In re P.C.

[Cite as In re P.C., 2020-Ohio-6791.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
IN RE: P.C. C.A. No. 19CA0092-M
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
CASE No. 2017 10 DQ 0529
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 21, 2020
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} P.C. appeals the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile
Division classifying him as a Tier III sex offender. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} We previously summarized the facts of this case as follows:
In October of 2017, a complaint was filed in the Medina County Court of Common
Pleas, Juvenile Division, charging P.C. with six counts of rape, felonies of the first
degree if committed by an adult, and six counts of gross sexual imposition, felonies
of the third degree if committed by an adult. The victim was P.C.’s 4-year-old
niece. The juvenile court denied the State’s motion to transfer the case from the
Juvenile Division to the General Division. The State then filed a notice of intent to
seek a serious youthful offender (“SYO”) dispositional sentence, and P.C. was
subsequently indicted on three counts of rape and three counts of gross sexual
imposition, all with attendant SYO specifications.
P.C. [entered a plea of admit and guilty] to the indictment and the juvenile court
imposed a blended sentence. For the adult portion of the sentence, the court ordered
P.C. to serve 15 years to life in prison on each of the three rape counts and 36
months in prison on each of the three gross sexual imposition counts, all to be
served concurrently with each other, and further classified P.C. as an adult Tier III
sex offender. The court stayed the adult portion of the sentence pending P.C.’s
successful completion of the juvenile portion of his sentence. For the traditional
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juvenile portion, the court ordered P.C. to serve a minimum of one year up to his
21st birthday in the Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) on each of the three
rape counts and a minimum of six months up to his 21st birthday in the DYS on
each of the three gross sexual imposition counts, all to be served concurrently with
each other, and further classified him as a Tier III juvenile offender registrant.
In re: P.C., 9th Dist. Medina No. 18CA0019-M, 2019-Ohio-2603, ¶ 2-3 (“In re: P.C. I”). P.C.
appealed, and this Court vacated the juvenile and adult sexual offender classifications, determining
that pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(A)(1) the juvenile court must classify the juvenile at the time of the
juvenile’s release from a secured facility.
{¶3} P.C. was released from the DYS in August 2019. Following a sexual offender
classification hearing in November 2019, the juvenile court requested the parties submit
supplemental briefing on whether the court had authority to classify P.C. as an adult Tier III sexual
offender as a part of his serious youthful offender stayed adult sentence. After the parties briefed
the issue, the trial court issued a judgment entry which, inter alia, classified P.C. as a juvenile Tier
III sexual offender as a part of a traditional juvenile sentence and as an adult Tier III sexual
offender as a part of a stayed adult sentence. The trial court read those findings and conclusions
to P.C. at a hearing in open court that same day.
{¶4} P.C. filed this appeal, raising three assignments of error for our review.
II.
Assignment of Error I
The juvenile court did not have the authority to classify P.C. as an adult tier
III registrant because the imposition of an adult classification pursuant to
[R.C. 2950] is not authorized punishment under R.C. 2152.13. [ ].
{¶5} After the parties briefed the issue, the juvenile court determined that P.C. would be
classified as an adult tier III sexual offender as a part of his serious youthful offender stayed adult
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sentence. In his first assignment of error, P.C. contends that the trial court did not have authority
to do so. We disagree.
{¶6} The juvenile court found P.C. to be a serious youthful offender pursuant to R.C.
2152.13. Pursuant to the statute, if, after considering the factors set forth in R.C.
2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i), “the court finds that a juvenile disposition alone would be inadequate to meet
the statutorily enunciated purposes of juvenile disposition, the court may impose an adult sentence,
albeit stayed, on the child[.]” State v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 544, 2009-Ohio-9, ¶ 25. When
imposing such a sentence, a juvenile court “may impose upon the child a sentence available for
the violation, as if the child were an adult, under [R.C. Chapter 2929], except that the juvenile
court shall not impose on the child a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole. R.C.
2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i). The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained the serious youthful offender
statutory scheme as follows:
A juvenile charged as a potential serious youthful offender does not face bindover
to an adult court; the case remains in the juvenile court. Under R.C. 2152.11(A), a
juvenile defendant who commits certain acts is eligible for “a more restrictive
disposition.” That “more restricted disposition” is a “serious youthful offender”
disposition and includes what is known as a blended sentence—a traditional
juvenile disposition coupled with the imposition of a stayed adult sentence. R.C.
2152.13. The adult sentence remains stayed unless the juvenile fails to successfully
complete his or her traditional juvenile disposition. R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii).
Theoretically, the threat of the imposition of an adult sentence encourages a
juvenile’s cooperation in his own rehabilitation, functioning as both carrot and
stick.
D.H. at ¶ 18. Pursuant to R.C. 2152.13(D)(3), a child upon whom a serious youthful offender
dispositional sentence has been imposed has a right to appeal the adult portion of the serious
youthful offender dispositional sentence as if the adult portion were not stayed. See In re T.D.R.,
11th Dist. Lake No. 2014-L-109, 2015-Ohio-3541, ¶ 22.
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{¶7} P.C. was released from the DYS in August 2019. During his sexual offender
classification hearing in November 2019, P.C. asserted that the trial court did not have authority
to classify a child as an adult sexual offender registrant as part of the stayed adult sentence of his
serious youthful offender dispositional sentence. P.C. argued R.C. 2152.13 only authorized the
juvenile court to impose a sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929, et seq, and Chapter 2929 of the Revised
Code did not grant any courts the authority to classify offenders. P.C. maintained that a common
pleas court’s authority to classify adults found guilty of a sexually oriented offense as sexual
offender registrants stemmed only from R.C. 2950. P.C. further maintained that a juvenile court’s
authority to classify a juvenile, regardless of whether the juvenile had been adjudicated an SYO,
as a sexual offender stemmed only from R.C. 2152.82 through R.C. 2152.85. The juvenile court
requested the parties to submit post-hearing briefs addressing the issue. Although the juvenile
court subsequently issued an order classifying P.C. as an adult Tier III sexual offender as part of
his stayed adult sentence, the court did not specifically address the merits of either parties’ brief.
{¶8} On appeal, P.C. first appears to argue that the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding in
In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, bars juvenile courts from including an adult Tier
III sex offender classification as a part of a serious youthful offender’s stayed adult sentence.
P.C.’s reliance on In re C.P. is misplaced. In In re C.P., the Supreme Court of Ohio held that R.C.
2152.86 was unconstitutional “[t]o the extent that it imposes automatic, lifelong registration and
notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile system[.]” (Emphasis
added.) Id. at syllabus. Because the juvenile court did not automatically adjudicate P.C. as a
juvenile lifetime registrant, the holding in In re C.P. is not applicable to this assignment of error.
{¶9} P.C. next argues that when imposing a dispositional sentence on a serious youthful
offender, a juvenile court is limited to the sentence options available under Chapter 2929 of the
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Revised Code pursuant to the SYO statute, and that Chapter 2929 does not grant any court the
authority to impose an adult sexual offender classification. In response, the State does not address
P.C.’s argument concerning the SYO statute and Chapter 2929, but instead asserts that R.C.
2950.01(G)(1)(a) requires that an adult sentence for a rape conviction under R.C. 2907.02 include
a mandatory tier III sex offender registration. The State further asserts that Chapter 2950 is
applicable to juveniles through R.C. 2152.191.
{¶10} In this case, P.C. entered a plea of admit and guilty to three counts of rape, in
violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), which specified that the victim was under ten years old, and
three counts of gross sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). All six counts of the
indictment included SYO specifications.
{¶11} R.C. 2152.13 (the “SYO statute”) grants a juvenile court authority to impose an
adult sentence on a child adjudicated a serious youthful offender. R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i)
provides,1
If the juvenile court on the record makes a finding that, given the nature and
circumstances of the violation and the history of the child, the length of time, level
of security, and types of programming and resources available in the juvenile
system alone are not adequate to provide the juvenile court with a reasonable
expectation that the purposes set forth in [R.C. 2152.01] will be met, the juvenile
court may impose upon the child a sentence available for the violation, as if the
child were an adult, under [R.C. Chapter 2929], except that the juvenile court shall
not impose on the child a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole.
(Emphasis added.)
1
In his merit brief, P.C. cites to R.C. 2152.13(D)(1)(a). That statute applies when a child
is adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act under circumstances that require the
juvenile court to impose a serious youthful offender disposition sentence. In this case, the juvenile
court stated that it adjudicated P.C. as a delinquent child for committing an act under circumstances
that allowed, but did not require the court to impose a serious youthful offender dispositional
sentence. Accordingly, the trial court imposed P.C.’s serious youthful offender sentence pursuant
subsection (D)(2)(a)(i) of R.C. 2152.13. Neither the State nor P.C. objected to this finding below
nor do they raise it as an issue on appeal. Nonetheless, the language P.C. cites from subsection
(D)(1)(a) in support of his argument mirrors the language in subsection (D)(2)(a)(i).
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{¶12} In addition to other sentencing guidelines in Chapter 2929 a court is required,
pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(a)(iii), to include in an offender’s sentence a statement that an
offender is a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender if the offender is being sentenced “for a
child-victim oriented offense, and the offender is a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender
relative to that offense.” R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a), expressly states that “[a] sex offender who is
convicted of, pleads guilty to, has been convicted of, or has pleaded guilty to * * * [a] violation of
[R.C. 2907.02] is a tier III sex offender/child victim offender.
{¶13} Thus, contrary to P.C.’s assertion, Chapter 2929 not only includes provisions
expressly addressing the imposition of a sexual offender classification on an offender, those
provisions require a court to impose a tier III classification when sentencing an offender for a
violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1). Because the SYO statute allows a juvenile court to impose upon
an SYO the adult sentence available under Chapter 2929 for a violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b),
we conclude that the juvenile court had authority to classify P.C. as an adult tier III sex offender
as part of his stayed adult sentence. See 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i); R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(a)(iii); R.C.
2907.02(A)(1); R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a).
{¶14} P.C.’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error II
The juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting the Summit
Psychological Report into evidence and considering it when the report’s
author did not come to P.C.’s classification hearing. [ ].
{¶15} In his second assignment of error, P.C. contends that the juvenile court erred and
abused its discretion by admitting into evidence and considering a report from Summit
Psychological Associates because (1) the report was unfairly prejudicial pursuant to Evid.R.
7
403(A); (2) the report’s writer was not qualified as an expert pursuant to Evid.R. 702; and (3) the
report was not authenticated pursuant to Evid.R. 901.
{¶16} In its response, the State contends that because the Rules of Evidence do not apply
to sexual offender classification hearings, P.C.’s assignment of error should be overruled. We
agree.
{¶17} The Ohio Rules of Evidence are limited in scope. Evid.R. 101(C), states, in
pertinent part:
These rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not apply in the following
situations:
***
(3) Miscellaneous Criminal Proceedings. Proceedings for extradition or rendition
of fugitives; sentencing; granting or revoking probation; proceedings with respect
to community control sanctions; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal
summonses and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on bail or
otherwise.
***
(6) Other Rules. Proceedings in which other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
govern matters relating to evidence.
{¶18} Courts have long recognized that the rules of evidence do not apply to adult sexual
offender classification hearings. See State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 425 (1998). This is because
such hearings are “‘similar to sentencing or probation hearings where it is well settled that the
Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply.’” State v. Hassenruck, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011230,
2018-Ohio-4546, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Wright, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18941, 1999 WL 420377,
*2 (June 23, 1999), quoting Cook at 425.
