State v. Hughes

[Cite as State v. Hughes, 2020-Ohio-4516.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 17-20-04
v.
WILLIAM L. HUGHES, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Sidney Municipal Court
Trial Court No. 19CRB00685
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 21, 2020
APPEARANCES:
Jim R. Gudgel for Appellant
Jeffrey L. Amick for Appellee
Case No. 17-20-04
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, William L. Hughes (“Hughes”), appeals the
February 1, 2020 judgment entry of sentence of the Sidney Municipal Court. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On August 21, 2019, Hughes was charged with aggravated menacing in
violation of R.C. 2903.21(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. (Doc. No. 1). On August
26, 2019, Hughes appeared for arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. (Doc.
No. 7).
{¶3} On December 20, 2019, Hughes withdrew his plea of not guilty and
entered a guilty plea, under a negotiated plea agreement. (Doc. No. 15). In
exchange for his guilty plea, the State amended the aggravated-menacing charge
to—menacing in violation of R.C. 2903.22, a fourth-degree misdemeanor, and
dismissed Hughes’s traffic violation in another case.1 (Id.); (Dec. 20, 2019 Tr. at
3). The trial court conducted a Crim.R. 11 colloquy, accepted Hughes’s guilty plea,
and ordered a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) be prepared. (Id.); (Id. at 3-
5).
{¶4} On January 31, 2020, Hughes’s court-appointed counsel filed a motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. (Doc. No. 17). The State filed a memorandum in
1
Hughes was also charged in case number 19TRD03525 with operating a motorcycle with a driver’s license
that did not bear the motorcycle endorsement in violation of R.C. 4510.12, a minor misdemeanor. (See Doc.
No. 17).
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opposition to Hughes’s motion on the same day. (Doc. No. 18). The trial court
assigned the motion to withdraw guilty plea and sentencing for a hearing. (Doc.
No. 19). Thereafter, Hughes retained private counsel who filed a notice of
appearance-substitution of counsel and a motion to continue the scheduled hearing,
which the trial court denied as untimely filed. (Doc. Nos. 20, 21, 22).
Nevertheless, and on February 4, 2020, the trial court rescheduled both hearings for
February 11, 2020. (Doc. No. 23). On February 6, 2020, Hughes filed his second
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Doc. Nos. 24, 25).
{¶5} The trial court held its hearing on February 11, 2020 to address
Hughes’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Doc. No. 27). After receiving
evidence on the motion, the trial court denied Hughes’s motion, and then proceeded
to sentencing. (Id.). The trial court sentenced Hughes to a one-day-jail term and
one year of community control sanctions.2 (Id.). The trial court filed its judgment
entry of sentence on February 11, 2020. (Id.).
{¶6} Hughes filed his notice of appeal on February 24, 2020. (Doc. No. 28).
He raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Court abused it’s [sic] discretion in denying the Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea.
2
Hughes was given credit for one day previously served, was required to complete an anger-rage program
as a condition of his community control sanctions, and ordered pay a $125 fine plus court costs. (Doc. No.
27).
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{¶7} In his assignment of error, Hughes argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Standard of Review
{¶8} A defendant may file a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea
pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. Although a trial court should freely grant such a motion,
a defendant does not maintain an absolute right to withdraw his plea prior to
sentencing. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 526 (1992). Instead, a trial court must
hold a hearing to determine whether a “reasonable and legitimate basis” exists for
the withdrawal. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶9} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to deny a presentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is limited to whether the trial court abused its
discretion. State v. Nathan, 99 Ohio App.3d 722, 725 (3d Dist.1995), citing State
v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977). An abuse of discretion implies that the trial
court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio
St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980). When applying this standard, a reviewing court may
not simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. State v. Adams, 3d Dist.
Defiance No. 4-09-16, 2009-Ohio-6863, ¶ 33.
Analysis
{¶10} We consider several factors when reviewing a trial court’s decision to
grant or deny a defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw a plea, including: (1)
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whether the withdrawal will prejudice the prosecution; (2) the representation
afforded to the defendant by counsel; (3) the extent of the hearing held pursuant to
Crim.R. 11; (4) the extent of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea; (5)
whether the trial court gave full and fair consideration of the motion; (6) whether
the timing of the motion was reasonable; (7) the stated reasons for the motion; (8)
whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges and potential sentences;
and (9) whether the accused was perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense to the
charges. State v. Lane, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-10, 2010-Ohio-4819, ¶ 21, citing
State v. Griffin, 141 Ohio App.3d 551, 554 (7th Dist.2001). See also State v. Fish,
104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240 (1st Dist.1995), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Sims, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160856, 2017-Ohio-8379. “None of the factors is
determinative on its own and there may be numerous additional aspects ‘weighed’
in each case.” State v. North, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-18, 2015-Ohio-720, ¶ 16,
citing Griffin at 554 and Fish at 240.
{¶11} Our examination of the reasonable-and-legitimate-basis factors
supports that the trial court’s decision to deny Hughes’s presentence motions to
withdraw his guilty plea was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hughes’s motions to withdraw
his guilty plea.
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{¶12} As to the first factor, the State contends that it would be prejudiced if
the trial court were to allow Hughes to withdraw his guilty plea. However, the State
did not provide its specific basis for the prejudice in its memorandums, appellee’s
brief, or argument before the trial court. Moreover, the trial court made no express
determination as to this factor. Importantly, Hughes filed his motion before his
sentencing hearing was held. Therefore, we conclude that the first and sixth factors
weigh in favor of granting Hughes’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶13} Nevertheless, in our review of the totality of the circumstances in this
case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Hughes’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See State v. Rickman,
3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-13-15, 2014-Ohio-260, ¶ 13 (reviewing the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying
Rickman’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea); State v. Fields, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-090648, 2010-Ohio-4114, ¶ 14. Specifically, we note, that Hughes received
a favorable negotiated plea agreement in which the State agreed to amend the
original charge and dismiss another charge. (Doc. No. 15). (See Dec. 20, 2019 Tr.
at 3). Hence, such a favorable plea agreement evidences that Hughes was
represented by competent trial counsel. Compare State v. Ferdinandsen, 3d Dist.
Hancock No. 5-15-08, 2016-Ohio-7172, ¶ 31 (concluding that the second factor did
not weigh in Ferdinandsen’s favor because he “was offered a very favorable
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negotiated plea agreement”). Further, Hughes asserts that his court-appointed
counsel made certain promises to him as to his ultimate sentence. However, no
evidence was presented to the trial court to support these assertions. Therefore, we
conclude that the second, third, and eighth factors do not weigh in Hughes’s favor.
{¶14} Addressing the fourth and fifth factors in our totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis, the trial court’s hearing on Hughes’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea was conducted just before its sentencing hearing wherein both parties
had the opportunity to speak and present their evidence. (Feb. 11, 2020 Tr. at 3-6).
Compare State v. Motley, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-040430 and C-040431, 2005-
Ohio-2450, ¶ 12 (noting that the trial court permitted Motley “a full opportunity to
speak on why his Crim.R. 32.1 motion should have been granted” “[a]t the
sentencing hearing”). See also Rickman at ¶ 21. Similarly, here the trial court gave
full and fair consideration of Hughes’s reasons to withdraw his guilty plea. Indeed,
the trial court discussed the propriety of Hughes’s motion, while addressing the
reasonable-and-legitimate-basis factors. (See Feb. 11, 2020 Tr. at 3-9). Thus, the
fourth and fifth factors do not weigh in Hughes’s favor.
{¶15} Turning to the remaining factors, under the seventh and ninth factors,
Hughes did not present any reasonable and legitimate basis for withdrawing his
guilty plea and his claim of innocence is not substantiated by the record. See North,
2015-Ohio-720, at ¶ 27. Under the facts presented, we conclude that Hughes’s
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motion to withdraw his plea is a merely a change of heart since his stated reasons
for withdrawal does not amount to a claim of innocence. “‘A change of heart or
mistaken belief about pleading guilty is not a reasonable basis for withdrawal of a
guilty plea.’” State v. Jones, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 09 MA 50, 2011-Ohio-2903,
¶ 20, quoting State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94419, 2010-Ohio-5784, ¶ 9.
{¶16} Moreover, even though Hughes does assert a claim of innocence, his
claim is not substantiated by the record. Claims of innocence must be substantiated.
North at ¶ 27. Rather, Hughes’s claim of innocence is contradicted by his statements
at the change-of-plea hearing wherein Hughes voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly admitted guilt to the menacing charge. (Dec. 20, 2019 Tr. at 3). See
Motley, 2005-Ohio-2450, at ¶ 10. For these reasons, we conclude the record does
not substantiate that Hughes pled guilty to a crime that he did not commit. See State
v. Calloway, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040066, 2004-Ohio-5613, ¶ 15, quoting State
v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 14, (concluding that “‘a guilty
plea, absent an assertion of innocence, is an admission of guilt.’”). As such, the
seventh and ninth factors do not weigh in Hughes’s favor.
{¶17} Therefore, despite our conclusions that the first and sixth factors weigh
in Hughes’s favor, we conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that
Hughes did not have a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw his guilty plea.
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See Jones, 2011-Ohio-2903, at ¶ 20. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Hughes’s request to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶18} Hughes’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶19} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
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