Office and Victim Witness
Program.
{¶ 3} On March 3, 2020, approximately one year after Owens had been indicted,
Owens, still represented by Attorney Lennen, entered into a plea agreement with the state.
The plea agreement required Owens to plead guilty to rape in exchange for dismissal of the
aggravated burglary charge. The plea agreement did not include any promises between
Owens and the state regarding sentencing. Specifically, as the change of plea form stated
regarding the parties' plea agreement:
Count(s) 2 is hereby dismissed. Defendant understands this is
a mandatory sentence. Defendant understands he/she is to be
classified by law as a tier 3 offender (crimes after 1/1/08).
AGREED No agreement as to sentencing, parties free to
recommend sentence.
(Underlined text sic.)
{¶ 4} The change of plea form also set forth the following as it relates to the
voluntary nature of Owens' guilty plea:
VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA. Pleading guilty is what I want to
do. I have relied upon my attorney for advice but the decision
to enter a plea of guilty is mine and not the decision of my
attorney. No threats have been made to me to induce me to
enter a plea of guilty. No promises have been made to me as
to the sentence to be imposed by the Court and further no other
promises have been made to me except as part of the plea
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agreement.
(Bold and underlined text sic.)
{¶ 5} The change of plea form further set forth the following table notifying Owens
of the maximum possible penalty he faced by pleading guilty to rape:
Maximum Mandatory
Prison: None 3 years, 4 years, 5 years, 6
years, 7 years, 8 years, 9
years, 10 years, 11 years
Fine: $20500 None
{¶ 6} Pursuant to the parties' plea agreement, Owens subsequently appeared
before the trial court and pled guilty to rape in exchange for dismissal of the aggravated
burglary charge. The record indicates the trial court accepted Owens' guilty plea upon
finding Owens' plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Because the trial
court did not make an audio recording of Owen's plea, the record does not contain a
transcript of Owen's plea hearing.
Owens' Sentence and Crim.R. 32.1 Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
{¶ 7} On May 6, 2020, the trial court, Judge Stephen R. Bruns presiding, sentenced
Owens to serve a mandatory eight-year prison term. Approximately one month later, on
June 26, 2020, Owens, represented by new counsel, Attorney Jay Adams, filed a Crim.R.
32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea. Owens' motion included a supporting affidavit from his
former counsel, Attorney Lennen. The trial court, Judge Dennis J. Langer sitting by
assignment, held a hearing on Owens' motion to withdraw guilty plea on March 5, 2021.
During this hearing, the trial court heard testimony from one witness, Attorney Lennen. The
following is a summary of Attorney Lennen's testimony elicited at the hearing on Owens'
Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea.
Attorney Lennen's Testimony
{¶ 8} Attorney Lennen testified that he had been a licensed attorney since 1987
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whose practice consists of work in the fields of domestic relations and criminal law. Attorney
Lennen testified that he was appointed to represent Owens after Owens was indicted on
charges of rape and aggravated burglary. Attorney Lennen testified that his representation
of Owens included discussing with Owens a potential plea bargain with the state. Attorney
Lennen testified, however, that "there wasn't really much from the State other than, you
know, plead guilty and – there wasn't really, I don't remember them really offering much, if
anything."
{¶ 9} Attorney Lennen testified that a special prosecutor was appointed to represent
the state because the victim, D.G., "was close friends with a higher up in the Sheriff's
Department, and a member of the Victim Witness Department here in this county," who
were "two important witnesses in this case." Attorney Lennen testified that the familiarity
between D.G. and "people in the inner-workings of the court system" caused Owens to have
concerns about the fairness of the proceedings "just by the fact of, you know, he knew that
people were connected with everybody."
{¶ 10} Despite Owen's concerns that "everybody was in cahoots with each other,"
Attorney Lennen testified that he told Owens the trial court judge presiding over his case,
Judge Bruns, was "beyond reproach." Attorney Lennen also testified that Judge Bruns
would not be "affected by that." Attorney Lennen then testified:
And I – I continued to tell [Owens] that, you know, the person
we have – always have to be worried about is the judge and this
is not a judge – or any judge to be honest with you, that you
have to worry about. There was no indication, I told him, that
I've ever see, [that] would cause any concern and I impressed
that upon him that you – the Judge is a good judge. Trust in the
Judge.
{¶ 11} Attorney Lennen also testified that he told Owens there was no reason for him
to think he would not be treated fairly because "you got Judge Bruns, don't – don't worry
about that." Attorney Lennen further testified that he told Owens, who the record indicates
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had no previous experience with the criminal justice system, to "trust the system" because
"it's a great system."
{¶ 12} Attorney Lennen testified that he had discussed with Owens the facts of the
case, the discovery that he had received from the state, and the potential defenses that
Owens could raise if the matter was to proceed to trial. Attorney Lennen testified that
following these discussions, Owens decided to accept the state's plea offer and enter a
guilty plea despite the case being a "triable case." Explaining further, Attorney Lennen
testified that prior to Owens accepting the state's plea offer, he advised Owens that if he
took the matter to trial that "it could go either way," "[n]o case is completely winnable, no
case is complet[ly] loseable." Attorney Lennen then testified:
But I explained to [Owens] that, you know, in the system it's –
it's not a rule, but it happens a lot, if you go to trial and you lose
at a jury trial, expect to get closer to the max as opposed to the
minimum. And I – I think that had a big effect on him knowing
that, you know, I could be, you know, doing – doing mul – you
know, eight, nine, ten, eleven years, whatever it would be.
{¶ 13} Attorney Lennen also testified:
I also told him that – cause he wondered about, well, if I do a
plea, I said there was no promises, the State wasn't agreeing to
anything. And I said my experience with the – with – with the
facts of this case, and with his lack of any record, and his
background, I said my opinion, you would probably be at the low
end of three, four, five, is what I would expect. I told him it's not
a promise from me, cause I can't make that promise, it's up to
the judge, they do a pre-sentence investigation, you do what
you're supposed to do, but with everything, in my experience, in
– in these types of cases and with the facts and with his
background, I expected him to be at the low end, if he entered
a plea and accepted responsibility and followed the rules.
{¶ 14} Attorney Lennen further testified and reiterated that he did not promise Owens
anything prior to Owens agreeing to accept the state's plea offer. This includes any
promises regarding the sentence the trial court would ultimately impose.
{¶ 15} Attorney Lennen testified that Owens concerns about the fairness of the
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proceedings "amplified" after Owens saw the victim, D.G., "talking and laughing and –
seeming to have a connection at that point" with "members of the court personnel." Attorney
Lennen testified that these observations caused Owens to believe that he was "in a bad
place," that he was being set up, that he made a mistake by accepting the state's plea offer,
and that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. Attorney Lennen nevertheless testified that
he continued to tell Owens to "trust the Judge." Attorney Lennen testified that this included
the day of Owens' sentencing hearing, May 6, 2020. Explaining what happened that day,
Attorney Lennen testified:
I was sitting at the other end of the – this floor and [Owens] came
up the stairway, I think he came up this stairway and walked
around, and as soon as he came up to me and he was with his
girlfriend, stated to me, I – I wanna withdraw my plea.
{¶ 16} Attorney Lennen then testified:
I asked [Owens] why and he said they're talking, everybody's
chummy, (unintelligible) you know, this is – I know what you've
told me, but this is going – you know, I don't see where this is
gonna be fair and he felt that he had made a major mistake and
he wanted to – he wanted to go back to trial and he did not – he
did not wanna go forward with the sentencing at that time
because he felt he was gonna get the high end despite what I'd
told him throughout.
{¶ 17} Attorney Lennen testified that after speaking with Owens he then
"immediately" went back to Judge Bruns' chambers and asked Judge Bruns "do you know
what sentence you're gonna give?" Attorney Lennen testified that Judge Bruns responded
and said, "I'm goin' low end. I just don't know where on the low end I'm gonna go." Attorney
Lennen testified that he took this to mean Judge Bruns was planning on sentencing Owens
to a prison term of three, four, or five years "cause I consider that to be the low end."
Attorney Lennen testified that he then left Judge Bruns' chambers and went back to talk to
Owens. Describing his conversation with Owens, Attorney Lennen testified:
I basically went up to him, I said, I – you're getting exactly what
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I told you – what I told you I thought you would get, and that's
three, four, or five. I told him I did ask the Judge if he knew what
he was gonna do on sentencing, he said he was goin' low end,
I told him you're gettin' three, four, or five.
Attorney Lennen also testified that he told Owens, "I said I expect the low end of three, four,
or five, but it's up to the Judge."
{¶ 18} Attorney Lennen testified that Owens trusted him and believed what he said
because "it's what I'd told him throughout" that, in his opinion, "this Judge would do without
a promise of three, four, five, he thought he was getting' railroaded, I went in, the Judge told
me low end, I went out and told him, you're getting' three, four, five." Thereafter, when
asked whether he believed Owens would have insisted on withdrawing his plea if Judge
Bruns had "said anything other than low end," Attorney Lennen testified that he had "no
doubt" that Owens "woulda told me to withdraw the plea cause that's what he sent me –
that's what he told me throughout the day. Up until that point." Attorney Lennen also
testified that, but for Judge Bruns telling him that he was "goin' low end" when sentencing
Owens, that Owens would have instead moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Attorney Lennen
further testified that he would have "made arguments" on Owens' behalf at sentencing "to
try to get the sentencing towards a three, four, or five" if Judge Bruns had not told him he
was planning on sentencing Owens on the "low end."
