Weiler v. Technipower, Inc.

[Cite as Weiler v. Technipower, Inc., 2023-Ohio-465.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
SHAWN WEILER, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 111729
v. :
TECHNIPOWER INC.,
A GEORGIA CORP., :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 16, 2023
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Case No. CV-22-958414
Appearances:
Shawn Weiler, pro se.
Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, and Douglas M. Oldham, for
appellee.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Shawn Weiler (“Weiler”) appeals the trial court’s
decision granting defendant-appellee Technipower Inc.’s, a Georgia Corp.
(“Technipower”), motion to dismiss. We affirm the trial court’s decision.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On January 18, 2022, Weiler filed a complaint against Technipower
for discovery. According to Weiler’s complaint, Technipower is a staffing agency
who places employees with its clients. Weiler claims that he was contacted by an
employee of Technipower, who reached out to him concerning a possible position of
employment. Weiler expressed an interest in the position. Weiler claims that
Technipower stopped responding to his communications, prompting him to file an
action against Technipower.
In Weiler’s complaint, he acknowledged that he does not know the
client that posted the position with Technipower and thus commenced a civil action
against Technipower for the information. Weiler requested the name, address, and
registered agent of the company who posted the position. Weiler stated that his
request is necessary so that he can initiate a civil action against Technipower and
the company that hired Technipower to fill the position of employment.
On January 21, 2022, Weiler filed a motion for temporary restraining
order stating that he is unemployed and that he wants the job that Technipower told
him was available. Weiler again requested the name of the company that hired
Technipower to recruit for the position. Weiler stated in his motion that he was a
good match for the job and that he was suffering irreparable economic loss while
waiting to work. Attached to Weiler’s motion for temporary restraining order was
the email that a representative of Technipower sent him concerning the position.
The email, dated December 20, 2021, stated:
Hello! I hope you are doing well. I wanted to reach out to you
regarding a Remote Electrical Designer role we have open. The
company is an MEP firm looking for someone who can design power
and lighting utilizing Revit. Are you open to new roles at this time?
Thank you!
According to Weiler, after he expressed interest in the position,
Technipower ceased further contact. As a result, Weiler sent Technipower a
message on January 13, 2022, stating:
Hello, I was contacted by email concerning a position of Remote
Electrical Designer last month by [your representative]. I require the
name and business address of your client who hired you to fill this
role. Refusing and thus delaying legal proceedings will result in me
seeking damages in court. I expect an answer within two hours.
Sincerely, Shawn Weiler.
On January 26, 2022, the trial court denied Weiler’s motion for
temporary restraining order. Journal entry No. 120810442 (Jan. 26, 2022). On
February 10, 2022, Technipower filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing that Weiler failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Technipower stated that although Weiler claims that he has a cause of
action against Technipower and its client, Weiler does not state what the cause of
action is.
On March 14, 2022, Weiler filed a motion for default judgment. In
his motion, Weiler argued that Technipower had failed to serve its answer to his
amended complaint within 14 days. On March 15, 2022, the trial court dismissed
Weiler’s motion for default judgment and rendered Technipower’s motion to
dismiss as moot. The trial court then ordered Technipower to answer or respond to
Weiler’s amended complaint no later than March 31, 2022. Journal entry
No. 121904678 (Mar. 15, 2022). On March 23, 2022, Technipower filed its motion
to dismiss the amended complaint. On March 30, 2022, Weiler filed an opposition
to Technipower’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint and requested a hearing
on the motion. On May 5, 2022, Weiler filed a motion for a hearing stating due
process requirements. The trial court set a hearing date of June 14, 2022.
The hearing occurred on that date, and the trial court rendered its
decision on June 27, 2022, granting Technipower’s motion to dismiss. The trial
court, in its journal entry, stated:
“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” Doe v. Cleveland
Metro. School Dist., 2012-Ohio-2497, 972 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.)
(quoting State Ex Rel. Hanson v. Guernsey City Bd, of Commrs., 65
Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 1992 Ohio 73, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992). “As long
as there is a set of facts, consistent with the plaintiffs complaint, which
would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not grant a
defendant’s motion to dismiss.” York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60
Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991).
In consideration of this motion, the court has presumed all factual
allegations of the complaint as true and made all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. The court finds that
plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claim upon which relief can be
granted. Specifically, plaintiff fails to aver sufficient facts in his
complaint to reveal a potential viable cause of action against either
Technipower, Inc, or its client. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to
dismiss amended complaint, filed 3/23/2022, is granted. Plaintiff’s
claims against defendant are dismissed with prejudice.
Court cost assessed to the plaintiff(s).
Pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B), the clerk of courts is directed to serve this
judgment in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B). The clerk must
indicate on the docket the names and addresses of all parties, the
method of service, and the costs associated with this service.
Journal entry No. 125463041 (June 27, 2022).
After the trial court dismissed Weiler’s case, he filed this appeal and
assigned one error for our review:
The trial court erred in granting the defendant-appellee’s motion to
dismiss with regards to plaintiff-appellant’s claim of failure to hire in
violation of public policy.
II. Pro Se Appellant
We recognize that Weiler is proceeding pro se, without the advice of
a licensed attorney. However, “[u]nder Ohio law, pro se litigants are held to the
same standard as all other litigants.” Bikkani v. Lee, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89312,
2008-Ohio-3130, ¶ 29, citing Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357,
363, 676 N.E.2d 171 (8th Dist.1996). See also Fleming v. Shelton, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 108660, 2020-Ohio-1387, ¶ 9.
III. Motion to Dismiss
A. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
as follows:
Our standard of review on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is de
novo. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint.
Under a de novo analysis, we must accept all factual allegations of the
complaint as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
favor of the nonmoving party.
(Citations omitted.) NorthPoint Props. v. Petticord, 179 Ohio App.3d 342, 2008-
Ohio-5996, 901 N.E.2d 869, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).
A trial court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted where it appears “beyond doubt from the
complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling [him] to relief.” Grey v.
Walgreen Co., 197 Ohio App.3d 418, 2011-Ohio-6167, 967 N.E.2d 1249, ¶ 3 (8th
Dist.).
B. Law and Analysis
In Weiler’s sole assignment of error, he argues that the trial court
erred by granting Technipower’s motion to dismiss. Weiler further claims that he
has a constitutional right to acquire and possess property and that as a member of
the public he was entitled to be employed by a corporation. However, Weiler does
not cite any legal authority that supports his right to employment by a specific
corporation.
App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an appellant to assert “[a]n argument
containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each
assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support
of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record on which appellant relies.” This court may disregard an
assignment of error where an appellant fails to support his or her
argument with citation as required by App.R. 16(A). App.R. 12(A)(2);
State v. Lawshea, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101895, 2015-Ohio-2391,
¶ 51 (failure to provide legal authority in support of argument, alone,
is sufficient ground to overrule assignment of error).
State v. Banks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108166, 2020-Ohio-3029, ¶ 18.
While we may agree with Weiler that he has a right to work, he does
not have a right to be employed by a specific employer. Additionally, Technipower
is not keeping Weiler from obtaining or maintaining employment. Weiler states that
his action is a failure to hire in violation of public policy. However, he does not state
a specific public policy that has been violated. Weiler cites legal authority that refers
to employees that have been discharged from their employment. However, Weiler
was never an employee of the company, Technipower or its unnamed client, nor was
he discharged. The arguments are not analogous and the case law provided does not
apply. Also, random usage of passages from the U.S. Constitution do not serve as
legal authority to support Weiler’s contentions. See, e.g., Widok v. Estate of Wolf,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108717, 2020-Ohio-5178, ¶ 31.
We determine that there were never any promises of employment
made to Weiler. There is no evidence in the record that Weiler was ever interviewed
or offered the position he referenced or that Technipower ever made any guarantees
to Weiler about an employment offer or position. In reviewing the facts most
favorable to Weiler, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Therefore, Weiler’s assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR