Garcia v. Samano

[Cite as Garcia v. Samano, 2019-Ohio-3223.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
JESSICA GARCIA, :
Appellant, : CASE NO. CA2018-05-094
: OPINION
- vs - 8/12/2019
:
MANUEL GARCIA SAMANO, :
Appellee. :
APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
Case No. DR16-11-1125
Arnold Law Firm, LLC, Brittany N. Born, 8833 Chapelsquare Lane, Suite C, Cincinnati, Ohio
45249, for appellant
Manuel Garcia Samano, 2305 Dixie Highway, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, pro se
RINGLAND, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jessica Garcia, appeals from the decision of the Butler County Court
of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, dividing marital property after her divorce
from appellee, Manuel Garcia Samano. For the reasons detailed below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Jessica and Manuel married in 2009. On November 22, 2016, Jessica filed a
complaint for divorce. The trial court held final hearings in September and October of 2017.
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This appeal largely concerns the division of marital property associated with Garcia One, LLC
and other real property owned or sold during the marriage.
{¶ 3} Jessica testified that she and Manuel owned Garcia One, a car dealership or
"buy here-pay here lot" during the course of the marriage. Jessica stated that "we sold cars
and we also fixed them, like a mechanic shop." The parties disagreed on how the business
was run, with Jessica alleging that Manuel did not do "anything really legitimately" and that
the business was run with unaccounted cash. Due to bad record keeping, Jessica was
unable to keep internal books on the business or pay out expenses. Jessica also described
certain questionable business practices, such as instances in which she purportedly
notarized unsigned titles and an instance in which she was held personally liable in a matter
after Manuel repossessed a vehicle sold by the company. Jessica testified that she stopped
working for Garcia One due to these business practices.
{¶ 4} Manuel stated that he was a part owner of Garcia One. However, similar to
Jessica's testimony, Manuel's description of the business was extremely vague and
inconsistent. Manuel testified that there was no written partnership agreement, just an oral
agreement amongst themselves. Manuel testified that the rent for the business premises
was paid by whichever partner could pay at the time, but they were "probably" going to be
evicted because "no one has paid" the rent. When one of Manuel's alleged partners testified,
he denied any ownership interest in Garcia One, but suggested that Manuel might have
"considered" him a part owner due to a prior familial relationship. As of the time of the final
hearing, Manuel testified that he no longer receives "anything" from the company. As to his
involvement in the company, Manuel stated that he doesn't work there anymore, but will
sometimes go there to visit friends. However, this contradicted Manuel's earlier testimony in
which he stated that he would still occasionally fix a vehicle for the company for cash.
{¶ 5} In addition to the disputes regarding the business, the parties also raise multiple
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issues with regard to certain real properties. Manuel testified about multiple properties that
he owned during the marriage, including properties which were sold within weeks of the filing
of the complaint for divorce. In total, Manuel sold six properties between October and
November 2016, shortly before Jessica filed her complaint for divorce.
{¶ 6} Following its review of the evidence, the trial court divided the parties' marital
property and entered a final decree of divorce. Jessica now appeals the trial court's decision
regarding several aspects of the property division, raising three assignments of error for
review.
{¶ 7} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 8} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS.
{¶ 9} In her first assignment of error, Jessica argues the trial court erred by failing to
include all relevant property owned by the parties in the decision dividing their marital
property. Jessica's argument is without merit.
{¶ 10} Property division in a divorce proceeding is a two-step process that is subject to
two different standards of review. Smith v. Smith, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2016-08-059,
2017-Ohio-7463, ¶ 8. Initially, pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(B), "the court shall * * * determine
what constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property." An appellate court
reviews the trial court's classification of property or debt as marital or separate under the
manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Oliver v. Oliver, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-01-
004, 2011-Ohio-6345, ¶ 8.
{¶ 11} Jessica maintains the trial court erred by failing to include additional property in
the initial marital property classification. Specifically, Jessica alleges Manuel is a part owner
of Garcia One. Additionally, Jessica claims that Manuel failed to disclose certain real
property to the trial court and the trial court failed to consider other property the parties
owned, including a tow truck.
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{¶ 12} We find the trial court's classification of the parties' marital property is
supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court noted that neither Jessica
nor Manuel were "particularly credible as far as how they made a living prior to separation."
Though Manuel stated that he had an ownership interest in Garcia One, the record is
exceedingly sparse as to any details or consequences of that purported ownership interest or
if said ownership interest was a going concern. Both parties' respective testimonies reflect a
failure to comprehend the nature or structure of the business. Manuel stated that there is no
written partnership agreement with respect to the company and "[t]hat is the problem. It's just
an oral agreement so whenever it's time to pay the rent, no one has money to pay the
rentals." There is also confusion as to who owns the business, or if the business retains any
value. Jessica admits that she previously worked for the company where Manuel failed to do
"anything really legitimately" and operated solely in cash. Manuel testified that Garcia One
does not own the real property where the business operates and that they were "probably"
going to be evicted due to the failure to pay rent. Manuel also testified that he "isn't receiving
anything" from Garcia One, but will stop by occasionally to visit with friends or fix a vehicle for
cash.
{¶ 13} Jessica places emphasis on the testimony of David Wood, an investigator with
the State of Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, who testified that Manuel is the owner of Garcia
One. However, Wood testified that his knowledge was related to a prior 2013 proceeding.
Wood expressly stated that he had no reason to look at the ownership records since that
time.
{¶ 14} In short, given the exceedingly limited, vague, and contradictory evidence
presented to the trial court, we find it appropriate that the trial court would find neither party
credible as to the ownership of Garcia One and therefore exclude it from the division of
marital property. We similarly find that Jessica's remaining arguments are without merit as to
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property located at 21 Kelly Court and a tow truck. The record of the ownership of those
interests were disputed by the parties with the trial court below. As the trial court was in the
best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and resolve conflicts in the evidence,
we will not reverse unless the finder of fact "clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered." Eastley
v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St. 3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. The trial court did not clearly lose its
way in classification of the parties' marital property. Jessica's first assignment of error is
overruled.
{¶ 15} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 16} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT HUSBAND EXERCISED
FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT.
{¶ 17} In her second assignment of error, Jessica asserts that the trial court erred by
not finding that Manuel engaged in financial misconduct. We disagree.
{¶ 18} Findings as to whether a party has engaged in financial misconduct are
reviewed pursuant to the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Robinson v. Robinson,
12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-11-118, 2013-Ohio-4435, ¶ 14. Under this standard, the
reviewing court weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact
"clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment]
must be reversed and a new trial ordered." Id., quoting Eastley at ¶ 20. The burden of
proving financial misconduct is on the complaining party. Smith, 2017-Ohio-7463 at ¶ 10.
{¶ 19} The term "financial misconduct" has a specific meaning and is defined in R.C.
3105.171(E)(4). Pursuant to that provision, financial misconduct includes, but is not limited
to "the dissipation, destruction, concealment, nondisclosure, or fraudulent disposition of
assets." Robinson at ¶ 12. Financial misconduct implies some type of wrongdoing such as
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interference with the other spouse's property rights (i.e., wrongful scienter). Taub v. Taub,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-750, 2009-Ohio-2762, ¶ 33; White v. White, 5th Dist. Licking
No. 15-CA-54, 2016-Ohio-2997, ¶ 13, citing Bucalo v. Bucalo, 9th Dist. Medina No.
05CA0011-M, 2005-Ohio-6319, ¶ 23. In cases of financial misconduct, "typically, the
offending spouse * * * either profit[s] from the misconduct or intentionally defeat[s] the other
spouse's distribution of marital assets." Taub at ¶ 33; Mikhail v. Mikhail, 6th Dist. Lucas No.
L-03-1195, 2005-Ohio-322, ¶ 28.
{¶ 20} In this case, both parties have repeatedly accused the other of fraudulent or
illegal activity throughout the marriage and the pendency of this divorce. As previously noted,
Manuel conveyed six properties to various individuals within weeks of Jessica's complaint for
divorce. Jessica alleges that she was unaware of these conveyances and testified that she
did not release her dower rights on these properties. As part of her case, Jessica introduced
exhibits including appraisal values of the properties. Nevertheless, although Jessica notes
that Manuel conveyed six properties, she only addresses three such conveyances in her
brief:
Property Sale Price Appraisal Value
252 Hanover Street $8,000 $12,200
1437 See Avenue $10,000 $30,320
"A third property"1 $10,000 $32,610
Jessica argues the conveyances by Manuel were intended to defraud her and the trial court
erred by failing to include the properties in the recapitulation index or decree.
{¶ 21} After considering the evidence, we again conclude the trial court's decision is
supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. While Jessica alleges that she had no
knowledge of the sales and generally complains of Manuel's fraudulent activities, there was
dispute between the parties as to the sale price and appraisal value that the trial court
1. Jessica did not provide the address for the "third property."
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considered in entering final judgment. In this case, Manuel disputed the appraised values
and argued that some of the properties were in poor condition, including the Hanover Street
property, which he described as missing windows and "still a lot of things missing" and not
habitable. Manuel also described the See Avenue property as a "destroyed property."
Furthermore, Manuel also presented the testimony of Jorge Romero, who testified that he
purchased three of the properties. Romero explained that he transacted business with both
Jessica and Manuel "in a parking lot" and paid cash for the properties. Romero testified that
both Jessica and Manuel appeared pleased with the sales and "were dying to get some
money."
{¶ 22} Though we recognize that transacting real estate business in cash "in a parking
lot" is peculiar, the testimonies of both Jessica and Manuel indicate that their financial
dealings often lack transparency. Both parties testified that many of their dealings involve
strictly cash transactions that were largely unexplained or not coherently established before
the trial court. Under the circumstances, we are unable to determine whether any financial
misconduct occurred, or whether Jessica was indeed in agreement with these real estate
transactions. As a result, we find that Jessica has not met her burden of proving financial
misconduct. Jessica's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 24} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY MAKING AN INEQUITABLE AWARD
CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF CERTAIN PROPERTY.
{¶ 25} In her third assignment of error, Jessica argues the trial court erred by making
an inequitable division of property. Jessica's argument is without merit.
{¶ 26} As noted in Jessica's first assignment of error, property division in a divorce
proceeding is a two-step process that is subject to two different standards of review. Smith,
2017-Ohio-7463 at ¶ 8. After the initial step of classifying the property as separate or marital,
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"the court shall disburse a spouse's separate property to that spouse" and divide the marital
property equally. R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) and (D). However, if the court finds an equal division
would be inequitable, then the court must divide the property in a manner it determines is
equitable. R.C. 3105.171(C)(1); Roberts v. Roberts, 12th Dist. Clinton Nos. CA2012-07-015
and CA2012-07-016, 2013-Ohio-1733, ¶ 34. The trial court is given broad discretion in
fashioning a property or debt division and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Williams v. Williams, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-08-074, 2013-Ohio-3318, ¶ 54. To find
abuse of discretion, we must determine that the trial court's decision was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable, and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 27} Similar to her second assignment of error, Jessica alleges that Manuel
attempted to deceive the trial court by transferring properties to family members at a reduced
cost and therefore the trial court should have valued the respective properties based on their
appraised values instead of sale price. Therefore, Jessica argues that since the incorrect
values were assigned to the properties, the trial court's division of marital property was
inequitable.
{¶ 28} However, as noted earlier, Jessica failed to sustain her burden of proof with
respect to any financial misconduct or fraud related to the sale of the properties. The trial
court's recapitulation index and final decree show that the court considered matters of
credibility in fashioning the final property division, despite the extraordinary inconsistencies of
the parties. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its equitable division of
marital property. As a result, Jessica's third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 29} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.
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