DocketNumber: No. 06 CO 61.
Citation Numbers: 893 N.E.2d 916, 177 Ohio App. 3d 87, 2008 Ohio 3327
Judges: WAITE, Judge.
Filed Date: 6/30/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 89
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 90
{¶ 1} This action arose following teacher layoffs caused by a significant budget deficit in the East Liverpool School District. Appellants, the East Liverpool Education Association, OEA/NEA, and Pamela S. McDowell, filed a declaratory-judgment action in the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas claiming that R.C. Chapter
{¶ 2} In this appeal, appellants argue that the trial court erred when it concluded that only a school board can challenge a declaration of fiscal emergency, that the auditor erred in calculating the district's deficit, that they were *Page 91
denied their fundamental right to an elected school board, and that R.C. Chapter
{¶ 4} By statute, this type of commission is designed to eradicate a school district's financial deficits. Thus, a commission has the authority to reduce the number of teachers in the district, even if an applicable collective-bargaining agreement states otherwise, so long as the agreement took effect after November 21, 1997. R.C.
{¶ 5} In response, appellants filed a declaratory-judgment action in the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas against the board, the commission, the Ohio Department of Education, the superintendent of public instruction, Susan Tave Zelman, and the state auditor.
{¶ 6} Appellants asked the trial court to declare R.C. Chapter
{¶ 7} Appellants hoped to void the auditor's December 18, 2003 declaration of fiscal emergency. They alleged that the auditor had erred in finding that the school district had a greater than ten percent deficit for the school year. This finding was a prerequisite to the declaration of fiscal emergency in this case. Appellants also claimed that the board breached its duty to submit a financial plan prior to the fiscal-emergency declaration and that its failure violated their due process rights. R.C.
{¶ 8} On July 26, 2006, the trial court granted the board partial judgment on the pleadings, and held that R.C. Chapter
{¶ 9} The trial court again granted the board's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings on August 1, 2006. This decision was virtually identical to its July 26, 2006 decision. On August 28, 2006, the trial court dismissed the board as a defendant since the remaining issues did not relate to the board.
{¶ 10} The court held a hearing on the remaining parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants, i.e., the auditor and the commission, and overruled appellants' motions.
{¶ 11} Appellants timely appealed the trial court's decisions dated July 26, August 1, August 28, and October 4, 2006.
{¶ 13} Our review of the trial court's summary judgment decision is de novo. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker
(1995),
{¶ 14} The movant bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ. R. 56; Dresherv. Burt (1996),
{¶ 15} Appellants divide their first assignment of error into four subparts. In the first they assert:
{¶ 16} "A. The trial court erred when it found only the school board could challenge the Auditor's declaration of fiscal emergency."
{¶ 17} As a threshold matter, appellants argue that they have standing to pursue a legal challenge to the auditor's decision. Appellants reject the conclusion that R.C.
{¶ 18} Appellants' argument relies on an interpretation of R.C.
{¶ 19} R.C.
{¶ 20} "The auditor of state may issue an order declaring a school district to be in a state of fiscal emergency if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
{¶ 21} "(a) An operating deficit has been certified for the current fiscal year by the auditor of the state, and the certified operating deficit exceeds ten per cent, but does not exceed fifteen per cent, of the school district's general fund revenue for the preceding fiscal year; *Page 94
{¶ 22} "(b) A majority of the voting electors have not voted in favor of levying a tax * * * that the auditor of state expects will raise enough additional revenue in the next succeeding fiscal year that division (B)(5)(a) of this section will not apply to the district in the next succeeding fiscal year;
{¶ 23} "(c) The auditor of state determines that a declaration of fiscal emergency is necessary to correct the district's fiscal problems and prevent further fiscal decline."
{¶ 24} R.C.
{¶ 25} "A determination by the auditor of state under this section that a fiscal emergency exists is final,except that the board of education of the school districtaffected by such a determination may appeal thedetermination of the existence of a fiscal emergency condition to the court of appeals having territorial jurisdiction over the school district. * * * In such appeal, determinations of the auditor of state shall be presumed to be valid and the board of education shall have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that each of the determinations made by the auditor of state as to the existence of a fiscal emergency condition under this section was in error." (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 26} The governing statute does not grant any other party the right to dispute the auditor's fiscal-emergency determination. In enacting R.C. Chapter
{¶ 27} Accordingly, the argument raised in this subsection of appellants' first assignment of error is unpersuasive.
{¶ 28} Appellants' second argument asserts,
{¶ 29} "B. The Auditor erred in calculating the school district's deficit."
{¶ 30} Again, R.C.
{¶ 31} The association does not have the right to challenge the auditor's fiscal-emergency determination. Thus, appellants do not have standing to assert the argument contained in this subsection of their first assignment of error.
{¶ 32} Appellants' third argument alleges,
{¶ 33} "C. Appellees were not entitled to summary judgment on Appellants' fifth claim and Appellants were entitled to summary judgment on their fifth claim."
{¶ 34} Appellants allege that R.C. Chapter
{¶ 35} "Provision shall be made by law for the organization, administration and control of the public school system of the state supported by public funds: provided, that each school district embraced wholly or in part within any city shall have the power by referendum vote to determine for itself the number of members and the organization of the district board of education, and provision shall be made by law for the exercise of this power by such school districts."
{¶ 36} Appellants claim that voters in this case elected their school board under Section
{¶ 37} Appellants' constitutional argument is unpersuasive. Section
{¶ 38} In addition, legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. Desenco, Inc. v.Akron (1999),
{¶ 39} The statute and the Ohio Constitution are not incompatible. To the contrary, appellants, as registered city voters, did elect their school board. Thereafter, the commission was appointed to assume only the board's fiscal responsibilities during the state of fiscal emergency. The elected board retained all other rights and duties attendant to a school board. Further, upon the termination of the fiscal-emergency determination in the East Liverpool School District, the elected board will resume all duties, including those concerning fiscal management. Barnesville,
{¶ 40} Appellants argue that Barnesville
is distinguishable and does not control here, because the instant cause involves a city school district, and voters in a city school district have the right to an elected school board. Section
{¶ 41} "No one disputes that there is a fundamental right to vote. * * * However, `not every limitation or incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of review.' Bullock v. Carter
(1972),
{¶ 42} Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio inState ex rel Ohio Congress of Parents Teachers v.State Bd. of Edn.,
{¶ 43} Based on the foregoing, this argument lacks merit and is overruled.
{¶ 44} Appellants' final argument in their first assignment of error asserts:
{¶ 45} "D. Appellees were not entitled to summary judgment on Appellants' sixth claim and Appellants were entitled to summary judgment on their sixth claim." *Page 97
{¶ 46} Appellants allege that R.C. Chapter
{¶ 47} "Equal protection under the law requires that no person or class of persons be denied the protection* afforded by the law to other persons or classes in like circumstances. * * * The Equal Protection Clause does not prevent all classification, however. It simply forbids laws that treat persons differently when they are otherwise alike in all relevant respects." State v. Alfieri (1998),
{¶ 48} In our recent decision inBarnesville,
{¶ 49} We upheld the dismissal of the Equal Protection Clause challenge in Barnesville. We explained that the statute did not infringe on the fundamental right to vote because the elected school board members were not removed; instead they retained all of their duties except those relevant to financial decision-making. Further, once the fiscal emergency ceased, the board would once again control the financial aspects as well. Id. at ¶ 34-37; accord,Shelby, 5th Dist. No. 06CA86,
{¶ 50} We also noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that "there is no constitutional right to an elected school board." Id. at ¶ 40, citing Sailorsv. Bd. of Edn. (1967),
{¶ 51} Based on our recent analysis inBarnesville, we reject appellants' Equal Protection Clause argument as well. Because none of appellants' various arguments have merit, we overrule appellants' first assignment of error in total.
{¶ 53} "After the pleadings are closed but within such times as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Civ. R. 12(C). A *Page 98
Civ. R. 12(C) motion is specifically limited to resolving questions of law. Case W. Reserve Univ. v. Friedman
(1986),
{¶ 54} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that this type of dismissal is appropriate only when "a court (1) construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." State ex rel Midwest PrideIV, Inc. v. Pontious (1996),
{¶ 55} In considering a motion under Civ. R. 12(C), the trial court can consider only the face of the pleadings; the motion cannot be supported by facts outside the pleadings. Epperly v. Medina City Bd. of Edn. (1989),
{¶ 56} Further, appellate review of a Civ. R. 12(C) motion is de novo, and a reviewing court will reverse a judgment on the pleadings if the plaintiffs can prove a set of facts that would entitle them to relief. Flanagan,
{¶ 57} The trial court's decision to grant the board's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings in this case concerned appellants' claim that the appointment of the commission and its subsequent reduction in the district's teacher workforce violated appellants' collective-bargaining agreement and thus violates their constitutional right to enter into contracts.
