Nguyen v. Coy

[Cite as Nguyen v. Coy, 2017-Ohio-4164.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
LIEN NGUYEN C.A. No. 28308
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
MICHAEL COY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. DR-2014-09-2667
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: June 7, 2017
TEODOSIO, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Lien Nguyen, appeals from the decree of divorce entered by the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division that found spousal support
was not appropriate and reasonable. We reverse and remand.
I.
{¶2} In May 2016, a trial was conducted as to the divorce of Ms. Lien Nguyen and Mr.
Michael Coy. On June 29, 2016, the trial court entered its decree of divorce, granting a divorce
on the grounds of incompatibility, and finding that spousal support was not appropriate and
reasonable. Ms. Nguyen now appeals, raising one assignment of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT
SPOUSAL SUPPORT WAS NOT REASONABLE AND APPROPRIATE.
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{¶3} Ms. Nguyen argues the trial court abused its discretion in determining that spousal
support was not reasonable and appropriate. We agree. We note that Ms. Nguyen presents us
with two separate arguments as to why the trial courts determination was an abuse of discretion:
first, that the court erred in its application of law as to the relative income of the parties, and
second, that the court erred in determining the actual income of the parties. Because we
conclude the trial court abused its discretion with regard to the first issue, we decline to address
Ms. Nguyen’s second line of argument.
{¶4} A trial court’s award of spousal support is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Organ v. Organ, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26904, 2014–Ohio–3474, ¶ 6. An abuse of discretion is
more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When
applying this standard, a reviewing court is precluded from simply substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).
{¶5} “In determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable,” the court
shall consider the factors listed in Section 3105.18(C)(1)(a-n). R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). One of the
factors that a court must consider in determining spousal support is the “relative earning abilities
of the parties.” R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(b).
{¶6} Ms. Nguyen argues that the trial court erred in its application of law in
determining the relative earning abilities of the parties. In the Decree of Divorce, the trial court
stated: “Because each party is considered, by statute to have contributed equally to the
production of marital income and requisition of assets, the Court finds that the parties have equal
earning abilities.” At oral argument, Mr. Coy conceded that this is a misstatement of law, but
suggested it was harmless error.
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{¶7} In concluding that the relative earning abilities of the parties are equal, the trial
court misapplied R.C. 3105.18(C)(2), which provides: “In determining whether spousal support
is reasonable and in determining the amount and terms of payment of spousal support, each party
shall be considered to have contributed equally to the production of marital income.” R.C.
3105.18(C)(2) goes to the issue of the production of marital income, and does not apply to
relative earning abilities. Because the trial court misapplied the law, and consequently failed to
consider the evidence before it on the issue of relative earning potential, the ruling of the trial
court was arbitrary and the court therefore abused its discretion with regard to its spousal support
analysis. As the relative earning ability of the parties is one of the factors that must be
considered in the determination of spousal support, the misapplication of the law was not
harmless error.
{¶8} For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Nguyen’s assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{¶9} The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations
Division is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
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Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J.
CALLAHAN, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
RANDAL A. LOWRY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
KENNETH L. GIBSON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
LESLIE S. GRASKE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.