Goddard v. Goddard

[Cite as Goddard v. Goddard, 2020-Ohio-3372.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
DANIEL B. GODDARD, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 109085
v. :
LAURENCE V. GODDARD, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 18, 2020
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Probate Division
Case No. 2018ADV239458
Appearances:
Paul Croushore, for appellant.
Buckley King L.P.A., and Woods King III; Bernstein and
Burkley, P.C., and Harry W. Greenfield, for appellee.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Daniel B. Goddard (“plaintiff”) appeals the
decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, that
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Laurence V. Goddard
(“defendant”). Upon review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Background
On December 10, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of
fiduciary duties against defendant. The complaint alleged that plaintiff is a
beneficiary of three trusts and that defendant, who is plaintiff’s father, is the trustee
over the trusts. Plaintiff claimed that defendant breached his fiduciary duties and
sought the removal of defendant as trustee, an accounting of the trusts, modification
or termination of the trusts, damages, and other relief.
The complaint alleged that two of the subject trusts were established
in 2005 when plaintiff’s parents divorced. One trust instrument was dated May 22,
2005 (“the May 2005 trust”) and was a revocable trust. The other trust instrument
was dated June 21, 2005 (“the June 2005 trust”) and was an irrevocable trust. The
complaint further alleged that prior to the divorce, defendant created the Goddard
Family, LLC (“the GFLLC”), in which plaintiff has an interest. The complaint states
that the third trust instrument purportedly was entered on June 1, 2012 (“the June
2012 trust”).
Plaintiff claimed that he was unaware he was the beneficiary of any
trust instrument or agreement until on or about February 29, 2012. Moreover, he
claimed that he did not recall signing any trust instrument between himself and
defendant at any time and that he never agreed to assign his membership interest in
the GFLLC. The complaint raises a number of other allegations concerning
defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary duties involving the trusts.
Defendant filed an answer that set forth a number of affirmative
defenses. In the course of proceedings, defendant was granted leave to file a motion
for summary judgment. In defendant’s motion for summary judgment, defendant
stated that both of the 2005 trusts had been fully administered since at least 2012,
that all disbursements were made for plaintiff’s benefit, that plaintiff received a
complete accounting of trust payments, that plaintiff’s interest in the GFLLC was
transferred to the June 2012 trust, and that plaintiff’s 29.47 percent interest in the
GFLLC has remained unchanged. Defendant presented evidence showing that the
GFLLC was established by him as part of his estate planning for his family and that
the operating agreement confers decision-making authority on him as the manager
of the GFLLC. Defendant stated that advancements made for plaintiff’s benefit from
the GFLLC were added to the loan account from the GFLLC and kept as part of the
financials of the GFLLC. Defendant set forth additional arguments and attached
documentation to his motion, including supporting affidavits, bank statements,
trust accountings, and financial records. He also referred to other evidence already
in the record. Additionally, defendant argued that plaintiff’s claims were barred by
the statute of limitations under R.C. 5810.05.
Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff conceded “that the 2005 trusts have been administered and therefore no
genuine issue of material fact exists as to his claims relating to the administration of
those trusts.” Plaintiff argued that genuine issues of fact remained regarding the
creation and execution of the June 1, 2012 trust and claimed he could not have
signed the trust instrument since defendant’s visit to New York occurred before the
effective date of the trust instrument. Plaintiff provided an affidavit in which he
denied signing the trust instrument. He also argued that the value of his
membership interest in the GFLLC was in dispute, noting its “modest growth.”
Plaintiff claimed that he believed the disbursements to him from the GFLLC were
gifts from defendant as opposed to a loan, and he asserted that defendant’s
accounting of the money as a loan was a breach of fiduciary duty. He also pointed
to delays in being provided with tax documents related to his interest in the GFLLC.
He made many accusations and claimed that genuine issues of material fact existed
as to whether defendant breached his fiduciary duty “by [not] acting as a prudent
investor in administering the plaintiff’s trust” and as to whether the defendant acted
in good faith in administering the trust and as manager of the GFLLC.
On September 6, 2019, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendant. The trial court found that plaintiff “became aware of the 2005
Trusts and the fact that there was a Trust that held the [GFLLC] by email from the
Defendant on March 1, 2012” and that the 2005 trusts had been fully administered.
The trial court held that plaintiff was barred by the four-year statute of limitations
under R.C. 5810.05(C) from raising any issues regarding the 2005 trusts, including
any activity regarding the GFLLC before March 1, 2012. The court also recognized
plaintiff conceded in his brief in opposition to summary judgment that the 2005
trusts were not in issue. The trial court proceeded to find there were no genuine
issues of material fact regarding the June 2012 trust. The trial court found plaintiff
submitted a self-serving affidavit averring that he did not sign the trust instrument.