{¶ 58} R.C.
{¶ 59} "(A) A school district financial planning and supervision commission has the following powers, duties, and functions: * * * (11) To make reductions in force to bring the school district's budget into balance, notwithstanding * * * any collective bargaining agreement entered into on or after November 21, 1997."
{¶ 60} In Barnesville,
{¶ 61} Here, appellants argue that R.C. Chapter
{¶ 62} However, the actual collective-bargaining agreement in effect and attached to appellants' second amended complaint is dated September 1, 2001, to August 31, 2004.
{¶ 63} Again, the facts in this case are strikingly similar to those in Barnesville. The plaintiffs in that case, which included an education association, claimed their agreement was violated by the subsequently enacted R.C. Chapter
{¶ 64} This court, however, rejected this argument, finding:
{¶ 65} "[T]he parties' extension of contractual rights in a new contract does not affect the expiration date of the prior contract for purposes of the Contract Clause. In fact, R.C.
{¶ 66} "`No agreement shall contain an expiration date that is later than three years from the date of execution. The parties may extend any agreement, but the extensions do not affect the expiration date of the original agreement.'
{¶ 67} "For all of these reasons, a statute effective in 1996 and a statutory provision effective in 1997 do not act to impair existing contractual obligations where those laws were applied to impair obligations granted under an agreement that was not executed until 2001. The Contract Clause is not implicated, and we thus need not analyze the public purpose or propriety of the method for attaining that purpose under any test set forth by appellants. This assignment of error is without merit." Id. at ¶ 60-62.
{¶ 68} In the instant case, appellants' agreement was not executed until 2001. As such, the statute in question is not subsequent legislation impairing appellants' contract rights. Based on this court's recent analysis of the almost identical issue in Barnesville, we overrule appellants' second assignment of error. *Page 100
{¶ 70} This assignment of error takes issue with the trial court's conclusion that the board was not required to submit a written financial-recovery plan pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 71} "Within sixty days of the auditor's declaration [of the existence of a fiscal watch] under division (A) of section
{¶ 72} We must once more state that appellants have not established their standing to challenge the auditor's determination that a state of fiscal emergency existed. R.C.
{¶ 73} As appellants contend, the trial court essentially found that the board was not required to submit a plan pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 74} The trial court recognized that the board could have filed a plan in this case as required by R.C.
{¶ 75} R.C.
{¶ 76} It appears that a board cannot escape the statutory requirement to prepare a fiscal plan on the basis that any proposed plan will be unsuccessful. The consequences of the failure to submit a plan, though, are also set forth in the statute. R.C.
{¶ 77} Although it is clear that the board was required to submit a fiscal plan, we agree with the trial court that the board's failure to submit a financial plan was harmless because it was not the sole basis for the fiscal-emergency determination. We agree with the trial court's determination that the declaration of fiscal emergency would have been declared "no matter what plan the School Board filed." Further, the auditor had another basis for declaring the fiscal emergency — the school district had been operating at more than a ten percent deficit. R.C.
{¶ 78} For the reasons cited above, we overrule appellants' third assignment of error.
{¶ 79} In conclusion, we hold that appellants have no standing to challenge the auditor's declaration of fiscal emergency or the individual determinations that went into the auditor's decision-making process in making that declaration. R.C. Chapter
Judgment affirmed.
DEGENARO, P.J., and DONOFRIO, J., concur. *Page 103
Flanagan v. Williams , 87 Ohio App. 3d 768 ( 1993 )
Coventry Twp. v. Ecker , 101 Ohio App. 3d 38 ( 1995 )
Conant v. Johnson , 1 Ohio App. 2d 133 ( 1964 )
Case Western Reserve Univ. v. Friedman , 33 Ohio App. 3d 347 ( 1986 )
State v. Alfieri , 132 Ohio App. 3d 69 ( 1998 )
McGee v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. , 103 Ohio App. 3d 236 ( 1995 )
Sailors v. Board of Ed. of Kent Cty. , 87 S. Ct. 1549 ( 1967 )