State v. Hyde

[Cite as State v. Hyde, 2020-Ohio-4383.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 109189
v. :
EDWARD HYDE, JR., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 10, 2020
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-98-368392-ZA
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Mary M. Frey, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Lester S. Potash, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Defendant-appellant Edward Hyde, Jr. (“Hyde”), appeals the trial
court’s decision to deny his motion to terminate the lifetime suspension of his
driving privileges. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
Background
In 1988, Hyde was convicted of one count of aggravated vehicular
homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06, a felony of the third degree, and three counts
of aggravated vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08, felonies of the fourth
degree, with an attendant D.U.I. specification on each count. Hyde was sentenced
to five years in prison and his driver’s license was suspended for life. His convictions
were affirmed on appeal in State v. Hyde, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77592, 2001 Ohio
LEXIS 81 (Jan. 11, 2001) (“Hyde I”).
On May 5, 2015, the trial court denied Hyde’s motion for termination
of suspension of his driving privileges, or for limited occupational privileges. That
decision was reversed in State v. Hyde, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103098, 2016-Ohio-
113 (“Hyde II”), wherein it was determined that the trial court relied on “outdated
case law” and made erroneous legal conclusions. Id. at ¶ 10 and 22. In Hyde II, this
court recognized that “the trial court’s reliance on the fact he committed the offenses
while under the influence was not a valid basis for denying his motion,” and the case
was remanded “for the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether ‘other
considerations’ weigh against terminating Hyde’s life suspension pursuant to R.C.
4510.54(D).” Id. at ¶ 17 and 27. In February 2017, the trial court granted Hyde
limited driving privileges for occupational, medical, and church purposes. In the
judgment entry, the trial court retained “the right to modify or terminate the
defendant’s limited driving privileges * * *.”
On September 23, 2019, over 30 years after his conviction, Hyde filed
a motion to terminate his driver’s license suspension and requested a hearing
pursuant to R.C. 4510.54. The state filed a brief in opposition to the motion on
October 3, 2019. On October 9, 2019, the trial court denied the motion upon
“consideration of the motion filed and the state’s brief in response[.]” Hyde timely
filed this appeal.
Law and Analysis
Hyde raises three assignments of error for our review. His first two
assignments of error challenge (1) the trial court’s issuance of a ruling before the
time for filing a reply brief, and (2) the clerk of courts’ erroneous service of the
electronic notification of the filing of the state’s brief in opposition upon Hyde and
not upon his counsel.
The Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no provision that
would require the trial court to allow for a reply brief before ruling on the motion at
issue. Hyde argues that Crim.R. 57(B) directs that in the absence of a procedure
under the criminal rules, the civil rules of procedure may be applied. Therefore, he
claims he was entitled to file a reply under a Civ.R. 6(C)(1).
Hyde misconstrues Crim.R. 57(B), which provides: “If no procedure
is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not
inconsistent with these rules of criminal procedure, and shall look to the rules of
civil procedure and to the applicable law if no rule of criminal procedure exists.” As
stated in Crim.R. 57(A)(1): “The expression ‘rule of court’ * * * means a rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court or a rule concerning local practice adopted by
another court that is not inconsistent with the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court and is filed with the Supreme Court.”
As applicable in this matter, Loc.R. 11(D) of the Court of Common
Pleas of Cuyahoga County, General Division, allows reply briefs to be filed “‘with
leave of the Court only upon a showing of good cause.’” Loc.R. 11(D) is not
inconsistent with the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure and is the applicable law
that governs in this matter.
Thus, the trial court was permitted to rule upon Hyde’s motion
without waiting for a reply brief. See State v. Chapman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
107158, 2019-Ohio-176, ¶ 16-17 (finding the trial court was permitted to rule on a
motion for leave for a new trial without waiting for a reply). Insofar as Hyde argues
that the clerk of courts erroneously sent notification of the filing of the brief in
opposition to him, as opposed to his counsel of record, we find no reversible error
occurred because the trial court was permitted to rule on the motion without a reply
and nothing prevented Hyde from requesting leave to file a reply after his motion
was denied. Accordingly, we overrule the first and second assignments of error.
Under his third assignment of error, Hyde claims the trial court
abused its discretion when denying his motion to terminate his driver’s license
suspension.