The court recognized that plaintiff claimed he could not have signed the trust
because defendant was not in New York on June 1, 2012, but that the signature line
on the trust document was not dated. The court also noted a separate document
dated June 1, 2012, that assigned his interest in the GFLLC to the 2012 trust and an
email dated March 1, 2012, that was sent to plaintiff referencing a trust related to
the GFLLC and the need to sign papers when defendant visited him in New York.
The trial court also found plaintiff was on notice that payments for his expenses were
not gifts by his father. The trial court referenced an email that clearly stated that
insurance premiums, medical bills, and other expenses were paid by the trusts
and/or the GFLLC. The court further found the exhibits filed by both parties
established that “Plaintiff knows, or should know, the value of Plaintiff’s
membership interest in GFLLC.” The trial court found that “the remainder of the
Plaintiff’s claims, regarding the June 1, 2012 Trust” were not supported by the
evidence and that the statements in plaintiff’s affidavit were contradicted by the
record. In granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court
concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate any genuine issues of material fact or
set forth any evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty.
Plaintiff timely filed this appeal.
Law and Analysis
Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo, governed by the
standards set forth in Civ.R. 56. Argabrite v. Neer, 149 Ohio St.3d 349, 2016-Ohio-
8374, 75 N.E.3d 161, ¶ 14. Summary judgment is appropriate only when “[1] no
genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, [2] the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, and [3] viewing the evidence most strongly in favor
of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach a conclusion only in favor of
the moving party.” Id., citing M.H. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 134 Ohio St.3d 65, 2012-
Ohio-5336, 979 N.E.2d 1261, ¶ 12. Once the moving party has satisfied its initial
burden of identifying specific facts in the record that demonstrate an entitlement to
summary judgment under Civ.R. 56, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden
to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Crenshaw v.
Cleveland Law Dept., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108519, 2020-Ohio-921, ¶ 33, citing
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 1996-Ohio-107, 662 N.E.2d 264.
Under his sole assignment of error, plaintiff argues that the trial court
erred in finding the statute of limitations had begun to run on March 1, 2012, as to
the June 2012 trust. Plaintiff claims that his knowledge of the existence of the 2005
trusts on June 1, 2012, is not dispositive of when he knew or should have known of
the alleged impropriety or when his claims accrued.
Initially, we recognize that the trial court determined that “the
Plaintiff is time barred from raising issues regarding trusts existing [as of March 1,
2012] to which he is a beneficiary, including any activity regarding the GFLLC before
that time.” The only trusts in existence as of March 1, 2012, were the May 2005 trust
and the June 2005 trust. The trial court proceeded to find that “the remainder of
the Plaintiff’s claims, regarding the June 1, 2012 Trust” were not supported by the
record. Our review reflects that summary judgment was appropriately granted in
defendant’s favor.
The record reflects that the 2005 trusts were established upon the
divorce of plaintiff’s parents and had been fully administered since at least 2012.
Plaintiff did not dispute that payments from the June 2005 trust were made for his
benefit. The checks were drawn on plaintiff’s trust bank account, and defendant
provided bank records, financial statements, and other documents detailing the
activity of the trusts. Evidence also showed that the GFLLC had been established
and capitalized by defendant as an estate planning tool for his family on March 20,
2000. The operating agreement of the GFLLC conferred decision-making authority
on defendant as the manager of the limited liability company. Plaintiff’s
membership interest in the GFLLC was initially held in the May 2005 trust and was
the only asset of that trust. Evidence was provided showing that plaintiff’s interest
in the GFLLC was transferred to the June 2012 trust and that his interest in the
GFLLC remained unchanged. In his opposition to summary judgment, “Plaintiff
concede[d] that the 2005 trusts have been administered and therefore no genuine
issue of material fact exists as to his claims relating to the administration of those
trusts.” Thus, the record demonstrates that summary judgment was warranted in
defendant’s favor with regard to the 2005 trusts.
Not only did plaintiff concede the lack of any genuine issue of material
fact relating to the administration of the 2005 trusts, but also, we agree with the trial
court that the four-year statute of limitations under R.C. 5810.05(C) also bars any
claims regarding the 2005 trusts, including any activity regarding the GFLLC before
that time. Evidence of an email sent to defendant on March 1, 2012, reflects that
plaintiff was made aware of the existence of trusts that had been set up by defendant,
that distributions were made for plaintiff’s benefit, and that the trusts had been
substantially depleted. The email also referred to a “trust related to a company
called Goddard Family LLC,” which was described as “an estate planning vehicle and
fund for family emergencies.” Upon receiving this email, plaintiff should have been
aware that his father was administering the trusts and that the disbursements
received by plaintiff for his expenses were paid with funds from the trusts or were
made from the GFLLC. Accordingly, we find no error by the trial court.
Defendant argues that because the assignment of error as presented
should be overruled, that any additional arguments should be disregarded. We shall
exercise our discretion in this regard; however, we recognize that plaintiff makes a
cursory argument that the trial court erred in making its findings with regard to the
June 2012 trust, makes general arguments that each of his claims should survive,
and fails to point to sufficient evidence in the record upon which to find that any
genuine issue of material fact exists in regard to his claims.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its findings regarding the
execution of the June 2012 trust. The trial court noted evidence to contradict
plaintiff’s self-serving averment that he did not sign the June 2012 trust instrument
and his challenge to the circumstances surrounding its execution. The record shows
that the signature on the June 2012 trust instrument was not dated, the March 1,
2012 email sent by defendant indicated that plaintiff needed to sign a document
related to the trust “[w]hen I see you in NY,” plaintiff did not dispute that defendant
visited him in New York on March 16-17, 2012, and there was a separate document
that assigned plaintiff’s interest in the GFLCC. Also, we note that plaintiff provided
no corroborating evidence to demonstrate that his signature on the instruments was
not authentic and he failed to sufficiently demonstrate any genuine issue of material
fact regarding the execution of these instruments. See U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v.
Bobo, 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA45, 2014-Ohio-4975, ¶ 1; Fifth Third Bank v. Jones-
Williams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-935, 2005-Ohio-4070, ¶ 27-29.
The trial court further determined that plaintiff was on notice of the
source of funds used for his maintenance, that he knew or should have known of the
value of his interest in the trust, and that there was insufficient evidence of a breach
of fiduciary duty. Although plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in these
findings, he fails to cite to sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that there
is a genuine issue of material fact. Throughout this case, plaintiff has done little
more than make self-serving statements and bald accusations to contradict the
evidence presented by defendant.
Defendant presented evidence in support of his motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56. The evidence showed that plaintiff’s membership
interest in the GFLLC was unchanged and that no disbursements had been made
from the trust. Rather, funds were provided to plaintiff as advancements from the
GFLLC and were treated as interest-free loans. These advancements were added to
a loan account kept for plaintiff as part of the financials of the GFLLC. Plaintiff’s
29.47 percent interest in the GFLLC remained unchanged.
Plaintiff acknowledged in the complaint that he was provided with
financial statements and balance sheets of the GFLLC, tax forms detailing plaintiff’s
interest in the GFLLC, and account statements, all of which were consistent with the
reporting requirements set forth under R.C. 5808.13(C). In support of the motion
for summary judgment, defendant provided supporting documentation reflecting
the disclosures that were made to plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff was provided with
a full accounting in January 2015.
Insofar as plaintiff claimed that he believed funds were gifted from
his father, as opposed to a loan, the evidence in the record refuted this argument.
Plaintiff was informed in the email dated March 1, 2012, that the distributions for
his insurance premiums, medical bills, and other expenses were paid by the trusts
and/or the GFLLC. As the trial court found, “the Plaintiff’s own Exhibit G also
dispels his asserted belief that his father was paying his medical and other bills out
of his own funds as a gift.”
Our de novo review of the matter reflects that defendant satisfied his
initial burden of identifying specific facts in the record that demonstrate an
entitlement to summary judgment under Civ.R. 56. Plaintiff made self-serving
assertions that are contradicted by the record, and he fails to point to any specific
facts that give rise to any breach of fiduciary duty or that support his claims for
removal of defendant as trustee, an accounting, or modification or termination of
the trusts. A nonmovant may not rely on his own unsupported and self-serving
assertions, offered by way of affidavit and without corroborating materials, to defeat
a well-supported motion for summary judgment. Brehm v. MacIntosh Co., 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-19, 2019-Ohio-5322, ¶ 36, citing Eichenberger v. Tucker,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-515, 2013-Ohio-805, ¶ 9; Merino v. Levine Oil Ents.,
L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-205, 131 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 36 (7th Dist.). Plaintiff failed to set forth
sufficient evidence to meet his reciprocal burden pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding his claims.
After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we
conclude that defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Appellant’s assignment
of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, probate division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J., CONCUR