{¶19} As in the context of an adult sentencing hearing, the applicability of the Rules of
Evidence is limited at the dispositional stage of juvenile court proceedings. Indeed, the juvenile
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rules expressly allow a juvenile court to “admit evidence that is material and relevant, including,
but not limited to, hearsay, opinion, and documentary evidence” during a dispositional hearing
unless it concerns a motion for permanent custody. Juv.R. 34(B)(2); see Evid.R. 101(C)(6). A
juvenile sexual offender classification hearing is akin to a dispositional hearing in the juvenile
context much like an adult sexual offender classification hearing is akin to an adult sentencing
hearing. See Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 425. The determination as to how a juvenile will be classified
does not occur until after a child has already been adjudicated delinquent for committing a sexually
oriented offense. See R.C.2152.83(A)(1); see also Cook at 425 (“A determination hearing does
not occur until after the offender has been convicted of the underlying offense. Further, the
determination hearing is intended to determine the offender’s status, not to determine the guilt or
innocence of the offender.”). Therefore, we conclude that the Rules of Evidence do not strictly
apply to a juvenile sexual offender classification hearing. See id.
{¶20} In his reply brief, P.C. argues for the first time that the report at issue was not
reliable and that the writer of the report was not credible. Despite our conclusion that the Rules of
Evidence to do not strictly apply to sex offender classification hearings, we recognize that evidence
admitted during such hearings must still be reliable. See State v. Miller, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
104747, 2017-Ohio-1554, ¶ 26, compiling cases. However, this Court has long held that a party
cannot raise new issues for consideration in his reply brief, and that a reply brief is merely an
opportunity to respond to the brief of the appellee. State v. Caldwell, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26306,
2013-Ohio-1417, ¶ 9, quoting Willett v. Willett, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22167, 2005-Ohio-342, ¶ 8,
fn. 1. Because the second assignment of error in P.C.’s merit brief only asserts that the trial court
erred by admitting the report in violation of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, we must limit our review
accordingly.
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{¶21} P.C.’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error III
The juvenile court abused its discretion when it viewed P.C.’s case through an
adultified (sic.) lens, disregarded the testimony of the professionals who
testified about P.C.’s progress, and classified him as a tier III juvenile sex
offender. [ ].
{¶22} In his third assignment of error, P.C. contends that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by classifying P.C. a tier III juvenile sex offender because the court “disregarded all of
the positive testimony given about P.C.” and its decision is “not consistent with or supported by
the totality of the record.” Upon review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in this case.
{¶23} In this case, the court classified P.C. as a juvenile tier III sex offender registrant
pursuant to R.C. 2152.83 as part of his traditional juvenile disposition. The definition of a “tier III
sex offender” includes “[a] sex offender who is adjudicated a delinquent child for committing or
has been adjudicated a delinquent child for committing any sexually oriented offense and who a
juvenile court, pursuant to section 2152.82, 2152.83, 2152.84, or 2152.85 of the Revised Code,
classifies a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender relative to the offense.” R.C. 2950.01(G)(3).
Prior to issuing the order classifying a child as a juvenile offender registrant, the court is required
to hold a hearing pursuant to R.C. 2152.831 to determine whether the child is a tier I, tier II, or tier
III sex offender. R.C. 2152.83(A)(2); R.C. 2152.831(A). A juvenile court has discretion to
determine a juvenile offender registrant’s classification tier. In re C.P., 2012-Ohio-1446, ¶ 20,
citing R.C. 2152.82(B). An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment;
it implies that the juvenile court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
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{¶24} In making the decision whether a delinquent child should be classified as a juvenile
offender registrant, a judge must consider all relevant factors. Pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(D), those
factors include, but are not limited to:
(1) The nature of the sexually oriented offense or the child-victim oriented offense
committed by the child;
(2) Whether the child has shown any genuine remorse or compunction for the
offense;
(3) The public interest and safety;
(4) The factors set forth in division (K) of section 2950.11 of the Revised Code,
provided that references in the factors as set forth in that division to “the offender”
shall be construed for purposes of this division to be references to “the delinquent
child;”
(5) The factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of section 2929.12 of the Revised
Code as those factors apply regarding the delinquent child, the offense, and the
victim;
(6) The results of any treatment provided to the child and of any follow-up
professional assessment of the child.
Relevant to R.C. 2152.83(D)(4), the factors set for in R.C. 2950.11(K) include
(1) The [delinquent child]’s age;
(2) The [delinquent child]’s prior criminal or delinquency record regarding all
offenses, including, but not limited to, all sexually oriented offenses or child-victim
oriented offenses;
(3) The age of the victim of the sexually oriented offense or child-victim oriented
offense the [delinquent child] committed;
(4) Whether the sexually oriented offense or child-victim oriented offense the
[delinquent child] committed involved multiple victims;
(5) Whether the [delinquent child] used drugs or alcohol to impair the victim of the
sexually oriented offense or child-victim oriented offense the [delinquent child]
committed or to prevent the victim from resisting;
(6) If the [delinquent child] previously has been convicted of, pleaded guilty to, or
been adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that if committed by an
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adult would be a criminal offense, whether the [delinquent child] completed any
sentence or dispositional order imposed for the prior offense or act and, if the prior
offense or act was a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense,
whether the * * * delinquent child participated in available programs for sex
offenders or child-victim offenders;
(7) Any mental illness or mental disability of the [delinquent child];
(8) The nature of the [delinquent child]’s sexual conduct, sexual contact, or
interaction in a sexual context with the victim of the sexually oriented offense the
[delinquent child] committed or the nature of the [delinquent child]’s interaction in
a sexual context with the victim of the child-victim oriented offense the [delinquent
child] committed, whichever is applicable, and whether the sexual conduct, sexual
contact, or interaction in a sexual context was part of a demonstrated pattern of
abuse;
(9) Whether the [delinquent child], during the commission of the sexually oriented
offense or child-victim oriented offense the [delinquent child] committed,
displayed cruelty or made one or more threats of cruelty;
(10) Any additional behavioral characteristics that contribute to the [delinquent
child]’s conduct.
{¶25} In this case, the juvenile court made its decision to classify P.C. as a tier III sex
offender after “consider[ing] multiple factors including:
the evidence in the this case; the nature of the offense; the effect of the offense on
the victim; the victim’s impact statement; [P.C.]’s sex offender evaluations and
reports, and the recommendations therein; the likelihood for recidivism; the
participation and completion, or lack of participation and completion of sex
offender treatment; the participation and completion, or lack of participation and
completion of any other treatment and recommendations based upon the
evaluations performed; [P.C.]’s prior court record; arguments of counsel and all
other relevant information[.]
{¶26} On appeal, P.C. asserts that the court “honed in on two pieces of evidence in
classifying P.C., and in doing so, it disregarded all of the positive testimony given about P.C. at
his classification hearing.” The first “piece of evidence” on which P.C. argues the trial court
“overly relied,” is the fact that he had not begun sexual offender treatment after being released
from DYS. In its journal entry, the court noted that despite the necessity for follow-up treatment—
12
stressed in both the report of Dr. Gazley submitted by P.C., the report from Summit Psychological
submitted by the State, and the testimony of the DYS psychiatry assistant presented at the
hearing—it was “uncontested and unexplained” as to why P.C. had not completed any follow-up
treatment in the three months since he had been released from DYS. The juvenile court stated that
it found “it troubling that [P.C.], who is on parole and potentially subject to a SYO
disposition/imposition of sentence, had not followed up with any sex offender treatment since his
release[.]”
{¶27} P.C. asserts that the trial court should have considered that P.C. did not begin this
treatment because “he was advised by his parole officer to wait for the results of his sex offender
classification hearing and DYS funding to fall in place.” A review of the transcript, however,
supports the trial court’s finding that P.C.’s failure to do follow-up treatment was not explained at
the hearing. Notably, P.C. supports this contention in his brief by pointing to a statement made by
his counsel at a separate hearing subsequent to the evidentiary hearing and after the trial court read
its findings and conclusions into the record. The statement asserted that P.C.’s counsel had
explained in chambers prior to the hearing that the reason P.C. had not obtained treatment right
away was “because of funding reasons and, also, was because he was advised to wait until the
results of this hearing.” Contrary to P.C.’s argument on appeal, P.C.’s counsel’s statement did not
indicate what the alleged “funding reasons” were or who had allegedly advised P.C. to wait to do
follow-up treatment. Regardless, despite the presence of P.C.’s parole officer at the evidentiary
hearing, no evidence was presented during the hearing to support these contentions, nor was any
evidence proffered to support P.C.’s counsel’s statement after the trial court had presented its
findings and conclusions of law at the subsequent hearing.
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{¶28} The second “piece of evidence” on which P.C. argues the juvenile court overly
relied is the sex offender evaluation prepared for the court by Summit Psychological Associates.
P.C. asserts that this report was not admissible under the evidentiary rules and “did not fall in line
with the reports done at DYS or Dr. Gazley’s report.” P.C. also points to his good behavior and
successful completion of sex offender treatment while at DYS and asserts that, prior to this case,
he had never been charged with or adjudicated of any offenses “despite his troubled childhood.”
Because we determined in assignment of error two that the Ohio Rules of Evidence do not strictly
apply to juvenile sex offender classification hearings, we reject P.C.’s reasserted argument in this
assignment of error that the juvenile court erred in considering Summit Psychological Associates’
report on that basis. We will, however, consider P.C.’s argument that the trial court overly relied
on that report.
{¶29} In its journal entry, prior to making its determination, the juvenile court explains
the evidence presented at the hearing. The court notes that P.C. had undergone juvenile sexual
offender evaluations with both Summit Psychological Associates and Dr. Gazley at the Forensic
Psychiatric Center of Northeast Ohio, and that the reports from both had been received and
reviewed by the court. The State did not present any witnesses at the hearing and relied on the
report of Summit Psychological Associates. Regarding this report, the court states that it will “not
consider the opinion of the writer on the ultimate issue, but would admit the report and other
findings therein, in as much as the same were relied upon by other witnesses in their preparation[.]”
During the evidentiary hearing, P.C. presented testimony from Scott Spohn, a psychiatry assistant
with the Department of Youth Services (“DYS”); M.C., P.C.’s father; and Dr. Thomas G. Gazley,
a psychologist at the Forensic Psychiatric Center of Northeast Ohio, who prepared a written report
submitted to the court.
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{¶30} The court’s journal entry first discusses Mr. Spohn’s testimony. Mr. Spohn testified
he is a psychiatry assistant and worked with P.C. while P.C. was in DYS custody for approximately
18 months, having 40 to 50 interactions with him. The court notes that Mr. Spohn testified he does
not have any specific sexual offender program training and works “under psychiatrist license and
supervision.” Mr. Spohn indicated P.C. had been screened using the Juvenile Sex Offender
Assessment Protocol II (J-SOAP-II). The court notes in its entry that the J-SOAP II is a guide, not
an empirical tool, and that is a tool designed for treatment rather than as a predictor of the
likelihood to reoffend.
{¶31} The court’s journal entry acknowledges Mr. Spohn’s testimony that P.C. dropped
from a scaled score of 79 to 21 on the J-SOAP-II. However, the court noted that the original score
of 79 was “reflected by Summit Psychological and not Mr. Spohn’s initial testing.” The court then
states that “no explanation was proffered by any party to the court for the significant difference in
initial scores between the two test giver results.” Though the court did not indicate the score of
the first test administered by DYS, a review of the record shows a score of 50. The court also
notes Mr. Spohn’s testimony that P.C.’s progress in the sex offender therapy offered at DYS took
longer than the best-case scenario, attributing this to P.C.’s initial trust issues, an unwillingness to
drop self-defensive protective mechanisms, struggles with peer interaction, and bottled up
emotions. Mr. Spohn also testified that P.C. eventually proceed through the behavior levels
designated by DYS.
{¶32} The court then explained Mr. Spohn’s testimony regarding P.C.’s treatment at
DYS. Mr. Spohn indicated that P.C. needed to address his social skills, guilt, empathy, and
remorse, and develop strategies to manage his risk factors. The treatment program is broken into
two phases. Phase I is designed to help an offender break down the series of events leading to the
15
offense and discover errors in thought. Mr. Spohn indicated that, during phase I, P.C. struggled
with protecting himself from his emotions, the premise that he was a victim, and a lack of
responsibility for his actions. The court then notes that P.C. “apparently progressed sufficiently to
move to Phase II where he had to present himself to a panel (constituted of whom the court was
not apprised) who apparently recommended his completion and release to parole.” Mr. Spohn
indicated that P.C. should continue sex offender treatment, engage in follow-up counselling for
self-esteem, and continue to work on developing healthy relationships. The juvenile court notes
in its entry that Mr. Spohn was unaware that P.C. had not sought any follow-up sex offender
treatment as of the date of the hearing.
