State v. Iden

[Cite as State v. Iden, 2020-Ohio-176.]
COURT OF APPEALS
MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
-vs- :
:
JOHN J. IDEN : Case No. CT2019-0004
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case. No. CR2017-0329
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: January 21, 2020
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
TAYLOR P. BENNINGTON JEFFERY M. BLOSSER
27 North Fifth Street 765 South High Street
P.O. Box 189 Columbus, OH 43206
Zanesville, OH 43701
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 2
Wise, Earle, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant John J. Iden appeals the January 3, 2019 judgment of
conviction and sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, Ohio.
Plaintiff-Appellee is the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On the morning of September 26, 1998, Robert Kremer drove to the Dillon
State Park hunting area in Nashport Ohio to do some groundhog hunting. As he drove
down a gravel access road into the park, he came upon a half-naked, blood-soaked
woman standing in a field off the side of the road. Kremer stopped, grabbed a blanket he
had in his truck and approached the woman.
{¶ 3} Kremer observed the woman was bleeding profusely from a horrible injury
on the top of her head. She was shaking, appeared to be in shock, and could only say
"help." Kremer wrapped the blanket around the woman and attempted to call 911, but had
no cell phone reception. He put the woman into his truck, drove back to the main road
and tried again. Unsuccessful, Kremer drove further up the road to a home and asked the
occupants to phone for help.
{¶ 4} Muskingum County Sheriff's Office Lieutenant Franklin Pete Fisher arrived
on the scene at approximately 9:30 a.m. to find the bloodied woman seated in Kremer's
truck, wrapped in the blanket and otherwise wearing nothing but a t-shirt and one sock.
He attempted to speak to the woman, but she was incoherent. Fisher could not even
determine her name. Detective Steve Welker arrived second on the scene, and then
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 3
Natural Resource Officer Mike Reed. Welker stayed with the woman to await an
ambulance while Fisher and Reed followed Kremer back to where he found the woman.
{¶ 5} The men searched the area where the woman was found. Fisher eventually
located a pile of clothing – jeans, tennis shoes and underwear. Leading up to the area
where the clothing was found, he additionally found bloody drag marks on the ground and
a pool of blood. Fischer called for an evidence technician to process the scene.
{¶ 6} Meanwhile, Detective Welker accompanied the woman to Good Samaritan
Hospital. Once there he could see she had a serious head injury. Her skull was visible in
several places. She also had other injuries over her entire body which Welker
photographed. Although she was in and out of consciousness, Welker eventually got the
woman's name, J.M., a phone number for her aunt, and the fact that she had been
physically and sexually assaulted by one person.
{¶ 7} Nurse Vickie Bell completed a rape kit on J.M. that morning which was later
transferred to the Bureau of Criminal Investigations (BCI) for testing. She completed the
appropriate steps and collected the appropriate samples.
{¶ 8} J.M's aunt, T.H arrived at the emergency room and spoke with law
enforcement. She advised that J.M had been out with her friend Ricky Allen the evening
before and that detectives should speak with him. J.M's mother wanted Allen arrested
because before J.M. went into surgery, she told her mother Allen had done this. Later,
however, J.M. told her aunt John Iden had done this to her. T.H. passed this information
on to law enforcement.
{¶ 9} J.M's injuries were extensive, and potentially fatal. She was seen in the
emergency room by a neurosurgeon, Dr. Michael Bruce Shannon. J.M had linear
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 4
lacerations to her face, neck and extremities. These were torn-tissue lacerations as
opposed to cut lacerations, some of which required sutures. J.M. additionally had bruises
and linear abrasions on her arms, legs and buttocks consistent with the drag marks
observed by Fischer at the scene. She also suffered a posterior depressed skull fracture.
Shannon opined these injuries were inflicted, and not caused by a fall or other accident.
He further opined J.M. had been held down, partially strangled, and that she had
attempted to fight off her attacker.
{¶ 10} Dr. Shannon performed the surgery to repair J.M's skull. He removed debris
and bone fragments and repaired a tear in the dura, the thick protective membrane
encasing the brain, and from which J.M's spinal fluid was leaking. He then closed the
scalp. J.M later required 2 additional surgeries. One when the bones in her skull became
infected, and a second to repair the defect in her skull and add a skin graft to close the
area. J.M. was left permanently scarred.
