DocketNumber: C-74310 and C-74311
Citation Numbers: 335 N.E.2d 874, 44 Ohio App. 2d 95, 73 Ohio Op. 2d 89, 1975 Ohio App. LEXIS 5744
Judges: Palmee, Keene, Shannon
Filed Date: 5/7/1975
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Commenting first upon Assignment of Error 3, I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in deciding "that there is no discretion on the court's part in these matters." My conception of the intendment of the following language in R. C.
"The time within which an accused must be brought to *Page 104 trial, or, in the case of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only by the following * * *
"(H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused's own motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance grantedother than upon the accused's own motion." (Emphasis added.)
What is reasonable must bear a direct relationship to the facts in each case. In view of the obvious intent of the legislature to have criminal charges disposed of with dispatch, thus serving the interests of the state and the rights of the defendant, the time extension which a trial court can grant under R. C.
Whenever a court upon its own motion orders a reasonable continuance, under (H), the basis for such action must affirmatively appear in the record. The reason or reasons cited in the record must always satisfy the concept of "reasonableness." Consequently, I agree with the decision to remand this case to the court of common pleas. It should proceed with a hearing incident to a discretionary determination whether or not the complete factual situation confronting it in this case justifies a reasonable extention of the trial date beyond 90 days.
The other assignment of error to which I desire to direct evaluation is No. 2. It reads:
"The Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Ohio, committed error when privately retained legal counsel agreed to a trial date beyond the 90 day period from *Page 105 the date of arrest and thereafter held that this agreement as to the trial date was not binding upon the defendant and did not waive his statutory right to be tried within a period of 90 days from the date of his arrest." (Emphasis added.)
My brothers come to the conclusion that this assignment is well taken and that counsel's agreement to a trial date beyond the 90 day period is effective without any showing of the participation by the defendant himself in such continuance. I disagree. My conclusion would be that counsel's agreement in this case was not binding on defendant and the assignment should be held meritless.
The record establishes no affirmative selection of the delayed trial date either by defendant or his counsel. There is an ambiguity about who chose the May 30, 1974 date. There is no indication that the defendant was present when it was selected. In fact the clear implication from the record is that the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel were there, butdefendant was not. Defense counsel maintained consistently that he merely "accepted" May 30, suggesting at most acquiesence. Neither defendant nor his counsel made a "motion" for a continuance.
Whether mere acquiesence in a trial setting can fairly be equated with a motion, as required by the first part of R. C.
The defendant has a constitutional right to a speedy trial, guaranteed both by the federal and state constitutions. Klopfer
v. North Carolina (1967),
Is the right to a speedy trial within the criminal code's present requirements therefore a substantial one? In Klopfer,supra, the United States Supreme Court describes the sacredness of the right in these words:
"The history of the right to a speedy trial and its reception in this country clearly establish that it is one of the mostbasic rights preserved by our Constitution.
My colleagues have concluded that the agreement to fix the trial date beyond the 90 day period is not of such constitutional magnitude that defendant's own counsel is ineffective to waive the statutory time limitation. I am obliged to reach a contrary conclusion.
The manifest intendment of R. C.
When a trial setting is within the periods established in R. C.
There is no perfect fact parallel between the case at bar andBrown v. State (1962),
"The defendant had not waived his right to be present; in fact he did not know that the hearing was being held. It is true that his attorney was present. But the proceeding that occurred appears to us to have been of such a nature that defendant himself should have been present in person * * *.
"We believe that under the circumstances * * * the appellant's presence was required * * * and that his right to be present was as vital to his defense as his specific constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Id. at 789.
In People v. Anderson (1965),
"What is of primary importance after all is the strong social policy in favor of requiring the presence of the defendant.
"In my view the decision below [which affirmed the conviction] * * * is a violation of fundamental fairness."Id. at 448.
R. C.