State v. Rodano

[Cite as State v. Rodano, 2017-Ohio-1034.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 104176
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
DALE RODANO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-14-590106-A
BEFORE: McCormack, P.J., E.T. Gallagher, J., and Stewart, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 23, 2017
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Michael J. Cheselka
75 Public Square, Suite 920
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O’Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Kerry A. Sowul
Andrew T. Gatti
Assistant County Prosecutors
Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
TIM McCORMACK, P.J.:
{¶1} A fire erupted in appellant-defendant Dale Rodano’s residence five weeks
after he obtained insurance on the house. The insurance company and the police
suspected arson. A jury ultimately convicted Rodano of three counts of aggravated
arson and one count of insurance fraud. After a careful review of the record and
applicable law, we affirm Rodano’s convictions.
Substantive Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On November 7, 2013, five weeks after Rodano obtained insurance on his
house in Parma, Ohio from Allstate Insurance, a fire erupted in the house around 2:00
p.m. Twenty-three firefighters in Parma’s fire department responded to the fire.
{¶3} Rodano claimed the fire started when one of his pets knocked over a candle
on a living room table while he was asleep in a chair in the living room. However,
Agent Joanna Lambert of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) issued a report that opined that the fire was incendiary; State Fire Marshall
Jeffrey Koehn investigated the fire and reached the same conclusion.
{¶4} On October 28, 2014, the grand jury indicted Rodano of four counts of
aggravated arson and one count of insurance fraud.
{¶5} The trial was initially scheduled for June 1, 2015. On the day of trial,
Rodano’s appointed counsel moved to withdraw because Rodano was unhappy with
counsel’s performance. The trial was continued to January 19, 2016. While preparing
for the trial, Agent Lambert reviewed her report and, upon further review, she changed
the conclusion of her report from “incendiary” to “undetermined” and issued a second
report concluding the cause of the fire was “undetermined.” Fire Marshall Jeffrey
Koehn, however, did not change his report and did not testify at trial.
{¶6} At the week-long trial, the state presented testimony from Rodano’s
acquaintance Lawrence Scott Allen, his girlfriend at the time Tracy Correll, his brother
David Rodano, his neighbor Scott Thom, whose house sustained damage in the fire, four
firefighters, two Allstate employees, and Agent Joanna Lambert. Rodano presented
three witnesses to testify on his behalf.
Trial Testimony
{¶7} Lawrence Scott Allen, an acquaintance of Rodano, testified that he told
Jeffrey Koehn, the state fire marshall in charge of the investigation of this case, about a
conversation he had with Rodano in the summer of 2012. In the conversation Rodano
entertained the idea of torching his house to collect on the insurance. Rodano
specifically mentioned a scenario where “a Christmas tree could conveniently fall over
and knock a candle over.” Scott Allen later did some plumbing work on Rodano’s
house. After the fire, he received a call from Rodano. Rodano told him the fire started
when he was asleep and one of the pets knocked over a candle and the couch caught on
fire. On cross examination, Allen admitted there was tension between the two after he
asked Rodano to file an insurance claim for an injury Allen sustained in Rodano’s home
but Rodano refused.
{¶8} Tracy Correll lived in Rodano’s Parma house for almost seven years. She
moved out in the first week of October 2013 because of Rodano’s problems with alcohol.
She testified that they had candles in the house, but they were mostly for decoration and
lit only at Christmas. She recalled Rodano talked about fire, remarking that “people
light their stuff on fire all the time, Tracy. You know, they can’t [really] prove nothing
if you don’t use an accelerant * * *.” Before she moved out in October of 2013, she
asked to take her personal belongings, to which Rodano responded, “Bitch, I’ll burn your
shit down before I give it back to you.”
{¶9} Dale Rodano’s brother, David Rodano, testified that in September or
October of 2013, his brother Dale told him that “he’s going to be rich” and that “he was
going to set his house on fire and that he was going to tell anybody that asked that the cat
and the dog were running around the house and knocked a candle over and that’s what
caused the fire.” When David Rodano commented that the excuse sounded “phoney,”
his brother responded that “it doesn’t really matter because you’re innocent until proven
guilty” and “nobody would be able to prove that he burned his house down.” David
Rodano described his brother as drunk and angry at the time he made these statements.