{¶ 11} J.M.'s brain injury may have been more severe had she not been
hypothermic upon arrival in the emergency room. Still, the portion of J.M's brain that was
injured impacted speech, understanding, and both short and long-term memory. These
deficits are permanent. J.M was unable to recall the event that left her with life-threatening
injuries.
{¶ 12} A few days after arriving at the hospital, J.M. was also seen by gynecologist
Dr. John Lepi. Lepi's vaginal exam revealed a half-inch tear at J.M.'s posterior fourchette,
the area between her vagina and rectum. The tear had begun to heal on its own. Dr. Lepi
further observed on the right side of J.M's vagina, and to the right of her cervix, an area
of denuded epithelium. In other words, the inside surface layer of the vagina had been
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 5
abraded. Lepi explained this was indicative of some type of forced entry which would not
occur with normal intercourse.
{¶ 13} The subsequent investigation in to this matter revealed that J.M. was at her
neighbor's house around 12:30 a.m. where Ricky Allen was also visiting. When Allen said
he was leaving to go to a bar, J.M. asked if she could ride along. The two went to a bar
called the Lighthouse and split up. Later, while Allen was dancing, J.M. approached and
introduced him to a man Allen believed she had picked up – Iden. She told Allen that they
were leaving and Iden would give her a ride home.
{¶ 14} Allen got home around 3:30 a.m. Later that day, he discovered Detective
Stutes of the Muskingum County Sheriff's Department wanted to talk to him about J.M.
Allen spoke with Stutes, and cooperated fully. He told Stutes what he knew and permitted
Stutes to search his car and seize the clothing he had been wearing the evening before.
Later testing of these items revealed nothing of evidentiary value. Presented with a photo
array, Allen identified Iden as the man J.M. left the Lighthouse with.
{¶ 15} Detective Stutes was able to speak with J.M on September 28, 1998, even
though she was in critical condition. She identified her attacker as "Mark," said she worked
with him at Union Tools, and that he had given her a ride to and from work a few times.
She also recalled he drove a white Ford Tempo. She told Stutes they had been to the
Lighthouse, City Limits, and Beach Ridge bars. She had no recollection, however, of
events from the time she left the Beach Ridge until she woke up in the hospital.
{¶ 16} Following up on this information, detectives retraced J.M.'s travels on the
night in question. They spoke with Lighthouse bartender Darlena Compton, who stated
J.M. is her cousin and that she saw J.M. at the Lighthouse in the early morning hours of
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 6
September 26, 1998. Compton stated J.M. arrived with Ricky Allen, but left with John
Iden. Compton had not met Iden before that evening, but J.M. told her his name, that they
worked together, and he was giving her a ride home. Compton also stated J.M. was
drinking that night.
{¶ 17} Detectives next spoke with City Limits bartender Jennifer Harris-Winters.
Harris-Winters recalled J.M. because she refused to serve her as she had no
identification. J.M. was not happy about this and "created a bit of a scene" before leaving.
J.M. told Harrris-Winters she and the male she was with were going to go to the Beach
Ridge Lounge where she could get served. Harris-Winters was not familiar with J.M. or
the man she was with.
{¶ 18} Detectives then spoke with bartender Kim Erdy who worked at the Beach
Ridge Lounge the morning in question. Erdy went to high school with J.M. and confirmed
she was at the Beach Ridge after midnight with a younger looking, dark-haired male.
Presented with a photo array, Erdy identified Iden as the man with J.M. Erdy recalled J.M.
drinking shots of tequila, and Iden having a beer. Although Erdy knew the two stayed at
the bar until closing, she did not see them leave.
{¶ 19} Detectives then spoke with bartender Glenna Sanborn, who is Erdy's
mother and also familiar with J.M. She too was working at the Beach Ridge the morning
in question. She recalled J.M. arriving at the bar with a young-looking male. He appeared
so young that Sanborn had the doormen double check his identification. Presented with
a photo array, Sanborn identified Iden as the man J.M. was with. She told detectives J.M.
was drinking shots of tequila. At closing, she saw J.M. and Iden leave together.