{¶ 19} Attorney Lennen testified that he did not make those arguments because it
would have been "a bad legal move * * * at that point, yeah," and provided "no benefit" to
Owens. Explaining why he believed this to be, Attorney Lennen testified:
I had three, four, or five. I knew the Judge was givin' me three,
four, or five cause that's what he told me. Or I'm sorry, given'
Mr. Owens – cause that's what he told me. And doin' this job, if
you know that – what the Judge is gonna do, the Judge is in a
tight spot anyway because he's got an emotional person and he
wants to, obviously, respect their rights too, for me to then get
up and – and so to speak, kick dirt on them when I know I'm
getting' what I – what I told him from day one I was getting, is
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completely anti to what I should be doing at that point in time
since I already got my three, four, five. All I'm doin' is makin' the
situation worse and possibly getting' the Judge at that point,
maybe, callin' us up there and say, look, I'm not doing this, you
know, I had my three, four, five.
{¶ 20} Attorney Lennen testified that when Judge Bruns sentenced Owens to eight
years in prison rather than to a term of three, four, or five years that he was "[f]loored."
"[s]peechless," and that Owens was "shell-shocked." Attorney Lennen also testified that he
could not remember anything like that happening before and that he considered it an
"aberration." Attorney Lennen further testified that he and Owens did not "do a lot of talking
after that because at that – as soon [as] that happened, I – in my view, I became a witness."
Attorney Lennen testified that he then told Owens to "seek counsel other than me because
you're gonna – I'm – I'm a witnesses and I can't – I can't help you here because I'm a
witness."
{¶ 21} Attorney Lennen testified that he did not meet Owens since the conclusion of
Owens' sentencing hearing. Attorney Lennen did testify, however, that he spoke with Judge
Bruns on the telephone the day after Owens' sentencing hearing for a pretrial conference
in another case. Attorney Lennen testified that during this call Judge Bruns "apologized to
me for not doing what he told me he would do." Explaining his conversation with Judge
Bruns further, Attorney Lennen testified:
I had a pretrial the next day and – and I actually (unintelligible)
brought it up cause, you know, I didn't feel I was a – representing
him anymore, but I had a telephone pretrial the next day and I
was waitin' for the Judge, as soon as the Judge got on the
telephone, the first thing he said to me was he was sorry for not
doing what he told me he would do. And I said, I appreciate
that, but – and I kinda, appreciated the apology, but it didn't
change, in my view, you know, I – probably didn't matter much
to [Owens], but I did appreciate him at least doing that the next
day because admittedly I was, as I said, I was a little bit floored
by what hap – what had happened the day before, but that was
[the] conversation, I don't know what case, but it was a
telephone conversation where we do pretrials – then we were
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doin' pretrials over the phone, I don't know what Prosecutor was
in the room with him, but that's how he started the conversation.
I thanked him at least for the apology. I thought, you know, it
was – it was fair of him to say that, I'm not sure everybody
would've, but he did.
{¶ 22} Continuing his explanation, Attorney Lennen then testified:
[W]hen he apologized to me for the – not doin' what he told me
he – he woulda done, he made the statement to me that he was
told that she – meaning the complaining witness, was not having
a difficult time dealing with this. And he said, and then when
she got up [at the sentencing hearing] and said that, that was
different than what I was told. I still to do – to this day, not know
who told him that prior to sentencing, it wasn't in the PSI, I know
that, so based upon that conversation, somebody had a
conversation with Judge Bruns prior to the sentencing and told
him that the complaining witnesses – wasn't – wasn't okay, but
was – was dealin' – was not having difficulty dealing with this, is
what he said. I wasn't a party to that conversation, I don't know
who it was, I never inquired afterwards what it wa – who said it,
but I know for a fact it wasn't in the PSI. And I don't – like I said,
it's unknown to me, but I know that's what he told me after he
apologized to me that next day.
Trial Court's Decision Denying Owens' Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
{¶ 23} Following Attorney Lennen's testimony, and after accepting written closing
arguments from both parties, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Thereafter,
on June 11, 2021, the trial court issued a detailed 24-page decision denying Owens' Crim.R.
32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea.
No Relief Under the Post-Sentence "Manifest Injustice" Standard
{¶ 24} In denying Owens' Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea, the trial court
initially noted that the "post-sentence standard" of review should apply to Owens' motion
because (1) this court, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, "has held that when a
defendant's request to withdraw his plea comes after pronouncement of sentence, the
appropriate standard is [to] permit plea withdrawal only to correct a manifest injustice;" (2)
Owens did not cite to any case law, nor was the trial court able to find any case law, "that
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supports the proposition that the liberal pre-sentence standard applies to a post-sentence
plea withdrawal request in a fact pattern similar to the case at bar;" and (3) even if,
hypothetically, the trial court had informed Owens that it intended to sentence him to an
eight-year prison term prior to the imposition of its sentence, "the post-sentence manifest
injustice standard still would have applied." The trial court reached this decision based on
the holding set forth by the Second District Court of Appeals that:
When a defendant discovers before sentencing the particular
sentence a trial court intends to impose, * * * a pre-sentence
motion to vacate his plea ordinarily should be treated as a post-
sentence motion. This is so because a defendant cannot test
the sentencing waters and then move to vacate his plea just
before sentencing if he receives an unpleasant surprise.
State v. Simpson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24266, 2011-Ohio-6181, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS
5064, *4 (Dec. 2, 2011).
{¶ 25} The trial court then noted its finding that Owens' case was not an
"extraordinary one" such that Owens should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. The
trial court reached this decision based on the following findings of fact:
● Owens knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his
plea of guilty to the charge of Rape.
● Other than the agreement or promise by the [state] to dismiss
the Aggravated Burglary count, no other promises were made
by anyone.
● Specifically, with regard to sentencing or a "low end" prison
sentence, no promises were made to Owens by [Attorney
Lennen], the [state], or the Judge.
● When [Owens] entered his guilty plea, while he subjectively
believed it likely he would receive a prison sentence of three,
four or five years, Owens understood he possibly could receive
a longer prison [sentence] and as high as eleven years.
● Prior to sentencing, Owens had a change of heart regarding
maintaining his guilty plea.
● Owens' motivation in moving to withdraw his guilty plea was
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that he had received an unexpected prison sentence.
{¶ 26} The trial court therefore concluded that it was not persuaded that a manifest
injustice—"a clear or openly unjust act"—existed that would justify setting aside Owens'
conviction and permit Owens to withdraw his guilty plea.
No Relief Under the "More Liberal" Pre-Sentence Standard
{¶ 27} The trial court also found that even if the "more liberal pre-sentence" standard
applied to Owen's motion that Owens had still failed to establish a "reasonable and
legitimate" basis for granting his Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea. In so holding,
the trial court noted that of the nine factors a trial court should consider when determining
whether to grant a presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea, only two of those factors
weighed in Owens' favor, i.e., whether the state would have been prejudiced by the
withdrawal and whether the motion was made within a reasonable time. As for the other
seven factors, the trial court set forth its findings as follows.
Whether the Defendant was Represented by Highly Competent Counsel
Keven Lennen is an experienced attorney, who specializes in
criminal law. He has been in practice since 1987 and has been
licensed in the State of Ohio, as well as the Federal Ohio District
Courts.
Lennen's representation of Owens – as Lennen detailed in his
testimony – was excellent. On behalf of Owens, he engaged in
conversations with the Special Prosecutor in an effort to reach
a plea agreement. Lennen obtained full discovery. Prior to trial,
he thoroughly reviewed with Owens the facts of the case, the
discovery, and the potential defenses which could have been
raised at trial.
The Plea of Guilty and Waiver of Trial by Jury, filed March 3,
2020, that Owens signed includes the language immediately
above his signature: "I am well satisfied with my attorney's
advice and counsel and believe he/she represented me
competently and to the best of his/her ability."
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Whether the Defendant was Afforded a Complete Crim.R. 11 Hearing
Before Entering the Plea
The transcript of the plea hearing was not preserved in this
case. However, Owens does not contend he was not given a
full and thorough Crim.R. 11 plea hearing.
The Plea of Guilty and Waiver of Trial by Jury, filed March 3,
2020, and signed by Owens contains the following
acknowledgments by Owens:
● He was making his guilty plea voluntarily, with
understanding of the nature of the Rape charge
and of the maximum penalty involved, and that it
carried mandatory prison term.
● He understood the effect of the plea of guilty,
and that the Court, upon acceptance of the plea,
would impose a sentence.
● He understood that by entering his guilty plea he
was waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront
witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be
compelled to testify against himself.
Whether the Trial Court Conducted a Full and Impartial Hearing on the Motion to
Withdraw the Plea
Owens was given a full evidentiary hearing on March 5, 2021
on his Motion to Withdraw Plea. His attorney was given the
opportunity – and did – submit post-hearing briefs thoroughly
delineating his reasons and arguments in support of Owens'
Motion.
Whether the Trial Court Gave Full and Fair Consideration to the Motion
The record in this case demonstrates that this Court case [sic]
gave full and fair consideration to Owens' Motion to Withdraw
Plea.
Whether the Motion Set Out Specific Reasons for the Withdrawal
The Court has made [the] factual finding that prior to sentencing
Owens had a change of heart regarding maintaining his guilty
plea, and that his motivation in moving to withdraw his guilty
plea was that he had received an unexpected prison sentence.
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Whether the Defendant Understood the Nature of the Charges and the Possible Penalties
The Plea of Guilty and Waiver of Trial by Jury signed by Owens
contains an acknowledgment by him that he understood the
nature of the Rape charge; that it carried a possible mandatory
prison terms of "3 years, 4 years, 5 years, 6 years, 7 years, 8
years, 9 years, 10 years, 11 years;" and that "No agreement as
to sentencing, parties free to recommend sentence."
This Court has made the specific factual finding that no promise
of a "low end" prison sentence was made to Owens by his
Attorney, the Special Prosecutor, or the Judge. This court has
also found that when he entered his guilty plea, while Owens
subjectively believed it likely that he would receive a prison
sentence of three, four or five years, he understood he possibly
could receive a longer prison [sentence], as high as eleven
years.
Whether the Defendant was Possibly Not Guilty of the Charges or Had a Complete
Defense to the Charges
Attorney Lennen testified he told Owens that that [sic] no case
is "completely winnable or loseable."
Lennen also testified that had Judge Bruns not stated he was
going to impose a "low end" sentence, Lennen would have
made a statement countering the victim's impact statement,
because, Lennen testified "at that point, to me the facts would
be worse case scenario, is more of a sexual battery than a rape,
even though we pled to the rape."
On cross-examination and re-cross-examination, Lennen
confirmed the following facts in the case:
● No witnesses recanted.
● Owens' DNA was found during the Sexual
Assault Nurse Examination kit performed on the
complaining witness.
● The Sexual Assault Nurse Examination
revealed the complaining witness had vaginal
tearing and bruising on her thighs.
● There were subsequent controlled phone calls
between Owens and the complainant in which
Owens, who had been drunk during the sexual
encounter, said he had no memory of the event
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and apologized if he had done anything wrong.
● At no point during the controlled phone calls did
Owens call the complainant a liar.
● During an interview with a BCI agent, Owens
said he didn't remember what happened because
he was very intoxicated that night.
Under re-direct examination, Lennen testified:
Q. Okay. You were asked about the idea of
potential defenses and the two of you went back
and forth on – on some of the facts, I won't wade
as deeply into that, the reality is, in this situation
there was a lot of drinking and a lot of back and
forth clothes and people in beds and things of that
variety, correct?
Correct.
Q. All right. And simply because Mr. Owens didn't
have any memory of what occurred, does that
mean that a jury may or may not believe that he
raped someone, correct?
No, it's a – it's a – it's a weakness to the case, but
also, you know, it's – if you're too drunk to
remember things, you're too drunk to remember
things and that's probably pretty much across the
board. So I think everybody under cross
examination during trial would've had the s – a lot
of the same difficulties with the facts that night
since everybody was drunk – drinking heavily,
from what I – from what I was able to investigate.
Q. You were asked a question about somebody's
clothes being in somebody's room and – and I
think that the State asked you, or maybe you said,
hey, can you tell him to get out of here. At that
point in time do you remember anything in the
discovery where the complainant said to her
boyfriend, or to anyone, at that moment, tell that
guy to get outta here, he raped me?
No, that – it – it's uncontroverted that the word
rape didn't come out till later that day and really
the first time it was [sic] ever came out is when she
had discussions with the la – with the person from
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Victim Witness.
Q. So real –
That's when it became a rape.
Q. So, reality is, there are some facts that are in
dispute?
Many.
Based upon the above testimony of Attorney Lennen, this Court
is unable to make a factual finding that Owens was perhaps not
guilty of Rape, or that had the case gone to trial [he] would have
had a convincing complete defense to the charge.
Owens' Appeal
{¶ 28} Owens now appeals, raising one assignment of error challenging the trial
court's decision denying his Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea.
Crim.R. 32.1 Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Standard
{¶ 29} Pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest
may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to
withdraw his or her plea." This rule creates two distinct types of motions for the withdrawal
of a guilty plea: a presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea and a post-sentence motion
to withdraw guilty plea. "There is a significant difference in the appropriate standard of
review for presentence and postsentence motions." State v. Leonhart, 4th Dist. Washington
No. 13CA38, 2014-Ohio-5601, ¶ 25.
{¶ 30} Generally, a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea "should be freely
and liberally granted." State v. Gabbard, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2006-03-025, 2007-
Ohio-461, ¶ 7, citing State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992). However, a defendant
does not possess an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. State v.
Manis, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-03-059, 2012-Ohio-3753, ¶ 24. "Rather, the trial court
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must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for
the withdrawal of the plea." State v. Newton, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2014-10-011, 2015-
Ohio-2319, ¶ 10, citing State v. Witherspoon, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-01-025, 2010-
Ohio-4569, ¶ 8. "In determining whether to grant a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty
plea, the trial court should consider the circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea."
State v. Harris, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-04-076, 2019-Ohio-1700, ¶ 11, citing State v.
Metcalf, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-12-299, 2003-Ohio-6782, ¶ 11. As noted above, the
nine factors that should be considered when evaluating those circumstances include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(1) whether the defendant was represented by highly competent
counsel;
(2) whether the defendant was afforded a complete Crim.R. 11
hearing before entering the plea;
(3) whether the trial court conducted a full and impartial hearing
on the motion to withdraw the plea;
(4) whether the trial court gave full and fair consideration to the
motion;
(5) whether the motion was made within a reasonable time;
(6) whether the motion set out specific reasons for the
withdrawal;
(7) whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges
and the possible penalties;
(8) whether the defendant was possibly not guilty of the charges
or had a complete defense to the charges; and
(9) whether the state would have been prejudiced by the
withdrawal.
State v. Snider, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-10-075, 2013-Ohio-4641, ¶ 9. "No one
factor is conclusive in the determination of whether a plea should be allowed to be
withdrawn." State v. Rivera, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-05-072, 2014-Ohio-3378, ¶ 17,
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citing State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240 (1st Dist.1995).
{¶ 31} Unlike a presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea, "Crim.R. 32.1 allows
post-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea in limited circumstances 'to correct a manifest
injustice.'" State v. Tapia-Cortes, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-02-031, 2016-Ohio-8101, ¶
11. A defendant who seeks to withdraw a guilty plea post-sentence has the burden of
establishing the existence of a manifest injustice. State v. Williams, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
CA2012-08-060, 2013-Ohio-1387, ¶ 11, citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977),
paragraph one of the syllabus. "To prove a manifest injustice, the defendant must show a
'fundamental flaw in the proceedings that results in a miscarriage of justice or is inconsistent
with the demands of due process.'" State v. Tringelof, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2017-
03-015 and CA2017-03-016, 2017-Ohio-7657, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Hobbs, 12th Dist.
Warren No. CA2012-11-117, 2013-Ohio-3089, ¶ 9. "The requirement of demonstrating a
manifest injustice is designed to discourage a defendant from pleading guilty to test the
weight of the potential reprisal, and later attempting to withdraw the plea if the sentence
was unexpectedly severe." Williams at ¶ 13. This sets forth an "an extremely high standard
that is allowable only in extraordinary cases." State v. Miller, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
CA2016-08-057, 2017-Ohio-2801, ¶ 15.
{¶ 32} "A trial court's decision regarding a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty
plea is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Rose, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2010-03-059, 2010-Ohio-5669, ¶ 15. So too is a trial court's decision
regarding a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Harris, 12th Dist. Butler
No. CA2018-04-076, 2019-Ohio-1700, ¶ 10 ("[t]he decision to grant or deny a presentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests within the trial court's discretion"). An abuse of
discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court's
attitude was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. State v. Robinson, 12th Dist.
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Butler No. CA2013-05-085, 2013-Ohio-5672, ¶ 14. "[A]n 'arbitrary' decision is one made
'without consideration of or regard for facts [or] circumstances.'" State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio
St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 125 (10th Ed.2014). "A
decision is unreasonable where a sound reasoning process does not support it." State v.
Miller, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-01-007, 2016-Ohio-7360, ¶ 7, citing AAAA Ents., Inc.
v. River Place Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). "'An
unconscionable decision may be defined as one that affronts the sense of justice, decency,
or reasonableness.'" State v. Wane, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2020-01-010, CA2020-01-
011, CA2020-01-014, and CA2020-01-015, 2020-Ohio-4874, ¶ 22, quoting Campbell v. 1
Spring, LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-368, 2020-Ohio-3190, ¶ 9.
No Error in the Trial Court's Decision Denying Owens' Motion
{¶ 33} Owens argues the trial court erred by reviewing his Crim.R. 32.1 motion to
withdraw guilty plea under the standard applied to a post-sentence motion rather than the
more lenient standard applied to a presentence motion. To support this claim, Owens
argues that "fundamental fairness," due process, and "the basic tenants [sic] of being able
to rely upon the advice of counsel" require the application of the presentence standard given
the facts indicating he would have moved to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing had
the trial court not advised his trial counsel, Attorney Lennen, that it planned on imposing a
"low end" prison term. However, regardless of whether the post-sentence or presentence
standard applies, we find no error in the trial court's decision denying Owens' Crim.R. 32.1
motion to withdraw guilty plea. Therefore, as discussed more fully below, because we find
no error in the trial court's decision under either the post-sentence or presentence standard
of review, Owens' single assignment of error challenging the trial court's decision denying
his Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea lacks merit.
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Analysis
{¶ 34} Due to the varying degrees of proof required, if Owens is not entitled to relief
under the more liberal standard applied to a presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea, the
same would hold true for the more stringent standard applied to a post-sentence motion to
withdraw guilty plea. Applying the presentence standard, the trial court found only two of
the nine factors a trial court should consider when determining whether to grant a
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea weighed in Owens' favor, whereas the other
seven factors did not. Given the thorough explanation of its findings within its lengthy,
detailed 24-page decision, we find no error with the trial court's decision as it relates to the
weight the trial court decided to give to those nine factors. This court, in fact, "must defer
to the trial court's judgment in evaluating the 'good faith, credibility and weight' of the
offender's motivation and assertions in entering and attempting to withdraw his plea." State
v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108294, 2020-Ohio-30, ¶ 5, citing State v. Xie, 62 Ohio
St.3d 521, 527 (1992); and State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977). Given the trial court's
findings are supported by the record, that is exactly what this court is doing here.
{¶ 35} We also find no error with the trial court's decision finding Owens had a
change of heart as to whether he should maintain his guilty plea, and that Owens' primary
motivation in moving to withdraw his guilty plea was the trial court's imposition of an eight-
year prison sentence. This is significant because, and as this court has repeatedly
recognized, "a mere 'change of heart' is insufficient justification to allow withdrawal of a
plea." State v. Harris, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-04-076, 2019-Ohio-1700, ¶ 15, citing
State v. Newton, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2014-10-011, 2015-Ohio-2319, ¶ 14; State v.
