DocketNumber: No. 07CA 00065.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 5079
Judges: DELANEY, J.
Filed Date: 9/30/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 3} On January 19, 2005, Feyko filed an application for appointment of guardian over the person and estate of Appellant. The grounds for the application stated Appellant was incompetent by reason of delirium, dementia and renal insufficiency. The same day, the probate court granted a temporary guardianship during the pendency of the application and set the matter for hearing on February 11, 2005.
{¶ 4} Feyko listed Appellant's two daughters, Erica Baker Allen and Christina Baker, and his brother, Robert Baker, as next of kin to receive notice of hearing on Probate Forms 15.0 and 17.4. A hearing notice was served on Ericka Baker Allen, who lives in Sarasota, Florida, by certified mail on February 1, 2005. Appellant was personally served with notice on February 4, 2005. Christina Baker, whose whereabouts were listed as unknown, was not served. Robert Baker, a resident of Celina, Ohio, also was not served. The record reflects the names of Christina Baker *Page 3 and Robert Baker were "crossed-out" and later "whited-out" on the form submitted by Feyko.1
{¶ 5} On February 7, 2005, a court investigator filed a report pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 6} There is no indication in the record that a hearing was held on February 11, 2005 or that a continuance of the hearing was sought or granted. However, since Appellant does not raise this issue herein, we assume for this appeal a hearing was held on February 11, 2005.
{¶ 7} On March 22, 2005, Appellant was evaluated by Bradley Hedges, Ph.D. Dr. Hedges' psychological report was filed on March 30, 2005. Appellant was diagnosed with unspecified dementia. Dr. Hedges opined Appellant could benefit from a guardian for at least one year due to the unknown etiology of the dementia.
{¶ 8} By entry dated April 18, 2005, the probate court appointed Feyko as guardian and issued letters of guardianship to Feyko. In its entry, the court found, "* * * that all persons who were entitled to notice of the hearing thereon were given * * *." No direct appeal was taken by Appellant challenging the appointment of a guardian, or the necessity of the guardianship. *Page 4
{¶ 9} Appellant made a request for a review hearing on April 13, 2006. On November 1, 2006, the probate court found the continuation of the guardianship was necessary and in the best interest of Appellant. In May 2007, Appellant requested an independent evaluation by Louis Hoyer, Ph.D.
{¶ 10} Dr. Hoyer examined Appellant in June 2007 and found he was restored to competency and opined the guardianship should be terminated. Appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Terminate the Guardianship on July 2, 2007.
{¶ 11} On August 8, 2007, the trial court ordered an independent psychological evaluation by Mid-Ohio Psychological Services, Inc. On September 17, 2007, Dr. Hedges again evaluated Appellant and found ongoing symptoms of dementia. He recommended the continued assistance of a guardian.
{¶ 12} On September 24, 2007, Appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Vacate Guardianship, alleging that the guardianship was voidab initio as a result of the probate court's failure to serve notice of the February 11, 2005 hearing upon Robert Baker and Christina Baker. Feyko opposed the motion arguing Appellant had no family entitled to notice as neither of his daughters were known to reside within this state, and his brother, who did reside in Ohio, does not qualify as next of kin under R.C.
{¶ 13} By entry dated November 9, 2007, the court denied the Motion to Vacate Guardianship, finding that Appellant's brother Robert Baker was not his next of kin and Christina Baker's whereabouts were unknown; therefore, neither was entitled to notice of the hearing pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 14} This appeal ensued and Appellant raises three Assignments of Error.2
{¶ 15} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO VACATE GUARDIANSHIP BY FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S BROTHER WAS NOT HIS `NEXT OF KIN' AND THUS NOT REQUIRED TO BE SERVED WITH NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE HEARING TO CONSIDER THE APPLICATION TO ESTABLISH A GUARDIANSHIP PURSUANT TO §
{¶ 16} "II. THE DEFINITION OF `NEXT OF KIN' ADOPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT, RESULTING IN APPELLANT'S BROTHER NOT BEING SERVED WITH NOTICE OF THE HEARING TO CONSIDER THE APPLICATION TO ESTABLISH A GUARDIANSHIP, VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
{¶ 17} "III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING ITS DEPUTY CLERK TO SUA SPONTE STRIKE APPELLEE'S DESIGNATION OF APPELLANT'S BROTHER AS PERSON TO BE SERVED WITH NOTICE OF HE (SIC) HEARING TO CONSIDER THE APPLICATION TO ESTABLISH A GUARDIANSHIP.
{¶ 19} We begin our analysis with the jurisdiction of the probate court in guardianship proceedings.
{¶ 20} In Shroyer v. Richmond, 3 the Ohio Supreme Court wrote, "Proceedings for the appointment of guardians, are not interpartes, or adversary in their character. They *Page 6 are properly proceedings in rem; they are instituted, ordinarily by application made on behalf of the ward, and for his benefit; and the order of appointment binds all the world. In such a proceeding, plenary and exclusive jurisdiction of the subject-matter, has been conferred by statute on the probate court, and that jurisdiction attaches, whenever application is duly made to the court for its exercise in a given case. * * * And when jurisdiction has attached, the court has full power to hear and determine all questions which arise in the case, whether in regard to the status of the ward or otherwise; and no irregularity in the proceedings, or mistake of law in the decision of the questions arising in the case, will render the order of appointment void, or subject it to impeachment collaterally. All questions necessarily arising the case, become res adjudicatae, by the final order of appointment, which binds all the world, until set aside or reversed by a direct proceeding for that purpose."
{¶ 21} R.C.
{¶ 22} R.C.
{¶ 23} R.C.
{¶ 24} "(A) * * * no guardian of the person, estate, or both, shall be appointed until at least seven days after the probate court has caused written notice, setting forth the time and place of the hearing, to be served as follows:
{¶ 25} "* * *
{¶ 26} "(2) In the appointment of the guardian of an incompetent, the notice shall be served:
{¶ 27} "(a)(i) Upon the person from whom appointment is sought, by a probate court investigator * * *. The notice shall be boldface type and shall inform the alleged incompetent, in boldface type, of his rights to be present at the hearing, to contest any application for the appointment of a guardian for his person, estate, or both, and to be represented by an attorney * * *.
{¶ 28} "(ii) * * *
{¶ 29} "(b) Upon the next of kin of the person for whom appointment is sought who are known to reside in this state."
{¶ 30} R.C.
{¶ 31} Based on this directive, we look to the R.C.
{¶ 32} "When a person dies intestate having title or right to any personal property, or to any real estate or inheritance, in this state, the personal property shall be *Page 8 distributed . . . in the following course: (A) if there is no surviving spouse, to the children of the intestate or their lineal descendents, per stripes; * * * (G) If there is no spouse, no children or their lineal descendents, and no parent surviving, to the brothers and sisters, whether of the whole or of the half blood of the intestate, or their lineal descendants, per stirpes * * *."
{¶ 33} We further note that R.C.
{¶ 34} It is Appellant's position that "next of kin" as applied to who must be served notice pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 35} Feyko contends that since Appellant was unmarried and had two daughters who would be the only heirs of Appellant if he were to die intestate at the time of hearing, the daughters are the next of kin entitled to notice of the hearing but only if they reside in Ohio. Since neither daughter was known to live in Ohio, Feyko submits that no one was entitled to notice, including Appellant's brother.
{¶ 36} Our decision on this matter involves the interpretation of the above-mentioned statutes. Our standard of review then is denovo.7
{¶ 37} The first rule of statutory construction is to look at the statute's language to determine its meaning. If the statute conveys a clear, unequivocal, and definite meaning, interpretation comes to an end, and the statute must be applied according to its terms.8
{¶ 38} Upon careful review, we agree with the probate court's interpretation and hold R.C.
{¶ 39} While we may agree with the Appellant's argument that the practical effect of our reading of the statute may result in the absence of knowledgeable, interested persons at the hearing to present evidence regarding the suitability of the proposed guardian or the best interest of the ward, we find the issue of notice best left to the legislature to determine.
{¶ 40} Since the notice requirements of the statute were not violated, we find Appellant's arguments set forth in the first assignment of error lack merit.
{¶ 41} Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error.
{¶ 43} It is apparent from the record that the question of constitutionality was not presented, considered or decided at the trial court level. Consequently, we will not consider the alleged constitutional violations here. "It is well established that an appellant may not raise such constitutional issues for the first time on appeal."10
{¶ 44} Therefore, we overrule the second assignment of error.
{¶ 46} We observe that R.C.
{¶ 47} The record further demonstrates notice had been given in the appropriate manner to the only person entitled by law to notice — Appellant. We note the probate court exceeded its obligation by also serving Appellant's out-of-state daughter, Erica Baker Allen.
{¶ 48} While we disagree with the manner the probate court altered the forms, we find the probate court properly fulfilled its statutory duty under R.C.
{¶ 49} Accordingly, we overrule the third assignment of error. *Page 12
{¶ 50} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fairfield County Probate Court is affirmed.
Delaney, J., Hoffman, P.J. and Farmer, J., concur.