DocketNumber: Court of Appeals No. WD-03-019, Trial Court No. 02-CR-343.
Citation Numbers: 2004 Ohio 1642
Judges: PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
Filed Date: 3/31/2004
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
{¶ 2} "1. The record does not support the Trial Court's sentence pursuant to O.R.C. §
{¶ 3} "2. Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the
{¶ 4} On October 3, 2002, appellant was indicted on two counts of domestic violence, in contravention of R.C.
{¶ 5} Count 2 of the indictment alleged that on the night of September 9, 2002, appellant knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to Annette Reissig, his wife, and that he had previously been convicted of domestic violence. At the trial on that charge, the state presented evidence that appellant's wife had sustained bruises to her face after an altercation with appellant. Appellant's wife testified that the bruises were inflicted by appellant during the September 9 confrontation, when he slapped her in the face. Appellant's defense was that any bruising that was evident on his wife occurred as a result of her employment as a forklift operator or from her recent Army Reserve training. Regarding that training, appellant's wife testified that it was physically challenging and had caused some bruising. She indicated, however, that none of the bruises she received during the training were on her face. The defense called as witnesses several individuals who testified regarding the bruises they observed on appellant's wife during a party which occurred the night she returned from her stint with the Army Reserve. The witnesses stated that they had observed bruises on appellant's wife's body, but not her face, just two days before the alleged incidents which formed the basis of Count 2. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found appellant guilty of domestic violence, and a sentencing hearing was set for January 13, 2003.
{¶ 6} At the hearing on January 13, the court first addressed Count 1 of the indictment, which alleged that another incident of domestic violence had occurred on August 8, 2002. The state amended Count 1 to reflect the charge as a first degree misdemeanor, appellant entered a guilty plea to that charge, and, after conducting a Crim.R. 11(D) colloquy, the court accepted appellant's plea and found him guilty of Count 1 as amended. The court then proceeded to sentence appellant on both counts. Upon finding that the appellant was not amenable to community control sanctions, the court imposed a prison term of 11 months, one month less than the maximum term allowed, in conjunction with appellant's conviction on Count 2. The court also imposed a six month suspended sentence and probation of five years in accordance with the guilty plea entered on Count 1. Counsel for appellant objected to the sentence on grounds of the propriety of the seriousness factors but made no further argument. The objection was duly noted, and the prescribed sentence was entered on January 13, 2003. It is from that judgment that appellant now appeals.
{¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the 11 month prison sentence he received on Count 2 was unsupported by the record and was contrary to law.
{¶ 8} At the outset, we note that a defendant who pleads guilty to a fifth degree felony may appeal a prison sentence that was imposed on the ground that the sentence is contrary to law. R.C.
{¶ 9} R.C.
{¶ 10} R.C.
{¶ 11} At the sentencing hearing below, the trial court began by noting in accordance with R.C.
{¶ 12} The court then examined the factors contained in R.C.
{¶ 13} Appellant asserts that the trial court did not adequately consider factors indicating that his conduct was less serious than conduct normally constituting domestic violence. In particular, he contends that the trial court failed to consider that his wife induced the offense and that he acted under strong provocation in committing the offense, as outlined in R.C.
{¶ 14} The record does not, however, support appellant's argument. Apparently, the alleged physical altercations in this instance were precipitated by unidentified phone calls. Appellant's assertion that he was "provoked" or "induced" by his wife's extramarital affair, where appellant's wife admitted to the affair several months before the incidents of domestic violence, strains the reading of R.C.
{¶ 15} Appellant also contests the length of the term imposed, pointing to the fact that he had never before served a prison term, and argues that the minimum sentence of six months should have been given. As noted above, R.C.
{¶ 16} Having satisfied R.C.
{¶ 17} Appellant further challenges the adequacy of the judgment entry on sentencing. Whereas a previous split in authority among Ohio jurisdictions was acknowledged, the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Comer (2003),
{¶ 18} In accordance with the foregoing, appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 19} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that at his trial below he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his rights under the
{¶ 20} The Supreme Court of Ohio has adopted a two-part test for determining whether a defendant was afforded effective assistance of counsel:
{¶ 21} "2. Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel's performance. (State v. Lytle [1976],
{¶ 22} "3. To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different." State v. Bradley (1989),
{¶ 23} Additionally, "[c]ounsel's decisions on which witnesses to call fall within the province of trial strategy and will not usually constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."Toledo v. Prude, 6th Dist. No. L-02-1250, 2003-Ohio-3226.
{¶ 24} Appellant points to two occurrences which he alleges indicate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. First, he claims that his counsel erred by calling witnesses that actually provided testimony favorable to appellee, while simultaneously failing to call witnesses from his wife's place of employment who could have testified that her work was the source of her bruises. Second, he cites an occurrence at the sentencing hearing wherein defense counsel objected to the sentence in light of the seriousness factors, but did not argue further on the subject.
{¶ 25} At trial, defense counsel called several witnesses who were at a party attended by appellant and his wife on the night she returned from training with her Army Reserve unit. Appellant claims that these witnesses' testimony damaged his case by establishing that they did not observe any bruising on appellant's wife's face, which would indicate that the facial bruising claimed by appellee as evidence of the domestic violence did not occur during her Army Reserve training. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has cautioned that "[t]o justify a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must overcome a strong presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." State v.Carter (1995),
{¶ 26} Appellant also claims that by objecting to his sentence without arguing further at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel was "ineffective". There is, however, no evidence that the standard of reasonable representation requires argument in such a circumstance, or is there any proof that the outcome of the sentencing hearing would have been different but for counsel's perceived shortcoming. Therefore, appellant's second contention on these grounds likewise fails the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore not well-taken.
{¶ 27} On consideration whereof, the court finds that appellant was not prejudiced or prevented from having a fair trial or sentencing hearing and the judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Court costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant.
Judgment Affirmed.
Handwork, P.J., Richard W. Knepper, J. and Mark L.Pietrykowski, J. Concur.