DocketNumber: Nos. C-040895 and C-060063.
Citation Numbers: 166 Ohio App. 3d 462, 2006 Ohio 1566
Judges: GORMAN, Judge.
Filed Date: 3/31/2006
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Beneficial Ohio, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court confirming the sheriffs sale of real property located at 11549 Lincolnshire Drive ("the property") and from an entry overruling a motion to vacate the sale. Because we find that Beneficial's right to due process was violated when defendant-appellee, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), failed to notify Beneficial of the date, time, and place of the sale under R.C.
{¶ 2} Beneficial held a second mortgage on the property in the amount of $28,668.25. It moved to foreclose on the property, naming as a defendant MERS, which held a first mortgage on the property. MERS filed a counterclaim and cross-claim, then moved for default judgment. The trial court granted MERS's motion. Thereafter, MERS filed a praecipe for order of sale, and a sheriffs sale was scheduled for November 4, 2004. MERS mailed notice of the date, time, and place of the sale to all parties of record except Beneficial. The sale proceeded as scheduled, without Beneficial's knowledge. Although the property had an appraised value of $129,000, Primero, L.L.C. ("Primero") purchased the property for $86,306. MERS received $83,760.71 from the sale, which satisfied its mortgage against the property. The remainder of the purchase price was allocated to cover court costs. Beneficial received nothing.
{¶ 3} Beneficial appealed in the case numbered C-040895. MERS did not respond to Beneficial's brief. Before the appeal was heard, we remanded the matter to the trial court for the purpose of determining a motion to vacate the entry confirming the sheriffs sale. We held Beneficial's appeal in abeyance until the trial court had ruled on the motion. On remand, the trial court allowed Primero to intervene as a defendant, and the court subsequently overruled the motion to vacate the sale. From the trial court's entry overruling the motion, Beneficial appealed in the case numbered C-060063. We have consolidated the appeals for purposes of briefing, argument, and decision.
{¶ 4} In its first assignment of error, Beneficial claims that the trial court erred in entering judgment confirming the sale and ordering distribution of the sale proceeds because Beneficial was never notified of the sale, in violation of its right to due process. In its second assignment of error, Beneficial argues that the trial court should have granted the motion to vacate the sale due to MERS's *Page 465 failure to notify Beneficial of the sale. Because both assignments of error effectively challenge the trial court's judgment confirming the sale of the property, we address them together.
{¶ 5} In general, an entry confirming the sale of real estate acts as a bar to any motion requesting that the sale be set aside. R.C.
{¶ 6} Due process requires that notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to inform interested parties of the pendency of an action and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections.Cincinnati v. York Rite Bldg. Assn.,
{¶ 7} The notice requirements pertaining to the sale of property in a foreclosure action are set forth in R.C.
{¶ 8} In the present case, it is not disputed that Beneficial was a party to the action and that MERS was the judgment creditor who had filed the praecipe for order of sale of the property. But Primero argues that MERS did not have to provide Beneficial with notice of the sale under R.C.
{¶ 9} Next, Primero contends that MERS did not need to notify Beneficial of the sheriffs sale, because Beneficial neglected its duty to keep itself apprised of the status of this case. We are unpersuaded. The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Jensen, finding that a lender who had knowledge that a sale was forthcoming did not have to monitor the newspaper for notice by publication when it was reasonable for that party to expect personal notice.Jensen,
{¶ 10} Finally, Primero argues that the postconfirmation bar contained in R.C.
{¶ 11} Primero points to certain statements in Beneficial's appellate brief as proof that counsel for Beneficial was aware that the sale had occurred before the trial court journalized its final entry confirming the sale of the property. The record does not support these statements. Nevertheless, Primero contends that the statements should be considered by the court as judicial admissions. We disagree. *Page 467
{¶ 12} The Ohio Supreme Court has defined a judicial admission as "a distinct statement of fact which is material and competent and which is contained in a pleading."Faxon Hills Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Joiners (1958), 168 Ohio St. 8,10, 5 O.O.2d 260,
{¶ 13} In Ishmail, the Supreme Court held that "[a] reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it [that] was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter." Id, paragraph one of the syllabus. The cases cited above involved alleged admissions made at the trial level and, therefore, appeared in the record on review. Beneficial did not make any admission at the trial level concerning when it had received notice of the court's final entry. We note that on the court's entry confirming the sale, the words "submitted 11-23-04" are stamped above a signature block provided for Beneficial's counsel. But this, alone, does not affirmatively demonstrate that Beneficial's counsel saw or received a copy of the entry prior to the time it was journalized.
{¶ 14} When we remanded this cause to the trial court for a determination of the sale, Primero cited Beneficial's brief. But this did not cure the statement's deficiency. The trial court did not have before it any sworn testimony or other competent evidence pertaining to whether Beneficial had received notice of the sale before the court entered judgment confirming the sale.
{¶ 15} We conclude that a factual statement in a brief that is unsupported by the record of the proceedings before the trial court runs afoul ofIshmail, supra. This court is not a fact-finding body. We review cases based only upon what occurred at the trial level, as reflected in the record of those proceedings. SeeIshmail,
{¶ 16} In sum, we conclude that MERS, as the judgment creditor seeking the sale of the property at issue, was required to serve Beneficial with notice of the date, time, and place of the sheriffs sale. Because Beneficial was thus deprived of its property without due process of law, we hold that the trial court erred in entering judgment confirming the property's sale. We further find that Beneficial was prejudiced by this error. See Jensen,
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain both of Beneficial's assignments of error. We reverse the judgment of the trial court confirming the sale of the property, and we remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with the law and this decision.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
DOAN, P.J., and SUNDERMANN, J., concur.