DocketNumber: 650
Judges: Guernsey, Middleton, Younger
Filed Date: 12/5/1963
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/12/2024
This is an appeal on questions of law by the Director of Highways of the state of Ohio in an appropriation action from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Hancock County sustaining a motion of the property owners, dismissing the resolution and finding of the director required to be filed pursuant to the provisions of Section
In its journal entry the court recited that no evidence had been adduced, and found that "the description of land contained in the resolution and finding * * * is vague and is not a metes and bounds description and is not sufficiently definite, accurate and detailed as to the property proposed to be appropriated, as required by law, and that by reason thereof a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of the Director of Highways to appropriate private property was not complied with and the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action." The court also found "that said Director of Highways is without authority to exercise the power of eminent domain to appropriate the property of the appellants' in fee simple for such limited access highway or freeway, and that by reason thereof this court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action."
The Director of Highways assigns error of the Common *Page 405 Pleas Court in each of these findings and in dismissing the resolution and finding by reason thereof.
The appellees claim, and the trial court apparently concluded, that the Director of Highways has no authority to appropriate land in fee simple for limited-access highways or freeways for the reason that Sections
Appellees' argument would be pertinent and cogent if the power and authority of the Director of Highways to appropriate land for a limited-access highway or freeway were derived solely from the provisions of Section
The only fee simple estate which the Director of Highways sought to appropriate in this proceeding was to the right of way of the highway proper. The director deriving his general power of appropriation of such right of way from Sections
We conclude that the Common Pleas Court was in error in finding that the Director of Highways had no power to appropriate the property in fee simple, but for the reasons hereafter stated such error was not prejudicial to the appellants when considered in the light of the validity of the court's judgment.
Respecting the finding of the Common Pleas Court that the description of land contained in the resolution and finding of the director was not sufficiently definite, accurate and detailed, since no evidence was adduced, the trial court could make such determination only as a matter of law. The following descriptive *Page 407 matter appears in the copy of the resolution and finding of the director filed in that court:
"The aforementioned property to be appropriated is located in the Northwest Quarter of Section 3, Town 1-South, Range 10-East, Eagle Township, Hancock County, Ohio, lying on the left and right sides of the centerline of a survey made by the Department of Highways, and recorded in the records of Hancock County, Ohio, and being more fully described as follows:
"Together with all the rights or easements of access to or from said limited access highway, from or to the land of said persons abutting upon that portion of said limited access highway, *Page 408 from a point 150 feet left of Station 627 plus 51.47 in said centerline of survey to a point 150 feet left of Station 650 plus 16.56 in said centerline of survey and on the right from a point 150 feet right of Station 625 plus 34.17 in said centerline of survey to a point 150 feet right of Station 651 plus 09.75 in said centerline of survey, as shown by the plans of said improvement herein referred to.
"Said stations being the Station numbers as stipulated in the hereinbefore mentioned survey."
By using the points, distances and courses set forth in the first paragraph of descriptive matter under the heading, "Parcel No. 56-WL," and those set forth in the descriptive matter under the heading, "Parcel No. 56," this court has been readily able to plot on paper each of the tracts so described, and, the starting points thereof having reference to lines and points customarily monumented in the geodetic survey pertaining to this area, there should be no unusual difficulty in plotting each of these tracts on the ground.
It will be noted that by utilizing the description for Parcel No. 56-WL it is possible to locate on paper, and on the ground, a number of different points in the centerline of the survey made for the improvement of State Route No. U.S. 25. However, *Page 409 there is nothing in the descriptive matter, or in the resolution and finding, which shows that any of the boundary lines of Parcel No. 56-WL constitute, or coincide with, the boundary lines of the highway, or that the centerline of the highway is a straight line, is not a meandering line, or that it has any specific location with reference to the boundary lines of Parcel No. 56-WL except at the points located in the description of said parcel.
Thus, although the second paragraph of descriptive matter under this parcel heading, which paragraph refers to rights or easements of access, would permit us to locate on paper, and on the ground, the four points therein referred to, nevertheless, without any showing of the width of the highway and/or the location of the centerline, or whether the centerline and/or edges of the highway constitute a straight line or a meandering line, it is impossible to plot on paper, or on the ground, the scope or extent of the rights or easements of access which the state therein attempts to describe and purports to appropriate.
Section
The statute does not provide, or permit, this mandatory requirement to be diluted, or in any way diminished, by the filing in the court thereafter of a "plat of the property appropriated." A plat is not a substitute for the description in the finding, as the finding must be complete and valid in and of itself.
Indeed, it should be observed parenthetically, that the plat filed herein shows that the course "N 01°50'00" W" is used therein as being equivalent to the course in the descriptions of both parcel No. 56-WL and parcel No. 56 stated as "South 01 degrees 50 minutes 00 seconds West." The former is neither the equivalent, nor the back azimuth, of the latter, and one or the other, but probably the course on the plat, is erroneous.
If the acquisition of land here in fee simple (Parcel 56-WL) is for a new highway all the rights possessed by the owner in such described property, including the invisible as well as the visible, are acquired by the appropriating authority. State, exrel. Lindemann, v. Preston, Director of Highways,
On the other hand, if the proceedings contemplate the extinguishment of rights or easements of access pertaining to an existing highway, or perhaps to land other than that which the director proposes to acquire in fee simple, the right or easement of access to be extinguished must be extinguished by appropriation with the same definiteness, accuracy, and detail of description as regards any other property to be appropriated.
Our record is the same as that before the trial court, no evidence having been taken, and it not appearing that the description of the rights or easements of access to be appropriated coincides with the property to be appropriated in fee simple, it not appearing that a new highway only, without pre-existing rights or easements of access, is involved, we must presume that the second paragraph is not mere surplusage, that the Director of Highways really intends to appropriate rights or easements of access to some parcel separate and apart from the fee simple title to parcel 56-WL which he is appropriating.
The description to such rights or easements of access not being "definite, accurate, and detailed," we conclude that the director's finding did not contain a "definite, accurate, and detailed description of the property * * * appropriated," that for such reason only the Common Pleas Court did not commit error in its similar finding pertaining thereto, in dismissing the resolution and finding of the Director of Highways, and in dismissing the appropriation proceedings filed in that court pursuant to such resolution and finding. The judgment of the Common Pleas Court is affirmed at the costs of the state of Ohio.
Judgment affirmed.
MIDDLETON, P.J., and YOUNGER, J. concur. *Page 411