Kramer v. Union Eye Care Center Inc., Unpublished Decision (12-15-1999)

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made: Appellant, Krystal A. Kramer, appeals from the order of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas denying her Civ.R. 60(A) motion for relief from judgment on the issue of when post judgment interest on the prejudgment interest award began to accrue. We affirm.

On January 7, 1992, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee, Union Eye Care Center, Inc., alleging malpractice by Dr. Antochow, an optometrist. The cause of action arose out of an act of negligence by Dr. Antochow that occurred on August 11, 1986. On October 8, 1996, following a trial by jury, Appellant was awarded $300,000.00. On October 9, 1996, Appellant moved the court for prejudgment interest. A hearing was conducted on this matter on June 30, 1998.

On July 9, 1998, the court ruled that pursuant to R.C.1343.03, Appellant was entitled to prejudgment interest on the judgment at the rate of 10% per annum from August 11, 1986, until the date of the verdict, October 8, 1996. The court further ordered that post judgment interest shall run from the date of the journal entry, July 9, 1998, until the date that the judgment has been satisfied.

Appellant did not appeal the court's order regarding interest. Rather, believing the starting date for post judgment interest to be a clerical error in the judgment, Appellant filed a Civ.R. 60(A) motion seeking relief from judgment on July 14, 1998. Appellant requested that the court order that the post judgment interest begin to accrue on the date of the jury verdict and not on the date of the court's journal entry. On August 18, 1998, the court denied Appellant's motion holding that the original journal entry accurately reflected the court's decision. The court explained that it would be patently unfair to require Appellee to pay post judgment interest for the period of time the motion for prejudgment interest was pending because Appellee had no control over the court's docket or the time line upon which the motion was considered. Appellant timely appealed the court's ruling and raised one assignment of error for review.

While Appellant has appealed the denial of a Civ.R. 60(A) motion, she has appeared to argue that the trial court erred substantively by improperly limiting the time when post judgment interest was to accrue.

Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(A):

Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.

This rule is applied to inadvertent clerical errors, and cannot be used to add language which was deliberately excluded from a judgment. Dentsply International, Inc. v. Kostas (1985),26 Ohio App.3d 116, paragraph one of the syllabus. Furthermore, Civ.R. 60(A) does not authorize "changing something that was deliberately done." Londrico v. Delores C. Knowlton, Inc. (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 282, 285. This rule is meant to correct the "type of mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is apparent from the record and which does not involve a legal decision or judgment[.]". Dentsply,26 Ohio App.3d 116, paragraph two of the syllabus.

As the court intended to have post judgment interest accru