State v. Singleton

[Cite as State v. Singleton, 2021-Ohio-3010.]
COURT OF APPEALS
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES:
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J.
Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
: Hon. John W. Wise, J.
-vs- :
:
MICHAEL SINGLETON, : Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026
:
Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
19 CRI 05 0316
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: August 31, 2021
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
MELISSA A. SCHIFFEL WILLIAM T. CRAMER
Delaware County Prosecutor 470 Olde Worthington Road, Suite 200
Westerville, Ohio 43082
By: JOEL C. WALKER
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
145 N. Union Street, 3rd Floor
Delaware, Ohio 43015
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Michael Singleton, appeals the verdict of the Delaware County
Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty of two counts of forcible rape in violation of
R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), both first-degree felonies; and abduction, with a sexual motivation, in
violation of R.C. 2905.02(B), a second-degree felony. Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} Carrie Wooten began exchanging FaceBook messages with Singleton in
March 2019. Singleton claimed that he knew Wooten from high school, but she did not
remember him. They communicated through written messages in FaceBook Messenger,
exchanged voice-mail messages, and used FaceTime to communicate face to face. The
messages became annoying to Wooten as they were taking up a lot of time and she found
Singleton "seemed to have what [she] would call drama associated with him." (Transcript
p. 219, lines 19-25) She quit responding and deleted his messages from her phone to
preserve space in its memory.
{¶3} Singleton messaged Wooten again on April 18, 2019, about two weeks after
their last contact, and they resumed their electronic conversation. Wooten began talking
with him again because the tone of his messages had changed. "He started sounding like
he was trying to be more stable. He was talking about getting right with God, getting right
with his family and wanting to, you know, make amends with them, and get back on track
with his life." (Transcript, p. 224, lines 24-25; p.25, lines 1-3).
{¶4} Singleton claimed to live in Indiana and he expressed a desire to return to
Ohio to reconnect with his family. He begged for her assistance. (Transcript, p.225).
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 3
Wooten interpreted his comments as sincere and offered to buy a bus ticket for Singleton
to return to Ohio. He accepted the offer and stated he would repay her for the expense.
{¶5} Singleton's arrival time was originally scheduled for April 20, 2019 at 8:00
p.m., (Transcript, p. 464, line 9) but he missed that bus and bought a ticket that brought
him to the bus station just before 2:30 a.m. Wooten met him at the bus station and drove
him to her home. She asked about when he would want to meet with his mother, but he
avoided that topic. She asked that he sleep on the couch, but he refused, and insisted
that he sleep in her bed. (Transcript, p. 286, lines 3-10). They talked until they fell asleep.
In the morning they engaged in consensual sex that Wooten described as normal and did
not involve hair-pulling, biting, slapping, angry talk or any uncomfortable positions.
{¶6} .Wooten was not scheduled to work on April 21st, the day after Singleton's
arrival, so they stayed together and talked. Wooten urged Singleton to go to his mother's
home, but he avoided discussing the topic and did not leave.
{¶7} Over the next few days they spent little time together as Singleton had found
employment and was generally at work while Wooten was home. He did continue to send
messages to Wooten while she was at work and, occasionally, the messages were
intimate and explicit. Singleton stated at one time that he loved Wooten, and Wooten
responded by sending a heart shaped icon. She later told him that she just did not feel
that way about him and began keeping him at arm’s length. (Transcript, p. 327, lines 13-
21; p. 329, lines 6-7.) Singleton continued to send multiple text and voice messages while
Wooten was at work, often unable or unwilling to respond. On Thursday, April 25, 2019,
Wooten delivered a message: "I literally just saw these and listened to them... I honestly
don't know what to say... I told you I don't do drama or BS and all you do is this back and
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 4
forth bi-polar shit that I'm not wanting nor needing. I'm sure you're sorry and what not but
I think it's time for you to move on... I'm sorry I really am but I'm over it for real." (Transcript,
p.357, lines 11-17). Singleton did not leave and on Friday afternoon she sent him a text
message:
“I said, "I'm not playing anybody... I work and I come home and sleep
and I told you that before you got here. As far as I remember I told you we
had to get to know each other but I'm pretty sure you had it in your head
that we were just jumping into relationship slash living together right away.
I told you yesterday that I was over it and I haven't changed my mind about
it. I obviously do what I say I'm gonna do cuz you're here. Like I said I forgive
what's been said and I wish no ill will on you but I'm over it and yes you're
gonna have to find someone else to stay with I'm sorry."
Transcript, p. 364, lines 4-14
{¶8} When she returned home from work Saturday morning, April 27, Singleton
was on the couch. She did not speak to him, but went to bed and awoke around 2:00
p.m. to find her adult son, Aaron Sebach, and Singleton talking. Singleton was drinking
vodka at the time. All three went out and purchased alcohol, but the parties have
conflicting stories regarding whether they all went together or Wooten went by herself.
Wooten remembers ordering a pizza before leaving for a local department store where
she made purchases, including a bottle of wine.
{¶9} When Wooten returned, Singleton was still present, but neither spoke to the
other. She described it as an awkward environment where she and Singleton were just
there and not speaking to each other. The pizza had arrived and Sebach and Singleton
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 5
had started eating. Wooten had a glass of wine with her pizza and she had a shot of hard
liquor with her son and Singleton.
{¶10} Sebach invited some of his friends over and they had planned to go out, but
he was concerned about leaving his mother with Singleton. While he could not clearly
articulate the source of his concern, he was bothered by a feeling that the relationship
between his mother and Singleton had worsened. Nevertheless, he left with his friends
at Wooten's urging.
{¶11} Wooten had no desire to speak with Singleton that evening and was viewing
FaceBook for relief and distraction. Singleton asked who she was talking to, and she
responded "no one." He hit her phone and asked again who she was talking to and she
responded that she was just scrolling through FaceBook and showed her phone.
{¶12} He then came up to her right side, pulled her pants down to expose the top
of her buttocks and bit her on the thigh, causing Singleton to react to the pain by turning,
pushing Singleton and asking him why he did that, telling him that it hurt. She attempted
to put some space between her and Singleton by moving into the living room from the
kitchen, but Singleton tackled her to the ground and pushed her legs up beside her head
and slapped her face. He grabbed her arm and forced her up the stairs, laughing at her
questions and telling her he has all night to do this.
{¶13} He dragged her to the bedroom and threw her to the bed and again forced
her legs up beside her head and slapped her face. He removed her pants, and
anticipating his next step, she asked that he stop because she was still on her period. He
removed her tampon, bit her thighs and vagina and digitally penetrated her vagina and
anus. He then stood to remove his pants and then forcibly penetrated her vagina with his
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 6
penis, ultimately ejaculating inside Wooten. Wooten testified that she did not consent to
any of this sexual conduct.
{¶14} Singleton cleaned the blood from his genitals and re-dressed, then sat on
the bed. Rocking back and forth on the bed and clapping his hands, Singleton questioned
Wooten's mental state, asking if she was bi-polar telling her that he needed to “figure
things out.” Singleton next wrapped a t-shirt around her neck and tightened it, restraining
her breathing and telling her that he should take care of her now so she could not say
anything. (Transcript, p. 415, lines 14-15). He left the bedroom, telling her to stay put
while he smoked a cigarette. Singleton went outside the apartment and, after he closed
the door Wooten followed and locked the door, returned to the bedroom and locked that
door and called her son. When she reached him, she told him that Singleton had hit her
and asked that he come home. She called 911 and put the phone under her bed and
then retrieved a pistol from under the bed.
{¶15} Singleton re-entered the apartment, apparently bypassing the door locks
with a credit card and confronted Wooten in the bedroom. She pointed the gun at him
and he laughed but did not enter the bedroom. He paced in the doorway and then went
downstairs where he was confronted by Sebach. Sebach told him to leave and Singleton
refused until Sebach produced a gun and ordered him from the home.
{¶16} Sebach checked on his mother and found her wrapped in a towel, wearing
a tank top and still holding a pistol. Her face was red and she had some bumps and she
was obviously very upset. She mentioned that she had called 911, so he expected the
police to arrive soon. Wooten stayed in her room and fell asleep, vomiting on herself
during the night. The police did not arrive and, in the morning, Sebach called his sisters.
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 7
They came to the apartment and took Wooten to the police department and then to the
hospital for an exam by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner. While Wooten showed no
obvious signs of injuries, she complained of pain in her neck and legs and walked with a
limp.
