State v. Williams

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-1002.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 18AP-891
v. : (C.P.C. No. 17CR-6553)
Joseph L. Williams, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on March 28, 2023
On brief: [Janet A. Grubb, First Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney], and Seth L. Gilbert, for appellee. Argued: Seth L.
Gilbert.
On brief: Kerry M. Donahue, for appellant. Argued:
Kerry M. Donahue.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Joseph L. Williams, was convicted of two counts of
murder with repeat violent offender specifications. This court affirmed the convictions on
direct appeal. State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-891, 2021-Ohio-3491 ("Williams I").
On September 1, 2022, this court granted Williams's application for reopening of his appeal
for the limited purpose of allowing review of Williams's claims that his right to a speedy
trial had been violated and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
to preserve the alleged speedy-trial violation for appellate review. State v. Williams, 10th
Dist. No. 18AP-891 (Sept. 1, 2022) (memorandum decision). The matter is now before us
on reopening. For the following reasons, we confirm our prior judgment affirming the
convictions.
No. 18AP-891 2
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The evidence and testimony presented at trial in this case are described in
our prior decision. Williams I at ¶ 2-21. In brief, Williams was involved in an altercation
with William Taylor on November 26, 2017. Taylor died the following day due to blunt
impact or blunt force injuries to the head. Ultimately, a jury found Williams guilty of two
counts of murder for causing Taylor's death, and the trial court found Williams guilty of the
repeat violent offender specification associated with each count. The trial court merged the
murder convictions and sentenced Williams to 15 years to life in prison on the murder
conviction, to be served consecutively to 3 years in prison on the repeat violent offender
specification.
{¶ 3} Because Williams asserts a violation of his right to a speedy trial in this
reopened appeal, we focus on the procedural history of the case from arrest to trial.
{¶ 4} Williams was arrested on November 26, 2017. Initially, he was charged with
murder in the Franklin County Municipal Court; that municipal court case was dismissed
at the request of the prosecutor after Williams was indicted on two counts of murder with
repeat violent offender specifications in Franklin C.P. No. 17CR-6553 on December 6, 2017.
The trial court set bond in case No. 17CR-6553 at $800,000 surety and $10,000
recognizance. Williams did not post bond in case No. 17CR-6553 and remained
incarcerated until trial began. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Williams, and
on December 13, 2017 Williams's trial counsel moved for discovery from plaintiff-appellee,
State of Ohio. The state provided its initial discovery response on January 3, 2018.
{¶ 5} On January 5, 2018, Williams was indicted on one count of possession of
cocaine in Franklin C.P. No. 18CR-53. That indictment alleged that on or about February 9,
2017 Williams was in possession of less than five grams of cocaine or a substance containing
cocaine. Bond was set in case No. 18CR-53 at $5,000 surety and $1,000 recognizance.
Williams did not post bond in case No. 18CR-53. Williams eventually pled guilty to the
charge in case No. 18CR-53, and the trial court sentenced him to 11 months in prison, to be
served concurrently with his sentence in case No. 17CR-6553.
{¶ 6} The trial court entered multiple continuances in case No. 17CR-6553,
ultimately setting the trial date for September 10, 2018. At a hearing on August 13, 2018,
Williams's trial counsel moved to dismiss case No. 17CR-6553, asserting that Williams's
No. 18AP-891 3
speedy-trial rights would be violated if trial commenced on September 10, 2018. In
response, the prosecutor argued that speedy-trial time had been tolled while the state
responded to Williams's motion for discovery and had been waived pursuant to two of the
continuances. Williams's trial counsel argued speedy-trial time was not waived pursuant
to the continuances. Although the prosecutor asserted there was no speedy-trial violation,
she suggested moving the trial date to August 20 or August 27, 2018. Williams's trial
counsel requested trial begin on August 20, 2018.
{¶ 7} On August 23, 2018, the trial court issued an order denying Williams's
motion to dismiss. The court concluded Williams waived his speedy-trial rights with
respect to one continuance and that another continuance tolled speedy-trial time because
the state had a reasonable basis to request the continuance. Although the court found that
beginning trial on September 10, 2018 would not violate Williams's right to a speedy trial,
it scheduled trial to begin August 27, 2018.