Additionally, across the street from the Beach Ridge was a truck stop that many
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 7
frequented for breakfast after the bars closed. Sanborn was there at 3:00 a.m. for
breakfast that morning and saw J.M. and Iden walking around the truck stop.
{¶ 20} Gregory Zigan, who knew J.M. from high school, and had previously met
Iden through a friend, was also at the truck stop that morning visiting his mother-in-law
who worked there. He too advised detectives that he saw J.M. and Iden walking around
the truck stop and picked Iden out of a photo array. He further advised that Iden
sometimes went by the name of Marcus, but his real name was John.
{¶ 21} As evidence quickly turned the investigation from Allen to Iden, detectives
set out to find Iden. They arrived at his home just as he was leaving in a white Ford
Tempo. He was stopped, and the vehicle seized.
{¶ 22} Detective Stutes spoke with Iden regarding his whereabouts on September
25-26, 1998. According to Iden he was at the Eagles with his mother and stepfather where
he saw J.M. and another woman around 12:15 a.m. The three then went to the Beach
Ridge where J.M. did shots and he had a beer. Iden stated he lost track of the other
woman. He told Stutes J.M. was talking to one of the barmaids and another man who
offered her a ride home. He intervened and said he was J.M.'s ride. Iden stated that
shortly thereafter, he told J.M. they were leaving. He recalled it was around 1:00 or 1:15
a.m. Iden described J.M. as "bomb-shelled" and "totally out of it." He told Stutes she
passed out as soon as she got into his Ford Tempo, and that he took her straight home.
Iden said he knew J.M. lived with her aunt on Church Street because they worked
together and he gave her a ride to and from work from time to time. He claimed he
dropped her off there, needing to first shake her awake and then practically carry her to
the front porch where he left her because she did not want her aunt to know she had been
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 8
out drinking. Iden claimed he was in bed by 2:30 a.m. He additionally claimed he was
unfamiliar with the Dillon State Park area.
{¶ 23} Muskingum County Sheriff's Department evidence technician Timothy
Hartmeyer processed the scene at Dillon State Park as well as Iden's Ford Tempo. At the
crime scene, Hartmeyer had recovered several items of clothing, shoes, underwear, and
a pair of urine-soaked jeans.
{¶ 24} While processing the Tempo, Hartmeyer noted that the inside of the right
front door of the car looked as though it had very recently been wiped down as it was
clean and the rest of the interior of the car was covered with a layer of dust. Hartmeyer
took several samples from suspect stains on the passenger side of the car, inside and
out. It also appeared to Hartmeyer that the passenger side front floor mat had recently
been removed, as the carpet underneath where it had been was clearly indented in the
shape of the missing mat. He further noted that there were balls of fiber at the crime scene
which were consistent with the carpet in the Tempo's floorboards. On the passenger seat
of the car was a tool box. Inside, there were tools with suspect stains, and in the bottom
of the box, fresh soapy water. In the trunk of the Tempo, there was a spare tire and a
jack, but no tire iron.
{¶ 25} On October 22, 1998, Detective Stutes requested further samples from
Iden's car because preliminary lab reports identified areas of blood. Ultimately, a blood
stain from inside the rear passenger side door was below reporting standards, but
consistent with J.M. Stains from the tools yielded no reportable results.
{¶ 26} Sometime shortly after the events of September 25-26, 1998, detectives
spoke with Iden's girlfriend at the time, Crystal Dunlap. Dunlap was also friends with
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 9
J.M. The first time detectives spoke with her, she offered nothing as she feared Iden.
The second time, however, Dunlap stated she had become suspicious of Iden's
possible involvement in J.M.'s rape and assault and asked him about the matter while
she was riding in his car. Iden responded by holding a crowbar across Dunlap's body
and stating "I did it to her and I can do it to you."
{¶ 27} In 1998, J.M's rape kit was processed at the BCI. The vaginal swabs and
smears tested and were negative for semen. As per policy at that time, therefore, no
further testing was done. In 2016, however, as part of a statewide initiative to re-test rape
kits using today's advanced technology, J.M's rape kit was resubmitted for testing. Upon
retesting, the perianal swab (the skin around the outside of the rectum) from the kit
identified a mixture of DNA, J.M.'s, as expected, and another profile consistent with Iden.
Allen was excluded from the mixture. The statistic for inclusion of Iden was 1 in 50,000.
{¶ 28} On September 20, 2017, the Muskingum County Grand Jury returned a six-
count indictment charging Iden as follows:
{¶ 29} Count one, kidnapping with sexual motivation, a felony of the first degree.
{¶ 30} Count two, rape, a felony of the first degree. This count contained a sexually
violent predator specification based upon Iden's two prior convictions for sexual battery.
{¶ 31} Count three, attempted murder, a felony of the first degree.
{¶ 32} Count four, felonious assault, a felony of the second degree.
{¶ 33} Count five, Kidnapping in order to terrorize of to inflict serious physical harm,
a felony of the first degree.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 10
{¶ 34} Count six, kidnapping with sexual motivation, a felony of the first degree.
This count contained a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator
specification.
{¶ 35} Iden pled not guilty to the charges and elected to proceed to a jury trial.
{¶ 36} Before trial, on July 2, 2018, the state filed a notice of intent to introduce
prior bad acts. In this motion the state outlined anticipated testimony from nine women
Iden had sexually assaulted in similar, albeit in less violent fashion, in his car and in the
same State Park or nearby rural area between 1994 and 1999. At trial, counsel for Iden
objected to presentation of testimony from any of the women, but the trial court granted
the motion over Iden's objection. The state ultimately presented testimony from five
women, A.T, M.C, R.F.S, C.O, and T.K.M., all of whom testified Iden forced them to
engage in sexual intercourse against their will, in his car, and in the Dillon State Park
area.
{¶ 37} The state further presented evidence from Iden's ex-wife, J.W., who testified
they would go to the Dillon State Park area to have sex while they were dating.
{¶ 38} J.M. testified as well, stating she recalled the evening of September 25-26,
1998, up until closing at the Beach Ridge Lounge. She does not recall leaving the Beach
Ridge, nor anything that happened thereafter until she woke up in the hospital. She further
had no recollection of anything she told law enforcement officials or anyone else
immediately thereafter.
{¶ 39} After hearing all the evidence, the jury was provided with instructions from
the trial court which included a limiting instruction as to the evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts. After deliberating, the jury found Iden guilty as charged. He was
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 11
subsequently sentenced to an aggregate total of 30 years to life and classified as a Tier
III sex offender.
{¶ 40} Iden filed an appeal, and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises one assignment of error:
I
{¶ 41} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF
WITNESSES WITH REGARD TO PRIOR BAD ACTS COMMITTED BY THE DENDANT."
{¶ 42} In his sole assignment of error, Iden argues the trial court erred in admitting
the testimony of alleged victims A.T., M.C., R.F.S., C.O., T.K.M., and Iden's ex-wife, J.W.
as their testimony was not inextricably related to the charged crimes so as to be part of
the same plan, scheme, or system, was not admissible to prove a behavioral fingerprint,
and was more prejudicial than probative. While we agree, we nonetheless find the error
harmless.
{¶ 43} The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St. 3d 173, 180, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987).
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. Evid.R. 402. Abuse of discretion means
more than an error of law or judgment. Rather, it implies that the court's attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217,
450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). Absent an abuse of discretion resulting in material prejudice to
the defendant, a reviewing court should be reluctant to interfere with a trial court's decision
in this regard. Sage, 31 Ohio St. 3d 173.
{¶ 44} Rule 404(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence and R.C. 2945.59 preclude
admission of other acts evidence to prove a character trait in order to demonstrate
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 12
conduct in conformity with that trait. State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St. 3d 521, 2012-Ohio-
5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 16. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an accused tending to show the plan with which an act
is done may be admissible for other purposes, such as those listed in Evid.R. 404(B); to
show "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident." In considering other acts evidence, trial courts should
conduct a three-step analysis. The first step is to consider whether the other acts evidence
is relevant to making any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Evid.R. 401. Next, the trial
court is to consider whether evidence of the other crimes, wrongs, or acts is presented to
prove the character of the accused in order to show activity in conformity therewith or
whether the other acts evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as those
stated in Evid.R. 404(B), proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Finally, a trial court is to consider
whether the probative value of the other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. See Evid.R 403, Williams, at ¶¶ 19-20.
{¶ 45} “Because R.C. 2945.59 and Evid.R. 404(B) codify an exception to the
common law with respect to evidence of other acts of wrongdoing, they must be construed
against admissibility, and the standard for determining admissibility of such evidence is
strict.” State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St. 3d 277, 281-82, 533 N.E.2d 682, (1988). As cautioned
by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St. 3d 527, 634 N.E.2d 616 (1994),
“... we therefore must be careful…to recognize the distinction between evidence which
shows that a defendant is the type of person who might commit a particular crime and
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 13
evidence which shows that a defendant is the person who committed a particular crime.”
Id. at 530, 634 N.E.2d 616. Evidence to prove the ‘type’ of person the defendant is to
show he acted in conformity therewith is barred by Evid.R. 404(B).
{¶ 46} In this matter, the state was permitted to introduce the testimony of five
women Iden raped in similar fashion to that of J.M. – in his car in the area of the Dillon
State Park, and threatened with harm if or when they resisted. The state was further
permitted to present testimony from Iden's ex-wife, to testify that she and Iden engaged
in consensual sex in the Dillon State Park area when they were dating.
{¶ 47} In its July 2, 2018 State's Notice of Intent to Use Prior Bad Acts, the state
argued this testimony was necessary to establish Iden's plan or method of operation. At
trial, counsel for Iden objected to any of the women being called to testify to prior bad acts
of Iden. The state responded that it should be permitted to introduce the evidence
because identity was at issue, and the testimony of the women was required to identify
J.M.'s attacker. T. 508-510. Here on appeal, the state argues the evidence was relevant
to prove Iden's motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and
absence of mistake or accident. The state further argues the evidence was presented to
identify the individual who kidnapped and assaulted J.M. because she could not
remember the attack.
{¶ 48} As an initial matter, we find the testimony of Iden's ex-wife, who stated she
and Iden would drive to the Dillon State Park when they were dating to have sex was
properly admitted.
{¶ 49} As to the remaining five women, all of whom testified they were raped by
appellant, we find this evidence was inadmissible for any of the reasons posed by the
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 14
state. Under the Williams test, therefore, we find the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting said evidence. First, the other acts evidence was of no significance in the
determination of what took place, or what facts were likely to exist regarding J.M. Next,
the testimony was not relevant to prove Iden's identity. Finally, the probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
{¶ 50} That said, our inquiry does not end there. In State v. Morris, 141 Ohio St. 3d
399, 2014-Ohio-5052, 24 N.E.3d 1153, at ¶ 25, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted “the
real issue when Evid.R. 404(B) evidence is improperly admitted at trial is whether a
defendant has suffered any prejudice as a result. If not, the error may be disregarded as
harmless error. And while courts may determine prejudice in a number of ways and use
language that may differ, they focus on both the impact that the offending evidence had
on the verdict and the strength of the remaining evidence. Both the error's impact on the
verdict and the weight of the remaining evidence must be considered on appellate
review.”
{¶ 51} In State v. Harris, 142 Ohio St. 3d 211, 2015-Ohio-166, 28 N.E.3d 1256, the
Court further observed:
Crim.R. 52(A) defines harmless error in the context of criminal cases
and provides: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Under the
harmless-error standard of review, “the government bears the
burden of demonstrating that the error did not affect the substantial
rights of the defendant.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Perry, 101 Ohio
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 15
St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 15, citing United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508
(1993). In most cases, in order to be viewed as “affecting substantial
rights,” “ ‘the error must have been prejudicial.’” State v. Fisher, 99
Ohio St. 3d 127, 2003-Ohio-2761, 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 7, quoting Olano
at 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770. Accordingly, Crim.R. 52(A) asks whether the
rights affected are “substantial” and, if so, whether a defendant has
suffered any prejudice as a result. State v. Morris, 141 Ohio St. 3d
399, 2014-Ohio-5052, 24 N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 24–25.