Hyde sought to terminate his driver’s license suspension pursuant to
R.C. 4510.54. The statute permits a defendant whose driver’s license has been
suspended for life or for a period in excess of fifteen years to “file a motion with the
sentencing court for modification or termination of the suspension.” The statute
requires the defendant to demonstrate that the requirements under R.C.
4510.54(A)(1)-(3) have been met. R.C. 4510.54(A).
Pursuant to R.C. 4510.54(B), the trial court has the discretion to
“deny the motion without a hearing, but shall not grant the motion without a
hearing.” The statute provides that “[i]f the motion is denied without a hearing, the
court may consider a subsequent motion filed by the defendant[,]” but “[i]f the court
denies the motion after a hearing, the court shall not consider a subsequent motion
for that person.” R.C. 4510.54(B).
Pursuant to R.C. 4510.54(D), “[b]efore ruling on the motion, the court
shall take into account the person’s driving record, the nature of the offense that led
to the suspension, and the impact of the offense on any victim.” R.C. 4510.54(D).
“The court may modify or terminate the suspension subject to any considerations it
considers proper if the court finds that allowing the person to drive is not a danger
to the public.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 4510.54(D).
Ultimately, the decision on whether to modify or terminate a driver’s
license suspension under R.C. 4510.54(D) rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Therefore, the trial court’s decision to deny appellant’s motion will not
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Bullington, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga Nos. 107266 and 107267, 2019-Ohio-351, ¶ 8-9. “‘When applying this
standard, an appellate court is not free to substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court.’” State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 255, 2002-Ohio-796, 762 N.E.2d 940,
quoting Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169, 559 N.E.2d 1301 (1990).
In this case, Hyde demonstrated compliance with all the
requirements set forth in R.C. 4510.54(A)(1)-(3) and the exclusions in R.C.
4510.54(F) do not apply. In support of his motion, appellant submitted a certificate
recognizing his employment service with the United States Department of Defense,
his driving record and criminal record, which revealed no further moving violations
or criminal offenses, proof of insurance, and other documents. The state’s brief in
opposition argued “the serious nature of Hyde’s offenses” and their impact. In
denying the motion, the trial court indicated that its ruling was made “in
consideration of the motion filed and the state’s brief in response.”
Although appellant argues that “the trial court’s order provides no
evidence of its consideration for this court to conduct a meaningful review,” the trial
court acted within its discretion in denying the motion and was not required to set
forth any reasons in its decision. As this court found in Bullington, the trial court’s
denial of a motion to terminate a driver’s license suspension without reasons or
explanation was not an abuse of discretion because the statute, which in that case
was R.C. 2925.03(G)(2), conferred the discretion to grant or deny the motion on the
trial court and did not require the trial court to engage in an analysis on the record.
Id. at ¶ 6 and 9.
We recognize that Hyde has demonstrated that he meets the
eligibility requirements under R.C. 4510.54(A), that his suspension was imposed
over 30 years ago, and as this court recognized in Hyde II, “he has remained a law-
abiding citizen since the charges and appears to have overcome his alcohol
addiction.” Hyde II, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103098, 2016-Ohio-113, at ¶ 22.
However, R.C. 4510.54(D) also instructs the court to take into account the nature of
the offense that led to the suspension and the impact of the offense on any victim,
and as acknowledged in Hyde II, “R.C. 4510.54(D) does allow the trial court
discretion in determining whether the modification or termination should be
granted based on ‘other considerations’ * * *.” Id. at ¶ 21. Nothing in R.C. 4510.54
requires a trial court to terminate a previously imposed license suspension when
eligibility requirements are met.
Our review of the trial court’s journal entry reflects that it considered
the arguments and documents presented in Hyde’s motion and the state’s response
relative to R.C. 4510.54(D). The trial court exercised its discretion to deny the
motion without a hearing. R.C. 4510.54(B).
Accordingly, we find the trial court acted within the discretion
afforded by R.C. 4510.54 and we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial
court. Nevertheless, we recognize that the trial court granted Hyde limited driving
privileges in February 2017, which was over two years before Hyde filed his motion
in this matter, and the trial court may consider a subsequent motion filed by the
defendant. See R.C. 4510.54(B). Under circumstances such as those presented in
this case, we would encourage trial courts to exercise their discretion in holding a
hearing under R.C. 4510.54(D) to afford the parties the opportunity to present
information relevant to the motion before rendering a decision. Hyde’s third
assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR