State v. Lyles

[Cite as State v. Lyles, 2022-Ohio-1414.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-210271
C-210272
Plaintiff-Appellee, : C-210273
TRIAL NOS. 20TRD-21456 A-C
vs. :
: O P I N I O N.
ANTRELL LYLES,
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed in C-210271 and C-210273, Reversed and
Remanded in C-210272
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 29, 2022
Andrew W. Garth, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and
Rebecca Barnett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson, Assistant Public
Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BERGERON, Judge.
{¶1} A fender bender led to defendant-appellant Antrell Lyles’s convictions for an
assured-distance violation, driving under suspension, and a hit-skip violation. Mr. Lyles now
appeals, asserting that his guilty plea for driving under suspension violated Traf.R. 10(D),
that the admission of his confession to the hit-skip violation contravened the corpus delicti
rule, and that his convictions ran against the manifest weight of the evidence. We sustain Mr.
Lyles’s challenge to his guilty plea, but otherwise we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
{¶2} Following an automobile accident, Mr. Lyles was charged with three
misdemeanor traffic offenses. The state’s witnesses offered conflicting accounts of what
transpired in this accident.
{¶3} Jacob O’Brien testified that, on the date of the accident, while sitting at a red
light in Clifton on Ludlow Avenue, another vehicle struck his car from behind. Mr. O’Brien
spoke with the driver of that vehicle, but that driver was not Mr. Lyles. In fact, Mr. O’Brien
disavowed ever seeing Mr. Lyles at the scene:
PROSECUTOR: Do you see that guy in the courtroom today?
MR. O’BRIEN: No.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. So are you able to see Mr. Lyles over there at the defense
table in the red-striped shirt?
MR. O’BRIEN: I did not see him, no.
PROSECUTOR: So that gentleman was not there?
MR. O’BRIEN: No.
That said, Mr. O’Brien acknowledged that he believed that another car had bumped the car
that ran into his (in a chain reaction manner), as the other vehicle had a license plate buried
in its rear bumper.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶4} On the other hand, Officer Helen Jackson testified that, on the date of this
incident, she responded to an accident in Northside at the intersection between Chase Avenue
and Hamilton Avenue. She testified that she saw two vehicles at the scene—Mr. O’Brien’s
vehicle (“Unit 3”) and a second vehicle (“Unit 2”). However, she discovered a third vehicle’s
(“Unit 1”) license plate lodged in the rear bumper of Unit 2. Officer Jackson ran Unit 1’s
license plate number, ascertaining the owner’s name and address (although she never
revealed the woman’s name during her testimony).
{¶5} Based on that lead, Officer Jackson sent an investigatory letter to the owner of
Unit 1. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lyles responded to the letter and then spoke with her by phone.
According to Officer Jackson, Mr. Lyles admitted over the phone that he precipitated the
accident and that he fled the scene because the vehicle belonged to his girlfriend, and he
feared her reaction if she learned about his involvement in an accident (with her car).
{¶6} Several days later, Officer Jackson went to Mr. Lyles’s address to write him a
ticket. She observed a Nissan Altima in his driveway with minor damage to the front bumper,
and a conspicuously missing front license plate despite indications that one had been attached
to the car. During their encounter, Mr. Lyles again admitted his involvement in the
automobile accident, acknowledging that he fled without exchanging his information with the
other drivers.
{¶7} At trial, Mr. Lyles’s counsel stipulated to the fact that he was driving under
suspension. Following this stipulation, the trial court inquired whether Mr. Lyles wished to
plead guilty to the offense:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: * * * So we will stipulate that he was under that
suspension code. * * * We are not contesting that he was driving in violation of
that charge.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
THE COURT: So [driving under suspension charge] is not an issue?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No.
***
THE COURT: I think there was just a stipulation. But we can make this even
cleaner. What is Mr. Lyles’s plea going to be?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Guilty.
THE COURT: All right. And do you waive and stipulate?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Waive and stipulate.
THE COURT: All right. Finding of guilty on B. We are going through with A
and C.
{¶8} The trial court subsequently found Mr. Lyles guilty on the remaining two
charges. Mr. Lyles now appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court violated Ohio law by accepting
his guilty plea without informing him of the effect of his plea, (2) the trial court erroneously
admitted his confession before the state established the corpus delicti of the offenses, and (3)
his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
II.
{¶9} Mr. Lyles’s first assignment of error challenges the propriety of his guilty plea
for driving under suspension in light of the trial court’s failure to first inform him of the effect
of that plea.
{¶10} Traf.R. 10(D) provides that “[i]n misdemeanor cases involving petty offenses *
* * the court * * * shall not accept [guilty] pleas without first informing the defendant of the
effect of the plea of guilty.” Driving under suspension is a petty offense, subject to the
requirements of Traf.R. 10(D). See Traf.R. 2(D) (“ ‘Petty offense’ means an offense for which
the penalty prescribed by law includes confinement for six months or less.”); R.C.
4510.111(C)(1) (“[driving under a suspended license] is an unclassified misdemeanor. The
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
offender shall be sentenced pursuant to sections 2929.21 to 2929.28 of the Revised Code,
except that the offender shall not be sentenced to a jail term.”).
{¶11} “Traffic Rule 10(D) and Crim.R. 11(E) * * * are ‘identical in all relevant
respects.’ * * * Accordingly, cases analyzing a court’s duties under Crim.R. 11(E) can also be
applied to cases analyzing Traf.R. 10(D).” State v. Everson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1138,
2018-Ohio-323, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Watkins, 99 Ohio St.3d 12, 2003-Ohio-2419, 788 N.E.2d
635, ¶ 15. “Before accepting a plea to a misdemeanor involving a petty offense, Crim.R. 11(E)
requires that a trial court inform the defendant only of the effect of the specific plea being
entered.” State v. Veite, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190339, 2021-Ohio-290, ¶ 11, citing State
v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877 N.E.2d 677, paragraph one of the syllabus.