Recently, in Morris, a four-to-three decision, we examined the
harmless-error rule in the context of a defendant's claim that the
erroneous admission of certain evidence required a new trial. In that
decision, the majority dispensed with the distinction between
constitutional and non-constitutional errors under Crim.R. 52(A). Id.
at ¶ 22-24. In its place, the following analysis was established to
guide appellate courts in determining whether an error has affected
the substantial rights of a defendant, thereby requiring a new trial.
First, it must be determined whether the defendant was prejudiced
by the error, i.e., whether the error had an impact on the verdict. Id.
at ¶ 25 and 27. Second, it must be determined whether the error was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 28. Lastly, once
the prejudicial evidence is excised, the remaining evidence is
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 16
weighed to determine whether it establishes the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 29, 33.
Harris, ¶ 36–37.
{¶ 52} Here, despite the fact that J.M. could not recall the attack, abundant
evidence pointed to Iden.
{¶ 53} First, DNA evidence found Iden could not be excluded from the DNA found
on J.M.'s perianal swab. The statistic attached to this finding was 1 in 50,000. At trial, BCI
forensic scientist Andrea Dennis explained this statistic means "* * * [W]e would estimate
we would need to see the profiles of 50,000 unrelated individuals before we would expect
that profile to randomly occur again." Iden. While not the strongest DNA statistic, J.M.
was seen with Iden that evening, not 49,999 other men, and in the 3:00 a.m. hour when
according to Iden, he was home in bed.
{¶ 54} Next, five people saw J.M. with Iden on the evening in question; Compton,
Allen, Sanborn, Erdy, and Zigan. T. 355, 373, 378, 382-383, 386-388, 397-398, 408-410.
{¶ 55} J.M. told Compton that she knew Iden from work, that she trusted him and
that he was going to give her a ride home. T. 382-383. J.M introduced Iden to Allen before
they left the Lighthouse. Although Allen did not recall Iden's name, he later identified Iden
in a photo array as the man J.M. left the Lighthouse with. Sanborn saw the pair together
at the Beach Ridge, and saw them leave together at closing time. T. 350-351. She too
identified Iden in a photo array. T. 355. Erdy also saw the two at the Beach Ridge and
picked Iden out of a photo array. T. 396-399. Both Sanborn and Zigan saw Iden walking
around with J.M. at a truck stop after 3:00 a.m. T. 354, 356, 408-410. This discredited
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2019-0004 17
what Iden had told detectives – that they left the Beach Ridge at around 1 or 1:15, that
J.M. was "bomb shelled," had passed out in his car, and that he took her straight home
from the Beach Ridge. T. 678-680, 684.
{¶ 56} Third, at the hospital, J.M. told her aunt that Iden was to blame for her
injuries. T. 341, 671. J.M. later told Detective Stutes "Mark" did this to her. She further
told him they worked together at Union Tools, he gave her rides to and from work, and
that he drove a white Ford Tempo. T. 665-667. Zigan cleared up the issue with Iden's
alias, advising detectives that he goes by Marcus, but his name is John. T. 409-410.
{¶ 57} Fourth, Iden told Dunlap that he was responsible for J.M.'s injuries, and that
he could do the same to her. T. 641.
{¶ 58} Fifth, contrary to Iden's statement to law enforcement, Iden's ex-wife
established he was in fact familiar with the Dillon State Park.
{¶ 59} Finally, the jury was provided with a limiting instruction as to the other acts
testimony. T. ***** A jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court.
{¶ 60} The above testimony was more than sufficient to identify Iden and convict
him of the charged offenses. We therefore find the testimony of the five women did not
influence the verdict, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and when excised, the
remaining evidence establishes Iden's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore
overrule Iden's sole assignment of error.
{¶ 61} The judgment of conviction and sentence of the Muskingum County Court
of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Wise, Earle, J.
Delaney, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur.
EEW/rw