In re R.E.

[Cite as In re R.E., 2014-Ohio-3595.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100954
IN RE: R.E.
A Minor Child
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division
Case No. DL 13108454
BEFORE: McCormack, J., S. Gallagher, P.J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 21, 2014
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Harvey B. Bruner
John D. Mizanin
Harvey B. Bruner Co., L.P.A.
The Hoyt Block Building
700 W. St. Clair Ave., #110
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Eben McNair
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Juvenile Justice Center, 4th Floor
9300 Quincy Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
TIM McCORMACK, J.:
{¶1} Juvenile-appellant, R.E., appeals his commitment to the Ohio Department of
Youth Services (“DYS”). Following a review of the record, we affirm the decision of
the trial court.
Procedural History
{¶2} On June 4, 2013, R.E. was charged with robbery in violation of R.C.
2911.02(A)(2), a felony of the second degree, in Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. DL-13108454. He denied the charges in the
complaint.
{¶3} On December 18, 2013, R.E. entered into a plea agreement. At that time,
R.E. had two additional cases pending in juvenile court: Case No. DL-13108680,
domestic violence, a misdemeanor of the first degree, and Case No. DL-13114245,
assault, also a misdemeanor of the first degree. Under the plea agreement, the state
agreed to amend the complaint in DL-13108454 to robbery in violation of R.C.
2911.02(A)(3), a felony of the third degree. In exchange, R.E. admitted to the amended
complaint in DL-13108454 and he admitted to the domestic violence in DL-13108680
and the assault in DL-13114245.
{¶4} The court engaged in a colloquy and ensured that R.E. understood his
rights, the nature of the charges against him, and that his change in plea indicated an
admission of the truth of the charges. The court also advised R.E. of the potential
penalties for each charge, ensuring that R.E. understood that the court could place R.E. in
DYS for six months up to his 21st birthday for the robbery and in the detention center for
90 days for the domestic violence and the assault. R.E. admitted the charges, and the
court proceeded to disposition.
{¶5} At the dispositional hearing, R.E., R.E.’s treating physician, attorney,
community control officer, mother, and the placement coordinator and the prosecutor
were present. Following the hearing, the court committed R.E. to nine months at DYS,
allowing for resubmission to a community corrections facility at a later date in order to
explore the possibility of R.E.’s admission to a residential treatment program.
Disposition
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, R.E. contends that the trial court’s
“sentence” did not accord with the overriding purposes of juvenile dispositions. In
support of his claim, he argues that one of the court’s less severe sanctions would better
serve R.E.’s care, protection, and mental and physical health.
{¶7} A juvenile court has broad discretion to fashion an appropriate disposition
for a child adjudicated delinquent. In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361, 2006-Ohio-5851, 856
N.E.2d 921, ¶ 6. The court may commit the child to the temporary custody of any
school, camp, institution, or other residential treatment facility operated for the care of
delinquent children, place the child in a detention facility, or place the child on
community control. R.C. 2152.19(A). Community control includes, but is not limited
to, basic probation supervision, intensive probation supervision, community service, and
house arrest. R.C. 2152.19(A)(4).
{¶8} The court may also commit the child to the legal custody of DYS for secure
confinement for an act that would be a felony of the third degree if committed by an adult
“for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of six months and a maximum
period not to exceed the child’s attainment of twenty-one years of age.” R.C.
2152.16(A)(1)(e).
{¶9} Regardless of the disposition, the trial court must impose dispositions that
are “reasonably calculated” to achieve certain statutory purposes. R.C. 2152.01(B); In re
K.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 99981 and 99982, 2013-Ohio-5743, ¶ 22. The
“overriding purposes” include providing for the care, protection, and mental and physical
development of children subject to this chapter, protecting the public interest and safety,
holding the offender accountable for the offender’s actions, restoring the victim, and
rehabilitating the offender. R.C. 2152.01(A). The statute further mandates that the
juvenile court achieve those overriding purposes through “a system of graduated
sanctions and services.” Id.{¶10} The juvenile court’s order of disposition will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion. D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361, 2006-Ohio-5851, 856 N.E.2d 921, ¶ 6.
An abuse of discretion suggests that the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary,
or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140(1983). Under this standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court. Id.{¶11} Here, the record reflects that the trial court considered the overriding
purposes of R.C. 2152.01 and committed R.E. to DYS when compelled by the evidence to
do so.
{¶12} At the hearing, the court engaged in a discourse with R.E., his attorney, and
the prosecutor concerning the three matters to which R.E. admitted. In the context of the
robbery, the court learned that R.E., along with two other juvenile defendants, started a
conversation with the victim on the street, punched or struck him in the head, and stole
his mobile phone. The domestic violence charge consisted of an argument with his
brother while at home, where his mother sought police intervention when R.E. punched
his brother in the mouth. The assault occurred while R.E. was in the detention center,
wherein R.E. assaulted another resident of the facility. During this exchange, the court
inquired about the large number of fights in the detention center with which R.E. has been
involved. R.E. explained that the fights have been gang-related. The court then spoke
at length with R.E. regarding his gang involvement, expressing frustration with R.E.’s
inability to avoid violating home detention.
{¶13} The court considered R.E.’s mental and physical health. Dr. Robert
Needleman, a developmental behavioral pediatrician who has treated R.E. since 2010,
testified that R.E. suffers from attention deficit disorder and depression, for which he has
prescribed various medications for R.E., as well as “conduct disorder, adolescent onset
type,” and “perhaps other psychiatric issues yet to be defined.” He also testified that
R.E. suffers from a mild form of sickle cell disease, which manifests itself with an
episode of pain crisis “perhaps once a year or less frequently.” He noted, however, that
R.E.’s record of sickle cell episodes “is less frequently than that.” Dr. Needleman stated
that he has not known R.E. to have an episode in the time he’s been treating him. He
also stated that he has not been able to treat R.E. on a regular basis due to R.E.’s repeated
admissions to the detention center.
{¶14} The court inquired of the doctor at length regarding R.E.’s sickle cell
disease, its symptoms, the possible causes of an episode, and the nature of two recent
episodes that occurred while R.E. was in solitary confinement. During this inquiry, Dr.
Needleman informed the court that R.E.’s most recent hospitalization was not necessarily
related to his sickle cell disease, as originally presumed, but rather he believed the
episode to be a panic attack. And R.E. admitted to faking one of the sickle cell episodes
while in confinement.
{¶15} R.E.’s community control officer, Charles Williams, testified that R.E. had
been on community control since November 2012 for a theft charge. Williams testified
that R.E. had not been compliant with the court’s orders to complete a psychological
evaluation, complete 20 hours of community service, and attend school daily. Williams
stated that within the first weeks of having R.E.’s case, he confirmed R.E.’s prominent
gang involvement and his reputation for fighting in the community. R.E.’s gang is
known for fights, robberies, and assaults.
{¶16} The trial court also considered alternative placement options. Various
placement personnel testified regarding the availability of residential treatment programs.
This testimony revealed that there were currently no residential treatment facilities
available to R.E. due to his sickle cell diagnosis. One of the placement officers testified
that several residential facilities had been explored as possible placement options;
however, the facilities were unwilling to assume the risk of R.E. having a sickle cell
episode while at their facility, especially in light of the fact that R.E. had been removed
from other detention centers approximately three times because of what appeared to be
sickle cell episodes.
{¶17} Prior to committing R.E. to DYS, the court noted that “every time we’ve
tried to get [R.E.] in the community he has done something, either cut his [home
detention] bracelet off [or] commit[ted] another act,” stating “[that] is why we’re here
today.” In fashioning R.E.’s commitment, the court stated that it wanted to protect the
community and R.E.’s family. It also stated that it wanted to help R.E. lead a more
productive life and that it did not prefer DYS “because it’s really a waste.” However, the
court noted that it was compelled to commit R.E. to DYS based upon R.E.’s medical
diagnosis and the evidence presented at the hearing, stating that “[R.E.’s] stuck with
whatever he was faking because I can’t overrule a medical diagnosis.” The court then
committed R.E. to DYS for nine months, allowing for resubmission to a community
corrections facility in order to explore the possibility of R.E.’s future admission to a
residential treatment program.
{¶18} In light of the above, we find that the trial court did not abuse its broad
discretion in committing R.E. to nine months in DYS. The record demonstrated that the
court considered the overriding purposes of juvenile disposition, R.E. has repeatedly
failed to comply with community control sanctions, and alternative residential treatment
facilities indicated their disinclination to accept R.E. The trial court’s disposition was
therefore not arbitrary or unreasonable. R.E.’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶19} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. The finding of
delinquency having been affirmed, any bail or stay of execution pending appeal is
terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of commitment.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
__________________________________________
TIM McCORMACK, JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR