Robinson v. Schreiber

[Cite as Robinson v. Schreiber, 2021-Ohio-903.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
ANDRE ROBINSON, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2020-L-064
- vs - :
VICTORIA ANNE SCHREIBER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Civil Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No.
2018 CV 00548.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Jason L. Carter, Carterlaw, LLC, 16781 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 287, Shaker Heights,
OH 44120 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Bradley Hull, IV, Bradley Hull, IV Esq., LLC, 1392 Som Center Road, Mayfield Heights,
OH 44124 (For Defendant-Appellant).
Leah J. Stevenson, Stevenson & Wagner, LLC, 137 Main Street, Suite 6, Chardon, OH
44024 (Guardian ad Litem).
MATT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Victoria Schreiber nka Hilditch, appeals the Judgment
of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, finding her in contempt of
court. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the lower court.
{¶2} On April 27, 2018, plaintiff-appellee, Andre Robinson, filed a Complaint for
Custody, Visitation, and Support against Hilditch with respect to their child, A.J.R. (dob
09/12/2015). Hilditch filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses on May 31, 2018.
{¶3} On December 20, 2018, Robinson was awarded parenting time with A.J.R.
{¶4} On April 10, 2019, the juvenile court issued a Judgment Entry adding the
following pertinent qualifications to the December 20, 2018 Entry:
Mother, Victoria Schreiber nka Hilditch, shall remain the designated
residential and legal custodian of the minor child, [A.J.R.].
If the minor child does not have daycare / school, all exchanges of
the minor child shall occur at the Eastlake Police Department located
at 35150 Lakeshore Boulevard, Eastlake, Ohio, 44095. During the
exchanges, the minor child’s stepfather shall remain in the car and
shall not participate in exchanges unless a true emergency arises.
Mother may use a well-known adult to the minor child for exchanges.
{¶5} Among other sundry motions, Hilditch filed Motions to Show Cause on May
8, 2019, and August 15, 2019. Robinson filed Motions to Show Cause on June 6, 2019,
June 17, 2019, July 29, 2019, September 18, 2019, and an Amended Motion to Show
Cause on September 16, 2019.
{¶6} Trial on the pending motions was held before a magistrate on September
16, 2019, and on November 20, 2019. During the course of the hearings, Robinson’s
July 29 Motion was dismissed.
{¶7} On December 20, 2019, a Magistrate’s Decision was issued, ruling that
Robinson’s June 6 and 17 Motions to Show Cause are well-taken, Robinson’s September
16 Amended Motion is well-taken in part, and Hilditch’s May 8 and August 15 Motions are
not well-taken. The magistrate made the following pertinent conclusions of law:
The Court finds that both parties appear incapable of and/or unwilling
to follow the Court order in place. The current Court order does not
require a third party be present for the exchange of the minor child.
It requires the minor child’s stepfather, Micha Hilditch, to remain in
the car and not participate in the exchange unless a true emergency
arises. Mother is able to facilitate exchanges but as she reports she
is uncomfortable being in Father’s presence and is unavailable for
visits, she is permitted to use a well-known adult to the minor child
for exchanges.
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The order does not require the parties to get out of the car for
exchanges. The minor child is four years old. The parties (or Mr.
Hilditch), for example, are able to pull up next to one another, open
the door for the minor child, and allow him to walk to the next car.
Additionally, either party is permitted to bring a third party if that
assists in making the exchange and someone is available. If the
minor child is uncomfortable walking to the next car alone and Mr.
Hilditch has driven the child that day, Father can retrieve the child
from the transporting car or have a third party assist in retrieving the
child if one is available. The same can be done at the conclusion of
Father’s parenting time all without necessitating a third party’s
presence and with Mr. Hilditch remaining in the car. The intent
behind the agreement limiting Mr. Hilditch’s involvement in the
exchange was to avoid an unnecessary conflict between Father and
Mr. Hilditch. On the contrary, the parties have used this term to add
even more conflict to an already adversarial situation.
Additionally, at the time the agreement was entered into, the minor
child was enrolled in school on Mondays and Fridays and Father was
able to pick up/drop off the minor child at school eliminating the need
for this additional interaction at the police station except for summers,
holidays, and school closings. Mother has removed the minor child
from schooling on Mondays and Fridays since the time of the
agreement.
Father has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother
violated the April 10, 2019 Order on Easter weekend 2019, Easter
2019, May 27, 2019, May 31, 2019, June 14, 2019, June 16, 2019,
and July 26, 2019, by not making the minor child available to Father
for exchanges on those dates. Evidence of only one offer of makeup
time was provided.
Mother has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Father
violated the April 10, 2019 Order on July 15, 2019, by driving off with
the minor child and failing to return him by 8:30 a.m.