{¶ 8} On August 28, 2018, the trial court entered a final continuance at the request
of Williams's trial counsel, setting trial for September 10, 2018. Williams did not sign that
continuance entry, instead indicating that he objected to the continuance and demanded a
speedy trial. Trial commenced on September 10, 2018 and lasted until September 17, 2018.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 9} In his reopened appeal, Williams assigns two errors for our review:1
I. APPELLANT'S STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS
AND HIS CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
II. APPELLANT'S COUNSEL ON APPEAL CONSTITUTED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR NOT
RAISING THE SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION.
1This court's decision granting Williams's motion to reopen his appeal permitted him to assert a violation of
his right to a speedy trial and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the speedy-trial issue.
Williams appears to have waived the latter issue because he asserted in his brief on appeal that "[i]t appears
trial counsel properly and timely made the motion [to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation] in the lower Court."
(Appellant's Brief following reopening at 12.)
No. 18AP-891 4
III. Analysis
{¶ 10} Once an appeal has been reopened, the appellant "must establish the merits
of both the direct appeal and the claim for ineffective assistance of [appellate] counsel."
State v. Long, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-90, 2022-Ohio-1601, ¶ 26. See also State v. Leyh, 166
Ohio St.3d 365, 2022-Ohio-292, ¶ 37 ("Under App.R. 26(B), the determination whether
appellate counsel was deficient and prejudiced the applicant is to be made after the appeal
has been reopened and the parties are afforded the opportunity to have counsel, transmit
the necessary record, and substantively brief the issues."). Williams's first assignment of
error addresses the merits of his claim that the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial,
while his second assignment of error asserts his prior appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to assert that issue.
A. Whether Williams's right to a speedy trial was violated
{¶ 11} The right to a speedy trial in criminal prosecutions is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio
Constitution. State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-170, 2021-Ohio-1936, ¶ 38. There is also
a statutory right to a speedy trial under Ohio law, pursuant to statutes implemented to
incorporate the constitutional protections. State v. Sellers, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-810, 2009-
Ohio-2231, ¶ 9.
{¶ 12} Appellate review of a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss based on a
speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Bias, 10th Dist.
No. 21AP-329, 2022-Ohio-4643, ¶ 149. We must give deference to the trial court's findings
of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but independently review
whether the trial court properly applied the law to those facts. Id.
1. Whether Williams's statutory right to a speedy trial was violated
{¶ 13} We begin by addressing whether Williams's statutory right to a speedy trial
was violated. Under R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), a person charged with a felony "[s]hall be brought
to trial within two hundred seventy days after the person's arrest." "Upon motion made at
or prior to the commencement of trial, a person charged with an offense shall be discharged
if he is not brought to trial within the time required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the
Revised Code." R.C. 2945.73(B).
No. 18AP-891 5
{¶ 14} A defendant establishes a prima facie violation of his statutory speedy-trial
right by demonstrating that more than 270 days elapsed before trial. State v. Boyce, 10th
Dist. No. 19AP-313, 2021-Ohio-712, ¶ 11. Once a defendant establishes a prima facie case,
the state bears the burden of proving that time was sufficiently tolled and the speedy-trial
period extended. Id. The time within which to bring a defendant to trial may be extended
for the reasons set forth in R.C. 2945.72. State v. Brown, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-40, 2019-
Ohio-4753, ¶ 27. "Hence, the proper standard of review in speedy trial cases is to simply
count the number of days passed, while determining to which party the time is chargeable,
as directed in R.C. 2945.72." Id. On appeal of an order denying a motion to dismiss based
on a statutory speedy-trial violation, we independently calculate whether the time to bring
a defendant to trial expired. Id.{¶ 15} In this case, 288 days elapsed between Williams's arrest on November 26,
2017 and the first day of his trial on September 10, 2018. Thus, because more than 270
days passed, Williams has demonstrated a prima facie violation of his statutory right to a
speedy trial. Boyce at ¶ 11. The state argues that several tolling events and waivers reduced
the number of days to fewer than 270. By contrast, Williams asserts he never intended to
waive his speedy-trial time and that more than 270 days elapsed before trial even if certain
tolling events are considered.