Wofford, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-10-210, 2015-Ohio-3708, ¶ 11; and State v. Metcalf,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-12-299, 2003-Ohio-6782, ¶ 19. Therefore, while we
understand the facts of this case are somewhat unique given the testimony offered by
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Attorney Lennen, the record clearly indicates that Owens was not promised anything as it
relates to sentencing prior to entering his guilty plea, nor was Owens unaware of the
maximum possible sentence he faced before he entered his guilty plea. See State v.
Hamblin, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2000-07-154, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1412, *6 (Mar. 26,
2001) ("[a] defendant who has a change of heart regarding his guilty plea should not be
allowed to withdraw that plea just because he realizes that an unexpected sentence may
be imposed"). Accordingly, under either the post-sentence or presentence standard, we
find no error in the trial court's decision denying Owens' Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw
guilty plea.
Conclusion
{¶ 36} For the reasons outlined above, and finding no merit to any of the arguments
advanced by Owens herein, Owens' single assignment of error challenging the trial court's
decision denying his Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea lacks merit and is
overruled.
{¶ 37} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL, J., concurs.
PIPER, P.J., concurs in judgment only.
PIPER, P.J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 38} I concur with the judgment of the majority in its ruling on the merits of Owens'
appeal. However, I write separately because it appears that the doctrine of res judicata
bars Owens' appeal altogether, and the appeal should consequently be dismissed. As the
majority opinion recognizes, Owens' motion to withdraw his plea, filed over seven weeks
after he was sentenced, is meritless. It is transparently obvious that Owens merely
experienced a change of heart after pleading guilty because his punishment at sentencing
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was greater than what his attorney thought it should be. State v. Guy, 12th Dist. Preble No.
CA2020-03-004, 2020-Ohio-6908, ¶ 11 ("A mere 'change of heart' is insufficient justification
to withdraw a guilty plea."). However, it seems that because Owens failed to raise the issue
at sentencing, he is barred from raising it in this appeal.
{¶ 39} The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment of conviction bars
a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any
proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any claimed lack of due process that
could have been raised by the defendant before the trial court. State v. Harding, 12th Dist.
Madison No. CA2019-05-012, 2020-Ohio-1067, ¶ 7. Owens was represented by counsel
at sentencing, but did not attempt to withdraw his plea or object to the court's sentence at
that time. As such, the present indirect appeal is merely an impermissible "re-packaging"
of evidence or issues that could have been raised at the trial court level. State v. Statzer,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2017-02-022, 2018-Ohio-363, ¶ 15.
{¶ 40} Owens asserts that he could not appeal his sentence directly because no
record was made of his counsel's ex parte communications with the court. Therefore, he
concludes that these statements remained evidence outside the record, which would have
been unavailable on direct appeal. It is true that "[t]he presentation of competent, relevant,
and material evidence outside the record may defeat the application of res judicata." State
v. Myers, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2019-07-074, 2021-Ohio-631, ¶ 17. However, Owens
and his counsel knew of Owens' expectation as to his sentence and were aware of why
Owens had such an expectation. Yet they chose to withhold the issue from the trial court,
which prevented the issue from being placed within record. As Owens chose not to raise
the issue of sentencing before the trial court, he should not now be permitted to capitalize
on his own intentional omission of evidence from the record through a collateral appeal
based on the assertion that the pertinent evidence was "outside the record." See State v.
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White, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03 MA 168, 2004-Ohio-2809, ¶ 20 ("If a defendant believes
that the trial court has committed an error, then he should raise that error at the first possible
opportunity, not in a collateral attack.").1
{¶ 41} Immediately after the sentence was pronounced, Owens' counsel should
have represented that Owens' sentence was not what he was "promised" pursuant to the
brief ex parte communication counsel initiated prior to the sentencing hearing. See
Prof.Cond.R. 3.7. Owens' counsel could have, and should have, articulated on the record
the particulars of the "promise," or the legitimacy of Owens' expectations. Raising the issue
then and there would have given the trial court the opportunity to immediately address the
issue. Additionally, once raised before the trial court, any resulting decision or ruling, if
adverse to Owens, would have been preserved for direct appeal. State ex rel. Holwadel v.
Hamilton Cty. Bd. Of Elections, 144 Ohio St.3d 579, 2015-Ohio-5306, ¶ 50. Instead, Owens'
counsel decided not to raise the issue on the record.
{¶ 42} Owens' counsel admitted in his later testimony that he believed, based on the
court's representations elicited in the ex parte communication, that Owens would get a
three, four, or five year sentence, and that Owens would have attempted to withdraw his
plea had he suspected he would receive a higher sentence.2 Owens' counsel, knowing this
information at the time of the sentencing hearing, remained silent, arguably a breach of his
duty to promptly represent his client. See Prof.Cond.R. 1.3. Interestingly, Owens' counsel
suggests that he became a witness once the sentence was pronounced, yet the day after
1. The doctrine of res judicata dictates that "a criminal defendant cannot raise any issue in a postsentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea that was or could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal." State v.
Brown, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-929, 2006-Ohio-3266, ¶ 7. Trial counsel's failure to raise the issue at
sentencing renders this appeal inappropriate.
2. Owens' motion does not challenge the propriety of the plea itself but rather is solely premised upon the
circumstances surrounding the pronouncement of his sentence. A failure to give a "promised" sentence at
the sentencing hearing would void the sentence, not the previous plea hearing. Owens does not argue that
his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary when given. Significantly, Owens has no complaints
regarding the entering of his guilty plea and assigns no error to that proceeding.
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sentencing, counsel proceeded to draw the trial court into a second ex parte communication
regarding Owens' sentence.
{¶ 43} To be sure, questioning the court about an alleged promise assuring a
particular sentence, elicited by means of an improper ex parte communication initiated by
an attorney, puts that attorney in an awkward position. See Prof.Cond.R. 3.5(a)(3)(i).
However, if counsel believed, as he later attested in his affidavit, that a promise had been
made and that his client had acted in reliance on that promise, counsel had a duty to
advocate for his client. See Prof.Cond.R. 1.1.
{¶ 44} An appropriate example of attorney conduct in a similar situation is State v.
Grigsby, 2d Dist. Greene No. 02CA16, 2003-Ohio-2823. In Grigsby, appellant alleged that
the court made off-the-record promises to induce his guilty plea, which were conveyed by
the court to counsel who, in turn, conveyed those representations to appellant. When the
court deviated from the alleged promises at sentencing, Grigsby's counsel the following day
filed both a motion to withdraw appellant's guilty pleas and an affidavit verifying the truth of
the facts submitted in support of his motion. Statements made by counsel during the plea
colloquy to the effect that no promises were made to appellant to induce his guilty plea were
directly contradicted by counsel's subsequent sworn statements (a professional conduct
violation akin to Owens' attorney's ex parte communication). However, on direct appeal,
the court of appeals characterized counsel's "immediate and forthright actions on his client's
behalf to correct a perceived injustice" as overcoming the impropriety of his earlier improper
conduct. Here, however, Owens' counsel did nothing to assist his client in perfecting the
record for a direct appeal.3
3. We note that Grigsby is dissimilar to the case sub judice in that the expectation resulting from an ex parte
communication was the expected sentence inducing Grigsby to enter a plea; here, Owens alleges no
inducement was given to secure his plea of guilty. "When a trial court promises a certain sentence, the
promise becomes an inducement to enter a plea, and unless that sentence is given, the plea is not voluntary.
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{¶ 45} Assuming the argument of appellate counsel on this collateral appeal, if
Owens had a definite expectation, or promise, as to the punishment he would receive, his
trial counsel strategically decided not to make a record. Counsel could have asked to
approach the bench and remind the trial court of any specific representations which counsel
relayed to Owens. Counsel could have proffered the specific expectation into the record or
objected to the sentence as not following the court's specific representation. Counsel could
have, and should have, placed in the record Owens' reliance upon the ex parte conversation
and simultaneously made a motion to withdraw Owens' plea. Instead, counsel's decision
at Owens' sentencing hearing was to leave his client, and the record, unprotected.4
{¶ 46} It is clear that Owens' desire to unwind these proceedings and withdraw his
guilty plea stems solely from his punishment being greater than his counsel thought it would
be. Despite being aware of the court's ex parte representation to his counsel, and because
Owens never attempted to challenge his sentence before the trial court, res judicata
apparently bars a challenge in subsequent proceedings to the number of years he received.
State v. West, Butler No. CA2018-09-183, 2019-Ohio-4826, ¶ 21.
{¶ 47} The timing of Owens' complaint about the sentence he received appears to
be nothing more than a tactical decision. Choosing not to make a record when he could
have done so and now asserting that the pivotal information is outside the record, appears
to be an attempt to game the system. The doctrine of res judicata, which applies to "every
question that might properly have been litigated," exists precisely "to prevent repeated
attacks on a final judgment." Mootispaw v. Doe, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA95-03-009, 1995
Accordingly, a trial court commits reversible error when it participates in plea negotiations but fails to impose
the promised sentence." (Citation omitted.) State v. Bonnell, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2001-12-094, 2002-
Ohio-5882, ¶ 18. Because Owens pled guilty without any promise, the trial court did not commit reversible
error which would require it to permit him to withdraw his plea. See id. at ¶ 23.
4. Oddly, appellate counsel makes no suggestion that trial counsel was ineffective.
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WL 617476, *1 (Oct. 23, 1995).
{¶ 48} However, in this appeal, the parties did not brief the application of res judicata
to Owens' case. Therefore, consistent with my dissent in State v. Keating, 12th Dist.
Clermont No. CA2019-08-064, 2020-Ohio-2770, ¶ 55–56 (Piper, J., dissenting), I would
reserve judgment at this time, opting to request supplemental briefing for a fair and full
consideration as to whether or not res judicata applies.
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