{¶8} The violations of the April 10, 2019 Order identified by the magistrate were
described as follows:
Easter 2019 was Father’s weekend with the minor child. Father was
to have the child beginning the Friday before Easter at 5:00 p.m.,
Mother was to have the child on Easter from 10:00 a.m. until 7:00
p.m., and Father was to have the minor child back from Easter at
7:00 p.m. until Monday morning for the remainder of his weekend
time. Mother had previously reported she was unable to facilitate the
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10:00 a.m. exchange on Easter morning due to third party
unavailability. Father and Mother were unable to coordinate a
different exchange time for Easter Sunday. Mother and Mr. Hilditch
notified Father that a third party was unavailable for the Friday
evening exchange so the Friday exchange did not occur. A makeup
exchange was not had and Father was not able to have the child
Friday or Saturday. After having the minor child all weekend, Mr.
Hilditch, a third party, and the minor child showed up for an exchange
at 7:00 p.m. on Easter Sunday and Father did not appear.
***
May 27, 2019, Memorial Day, was Father’s holiday. At 9:31 a.m.
Father was notified via Our Family Wizard that due to third party
unavailability, there was no one to accommodate an exchange.
Father offered to bring a third party to assist with the exchange and
no response was provided to Father.
May 31, 2019 was the start of Father’s weekend. At 4:16 p.m. Father
was notified via Our Family Wizard that a third party was unavailable
so the exchange with Father would not occur. Father offered to bring
a third party to assist with the exchange and was turned down on this
offer.
June 14, 2019 was the start of Father’s weekend parenting time.
Father and Mr. Hilditch arrived at the Eastlake Police Station. Mr.
Hilditch informed Father via Our Family Wizard that he waited at the
police station and once he was able to confirm he did not have a third
party, he left. Father reported he had a third party. Father was
unable to receive the child for the weekend.
June 16, 2019 was Father’s Day. Father reported to Mother and Mr.
Hilditch via Our Family Wizard he would be at the Eastlake Police
Station at 10:00 a.m. At 4:53 p.m., it was communicated to Father
that Mother and Mr. Hilditch had a third party at that time and could
meet with Father in the next thirty to forty-five minutes. Father did
not meet at that time and testified he was over an hour away and
was unable to make arrangements on such short notice.
July 15, 2019 was a Monday morning at the end of Father’s parenting
time with the minor child. Father drove up to the Eastlake Police
Station with the minor child. Mr. Hilditch communicated through Our
Family Wizard that he was inside the Police Department waiting for
the exchange. Father, believing Mr. Hilditch was violating the order
stating Mr. Hilditch was to remain in the vehicle, drove off with the
minor child. After communications back and forth over Our Family
Wizard, the parties met at approximately 5:00 p.m. at the police
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station with a third party arranged by Mother.
***
July 26, 2019 was the start of Father’s weekend parenting time.
Father arrived at the Eastlake Police Station and between 5:11 p.m.
and 5:56 p.m., sent Mother five messages on Our Family Wizard
questioning the whereabouts of their son and the exchange. Mother
responded the next afternoon stating “Don’t understand why you are
so worked up? You have gotten half your visits this month, just like
you paid half of your child support for the last couple of months.”
Mother testified she did not have a third party for the visit and
believed communicating this to Father would have been “futile.”
Father was unable to receive the child for that weekend
{¶9} Based on the foregoing, the magistrate determined accordingly:
The Court finds each parent is guilty of contemptuous behavior,
however, [it] finds Mother has engaged in contemptuous behavior on
significantly more occasions than Father. As such, Father’s single
contempt finding is negated due to Mother’s contemptuous acts.
Therefore, Mother, Victoria Hilditch fka Schreiber is found to be in
Contempt of Court.
***
Mother * * * shall serve 30 days in the Lake County Jail and pay a
fine of $250.00 and this sentence and fine shall be suspended based
on compliance with all of the terms of the following purge Order:
Father, Andre Robinson, shall be entitled to parenting time on four
(4) additional weekends with the minor child. The additional
weekends shall take place beginning January 1, 2020 where Father
shall be entitled to one additional weekend per month through April,
2020. If the parties cannot agree on a weekend, the weekend shall
be the first weekend of the month in which it is not Father’s regularly
ordered parenting time. Additionally, the parties shall continue to
follow the Court Order of April 10, 2019.
{¶10} Hilditch filed Preliminary Objections to the Magistrate’s Decision on January
3, 2020, and, after having obtained hearing transcripts, Supplemental Objections on
March 17, 2020.
{¶11} On April 15, 2020, the juvenile court overruled Hilditch’s Objections and
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adopted the Magistrate’s Decision.
{¶12} On May 14, 2020, Hilditch filed a Notice of Appeal. On appeal, she raises
the following assignment of error:
{¶13} “[1.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding Victoria Hilditch
in contempt of court.”
{¶14} “Contempt of court is defined as disobedience of an order of a court.”
Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio St.2d 55, 271 N.E.2d 815 (1971), paragraph one
of the syllabus. Contempt proceedings are civil in nature where the “sanctions are
primarily designed to benefit the complainant through remedial or coercive means.”
Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 16, 520 N.E.2d 1362(1988). “The purpose of sanctions in a case of civil contempt is to compel the contemnor
to comply with lawful orders of a court, and the fact that the contemnor acted innocently
and not in intentional disregard of a court order is not a defense to a charge of civil
contempt.” Windham Bank at paragraph three of the syllabus. The standard of proof in
civil contempt proceedings is clear and convincing evidence. Haun v. Haun, 11th Dist.
Portage No. 2018-P-0108, 2019-Ohio-5408, ¶ 59; Kolenic v. Kolenic, 2018-Ohio-1106,
109 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.).
{¶15} “[S]ince the primary interest involved in a contempt proceeding is the
authority and proper functioning of the court, great reliance should be placed upon the
discretion of the trial judge.” Denovchek at 16; Colagiovanni v. Hayden, 11th Dist. Lake
No. 2018-L-034, 2018-Ohio-4951, ¶ 16 (a finding of contempt, whether made directly by
the court or by adoption of a magistrate’s finding, is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
{¶16} In the present case, Hilditch was found in contempt for violating the juvenile
court’s order of April 10, 2019 by preventing Robinson from exercising parenting time on
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the following dates in 2019: April 19 (Friday), April 21 (Easter Sunday), May 27 (Memorial
Day), May 31 (Friday), June 14 (Friday), June 16 (Father’s Day), and July 26 (Friday). It
is well-established the failure to comply with a visitation order is proper grounds for the
finding of contempt. Porter v. Wirick, 3d Defiance Dist. No. 4-16-02, 2016-Ohio-5773, ¶
53 (affirming a finding of contempt for violating a “clearly established order for holiday
parenting time”); Sloat v. James, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008 CA 00048, 2009-Ohio-2849, ¶
26 (affirming a finding of contempt where “the trial court did not find appellant’s
explanations for her non-compliance with the court’s visitation either credible or sufficient
to establish extraordinary circumstances”). Hilditch does not deny that Robinson did not
exercise parenting time on these dates but asserts various reasons why she should not
be held in contempt.
{¶17} Hilditch’s principal argument is that of inability to comply with the juvenile
court’s April 10 order with respect to visitation on the dates in question. This claim of
inability rests, in turn, on a particular interpretation of the court’s order as to how the
exchange of the minor child could be effected.
{¶18} “As a general rule, the inability of the contemnor to comply with a judgment
or order, without fault on the contemnor’s part, is a good defense in a contempt
proceeding for disobedience of the order.” (Citation omitted.) Wagshul v. Wagshul, 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 23564, 2010-Ohio-3120, ¶ 35. “Although inability to comply with a
court order is a defense in a contempt proceeding, the burden of proving inability to
comply is on the party subject to the contempt charge.” Phelps v. Saffian, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 106475, 2018-Ohio-4329, ¶ 58. However, “the inability to comply must
‘“be real and not self-imposed, nor due to fraud, sharp practices, or intentional
avoidance.”’” (Citations omitted.) Abrams v. Abrams, 2017-Ohio-4319, 92 N.E.3d 368, ¶
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22 (2d Dist.); Briggs v. Moelich, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97001, 2012-Ohio-1049, ¶ 15 (“[a]
party must take all reasonable steps within her power to comply with the court’s order
and, when raising the defense of impossibility, must show ‘categorically and in detail’ why
she is unable to comply with the court’s order”).
{¶19} The order, in relevant part, stated that Robinson would have parenting time
on alternating weekends from 5:00 p.m. on Friday until the start of school on Monday but
not later than 8:30 a.m. and on certain holidays. When the child was in school or daycare,
Robinson could pick up or return the child to the school/daycare which would, in effect,
result in the exchange of the child. When the child was not at school or daycare, the
exchanges should occur “at the Eastlake Police Department.” During these exchanges,
the child’s stepfather (Micha) “shall remain in the car and shall not participate in the
exchanges.” Hilditch could “use a well-known adult to the minor child for exchanges.”
{¶20} As interpreted by Hilditch, and to some extent by Robinson, the child could
not be exchanged if Micha transported the child to the police station without another third-
party being present. “[T]he April 10, 2019 Order permitted Victoria Hilditch to use third
parties for exchanges when she was unable to do so herself, and explicitly restricted
Micha Hilditch from participating in the exchange. Therefore, on the dates Victoria
Hilditch was unable to participate * * *, if no third party could attend the exchanges with
Micha Hilditch, the exchange could not occur.” Appellant’s brief at 2. Concomitant with
this interpretation was the understanding that exchanges had to occur in the police station
itself. Appellant’s brief at 4-5.
{¶21} The December 20, 2019 Magistrate’s Decision offered an alternative
interpretation whereby the exchanges could occur in the police station parking lot and, if
Micha had transported the child, Robinson or another party could retrieve and/or deliver
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the child to Micha’s car. This was not the parties’ original interpretation, however, and
the propriety of holding Hilditch in contempt should be judged by her understanding of the
April 10 order. While a party’s subjective understanding does not necessarily control how
a court’s order should be interpreted, the April 10 order was based on “the agreement of
the parties,” “[i]n lieu of proceeding to Trial” on the Complaint, and, as noted, Robinson
shared Hilditch’s interpretation to some degree.1 Conversely, because Hilditch agreed to
the terms of the April 10 order, she cannot complain that they were inherently ambiguous
or impossible to perform.
{¶22} Hilditch claims that she was unable to comply with the April 10 order on the
dates in question because she was unable to participate in the exchange and no other
third party except for Micha was available. However, Hilditch’s inability to participate in
the exchanges is largely due to circumstances of her own making. Hilditch made a
decision that she would not personally participate in any exchange involving Robinson
because she felt uncomfortable dealing with him. As she testified: “I do not feel
comfortable subjecting myself to the intimidation and bullying and narcissistic behaviors
that I’m familiar with [Robinson] exhibiting when I have been present at exchanges.”
Hilditch’s feelings of discomfort do not justify her failure to provide Robinson with
parenting time. Without questioning the sincerity of her feelings, we note that Micha could
have accompanied her to exchanges and that the exchanges were taking place inside of
a police station. There is no evidence that her participation in exchanges would have
subjected her to any risk of physical or serious psychological harm.
1. Robinson’s interpretation of the order is not entirely clear. On the one hand, he believed that if he
provided a third party then the exchanges could take place even if Micha alone transported the child to the
police station. On the other hand, Robinson seemed to believe that exchanges nevertheless had to take
place in the police station.
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{¶23} Alternatively, Hilditch maintains that she was unavailable to participate in
exchanges due to her work schedule although she admitted that she would not participate
even if not working. We note that on three of the seven days Robinson was denied
parenting time Hilditch was not at work (Easter, Father’s Day, and Memorial Day). Having
to work might justify not complying with the April 10 order if there were no other
reasonable means of complying, but this is not the case. Exchanges could have occurred
at day care without involving Hilditch or Micha, but Hilditch made a decision to withdraw
the child from day care on Mondays and Friday afternoons based on what she considered
the child’s “best interest.” More specifically, Hilditch testified that the decision was made
because the child was having behavioral issues and so that he could spend Friday
afternoons with Micha. Without more, neither purpose justifies the denial of parenting
time. Moreover, Hilditch indicated that she employs various babysitters to watch the child
to allow Micha “to do the work he needs on a weekly basis.” While there was much
testimony as to why Micha’s family could not always be present for exchanges, there was
no testimony as to why private child-care providers could not have been employed to
assist in exchanges.
{¶24} Hilditch raises a myriad of other arguments as to why the finding of
contempt was an abuse of discretion that do not directly relate to her inability to comply.
She contends Robinson refused to negotiate or compromise to find a solution to the
difficulties associated with exchanges and that he refused to accept make-up time when
offered. We agree with the magistrate that both parties demonstrated “contemptuous
behavior” and have exploited the situation to create unnecessary conflict. However, this
is not a defense to violating a court order.
{¶25} Hilditch asserts that she filed motions with the juvenile court to modify the
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date and place of the exchanges as well as “to lift restrictions on Micha * * * participating
in exchanges.” Appellant’s brief at 3. As noted above, Hilditch agreed to the terms of the
April 10 order and failed to demonstrate her inability to comply with them. While she is
entitled to seek to modify those terms, it was incumbent upon her to comply with them as
long as they remained in effect.
{¶26} As noted above, both parties engaged in contemptuous conduct. Unlike
Robinson’s conduct, Hilditch’s conduct resulted in a significant loss of parenting time for
the other party. The juvenile court has sought to remedy this by awarding Robinson
parenting time on four additional weekends and to ensure Hilditch’s compliance by a
finding of contempt. Furthermore, the finding of contempt is purged by Robinson
receiving his parenting time. The court’s resolution of the matter is neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable and, accordingly, we defer to its judgment.
{¶27} The sole assignment of error is without merit.
{¶28} For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the Lake County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, finding Hilditch in contempt of court is affirmed. Costs
to be taxed against the appellant.
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.
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