State v. Patterson

[Cite as State v. Patterson, 2020-Ohio-5475.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2020-T-0015
- vs - :
SHARELLE BRITTANY PATTERSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas.
Case No. 2019 CR 00388.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ashleigh Musick, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481-1092 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Rebecca R. Grabski, 206 South Meridian Street, Suite B, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For
Defendant-Appellant).
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Sharelle Brittany Patterson (“Patterson”), appeals a February
19, 2020 judgment in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing her to a
five-year term of community control for one count of Vandalism, a fifth-degree felony, for
which she had entered a plea of guilty on January 8, 2020. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
{¶2} The allegations against Patterson, as set forth in the indictment and
transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearings, are straightforward:
Patterson was a tenant at an apartment complex in Trumbull County, Ohio. After being
evicted, she allegedly destroyed property on the interior, including damaging plumbing,
destroying appliances by cutting electrical cords, and causing cosmetic damages. The
amount to repair the damages totaled $4,718.35.
{¶3} Patterson and her counsel negotiated a plea agreement pursuant to
Crim.R. 11 on January 8, 2020. At the plea hearing, the trial court engaged in a plea
colloquy with Patterson and accepted the oral and written plea of guilty. The court then
accepted the terms of the plea agreement and ordered a presentence investigation.
The presentence investigation report was not filed with the record on appeal.
{¶4} On February 19, 2020, Patterson appeared at the sentencing hearing with
counsel, who orally moved the court to withdraw the guilty plea based on new evidence
discovered by Patterson. The trial court asked Patterson if she understood what
complicity was, to which she replied that she did not. Thereafter, Patterson took time to
speak with her counsel. Following the discussion, her counsel requested to withdraw
the oral motion and proceed to sentencing. The trial court granted the request and
sentenced Patterson to a five-year term of community control with conditions, as well as
an order of restitution in the amount of $4,717.55.
{¶5} Patterson filed a timely notice of appeal and raises two assignments of
error for our review. Her first assignment of error states:
Trial counsel was ineffective in his legal assistance by failing to
adequately inform Defendant-Appellant of all the evidence against
her before she agreed to plea under Crim.R. 11.
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{¶6} Under her first assignment of error, Patterson argues that her trial counsel
was ineffective because he did not present all of the state’s evidence to Patterson
before her guilty plea, thereby making her plea defective. Patterson also challenges
trial counsel’s decision to withdraw his oral motion to withdraw Patterson’s guilty plea
following a discussion had off the record.
{¶7} In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an
appellant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance fell “below an objective
standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel’s
performance.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the
syllabus (adopting the test set forth in State v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach
the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 143.
{¶8} There is a general presumption that trial counsel’s conduct is within the
broad range of professional assistance. Id. at 142. In order to show prejudice, the
appellant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at paragraph three of the
syllabus. In the context of a conviction based on a guilty plea, an appellant must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and, but for counsel’s alleged
errors, there is a reasonable probability appellant would not have pleaded guilty. State
v. Erich, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2016-A-0056, 2017-Ohio-8528, ¶17, citing State v.
Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 (1992), citing Strickland, supra, at 687 and Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985).
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{¶9} “‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders
enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and
the Ohio Constitution.’” State v. Gensert, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2015-T-0084, 2016-
Ohio-1163, ¶8, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). “In order for a
plea to be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, a defendant must be
‘informed in a reasonable manner at the time of entering his guilty plea of his rights to a
trial by jury and to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination, and
his right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his behalf.’” Id., quoting State
v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 478 (1981), interpreting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 (1969).
{¶10} On appeal, Patterson concedes the trial court conducted a proper plea
colloquy before she waived her jury trial rights. Further, the evidence Patterson claimed
to have discovered that allegedly proves she was not the person who vandalized the
apartment was not proffered for the record on appellate review. Based on the record
before us, Patterson intended at the plea hearing to admit guilt to the charge of
Vandalism—as alleged in the indictment and stated through a recitation of factual basis
on the record by the state. Patterson listened to the recitation of the evidence the state
intended to use had the matter gone to trial before voluntarily pleading guilty. Under
these circumstances, it was not necessary for Patterson to be fully informed of all the
evidence obtained in discovery before she chose to voluntarily admit guilt to the
Vandalism charge.
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{¶11} With regard to the evidence she claims proves her innocence and the
advice given by trial counsel before Patterson’s counsel withdrew the oral motion to
withdraw Patterson’s guilty plea, we note that “‘[w]hen affidavits or other proof outside
the record are necessary to support an ineffective assistance claim * * * it is not
appropriate for consideration on direct appeal.’” State v. Denihan, 11th Dist. Ashtabula
No. 2016-A-0003, 2016-Ohio-7443, ¶13, quoting State v. Zupancic, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
12CA0065, 2013-Ohio-3072, ¶4. Patterson does not challenge, or even acknowledge,
what advice she was given before allowing her counsel to withdraw the oral motion. For
this court to conclude that Patterson’s counsel objectively failed to provide counsel in a
manner that created prejudice would require us “‘to act in a way that is “purely
speculative” and would require [us to] resort to evidence outside the record on appeal.’”
Id., quoting Zupancic, at ¶5, quoting State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 390-391
(2000).
{¶12} For these reasons, the record on direct appeal does not support a
conclusion that Patterson’s trial counsel was ineffective in the manner she has alleged.
{¶13} Patterson’s first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶14} Patterson’s second assignments of error states:
The trial court abused its discretion by permitting counsel to
withdraw his oral Motion to Withdraw Defendant-Appellant’s plea at
the sentencing hearing.
{¶15} Under her second assignment of error, Patterson argues the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing her trial counsel to withdraw the oral motion to
withdraw Patterson’s guilty plea without conducting a hearing. An abuse of discretion
occurs when a trial court fails to “‘exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-
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making.’” State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶62,
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 11.
{¶16} Crim.R. 32.1 provides that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice
the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the
defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”
{¶17} Patterson’s argument relies on her prior assignment of error—which we
have determined lacks merit—that her trial counsel was ineffective. Patterson had an
opportunity to privately consult with her trial counsel, and the decision was made to
withdraw the oral motion to withdraw her guilty plea following their discussion.
Patterson directs us to no case law in support of her argument that the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing counsel to withdraw the oral motion, specifically
following a discussion with Patterson in the presence of the court. Further, nothing in
the record supports a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
sentencing to proceed in this matter.
{¶18} Patterson’s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶19} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
concur.
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