In re A.C.

[Cite as In re A.C., 2023-Ohio-902.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
In the Matter of: A.C., :
: Case No. 22CA20
Adjudicated Delinquent Child. :
:
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
:
: RELEASED: 03/15/2023
:
APPEARANCES:
Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for Appellant.
Kelsey R. Riffle, Washington County Assistant Prosecutor, Marietta, Ohio, for Appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} Appellant, A.C., appeals a decision of the Washington County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that adjudicated her a delinquent child for committing
the offense of making false alarms, in violation of R.C. 2917.32(A)(3), a first-degree
misdemeanor if committed by an adult. Appellant argues that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel during the dispositional hearing by failing to present
evidence to support her request for probation.1 After our review of the record and the
applicable law, we do not find any merit to appellant’s assignment of error. Therefore,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1
We note that R.C. 2152.19(A)(4)(a) allows a court to impose probation as a condition of community
control.
Washington App. No. 22CA20 2
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶2} On June 27, 2022, a complaint was filed that alleged appellant is a
delinquent child for committing the offense of making false alarms, in violation of R.C.
2917.32(A)(3), a first-degree misdemeanor if committed by an adult. At the adjudicatory
hearing, appellant admitted the allegation contained in the complaint. Before accepting
her admission, the court explained the dispositional orders that the court could impose,
including placing her on probation or requiring her to complete a rehabilitation program
at the Washington County Juvenile Center (WCJC). Appellant indicated that she
understood and wished to admit the allegations of the complaint.
{¶3} The court then proceeded with the dispositional hearing. Appellant’s
probation officer noted that the psychological evaluation indicated that appellant “does
struggle with a lot of mental health issues.” The probation officer believed that placing
appellant at WCJC, where she would be under medical care, “would be very beneficial
for her.” The probation officer also thought that appellant would benefit from the smaller
class sizes at the center. The probation officer, thus, stated that placing appellant in the
WCJC rehabilitation program would be in her best interest.
{¶4} The state likewise recommended that the court place appellant at WCJC.
The state indicated that the facts underlying the offense were serious: Appellant falsely
accused an individual of raping her when she was eight years old. The state suggested
that this type of false allegation could ruin a person’s life. The state additionally noted
that law enforcement officers worked for nearly one year to find evidence to support
appellant’s allegation before appellant admitted that she had not been truthful about her
accusation.
Washington App. No. 22CA20 3
{¶5} The state further asserted that the psychological evaluation raises several
concerns such as appellant’s poor performance in school and some significant mental
health issues. The state noted that appellant currently is enrolled in an online school
and lacks a structured environment. The state recommended that the court place her in
the WCJC rehabilitation program to give her structure, access to mental health
resources, and a better learning environment.
{¶6} The child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) also believed that placing appellant at
WCJC “would be the best option.” The GAL viewed this placement as “an opportunity
to ensure that there is regular and consistent counseling [and] to ensure that
schoolwork is being addressed.”
{¶7} Appellant’s counsel argued that placing her on probation would give her
adequate structure and would give appellant a chance to improve her behavior without
subjecting her to an institutional environment. Appellant and her mother also asked the
court to place her on probation.
{¶8} The court noted that the nature of the charge (falsely accusing another
person of raping her when she was eight years old) was serious and found that the
psychological evaluation indicated that appellant “needs a lot of help.” The court
determined that placing her in the rehabilitation program at WCJC would be in her best
interest. The court thus committed appellant to WCJC’s temporary custody to complete
a rehabilitation program.
Washington App. No. 22CA20 4
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
I. THE APPELLANT RECEIVED THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF HER RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
ANALYSIS
{¶9} In her sole assignment of error, appellant argues that trial counsel failed to
provide the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, she asserts that trial counsel
performed ineffectively during the dispositional hearing by failing to present evidence to
support her request for probation. Appellant criticizes counsel for presenting a closing
argument rather than finding evidence that supported her request for probation. She
alleges that counsel’s failure constitutes a complete denial of counsel at a critical stage
of the proceedings and entitles her to invoke the prejudice presumption set forth in
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).
{¶10} An accused juvenile has a constitutional right to counsel and the same
rights to effective assistance of counsel as an adult criminal defendant. In re Lower, 4th
Dist. Highland No. 06CA31, 2007-Ohio-1735, ¶ 37, citing In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1,
41, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. Thus, we apply the same Sixth Amendment
effective assistance of counsel principles that apply in criminal proceedings. See In re
B.C.S., 4th Dist. Washington No. 07CA60, 2008-Ohio-5771.
{¶11} Establishing constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel requires a
delinquent child (or a criminal defendant) to show (1) that counsel’s performance was
deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. E.g., State v.
Jenkins, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3413, 2014-Ohio-3123, ¶ 15,
Washington App. No. 22CA20 5
citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984); State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 85.
“Failure to establish either element is fatal to the claim.” State v. Jones, 4th Dist. Scioto
No. 06CA3116, 2008-Ohio-968, ¶ 14.
{¶12} Counsel’s performance is deficient when it falls “below an objective level
of reasonable representation.” State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815,
848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 95. Courts that are considering whether counsel’s performance fell
below an objective level of reasonable representation, “must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The party challenging counsel’s
performance “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689.
{¶13} The prejudice component requires the challenging party to show that a
reasonable probability exists that “ ‘but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine the outcome.’ ” Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1089, 188
L.Ed.2d 1 (2014), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; e.g., State v. Short, 129 Ohio
St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-3641, 952 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 113; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d
136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraph three of the syllabus. Furthermore, courts
ordinarily may not simply presume the existence of prejudice but must require the
defendant to affirmatively establish prejudice. State v. Clark, 4th Dist. Pike No.
02CA684, 2003-Ohio-1707, ¶ 22.
Washington App. No. 22CA20 6
{¶14} However, in limited circumstances, courts may presume prejudice. Florida
v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004) (noting that
prejudice presumed in narrow circumstances); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59; see also
Garza v. Idaho, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 139 S.Ct. 738, 744, 203 L.Ed.2d 77 (2019). For
example, “the complete denial of counsel” is “so likely to prejudice the accused that the
cost of litigating [its] effect in a particular case is unjustified.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-
59. This complete-denial-of-counsel prejudice presumption typically applies if an
“accused is denied counsel at a critical stage” of the proceedings. Id. Likewise, the
prejudice presumption may apply “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s
case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Id. The prejudice presumption also may apply
if “counsel is called upon to render assistance under circumstances where competent
counsel very likely could not.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695–98, 152 L.Ed.2d 914,
122 S.Ct. 1843, 1851–52, (2002), citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659–662, and Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932).
{¶15} In contrast, a mere failure at a sentencing hearing to present specific
evidence or to make a closing argument does not equate to presumed prejudice. In
Bell, for instance, the defendant asserted that trial counsel entirely failed to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing when counsel did not “ ‘mount
some case for life’ after the prosecution introduced evidence in the sentencing hearing
and gave a closing statement.” Bell, 535 U.S. at 696, quoting Brief for Respondent 26.
During the sentencing hearing, both the prosecution and the defense presented opening
statements. Defense counsel’s opening statement reminded the jury of the mitigating
evidence that had been presented during the trial phase and asserted that the
Washington App. No. 22CA20 7
defendant “was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance or duress, that he
was an addict whose drug and other problems stemmed from the stress of his military
service, and that he felt remorse.” Id. at 691. The prosecution then presented its
evidence in support of the death penalty, and defense counsel cross-examined the
witnesses. After both sides rested, the junior prosecuting attorney gave “a ‘low-key’
closing.” Id. at 692. Defense counsel chose to waive final argument, which prevented
“the lead prosecutor, who by all accounts was an extremely effective advocate, from
arguing in rebuttal.” Id. The jury subsequently found four aggravating factors and no
mitigating factors, which required the court to impose the death penalty.
{¶16} After his direct appeals were affirmed, the defendant filed a postconviction
relief petition. He argued that trial counsel did not provide effective assistance of
counsel during the sentencing phase and faulted counsel for failing to present mitigating
evidence and for waiving final argument. The defendant eventually succeeded with this
argument. Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961 (6th Cir.2001). The Sixth Circuit determined that
prejudice should be presumed under Cronic, “because his counsel, by not asking for
mercy after the prosecutor’s final argument, did not subject the State’s call for the death
penalty to meaningful adversarial testing.” Bell, 535 U.S. at 693 (summarizing Sixth
Circuit’s decision).
{¶17} The United States Supreme Court disagreed that the prejudice
presumption applied in this situation. Instead, it explained that the presumption applies
only if “the attorney’s failure [is] complete.” Id. at 697. The court emphasized that
Cronic held that the presumption may apply when “ ‘counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.’ ” Id. (emphasis sic),
Washington App. No. 22CA20 8
quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659; accord State v. Drain, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-
3697, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 69. The Bell court observed that the defendant had not argued
that trial counsel’s failure had been complete; in other words, the defendant did not
argue “that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the sentencing
proceeding as a whole.” Id. Rather, the defendant asserted “that his counsel failed to
do so at specific points.” Id. The court, thus, concluded that the defendant’s challenge
to counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence and decision to waive closing
argument was “plainly of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors” that are “subject
to Strickland’s performance and prejudice components.” Id. at 697-698, citing Burger v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 788, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987), and Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (observing that
Burger and Darden applied Strickland standard, not Cronic, when defendants
challenged counsel’s decision at capital sentencing hearing not to offer any mitigating
evidence). Therefore, the court concluded that the Strickland standard, not the
presumed-prejudice standard, applied to the defendant’s ineffective-assistance
challenge.
{¶18} Similarly, in the case before us, appellant faults counsel for failing to
present evidence at the dispositional hearing to support her request for probation. She
contends that counsel did not conduct any discovery during the dispositional phase and
asserts that merely presenting a closing argument does not subject the state’s case to
meaningful adversarial testing. Appellant’s argument, however, contradicts Bell’s
emphatic reminder that the presumption applies when “ ‘counsel entirely fails to subject
the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.’ ” Id. (emphasis sic),
Washington App. No. 22CA20 9
quoting Cronic at 659. Bell indicates that when the ineffectiveness claim involves an
alleged sentencing-hearing deficiency, counsel does not entirely fail to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing if counsel presents an argument
during the sentencing phase. Here, appellant’s trial counsel did not entirely fail to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Counsel appeared at
the dispositional hearing and presented an argument to support her probation request.
Counsel’s decision not to present evidence at the dispositional hearing does not equate
to a finding that counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing. Bell; Burger; Darden. Therefore, we do not agree with appellant
that the presumed-prejudice standard applies to her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim. Consequently, appellant must establish the Strickland-prejudice standard, i.e., a
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel’s alleged deficient performance, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.
{¶19} Appellant has not argued, however, that she can establish the Strickland-
prejudice standard. Instead, she relies solely upon the presumed-prejudice standard.
Given that appellant has not presented an argument regarding the Strickland-prejudice
standard, we will not create one for her. E.g., State v. Dailey, 4th Dist. Adams No.
18CA1059, 2018-Ohio-4315, ¶ 43-44, quoting State v. Palmer, 9th Dist. Summit No.
28303, 2017-Ohio-2639, ¶ 33 (appellate court does not have a duty to construct
argument on an appellant’s behalf and will not address “ ‘undeveloped arguments’
”); McPherson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21499, 2003-Ohio-
7190, ¶ 31 (appellate courts do not have duty to construct or develop arguments to
support a defendant’s assignment of error).
Washington App. No. 22CA20 10
{¶20} Additionally, appellant has not demonstrated that counsel’s performance
during the dispositional phase was deficient. Other than a broad assertion that trial
counsel did “nothing” to help her, appellant has not identified any additional actions that
trial counsel should have undertaken to support her request for probation.
{¶21} We observe that during the adjudicatory hearing, appellant agreed that she
had spoken with her counsel about her decision to admit the allegations of the
complaint and about the consequences if the court found her to be a delinquent child.
Additionally, trial counsel presented an argument during the dispositional phase to
support appellant’s request for probation. Counsel stated:
This is her first time getting into trouble really at all.
She does have a couple charges here, one was misuse of a motor
vehicle, and the case that she was found delinquent on, of course.
Basically, you know, based on the conversations with her, and briefly
with her parents, it’s obvious she needs some structure in her life.
I think probation would be sufficient enough to provide that structure.
One, she seems to be willing to be on probation, and we’ll you know,
want to be at least compliant with that structure, and sending her to the
center, which, you know, she doesn’t necessarily agree that that’s in her
best interest. She you know, she might just try to fight against that structure.
Additionally, you know, starting out on a probation-type of sanction
or punishment would not necessarily rule out the center at a later time, you
know, if the structure that probation tries to give her is not enough, then a
probation violation can be filed and then the center can be imposed at that
time.
She is going to counseling, L&P Services. Alison is her counselor.
She seems to be enjoying that. Doing well on that.
She is struggling in school with her online classes, but a drastic
change in her life, which would be removing her from her home and putting
her in a strange environment, you know, might make that worse.
Basically for those reasons, I think probation would be the most
appropriate sanction.
Counsel’s argument reflects that he had discussed the case with appellant, and he
informed the court of her desire to be placed on probation. He pointed out that
appellant has a minimal history of juvenile infractions. He recognized, through
Washington App. No. 22CA20 11
conversations with appellant, that she needs structure in her life and advised the court
that probation would provide adequate structure. Counsel further expressed concern
that placing appellant at WCJC would cause her to rebel, which would frustrate her
ability to address her mental-health issues and to improve her schoolwork. Appellant
has not identified what additional evidence counsel could have presented that might
have affected the outcome of the proceedings and has not shown that the failure to
present additional evidence was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.
{¶22} We additionally note that other courts have rejected ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims under similar facts. See State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
102260, 2016-Ohio-688, ¶ 26 (noting that a claim that counsel failed to present specific
evidence during sentencing phase usually relies upon evidence outside of the record
and thus is not a proper consideration on direct appeal); State v. Jordan, 2nd Dist. Clark
No. 2020-CA-62, 2021-Ohio-2332, ¶ 23 (rejecting ineffectiveness claim even though
counsel gave “only a ‘brief statement’ at sentencing); State v. Ford, 3rd Dist. Union No.
14-10-07, 2010-Ohio-4069, ¶ 18 (emphasis sic.) (pointing out that defendant “failed to
identify what, if any, evidence trial counsel could have presented to change the outcome
of the sentencing”). Consequently, appellant has not established that trial counsel failed
to provide the effective assistance of counsel.
{¶23} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s
sole assignment of error.
Washington App. No. 22CA20 12
CONCLUSION
{¶24} Having overruled appellant’s sole assignments of error, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Washington App. No. 22CA20 13
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
P.J., Smith and J., Abele: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing
with the clerk.