DocketNumber: Nos. 29021, 29022, 29023 and 29024
Citation Numbers: 246 N.E.2d 908, 18 Ohio App. 2d 63
Judges: DAY, J.
Filed Date: 4/17/1969
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
We have affirmed the judgments in these cases. Although we find none of the assignments of error briefed and argued well taken, the first assignment is of sufficient public and general interest to warrant a few words of explanation. *Page 64
In broad terms, the first assignment of error claims that the court below which rendered judgment by confession on cognovit notes without the confessing attorney being physically in court did not obtain jurisdiction over the subject matter. In lower terms, this contention leans upon the principle of strict construction of Section
The words in Section
"An attorney who confesses judgment in a case, at the time of making such confession, must produce the warrant of attorney for making it to the court before which he makes the confession, * * *."
The bald language of the statute lends support to the reading which would require that the confessing attorney be in court,physically, at the time judgment is taken. However, since the statute does not specify that the confessing attorney be infact, and literally, counsel for the defendant, it is fair to inquire what purpose would be served by the physical presence, particularly in the light of other consequences such presence would generate.
Practice in this jurisdiction will illustrate the point. Over many years Section
The very existence of Section
Should the statutory "requirement," if it is one, be deemed satisfied by the mere physical presence of the hall-way-confessor clothed, as he would be, in encylopedic innocence of any defense to the action? If so, the statute would be satisfied by an empty formality, and only inconvenience would be added to the present procedure. We are convinced that the Legislature intended no such result. It is fundamental that the law will not compel futility.
Yet, to read the statute as requiring the physical presence of an attorney to confess the judgment, who literally andactually represented the defendant, would necessarily destroy the cognovit concept. Compliance would effect repeal. The usefulness of the statute could not survive a mandatory adversary procedure that was more than formal.
Accordingly, we find the necessary presentation under the statute can be, and in the cases now before us was, legally effected through the plaintiff's attorney as agent for the confessing attorney. This may put some gloss on the enactment but it avoids the undesirable alternatives, clearly not in legislative contemplation, of compelled futility by requiring the presence of an unprepared and therefore unarmed, ostensible, adversary; or repeal by way of an enforced, literal, adversary proceeding.
The four cases before us are identical in principle. In all four cases the judgments are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
WHITE, P. J., and WASSERMAN, J., concur. *Page 66