{¶17} Detective Sergeant Michael Bolen of the Delaware Police Department
spoke with both Wooten and her son multiple times, photographed Wooten's apartment
and gathered relevant evidence. At his request, Wooten gave Detective Bolen her
FaceBook password and he was able to retrieve text and voice messages exchanged by
Wooten and Singleton.
{¶18} In May 2019, Singleton was indicted for two counts of forcible rape in
violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), both first-degree felonies; and one count of abduction,
with a sexual motivation, in violation of R.C. 2905.02(B), a second-degree felony. And in
August 2019, the State filed a Bill of Information alleging that after the indictment was
filed, Singleton engaged in witness intimidation in violation of R.C. 2921.04(A), a first-
degree misdemeanor. The trial court subsequently granted the state's motion to join the
charges for trial.
{¶19} Singleton entered a guilty plea to the witness intimidation charge. During
the plea hearing, the prosecution alleged that while he was in jail awaiting trial on the rape
charge, Singleton contacted an ex-girlfriend and asked her to convince the victim not to
continue with the prosecution. Singleton agreed with those facts. The trial court accepted
Singleton's plea and moved on to the trial on the felonies.
{¶20} The remaining charges were tried before a jury in June 2020 and Singleton
was convicted on both counts of rape and the single count of abduction. The court
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 8
merged the abduction charge with the first count of rape and sentenced Singleton to an
indefinite minimum term of ten years for each rape charge to run consecutively for an
aggregate sentence of twenty to twenty-five years. The ninety-day sentence for witness
intimidation was to run concurrently with the sentences for the rape. Singleton was
ordered to register as a Tier III sex offender.
{¶21} Singleton filed a notice of appeal and submitted two assignments of error:
{¶22} “I. THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE GUILTY
VERDICTS ON EITHER COUNT OF RAPE OR THE COUNT OF ABDUCTION.”
{¶23} “II. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF
DUE PROCESS WHEN THE PROSECUTION COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY
MISSTATING THE LAW REGARDING THE MENTAL STATE FOR RAPE DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENTS.”
ANALYSIS
I.
{¶24} Singleton argues that the weight of the evidence does not support the guilty
verdicts for rape and abduction, focusing primarily on the credibility of the state's
witnesses and inconsistencies or conflicts between their stories. Singleton's counsel
relied upon the same argument at trial, thoroughly cross-examining the witnesses to
reveal and highlight what he described as serious defects in the state's case and grounds
for a not guilty verdict. Singleton's trial counsel reviewed all the alleged defects and
inconsistencies in his closing argument, but the jury was not persuaded.
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 9
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶25} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a
manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence, even though the
evidence of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as
stated by State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997–Ohio–355; State v.
Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001).
“[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against
the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every
reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the
finding of facts.
***
“If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the
reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with
the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and
judgment.”
Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn.
3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–192 (1978).
{¶26} The reviewing court must bear in mind, however, that credibility generally is
an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d
904 (2001); State v. Murphy, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2953, 2008–Ohio–1744, ¶ 31.
Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent to
decide whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses, the
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 10
appellate court must afford substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.
Barberton v. Jenney, 126 Ohio St.3d 5, 2010–Ohio–2420, 929 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 20. In other
words, “[w]hen there exist two fairly reasonable views of the evidence or two conflicting
versions of events, neither of which is unbelievable, it is not our province to choose which
one we believe.” State v. Dyke, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 99 CA 149, 2002–Ohio–1152, at
¶ 13, quoting State v. Gore, 131 Ohio App.3d 197, 201, 722 N.E.2d 125(7th Dist. 1999).
Thus, an appellate court will leave the issues of weight and credibility of the evidence to
the fact finder, as long as a rational basis exists in the record for its decision. State v.
Picklesimer, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA9, 2012–Ohio–1282, ¶ 24.
{¶27} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may
not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “‘the jury clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, supra, at 387, quoting State v.
Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist. 1983). Accordingly,
reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id.{¶28} Singleton was charged with two counts of forcible rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(2), both first-degree felonies; and one count of abduction, with a sexual
motivation, in violation of R.C. 2905.02(B), a second-degree felony. Revised Code
2905.02(B) states that “[n]o person, with a sexual motivation, shall * * * [b]y force or threat,
restrain the liberty of another person under circumstances that create a risk of physical
harm to the victim or place the other person in fear.”
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 11
{¶29} Wooten described how Singleton tackled her as she tried to move away
from him and pushed her legs up beside her head. He took her by the arm and forced
her to follow him to the bedroom where he removed her pants and began biting her and
subsequently raped her. She testified that her neck and legs were injured as a result and
that she was confused and fearful as a result of Singleton's aggressive behavior.
{¶30} Singleton's behavior supports the jury's conclusion that he was acting with
a sexual motivation and Wooten's testimony, if believed, support a finding that he
forcefully restrained Wooten, caused her physical harm and fear.
{¶31} The record also supports the jury's guilty verdict for two counts of rape.
Revised Code 2907.20(A)(2) prohibits engaging in sexual conduct with another when the
offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force."
“Sexual conduct means vaginal intercourse between a male and female; * * * and, without
privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument,
apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration,
however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.” R.C. 2907.01(A).
Wooten's description of Singleton's actions satisfies the elements of the offense of forcible
rape. He gripped her arm, forced her to follow him to the bedroom where he threw her
on the bed. He removed her pants, underwear and tampon and bit her in the groin and
vagina and then penetrated her anally and vaginally with his fingers. He then removed
his clothing and engaged in vaginal intercourse with Wooten again placing her in an
awkward position with her legs pushed up near her head. She did not consent to any of
this conduct and told him she did not want him to do this, but he only responded that she
liked it and he would not stop.
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 12
{¶32} Wooten and Singleton engaged in sexual intercourse in the morning after
his arrival, but Singleton did not bite Wooten, did not tackle her, drag her to the bedroom
or push her legs up near her head. Wooten confirmed that she had consented to that
interaction, but did not consent to the aggressive behavior that gave rise to the charges
of rape. The testimony of Wooten, if believed, supports a conviction for a charge of rape
in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).
{¶33} Singleton suggests that the jury lost its way in arriving at a guilty verdict
based upon inconsistencies, lack of evidence of injuries to Wooten, or unexplained facts.
We have reviewed the record and transcript closely and, though Singleton points out
several issues, some significant, such as the lack of any visible evidence of injury to
Wooten, and others minor, such as the likelihood that Wooten's phone landed on top of
an animal cage, we cannot conclude that the jury lost its way in arriving at a guilty verdict.
The state provided evidence that, if believed, supported a guilty verdict.
{¶34} Singleton argued that Wooten was drunk during the incident and not a
credible witness, but the jury exercised its discretion, accepted her version of the facts
and was not swayed by Singleton's argument. The jury as the trier of fact was free to
accept or reject any and all of the evidence offered by the parties and assess the witness's
credibility. “While the trier of fact may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or
discount them accordingly * * * such inconsistencies do not render defendant's conviction
against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Craig, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 99AP–739, 1999 WL 29752 (Mar 23, 2000) quoting State v. Nivens, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 95APA09–1236, 1996 WL 284714 (May 28, 1996). Indeed, the trier of
fact need not believe all of a witness’ testimony, but may accept only portions of it as true.
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 13
State v. Raver, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP–604, 2003–Ohio–958, ¶ 21, quoting State
v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964); State v. Burke, 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 02AP–1238, 2003–Ohio–2889, quoting State v. Caldwell, 79 Ohio App.3d 667, 607
N.E.2d 1096 (4th Dist. 1992). Although the evidence may have been circumstantial, we
note that circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence. State
v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus,
superseded by State constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v.
Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997).
{¶35} When we consider the evidence presented at trial regarding the rape as well
as the efforts of Singleton to persuade Wooten to not testify, we conclude that this is not
an “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”
Thompkins, supra. The jury neither lost its way nor created a miscarriage of justice in
convicting Appellant and Appellee presented evidence of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
{¶36} Singleton's first assignment of error is denied.
II.
{¶37} In his second assignment of error, Singleton complaints that he was
deprived of a fair trial in violation of due process when the prosecution committed
misconduct by misstating the law regarding the mental state for rape during closing
arguments. He cites to a lengthy passage from the trial and notes that trial counsel
objected, suggesting that the objection applies to all the preceding comments of the
prosecutor. Upon review of the transcript, we find the subject of the objection to be the
two sentences preceding the objection:
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 14
If you were to believe defense counsel that this is just about Michael's
perception, then the State submits to you that the overwhelming evidence
in this case combined with the testimony should demonstrate to you that is
an offensive statement. That if someone says I didn't think I raped her, then
that person could not be found guilty.