Two weeks after the fire, Dale Rodano told his brother “not only that he was going to get
money from it, but that he had raised the payout on his insurance company.” As David
Rodano testified, “[Dale] was laughing about it because * * * it was like he tricked the
insurance man,” and he felt that he “was going to get away with this because the report
that the fire marshal[l] made said that the fire originated on the front porch, and [Dale]
says that he knew for a fact that that was incorrect and that the fire started in his living
room.” David Rodano testified that his brother did not tell him how the fire started but
only that “he was going to tell people that the cat and the dog were running around and
knocked a candle over and that’s what caused the fire.”
{¶10} Four firefighters of Parma’s fire department testified regarding their
response to the fire and the scope, intensity, duration, and spread of the fire. The state’s
exhibits included photographs of the house in flames and the extensive damages to the
house.
{¶11} Although Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment alleged victims Scott Thom and
Norman Thom, only the former testified. Scott Thom was Rodano’s next-door neighbor.
He testified that around the time of the fire, he was recovering from back surgery.
Sometime in the afternoon on the day of the fire, Rodano pounded on Thom’s door. By
the time he answered the door, Rodano had already gone to another neighbor, Len
Ziegler, who lived two doors down from Rodano’s house. Thom saw Rodano on his
knee in the yard, yelling for people to call 911. The fire department responded within
minutes. Thom’s house sustained damage from the fire — its vinyl siding melted from
the intense heat.
{¶12} Two Allstate Insurance employees also testified. Their testimony indicated
that Rodano obtained a homeowner policy for his residence on October 2, 2013.
Initially, Tracy Correll was on the policy as well. After she moved out, Rodano made
frequent phone calls to the insurance company to ensure that she was removed from the
insurance policy. She was removed on October 25, 2013. After the fire, Rodano
frequently expressed his frustration about the slow process of being paid on his policy.
In addition to the value of the home, he claimed over $77,000 in personal property
damaged by the fire.
{¶13} Agent Joanna Lambert of the ATF conducted an investigation on the cause
of the fire. She testified that she initially concluded that a couch on the porch was the
origin of the fire and the fire was incendiary, after she eliminated all other reasonable
sources of ignition. As she prepared for the trial and reviewed her initial report,
however, she began to have concerns about the origin of the fire due to the extent of
damage sustained by the couch in the living room. When she further analyzed the data
collected from the scene, she placed the origin of the fire in a living room couch, which
was by the window looking out to the porch. Agent Lambert’s further research and
analysis focused on a candle on a living room table.
{¶14} From this further investigation, Agent Lambert issued a second report. She
opined that there was a viable ignition source in the living room. However, she did not
know where the candle was located and how and where it had ended up, because the fire
department personnel could not recall whether the glass base of the candle was recovered
from inside the footprint of the couch or outside. She could not conclusively eliminate
the cause of fire as an accident. However, she was unable to eliminate the fire as
incendiary either. As a result, she ruled the cause of the fire as undetermined.
{¶15} The state solicited testimony from Agent Lambert regarding the rarity of a
fire caused by a candle being knocked over. Her research indicated that out of the
approximately 10,000 fires per year caused by candles, only two percent could be
attributable to a candle being knocked over. Lambert did acknowledge that there were
documented fire incidents caused by pets knocking over candles.
{¶16} The defense called four witnesses. Leonard Ziegler testified he lived two
doors down from Rodano’s house. Rodano told him the fire started while he was asleep
in the living room when one of his pets knocked a candle off a table onto an adjacent
couch. Ziegler remembered having seen a dog in Rodano’s yard on a prior occasion.
Emily Henceroth, whose family were the prior owners of the home that was the subject
house, testified that she sold the house in 1999 to Rodano. Rodano made several
improvements to the house between 2010 and 2013. The third defense witness was
Matthew Slotka, Vice President of Ohio Fire Claims, a public adjusting company hired by
Rodano to represent him in submitting claims to Allstate. He testified that he conducted
an inventory of proof of loss but Allstate denied his claim.
{¶17} The defense’s arson expert, John Agosti, presented his finding that the
candle in the living room was the source of the fire and its flame ignited the couch.
Agosti testified that the fire department’s removal of the candle from the spot it was
originally found made it impossible for him to determine whether the fire was
intentionally or accidentally started. He also concluded that the cause of the fire was
“undetermined.”
{¶18} The defense moved for Crim.R. 29 dismissal after the state presented its
case in chief and again after the defense presented its evidence. The trial court denied
the motions. The state dismissed Count 4, which related to a purported victim Norman
Thom. After deliberation, the jury found Rodano guilty of the remaining four counts:
three counts of aggravated arson and one count of insurance fraud. The trial court
sentenced him to 6 years in prison on each aggravated arson count and 36 months on the
insurance fraud, to be served concurrently. The court also imposed postrelease control
and advised Rodano of his duties to register as an arson offender. Rodano now
appeals, presenting three assignments of error for our review.
Grand Jury
{¶19} The first assignment of error states:
The prosecution erred in proceeding on the October 3, 2013 indictment
because it was issued it [sic] in violation of Rodano’s Fifth Amendment
right to be indicted by an independent and unbiased grand jury and because
that violation prejudiced Appellant.
{¶20} The first assignment of error relates to Agent Lambert’s change of her
opinion regarding the cause of fire from “incendiary” to “undetermined” subsequent to
the grand jury proceeding but before the trial. She testified at trial at length as to both
her initial and second report and the reasons for the change in her conclusion.
{¶21} As an initial matter, we note that Rodano did not challenge the grand jury’s
indictment at the trial court. Therefore, we review his claim for plain error. State v.
Long, 53 Ohio St. 2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). An error constitutes plain error if it is
obvious and affects a substantial right. State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St. 3d 227,
2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 108. Plain error exists where “but for the error, the
outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.” Id. at ¶ 108, citing Long,
paragraph two of the syllabus. We take notice of plain error with the utmost caution and
the burden of demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting the error. State v.
Jester, 32 Ohio St. 3d 147, 150, 512 N.E.2d 962 (1987).
{¶22} Both Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment to the Unites States Constitution provide that prosecution for capital offenses
or felonies shall be instituted by grand jury indictments. Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359, 362, 76 S. Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed.397 (1956). The grand jury’s responsibilities
include both “the determination whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has
been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.”
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974). The
grand jury sits not to determine guilt or innocence, but to assess whether there is adequate
basis for bringing a criminal charge. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51, 112
S. Ct. 1735, 118 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1992). “An indictment returned by a legally constituted
and unbiased grand jury * * * if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge
on the merits.” Costello at 363.
{¶23} Rodano does not claim on appeal that the indictment is deficient on its face;
neither does he claim ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in not moving to quash the
indictment. Rather, Rodano couches his argument in terms of a violation of his right to
an indictment by an independent and unbiased grand jury. He argues that, because the
grand jury’s indictment was based on Agent Lambert’s initial “faulty” report, the
indictment was not a product of “an investigative deliberation that is independent of both
the prosecuting attorney and the court,” citing United States v. Sigma Internatl., 244 F.3d
841,856 (11th Cir.2001).
{¶24} Rodano’s argument lacks clarity or cohesion. He predicates his claim on a
right to be indicted by an independent grand jury, but he does not articulate why the grand
jury’s investigative deliberation was not independent as a result of its consideration of a
report whose author changed her conclusion subsequent to the indictment.
{¶25} Rodano is essentially arguing that he was prejudiced by the grand jury’s
consideration of Agent Lambert’s first report instead of her second report. This claim is
apparently based on an assumption that the grand jury would not have indicted him if the
prosecutor had instead presented to the grand jury Agent Lambert’s second report, which
concluded that the cause of the fire was undetermined.
{¶26} Rodano’s claim of prejudice is without merit. This arson case, as we
discuss in the following, turns primarily on a significant amount of circumstantial
evidence in the form of corroborating testimony from multiple witnesses. More
importantly, we note that “[t]he indictment is not evidence, as every petit jury in a
criminal case is instructed. The prosecution must still produce evidence from which the
trial jury can find every element of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or the
defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal.” United States v. Short, 671 F.2d 178,
183 (6th Cir.1982). “[T]he prosecution’s evidence is tested at trial, not in a preliminary
proceeding.” Id.
{¶27} Furthermore, the court’s supervisory power to review grand jury
proceedings is limited to prevent fundamental unfairness. State v. Hill, 2015-Ohio-2389,
37 N.E.3d 822, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S.
250, 256-257, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 101 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1988). “An error is ‘fundamental’
when ‘the structural protections of the grand jury have been so compromised as to render
the proceedings fundamentally unfair, allowing the presumption of prejudice.’” Id.,
quoting Bank of Nova Scotia.
{¶28} Here, the prosecutor presented to the grand jury the ATF agent’s report
available to the prosecutor at the time. Although the grand jury did not consider her
second report (issued long after the grand jury proceeding), the prosecution’s evidence is
tested at trial, not in the grand jury proceeding. Short at 183. At trial, Agent Lambert
testified at great length before the jury regarding her change of opinion regarding the
cause of the fire from “incendiary” to “undetermined.” Based on the record before us,
we do not find the grand jury proceeding in this case fundamentally unfair resulting in
prejudice to the defendant. There is no reversible error, plain or otherwise, regarding the
grand jury proceeding. The first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶29} The second and third assignments of error state:
2. The evidence is insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction of
Count 1.
3. The evidence is insufficient to support convictions of aggravated
arson in Counts 2 and 3.
{¶30} Count 1 of the indictment charged Rodano with causing harm to his
residence under R.C. 2929.02(A)(2). Count 2 charged him with causing harm to Scott
Thom’s residence also under R.C. 2929.02(A)(2). Count 3 charged him with creating a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to Scott Thom under R.C. 2929.02(A)(1).
Under the second assignment of error, Rodano claims the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction of Count 1. Under the second assignment of error, he claims the
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of Counts 2 and 3.
Sufficiency of Evidence
{¶31} Rodano was convicted of three counts of aggravated arson as defined in
R.C. 2929.02. The aggravated arson statute states:
(A) No person, by means of fire or explosion, shall knowingly do any of
the following:
(1) Create a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person other
than the offender;
(2) Cause physical harm to any occupied structure; * * *.
{¶32} When reviewing a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine
the evidence admitted at trial and determine whether such evidence, if believed, would
convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). “The relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶33} A sufficiency challenge requires us to review the record to determine
whether the state presented evidence on each of the elements of the offense. This test
involves a question of law and does not allow us to weigh the evidence. State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶34} For his conviction of aggravated arson relating to his residence (Count 1),
Rodano argues that when the state’s expert could not determine the cause of the fire, the
state’s evidence cannot prove arson beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
{¶35} “Proof of guilt may be made by circumstantial evidence, real evidence, and
direct evidence, or any combination of the three, and all three have equal probative
value.” State v. Zadar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94698, 2011-Ohio-1060, ¶ 18. Direct
evidence exists when “a witness testifies about a matter within the witness’s personal
knowledge such that the trier of fact is not required to draw an inference from the
evidence to the proposition that it is offered to establish.” State v. Cassano, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 97228, 2012-Ohio-4047, ¶ 13. In contrast, “circumstantial evidence
requires the drawing of inferences that are reasonably permitted by the evidence.” Id.
See also State v. Hartman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90284, 2008-Ohio-3683, ¶ 37
(“[c]ircumstantial evidence is the proof of facts by direct evidence from which the trier of
fact may infer or derive by reasoning other facts in accordance with the common
experience of mankind”).
{¶36} Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same
probative value. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph one of the
syllabus. “Although there are obvious differences between direct and circumstantial
evidence, those differences are irrelevant to the probative value of the evidence —
circumstantial evidence carries the same weight as direct evidence.” Cassano at ¶ 13,
citing State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St. 3d 460, 485, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001). “Since
circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are indistinguishable so far as the jury’s
fact-finding function is concerned, all that is required of the jury is that it weigh all of the
evidence, direct and circumstantial, against the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jenks at 272. “‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be
more certain, satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence.’” State v. Hawthorne, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96496, 2011-Ohio-6078, quoting Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers,
Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330, 81 S. Ct. 6, 5 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1960).
{¶37} “A conviction can be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone.”
State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St. 3d 118, 124, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991), citing State v. Nicely, 39
Ohio St. 3d 147, 154-55, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988). A conviction of arson is no
exception. As is often in the arson cases, there is no eyewitnesses to the arson; proof of
arson, out of necessity, must often rely on circumstantial evidence. State v. Hall, 5th
Dist. Richland No. 2004-CA-0093, 2005-Ohio-4403, ¶ 31. Thus, “Ohio’s courts have
consistently found that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to sustain an arson
conviction.” State v. Simpson, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 01-CO-29, 2002-Ohio-5374, ¶
47, citing State v. Webb, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 72588, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2851
(June 25, 1998). See also, e.g. State v. McDowall, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 09AP-443,
09AP-444, 2009-Ohio-6902, ¶ 12 (while the arson case turns on circumstantial evidence,
the defendant’s conviction can be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone);
State v. Simpson, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 01-CO-29, 2002-Ohio-5374.
{¶38} In this case, while the state’s expert was unable to determine the cause of the
fire to aid the jury as to the question of whether the fire was the result of arson, the state
presented three witnesses who testified that, prior to the November 7, 2013 fire, Rodano
talked about arson for insurance money on multiple occasions. Two witnesses recalled
that Rodano specifically mentioned a scenario of a fire started by a candle being knocked
over, which was exactly how Rodano claimed the November 7, 2013 fire started.
Allstate employees testified that Rodano obtained insurance on his residence on October
2, 2013, five weeks before the fire, and contacted the insurance company repeatedly to
ensure Tracy Correll was removed from the policy after she moved out some time in
October of 2013. Rodano also inflated the value of personal property damage by the
fire.
{¶39} Although the ATF agent could not determine the cause of the fire as being
accidental or incendiary, Rodano made incriminating statements to three witnesses
hinting at a plot of arson for insurance money. Viewed in a light most favorable to the
state, the strong circumstantial evidence presented by the state here would convince the
average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The second
assignment of error is without merit.
{¶40} The third assignment of error concerns the two counts of aggravated arson
relating to damages to Scott Thom’s residence (Count 2) and the risk of harm to the
person Scott Thom (Count 3). Under Count 2, the state must prove Rodano knowingly
caused physical harm to Scott Thom’s residence. R.C. 2929.02(A)(2). Under Count 3,
the state must prove Rodano knowingly created a substantial risk of serious physical harm
to Scott Thom. R.C. 2929.02(A)(1). Thom testified that his house’s vinyl siding melted
from the heat generated by the fire.
{¶41} Regarding these two counts, the issue is whether Rodano, by starting a fire
in his own house, “knowingly” caused physical harm to his neighbor Scott Thom’s
residence and knowingly created a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Scott
Thom.
{¶42} R.C. 2901.22(B) defines the mental state of “knowingly” as follows:
A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that
his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a
certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware
that such circumstances probably exist.
{¶43} “The element of knowledge required for a finding of aggravated arson can
be established by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Worthy, 11th Dist. Lake No.
2004-L-137, 2005-Ohio-5871, ¶ 35, citing State v. Hoak, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
94-CA00-59-17, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3335, 10, and State v. Simpson, 7th Dist.
Columbiana Nos. 01-CO-29, 2002-Ohio-5374, ¶ 48. “Commonly, there is no direct
evidence of a defendant’s state of mind so the state must rely on circumstantial evidence
to satisfy this element of its case. A defendant’s state of mind may be inferred from the
totality of the surrounding circumstances.” (Citation omitted.) In re Horton, 4th Dist.
Adams No. 04CA794, 2005-Ohio-3502, ¶ 23.
{¶44} Pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(B), the state was only required to produce
evidence to show that Rodano was aware that his conduct “will probably” cause physical
harm to Scott Thom’s residence (Count 2) and create a substantial risk of serious harm to
Scott Thom (Count 3). R.C. 2901.22(B). Regarding a “substantial risk,” R.C.
2901.01(A)(8) defines it as “a strong possibility, as contrasted with remote or significant
possibility, that a certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist.”
{¶45} Although there was no testimony regarding whether the fire could have
easily spread to the neighbor’s house, or how close the two houses are, the state
introduced exhibit Nos. 1 and 2 (through Firefighter James Mitchell’s testimony), which
are photographs depicting Rodano’s house in flames and these photographs show the
close proximity of Thom’s house and Rodano’s house, which sit on small city lots. The
testimony that Rodano immediately ran to Thom’s residence to alert him of the fire also
evinces Rodano’s knowledge and awareness of the strong possibility of harm to Thom
and his residence.
{¶46} Therefore, the state produced sufficient evidence, although circumstantial,
that Rodano was aware that his conduct “will probably” cause physical harm to Scott
Thom’s residence and create a substantial risk of serious harm to Scott Thom, from which
the jury could infer that Rodano acted “knowingly.” Rodano’s convictions of Counts 2
and 3 are supported by sufficient evidence. The third assignment of error is without
merit.
{¶47} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________________________________________
TIM McCORMACK, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and
MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR