State v. Hurst

[Cite as State v. Hurst, 2020-Ohio-2885.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2019-03-028
: OPINION
- vs - 5/11/2020
:
JERRY HURST, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 17CR33649
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Kirsten A. Brandt, 520 Justice
Drive, Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for appellee
Kidd & Urling LLC, Thomas W. Kidd, Jr., James P. Urling, 8913 Cincinnati-Dayton Road,
West Chester, Ohio 45069, for appellant
PIPER, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Jerry Hurst, appeals his conviction for gross sexual imposition in
the Warren County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶2} When S.K. was approximately four years old, he visited a relative's home
where Hurst was living. During what was to be a three-day visit, Hurst sexually abused the
child. The child told his relative that he did not want to stay at her home any longer, and
Warren CA2019-03-028
the child's mother ("Mother") came to pick up the child. The child, who had been crying and
was "terrified," ran to Mother and seemed to her to be sad and scared. Thereafter, the child
had recurring nightmares and would scream out in his sleep asking for help. The child also
refused to go to bed without a light on or without the door to his bedroom being open.
{¶3} S.K. also began to act out in ways he had never done before. For example,
S.K. and Mother's fiancée were cleaning his bedroom. When the fiancée bent over on his
hands and knees to pick up items, the child pulled down his pants and urinated on the
fiancée's buttocks. The child explained, "that's what [Hurst] did to" him. Later that night,
Mother gave the child a bath. The child bent over, separated the cheeks of his buttocks,
and told Mother to "get in there."
{¶4} After the incidents involving the child urinating on Mother's fiancée and what
occurred during the bath, Mother went to the police, and an investigation began. Hurst was
later indicted for rape of a child under ten, as well as gross sexual imposition of a child less
than 13. Hurst pled not guilty and the matter proceeded to trial.
{¶5} Before trial, the trial court held a competency hearing to determine if S.K. was
competent to testify given concerns Hurst raised about the child's mental instability. The
trial court also allowed the child's testimony to be videotaped via deposition where Hurst
was located outside the courtroom while S.K. testified. The court later determined that S.K.
was competent to testify and granted the state's motion to admit S.K.'s deposition testimony
in lieu of live in-court testimony during Hurst's jury trial.
{¶6} The jury found Hurst guilty of gross sexual imposition, but was unable to reach
a verdict as to the rape charge. The trial court sentenced Hurst to five years in prison on
the gross sexual imposition conviction. Hurst now appeals his conviction, raising the
following assignments of error.
{¶7} Assignment of Error No. 1:
-2-
Warren CA2019-03-028
{¶8} THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN MR. HURST'S CONVICTION.
{¶9} Hurst argues in his first assignment of error that his conviction was against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶10} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge examines the "inclination of the
greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue rather
than the other." State v. Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶
14. To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the
conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State
v. Morgan, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2013-08-146 and CA2013-08-147, 2014-Ohio-2472, ¶
34.
{¶11} Questions regarding witness credibility and weight of the evidence "are
primarily matters for the trier of fact to decide since the trier of fact is in the best position to
judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence." State v.
Walker, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-04-085, 2007-Ohio-911, ¶ 26. As a result, "the
question upon review is whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed." State v. Grinstead, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2010-06-150, CA2010-07-163 thru
167, CA2010-07-180, 2011-Ohio-3018, ¶ 11. Therefore, an appellate court will overturn a
conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence only in extraordinary circumstances
when the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal. State v. Blair, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2014-01-023, 2015-Ohio-818, ¶ 43.
-3-
Warren CA2019-03-028
{¶12} Given a jury's role as arbiter of credibility, it is entitled to believe or disbelieve
all, part, or none of a witness' testimony. State v. Freeze, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-11-
209, 2012-Ohio-5840, ¶ 90. Moreover, there is nothing in the law requiring that a sexual
assault victim's testimony be corroborated as a condition precedent to conviction. State v.
Robinson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-01-013, 2015-Ohio-4533, ¶ 41.
{¶13} Hurst was convicted of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C.
2907.05(A)(4), which prohibits sexual contact with another who is less than 13 years old.
Sexual contact is "any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation
the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or if the person is a female, a breast, for the
purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person." R.C. 2907.01(B).
{¶14} After reviewing the record, we find that Hurst's conviction was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. S.K. testified that Hurst's "pee pee" touched his "butt"
while it was "hard." The child further testified, "he pulled my pants down, then he rubbed
on top of me and flipped me over." When the state asked the child whether Hurst's penis
was touching his buttocks cheeks, S.K. testified that Hurst's penis was "inside" his buttocks
cheeks. The child also recalled that he was crying and wanted to go home after the incident
with Hurst.
{¶15} While S.K.'s testimony was enough to establish the elements of gross sexual
imposition, the jury also heard testimony from Mother that S.K. came home early from his
visit and that he was upset and crying. After that visit, the child began having night terrors
that included his yelling for help, or screaming in his sleep, "get away from [me]," "don't
touch me," "get off me," "I don't want to do this," "I don't want to go," and "don't do that."
{¶16} S.K. also acted out in sexual ways, including urinating on the buttocks of
Mother's fiancée while he was bent over picking up S.K.'s belongings. When asked to
explain his behavior, S.K. told the fiancée, "that's what [Hurst] did to me." The fiancée
-4-
Warren CA2019-03-028
testified that the child was scared when he talked about the incident, and that after his
disclosure, the child would not go to sleep without a light on in his room and the door to his
bedroom open. S.K. also separated his buttocks cheeks during a bath and told Mother,
"get in there."
{¶17} S.K. received medical attention and was diagnosed with postraumatic stress
disorder and dissociative symptoms such as derealization. S.K.'s therapist testified that
S.K.'s actions and mannerisms, including telling fantastical stories, were a defense
mechanism used to combat stressful situations that made him feel unsafe. The therapist
also testified to other behaviors she attributed to the sexual abuse, including S.K. defecating
on a table and chasing a staff member with the excrement because that staff member
reminded him of Hurst and made him feel unsafe.
{¶18} The jury also heard from Hurst, who testified in his own defense. Hurst denied
having sexual contact with S.K. and claimed that Mother's fiancée coached the child into
lying about the abuse in an attempt to separate Mother from her family. However, the jury
heard Mother's fiancée testify, including being asked directly whether he had coached S.K.
to make false accusations about Hurst. The fiancée testified that he had not done so, and
had only told the child to tell the truth about what occurred. The jury was in the best position
to judge the credibility of all witnesses, including S.K., Hurst, and Mother's fiancée.
{¶19} The verdict demonstrates that the jury did not find Hurst's testimony credible
and that it found the state's witnesses credible to prove that Hurst had sexual contact with
S.K. Thus, we find that the jury did not clearly lose its way or create a manifest miscarriage
of justice when resolving conflicts in the evidence. After reviewing the record, we find
Hurst's conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Hurst's first
assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶20} Assignment of Error No. 2:
-5-
Warren CA2019-03-028
{¶21} THE COURT ERRORED [SIC] AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
PERMITTED AN INCOMPETENT MINOR WITNESS TO TESTIFY.
{¶22} Hurst argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court abused its
discretion by permitting S.K. to testify.
{¶23} According to Evid.R. 601(A), "every person is competent to be a witness
except: those of unsound mind, and children under ten years of age, who appear incapable
of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are
examined, or of relating them truly." "A child witness who is ten years of age or older at the
time of trial, but who was under the age of ten at the time an incident in question occurred,
is presumed competent to testify about the event." State v. Clark, 71 Ohio St. 3d 466, 471
(1994).
{¶24} Absent some articulable concern otherwise, an individual who is at least ten
years of age is per se competent to testify. State v. Swartsell, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-
06-151, 2003-Ohio-4450, ¶ 11. However, the presumption of competency recedes in those
cases where a witness is of unsound mind. Id. Even so, "some unsoundness of mind does
not render a witness incompetent if the witness otherwise possesses the three basic abilities
required for competency: the ability to accurately observe, recollect, and communicate that
which goes on around him or her." State v. Cooper, 139 Ohio App. 3d 149, 164 (12th
Dist.2000).
{¶25} A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's finding of competency absent
an abuse of discretion. State v. Sprauer, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2005-02-022, 2006-
Ohio-1146, ¶ 11. An abuse of discretion implies that the court's decision was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable, and not merely an error of law or judgment. Id.
{¶26} At the time of the trial, the child was 11 years old and thus presumed
competent. Hurst argues that S.K. was incompetent to testify because he was unable to
-6-
Warren CA2019-03-028
differentiate between fantasy and reality. However, after reviewing the record, we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that S.K. was competent to testify.