a. Tolling and waiver of statutory speedy-trial time
{¶ 16} "Two key concepts direct how a court must charge the days when calculating
a potential speedy trial violation: waiver and tolling." Brown at ¶ 28. If a defendant waives
speedy-trial rights, the days included in the waiver period do not count toward the deadline
for bringing him to trial. Id. Tolling occurs by operation of law under R.C. 2945.72 under
certain circumstances and the defendant is not required to agree to the tolling of time. Id.{¶ 17} An exhaustive list of events and circumstances that toll statutory speedy-trial
time is set forth in R.C. 2945.72. Id. at ¶ 29. As relevant to this appeal, the time to bring a
defendant to trial may be extended by a "period of delay necessitated by reason of a * * *
motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused." R.C. 2945.72(E). The
time to bring a defendant to trial may also be extended by "[t]he period of any continuance
granted on the accused's own motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance
granted other than upon the accused's own motion." R.C. 2945.72(H). The state argues
No. 18AP-891 6
that pursuant to these provisions, there were several events that tolled Williams's speedy-
trial time.
{¶ 18} Williams was arrested on November 26, 2017. When computing time under
the speedy-trial statute, we do not include the date of arrest. State v. Kadunc, 10th Dist.
No. 15AP-920, 2016-Ohio-4637, ¶ 10. Therefore, our count begins with November 27, 2017.
From November 27 to December 13, 2017, 17 days elapsed that are chargeable toward the
state.
{¶ 19} On December 13, 2017, Williams moved for discovery from the state. The
state filed its initial response 21 days later, on January 3, 2018. "A [defendant's] discovery
request tolls speedy-trial time for a reasonable amount of time necessary to allow the state
to respond to the request." State v. Belville, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-3879, ¶ 21.
There is nothing to indicate the state failed to respond to Williams's discovery request
within a reasonable time. Moreover, in his reply brief on appeal, Williams concedes his
speedy-trial time was tolled until the state's initial discovery response. Thus, the 21 days
that passed between December 14, 2017 and January 3, 2018 are chargeable toward
Williams and are not included in calculating his speedy-trial time. Id. at ¶ 23.
{¶ 20} Williams's speedy-trial time resumed on January 4, 2018 and continued until
January 17, 2018; those 14 days are chargeable toward the state. On January 17, 2018, the
trial court entered a continuance at the request of both parties reassigning the trial date to
February 14, 2018 ("the January 17th continuance"). Williams waived his right to a speedy
trial under the January 17th continuance. Accordingly, the 28 days from January 18 to
February 14, 2018 are chargeable toward Williams and are not included in his speedy-trial
time.
{¶ 21} On February 14, 2018, the trial court entered a continuance at the state's
request, reassigning the trial date to May 21, 2018 ("the February 14th continuance").
Williams objected to the February 14th continuance and the language in the continuance
entry waiving Williams's right to a speedy trial was struck out. The 96 days that elapsed
under the February 14th continuance are chargeable toward the state and are included in
calculating Williams's speedy-trial time.
{¶ 22} The trial court entered another continuance at the state's request on May 3,
2018, reassigning the trial date to July 9, 2018 ("the May 3rd continuance"). The parties
No. 18AP-891 7
dispute the effect of the May 3rd continuance. The continuance entry indicated Williams
objected to the continuance; however, the language waiving Williams's right to a speedy
trial was not struck out. At the August 13, 2018 hearing, the prosecutor alleged Williams's
trial counsel allowed the May 3rd continuance entry to be filed with the speedy-trial waiver
language in place and did not advise her that Williams was not waiving his speedy-trial time
until late May. The prosecutor argued that because the court speaks through its entries, the
state should have been allowed to rely on the waiver language contained in the May 3rd
continuance entry. We need not resolve this issue, however, because, as explained below,
we conclude that Williams's statutory speedy-trial right was not violated even if the 49-day
period under the May 3rd continuance is charged toward the state. Therefore, for purposes
of analysis, we will consider those 49 days as chargeable toward the state and include them
in our calculation of Williams's speedy-trial time.