(Transcript, p. 893, lines 6-12).
{¶38} Trial counsel did object, and did not comment on the law, but only stated
"[n]ot the case," so the nature of this objection is not clear.
{¶39} The Supreme Court of Ohio has instructed that:
When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, our inquiry is
twofold: we must first decide whether the prosecutor's actions were
improper, and if so, we consider whether the conduct prejudicially affected
the defendant's substantial rights. State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422,
2017-Ohio-9423, 108 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 228. “The touchstone of due process
analysis * * * is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).
Thus, “[t]he relevant question is whether the prosecutor’s 'comments ‘so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464,
91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986), quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,
643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974); see generally State v. Johnson,
144 Ohio St.3d 518, 2015-Ohio-4903, 45 N.E.3d 208, ¶ 78.
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 15
State v. Kirkland, 160 Ohio St.3d 389, 2020-Ohio-4079, 157 N.E.3d 716 reconsideration
denied, 160 Ohio St.3d 1421, 2020-Ohio-4811, 154 N.E.3d 109, and cert. denied, 2021
WL 1951932, 209 L.Ed.2d 763.
{¶40} Singleton insists that the comment of the prosecutor is a misstatement of
law and that "[a]lthough objective evidence may often be useful in discerning a
defendant's subjective state of mind, a jury can acquit a defendant-of rape based solely
on the defendant's subjective perception that sex was consensual, provided the jurors
believe the defendant on that point. Thus, the prosecution's closing argument misstated
the law on rape." (Appellant's Brief, p. 24). Appellant's conclusion, that he may be
acquitted based upon his subjective perception that the sex was consensual relies upon
selected citations to State v. Hartman, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 26609, 2016-0hio-2883,
64 N.E.3d 519.
{¶41} The court in Hartman discussed the victim's subjective beliefs, but never
uses the term "subjective" to describe Hartman's mental state. When referring to the
elements of purpose or intent, the court refers to an excerpt from the decision in State v.
Mundy, 99 Ohio App.3d 275, 288, 650 N.E.2d 502 (2d Dist.1994):
The determination of a defendant's mental state, absent some
comment on his or her part, must of necessity be determined by the nature
of the act when viewed in conjunction with the surrounding facts and
circumstances. State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 168, 555 N.E.2d
293, 302. This is, in fact, the well-recognized process of inferential
reasoning. This process by necessity incorporates an objective mechanism
or standard in determining the defendant's state of mind by the use of
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 16
circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact reviews the defendant's conduct in
light of the surrounding facts and circumstances and infers a purpose or
motive.
{¶42} We find no support in Hartman for Singleton's conclusion that he may be
acquitted based upon his subjective perception that the sex was consensual, and his
argument reveals that he does not rely on that mischaracterization of the law. First, he
notes that the jurors must believe him and then he describes the parties conduct in light
of the surrounding facts and circumstances to support his contention that Wooten's
contention that the rape was not consensual should not be believed. Singleton is relying
on the surrounding facts and circumstances to bolster his argument that the sexual
conduct was consensual and, in fact, offers no evidence regarding his subjective
perception.
{¶43} The prosecutor stated that Singleton may argue that he perceived that his
sexual conduct was not rape, but he may still be convicted of rape based upon the
conduct of the parties and the surrounding facts and circumstances. In the context of this
case, we do not find that the prosecutor's comments were legally incorrect, that his
actions were improper or that Singleton's substantial rights were prejudicially affected by
the comment. That comment did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process as the state’s obligation to prove all the
elements of the crime were clearly stated. The trial court's instructions provided a
definition of the element of purpose and its response to the jury's question regarding
consent served to emphasize the obligation of the state to prove intent and purpose.
Further, there was no direct evidence of Singleton's subjective perception of his sexual
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0026 17
conduct, so the jury and the parties relied upon circumstantial evidence to evaluate his
intent and purpose.
{¶44} Singleton's second assignment of error is overruled and the decision of the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Baldwin, P.J.
Hoffman, J. and
Wise, John, J. concur.