{¶27} During the competency hearing, the trial court questioned S.K. to specifically
inquire whether the child was of sound mind. The child was able to accurately relate his
name, age, details about his schooling, the particulars of his living situation, as well as
information about the past, such as Christmas gifts he received the previous year. S.K.
also testified that he knew the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie,
demonstrated his understanding of the concepts of truth and lies, and also stated it was
wrong to tell a lie and that there were repercussions for lying.
{¶28} The trial court also considered testimony from S.K.'s therapist that he knew
the difference between truth and lies, and that the child used fantasy as a defense
mechanism to protect himself from difficult situations. While Hurst is correct that the child's
testimony sometimes contained fantastical stories, such as that his toy could bite, that he
kept a ninja sword and guns, and that a giant snake lived in his house, the record indicates
that the child told the stories during moments of discomfort and to escape feelings of being
unsafe. Otherwise, however, S.K. reiterated time and again that his statements regarding
what Hurst did to him were the truth and were not a "story" he told.
{¶29} After reviewing the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in finding S.K. competent to testify. As such, Hurst's second assignment of error is
overruled.
{¶30} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶31} THE COURT ERRORED [SIC] WHEN IT VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1 SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
-7-
Warren CA2019-03-028
{¶32} Hurst asserts in his third assignment of error that his right of confrontation was
violated when the trial court permitted S.K. to testify by way of video deposition instead of
live, in-court testimony.
{¶33} According to R.C. 2945.481, a child victim of a sex offense may testify by
videotaped deposition without the defendant in the room. The statute requires that the
defendant be able to see and hear the child's testimony on a monitor, be provided a means
of communication with defense counsel, and that the child be able to see the defendant on
a monitor provided for that purpose. R.C. 2945.481(A)(3). The state may move for
admission of the deposition testimony if (1) the defendant had the opportunity to develop
the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination and (2) the trial court determines that
there is reasonable cause to believe that if the child were to testify in person he or she
would experience "serious emotional trauma" as a result. R.C. 2945.481(B)(1).
{¶34} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides a criminal defendant with the right to confront the
witnesses against him or her. However, face-to-face confrontation in the literal sense is not
required by either the federal or state constitutions. State v. Self, 56 Ohio St. 3d 73 (1990).
Instead, the constitutional guarantees inherent in the right to confront witnesses include "the
opportunity to cross-examine and the right to observe the proceeding." Id. at 79. Thus, the
Self Court determined that Ohio's statute permitting child victims to testify via deposition
does not violate a defendant's confrontation rights so long as the statutory requirements are
followed. Id.
{¶35} After reviewing the record, we find that Hurst's rights were not violated by the
trial court's decision to allow S.K. to testify by deposition. The record indicates that the
protocols set forth in R.C. 2945.481 were followed during the child's deposition in that Hurst
was able to view the child's testimony through a monitor, Hurst was able to immediately
-8-
Warren CA2019-03-028
communicate with defense counsel, and the child, while testifying, was able to view Hurst
on a monitor.
{¶36} Hurst argues that the monitor upon which the child could see him was not
large enough or positioned closely enough to the witness stand to allow his meaningful
presence in the courtroom when S.K. testified. However, the trial court specifically asked
S.K. if he could see the monitor and the child indicated that he did. The court then asked
the child whether he recognized the person on the screen, and S.K. immediately identified
Hurst. Later during his testimony, the child was asked whether he saw Hurst, "right now,"
and S.K. pointed directly at the screen. Therefore, the monitor upon which Hurst appeared
to the child during his testimony was proper and met the statutory requirement that the
defendant be viewed by the child-witness during his or her testimony.
{¶37} Regarding the admission of the videotaped testimony in lieu of S.K.'s in-court
testimony, the record demonstrates that the statutory requirements were met. First, S.K.
was cross-examined by defense counsel during his deposition. Second, the trial court
determined that S.K. would suffer severe emotional trauma if required to testify in person.
In support of the trial court's finding, it heard testimony from S.K.'s therapist, as well as the
therapist's supervisor, that if S.K. were required to testify in court, he would suffer severe
emotional trauma. The trial court also considered information from the therapist's case
notes, as well as its own observations of the child during S.K.'s videotaped testimony. The
court noted that the child became "visibly upset" when asked certain questions, including
laying his head down on the witness stand, looking away, and putting his head in his hands.
{¶38} After reviewing the record, we find that the statutory protocol was followed for
allowing S.K. to testify via videotaped deposition and that the trial court properly admitted
the deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony. As such, Hurst's third assignment of error
is overruled.
-9-
Warren CA2019-03-028
{¶39} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.
- 10 -