{¶ 23} On July 2, 2018, the trial court entered another continuance at the state's
request, reassigning the trial date to September 10, 2018 ("the July 2nd continuance"). The
parties also dispute the effect of the July 2nd continuance. Williams clearly objected to the
July 2nd continuance and the language in the continuance entry waiving his right to a
speedy trial was struck out. At the August 13, 2018 hearing, the prosecutor asserted the
July 2nd continuance was necessary to investigate the possibility that Williams might have
been involved in the death of a witness. Williams's trial counsel argued there was no
reasonable basis to believe Williams was involved in the witness's death and speedy-trial
time should not be tolled for the period under the July 2nd continuance. In its decision
denying Williams's motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded Williams's speedy-trial
time during this period was tolled under R.C. 2945.72(H) because the state's request was a
reasonable basis to continue the trial date. Again, we need not resolve this issue because
we find that even if the time under the July 2nd continuance is charged to the state,
Williams's statutory speedy-trial right was not violated. Although the July 2nd continuance
originally set the trial date for September 10, 2018, the trial court's subsequent order
denying Williams's motion to dismiss set the trial date for August 27, 2018. Accordingly,
for purposes of analysis, we deem the July 2nd continuance to have extended the trial date
by 49 days, which are chargeable toward the state and are included in calculating Williams's
speedy-trial time.
No. 18AP-891 8
{¶ 24} The trial court entered a final continuance at the request of Williams's trial
counsel on August 28, 2018, setting trial for September 10, 2018 ("the August 28th
continuance"). Williams's trial counsel signed the August 28th continuance entry, but
Williams did not sign it and instead indicated he objected to the continuance and demanded
a speedy trial. Williams argues on appeal that the 14-day period from August 28 to
September 10, 2018 should not be charged toward him for purposes of calculating speedy-
trial time. A defendant is bound by his counsel's actions in waiving speedy-trial rights by
seeking or agreeing to a continuance, even over the defendant's objections. Brown at ¶ 28.
Accordingly, this 14-day period is chargeable toward Williams and is not included in
calculating his speedy-trial time.
{¶ 25} Based on the various waiver and tolling events described above, we conclude
that 225 of the 288 calendar days that elapsed between November 27, 2017 and
September 10, 2018 are chargeable toward the state for purposes of calculating Williams's
speedy-trial time.
b. Three-for-one counting when a defendant is held in jail in lieu of bail
{¶ 26} When determining the 270-day period within which a defendant must be
brought to trial on a felony charge, "each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu
of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three days." R.C. 2945.71(E). Williams
did not post bond in case No. 17CR-6553 and remained in jail until his trial began. Williams
argues that because he remained in jail pending trial, each day he was held in jail must be
counted as three days pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(E).2 By contrast, the state argues Williams
2 In his initial brief on appeal, Williams asserted he was incarcerated for 295 days, which appears to encompass
the time from his arrest on November 26, 2017 through the last day of his trial on September 17, 2018.
Williams argued he was entitled to triple counting of that entire time, for a total of 885 days of speedy-trial
time. In his reply brief, Williams continued to assert he was entitled to triple counting for the entire time he
was incarcerated, but also proffered an alternative calculation of 323 days based on partial triple counting and
counting backward from the date of his sentencing. At the August 13, 2018 hearing, however, Williams's trial
counsel only argued Williams was entitled to triple counting for the time he was incarcerated prior to
January 6, 2018. Accordingly, to the extent Williams now argues he was entitled to triple counting of any days
after the indictment was issued in case No. 18CR-53, such a claim would potentially be subject to plain-error
review because Williams did not assert that argument in the trial court. See Crim.R. 52(B) ("Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court."); State v. Black, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-405, 2017-Ohio-3001, ¶ 17 ("[W]e find Black did not timely object
to the trial court's alleged error. Consequently, he waived all but plain error."). Because we conclude Williams
fails to establish a violation of his right to a speedy trial under the usual standard governing review of such a
claim, he would also fail under the heightened plain-error standard. See State v. Huish, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-
255, 2023-Ohio-365, ¶ 65 (referring to the "exceedingly high threshold required under plain error").
No. 18AP-891 9
was only entitled to triple counting until January 5, 2018 when he was indicted in case No.
18CR-53.