That is, “the court must inform the defendant that a plea of guilty is a complete admission of
guilt.” Id.{¶12} “The right to be informed that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt is
a nonconstitutional right and subject to review for substantial compliance.” Id. at ¶ 16, citing
State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 12. “When a trial court
does not substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 in regard to a nonconstitutional right, we must
determine whether the trial court partially complied or failed to comply with the rule. If the
trial court partially complied, the plea may be vacated only if the defendant demonstrates a
prejudicial effect.” Id., citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d
462, ¶ 32. However, “ ‘[a] complete failure to comply with the rule does not implicate an
analysis of prejudice.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881
N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22.
{¶13} We do not believe that the trial court substantially complied with Traf.R. 10(D).
A review of the transcript demonstrates that the trial court never explained that a plea of
guilty constitutes a complete admission of guilt, or otherwise engaged with Mr. Lyles to
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
inform him of the effect of his plea. The entire discussion involved a colloquy with counsel,
rather than the defendant. This case is similar to State v. Veite, where we held that the
following colloquy constituted a “complete failure” to comply with Crim.R. 11(E):
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Veite, do you understand that on the B charge,
which is the public indecency, the maximum possible penalty is 30 days in jail
and/or a $250 fine? Yes?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: And on the C charge (voyeurism), the maximum penalty is 90
days in jail and/or a $700—No. I’m sorry. 60 days in jail, M3, and a $500 fine.
Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Do you have any questions before I accept your plea?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: No? I’ll accept the pleas of guilty. Facts.
Veite, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190339, 2021-Ohio-290, at ¶ 12. Like in Veite, here the trial
court never used any language that would explain to Mr. Lyles that his guilty plea constituted
a complete admission of guilt. In fact, in this case the trial court did not even address Mr.
Lyles personally. We accordingly disagree with the state’s argument that the trial court
substantially complied with Traf.R. 10(D).
{¶14} The state maintains that, even if the trial court violated Traf.R. 10(D), Mr. Lyles
waived and/or invited the trial court’s violation of the rule. We disagree. Neither Traf.R.
10(D) nor Crim.R. 11(E) indicates that the defendant must invoke his right to be informed of
the effect of his plea to trigger the trial court’s duty under either of those provisions. See State
v. Penkala, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-14-028, 2015-Ohio-914, ¶ 6 (“As quoted above, Crim.R.
11(E) reads that a court ‘shall not accept’ no contest pleas without first explaining the effect
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
of the pleas. The term ‘shall’ in a statute or rule connotes a mandatory obligation unless other
language evidences a clear and unequivocal intent to the contrary. * * * Crim.R. 11(E) places
an affirmative duty on the trial judge which cannot be waived by defense counsel.”). We
accordingly sustain Mr. Lyles’s first assignment of error, vacate his guilty plea to driving
under suspension, and remand for further proceedings.
III.
{¶15} Mr. Lyles’s second assignment of error maintains that (1) his confession was
inadmissible because the state failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offense, and (2) his
convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
A.
{¶16} “Before a confession to a crime is admissible, the state must have some
evidence outside of the confession tending to establish the corpus delicti.” State v. Kraft, 1st
Dist. Hamilton No. C-060238, 2007-Ohio-2247, ¶ 18, citing State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d
31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus. “The state’s evidentiary burden
under the corpus delicti rule is minimal: only a ‘modicum of evidence’ is necessary to satisfy
the rule.” Id. at ¶ 20. “This evidence does not need to relate to every element of the offense
and can be circumstantial.” Id.
{¶17} Both Mr. O’Brien and Officer Jackson testified to the existence of another
vehicle’s license plate lodged in the rear bumper of Unit 2. We believe that this evidence
constitutes the “modicum of evidence” necessary to establish the corpus delicti of the offense.
The license plate represents some evidence that another vehicle struck Unit 2, causing the
accident. And thus, the admission of Mr. Lyles’s confession did not violate the corpus deliciti
rule.
B.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶18} Alternatively, Mr. Lyles argues that, even if his confession rests on a solid
foundation, his convictions ran against the manifest weight of the evidence. In reviewing
whether a conviction runs counter to the manifest weight of the evidence, we sit as a
“thirteenth juror.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We
will reverse the trial court’s decision to convict and grant a new trial only in “ ‘exceptional
cases in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” State v. Sipple, 2021-
Ohio-1319, 170 N.E.3d 1273, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175,
485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶19} For this point, Mr. Lyles essentially posits that the evidence weighs heavily
against the finding of his involvement in this accident. Mr. Lyles emphasizes that the
prosecuting witnesses gave conflicting accounts on the location where this accident occurred
and the number of vehicles in the accident. But these testimonial inconsistencies do not
weigh heavily against the convictions, particularly where (1) the witnesses agreed that there
was a license plate lodged in Unit 2’s rear bumper, (2) Officer Jackson testified that Mr. Lyles
responded to an investigatory letter sent to the owner of that license plate, and (3) Mr. Lyles
confessed that he was in the accident and fled the scene.
{¶20} Accordingly, we reject Mr. Lyles’s challenge to the weight of the evidence, and
overrule his second assignment of error in full.
* * *
{¶21} In light of the foregoing, we sustain Mr. Lyles’s first assignment of error, vacate
his plea to driving under suspension, and remand that cause for further proceedings. We
overrule Mr. Lyles’s second assignment of error in full and otherwise affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Judgment accordingly.
MYERS, P. J., and CROUSE, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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