{¶ 27} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the triple-count provision under
R.C. 2945.71 "is applicable only to those defendants held in jail in lieu of bail solely on the
pending charge." (Emphasis added.) State v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66 (1976),
paragraph one of syllabus.3 The court subsequently held that " 'when new and additional
charges arise from the same facts as did the original charge and the state knew of such facts
at the time of the initial indictment, the time within which trial is to begin on the additional
charge is subject to the same statutory limitations period that is applied to the original
charge.' " State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 68 (1989), quoting State v. Clay, 9 Ohio App.3d
216, 218 (11th Dist.1983). However, "[a]dditional crimes based on different facts should
not be considered as arising from the same sequence of events for the purposes of speedy-
trial computation." State v. Baker, 78 Ohio St.3d 108, 111 (1997). The court later clarified
that "[w]hen multiple charges arise from a criminal incident and share a common litigation
history, pretrial incarceration on the multiple charges constitutes incarceration on the
'pending charge' for purposes of the triple-count provision of the speedy-trial statute."
State v. Parker, 113 Ohio St.3d 207, 2007-Ohio-1534, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 28} Here, the event that formed the basis for the drug possession charge in case
No. 18CR-53 occurred before the altercation that resulted in the murder charges in case No.
17CR-6553. Thus, while the state may have had knowledge of the facts supporting the
indictment in case No. 18CR-53 at the time of the indictment in case No. 17CR-6553, the
charge in case No. 18CR-53 did not "arise from the same facts" as the charges in case No.
3 Williams asserts MacDonald is "one mistaken case that should be overturned or revisited." (Appellant's
Reply Brief following reopening at 4.) "This court as an intermediate appellate court, is bound by, and must
follow and apply, the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court. This court has no authority to modify, and much
less to overrule, any decision of the Ohio Supreme Court." Gehad & Mandi, Inc. v. Ohio State Liquor Control
Comm., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1181, 2006-Ohio-3081, ¶ 7.
No. 18AP-891 10
17CR-6553.4 Adams at 68. Moreover, if Williams had posted bond in case No. 17CR-6553
at some point after January 5, 2018, he would not have been released from jail unless he
also posted the separate bond imposed in case No. 18CR-53. Accordingly, we conclude that
for purposes of calculating speedy-trial time, Williams was not held in jail in lieu of bail
solely on case No. 17CR-6553 after January 5, 2018 when the indictment was issued in case
No. 18CR-53. Thus, Williams was not entitled to triple counting pursuant to R.C.
2945.71(E) of any time after January 5, 2018.
{¶ 29} As explained above, the 17-day period from November 27, 2017 until
Williams filed his discovery request on December 13, 2017 was chargeable to the state. The
triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71(E) applies because Williams was in jail in lieu of bail
solely on the charges in case No. 17CR-6553 at the time. Therefore, those 17 days are treated
as 51 days for purposes of calculating Williams's speedy-trial time. Similarly, on January 4
and January 5, 2018, after the state filed its discovery response, Williams was in jail in lieu
of bail solely on the charges in case No. 17CR-6553. Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(E), those 2
days are counted as 6 days for purposes of calculating Williams's speedy-trial time.
c. Summary of Williams's statutory speedy-trial time
{¶ 30} Pursuant to our independent calculation, considering the various waivers and
tolling events, and triple counting of time pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(E) for the days Williams
was in jail in lieu of bail solely on the charges in case No. 17CR-6553, we conclude that at
most 263 days of speedy-trial time chargeable to the state elapsed between Williams's arrest
and the first day of his trial:
4 In a decision issued just two years later, the Supreme Court asserted that the MacDonald rule was not
intended to be immutable. State v. Ladd, 56 Ohio St.2d 197, 202 (1978). The court acknowledged that
situations could arise where applying the MacDonald rule would be inequitable and allow delay in the judicial
system, such as where "a prosecutor might add a frivolous charge to a meritorious one in order to invoke
MacDonald and thus deny a defendant the benefit of [the triple counting provision]." Ladd at fn. 4. Similarly,
this court has acknowledged that "cases involving subsequent indictments can be problematic with respect to
the issue of speedy trial rights." State v. Mohamed, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-960, 2009-Ohio-6658, ¶ 28.
However, there is nothing in the record before us to indicate that the fifth-degree felony charge indicted in
case No. 18CR-53 was frivolous or that it was filed with the intention of extending the time in which Williams
could be brought to trial in case No. 17CR-6553.
No. 18AP-891 11
Beginning date End date Calendar Speedy-trial
days elapsed time elapsed
November 27, 2017 December 13, 2017 17 51
December 14, 2017 January 3, 2018 21 0
January 4, 2018 January 5, 2018 2 6
January 6, 2018 January 17, 2018 12 12
January 18, 2018 February 14, 2018 28 0
February 15, 2018 May 21, 2018 96 96
May 22, 2018 July 9, 2018 49 49
July 10, 2018 August 27, 2018 49 49
August 28, 2018 September 10, 2018 14 0
Total 288 263
{¶ 31} Because fewer than 270 days elapsed between Williams's arrest and the first
day of his trial, his statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated and the trial court did
not err by denying his motion to dismiss on that basis.
2. Whether Williams's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated
{¶ 32} We also consider whether Williams's constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated. "[E]ven if statutory timetables are complied with, 'constitutional guarantees may
be broader than statutory provisions in some circumstances.' " Columbus v. LaMarca, 10th
Dist. No. 15AP-440, 2015-Ohio-4467, ¶ 15, quoting Sellers, 2009-Ohio-2231, at ¶ 12. When
analyzing a constitutional speedy-trial claim, we undertake a two-step inquiry. First, we
consider whether the defendant has established that the delay was presumptively
prejudicial. Smith, 2021-Ohio-1936, at ¶ 38. Second, if a presumptively prejudicial delay
exists, we apply a four-factor balancing test examining: (1) the length of delay, (2) the
reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant's timely assertion of his speedy-trial right, and
No. 18AP-891 12
(4) the resulting prejudice to the defendant from the delay. Kadunc at ¶ 19, citing Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
{¶ 33} "Generally, delay is presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year."
Smith at ¶ 38. As explained above, in this case the total delay between arrest and trial was
288 days (approximately 9 and 1/2 month), and only 225 calendar days (approximately 7
and 1/2 month) of that time was chargeable to the state. This court and other Ohio
appellate districts have previously held that similar delays are not presumptively
prejudicial. See State v. Graham, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-636, 2019-Ohio-2020, ¶ 58 (delay
of 9 months between indictment and plea was not presumptively prejudicial); State v.
Webb, 4th Dist. No. 01CA32, 2002-Ohio-3552, ¶ 26 (delay of "just over [6] months" was
not presumptively prejudicial); State v. Pinson, 4th Dist. No. 00CA2713 (Mar. 16, 2001) (6
and 1/2 month delay "does not come close to approaching [the] threshold for presuming
prejudice"); State v. Johnson, 13 Ohio App.3d 271, 271-72 (8th Dist.1984) (9-month delay
was not presumptively prejudicial). Because Williams has not demonstrated a
presumptively prejudicial delay, we need not reach the second step of the analysis. Kadunc
at ¶ 23.
{¶ 34} Williams has failed to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional right to a
speedy trial, and the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss on that basis.
{¶ 35} Because Williams has failed to establish a violation of his statutory or
constitutional rights to a speedy trial, we overrule his first assignment of error.
B. Whether Williams's prior appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to
argue a speedy-trial violation on direct appeal
{¶ 36} In his second assignment of error, Williams asserts his prior appellate
counsel was ineffective during the initial direct appeal for not presenting an assignment of
error asserting a violation of his right to a speedy trial. An appellate attorney has wide
latitude in deciding which issues and arguments will be most effective on appeal and is not
required to argue meritless assignments of error. State v. Lee, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-226,
2007-Ohio-1594, ¶ 3. As explained above, we conclude that Williams's right to a speedy
trial was not violated. Therefore, Williams's prior appellate counsel was not ineffective for
failing to assert a meritless claim. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1032,
No. 18AP-891 13
2010-Ohio-786, ¶ 18 (concluding appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise a
meritless claim).
{¶ 37} Accordingly, we overrule Williams's second assignment of error.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Williams's two assignments of error
and, pursuant to App.R. 26(B)(9), we confirm our prior judgment affirming the judgment
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment confirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER and BOGGS, JJ., concur.