{¶33} The juvenile court’s journal entry then briefly addresses P.C.’s father’s testimony.
P.C.’s father stated that P.C. resides with him, and that P.C. is employed and has obtained is GED.
His father also indicated that he monitors P.C.’s social media and internet usage. The court then
recognized P.C.’s father’s expression of hope and support for his son.
{¶34} Next, the juvenile court’s journal entry explains the testimony and accompanying
report of Dr. Gazley. Dr. Gazley testified that he performed various psychological tests and
assessments on P.C., conducted interviews, and reviewed records. Dr. Gazley opined that P.C.’s
sexual gratification was in part to relieve sadness and depression, and found that P.C. suffered
from depression. Dr. Gazley opined that P.C.’s overall risk for sex offense recidivism is below
the base rate for juvenile recidivism. Dr. Gazley also opined that although P.C. met the DSM-V
criteria for pedophilia, paraphilic incest, and voyeurism, he believed they were not appropriate
diagnoses because P.C. was not expressing arousal to such events per his results on the Abel test,
which assesses sexual interest and arousal patterns. The juvenile court noted in its entry that Dr.
Gazley stated this opinion despite the facts of this case demonstrating that P.C. had openly
16
offended on his four-year-old niece, had an on-going incestuous relationship with his older sister
for years, and admitted to peeping on his female siblings. Finally, the court recognized that Dr.
Gazley opined P.C. needed to continue outpatient sex offender treatment regardless of the progress
he made at DYS. The court quoted Dr. Gazley’s report wherein he opines that P.C.’s “participation
in sex offender treatment would significantly reduce risk for future recidivism.”
{¶35} The court then observed that “[r]egardless of his preferred interest/arousal, [P.C.]
nonetheless committed offenses and engaged in sexual acts that did not apparently register arousal
on the Abel test.” In its journal entry, the court stated that it did not receive an adequate explanation
as to how or why this could occur, but was left with the notion that “‘sex is comforting’ for
depression.” The court found Dr. Gazley’s assessment that “sex is comforting” combined with the
lack of explanation regarding P.C.’s opportunistic sexual actions troubling “inasmuch as it leaves
everyone to have concerns of being offended upon by [P.C.], as long as it would make him feel
good.”
{¶36} The court then noted that, contrary to Dr. Gazley’s opinion, the report from Summit
Psychological Associates indicated that P.C. was a high risk for future offending based upon the
presence of static and dynamic risk factors and deeply ingrained paraphilic disorders involving
deviant sexual attraction. The report also opined that P.C. was unable to identify triggers and high
risks for offending which is a prerequisite in relapse prevention planning. Consequently, the writer
of the report opined that P.C. was in need of ongoing sex offender specific treatment on an
outpatient basis despite his completion of sex offender treatment at DYS. The report also
pronounced that P.C. should not have access to children or minors, pornography, or unmonitored
internet access.
17
{¶37} The juvenile court stated that it was not unexpected that Dr. Gazley’s report and
the report from Summit Psychological Associates would differ in various interpretations, but noted
that “what both stress, including Mr. Spohn from DYS, is the necessity for follow up treatment.”
The juvenile court found it troubling that P.C. had not engaged in any treatment in the three months
since he had been released from DYS custody in light of these recommendations and the fact that
P.C. was on parole and potentially subject to the imposition of a SYO adult sentence. The court
further noted that P.C.’s failure to seek follow-up treatment was not contested or explained during
the hearing.
{¶38} Based on our review of the trial court’s journal entry, we cannot conclude that P.C.
has shown that the court relied too heavily on the report from Summit Psychological Associates.
The court’s review of that document is limited to a single paragraph explaining how the writer’s
opinion differed from that of Dr. Gazley and why. Instead, the court appears to have been most
concerned by P.C.’s prior opportunistic sexual actions apparently committed in order to relieve his
ongoing depression and the fact that P.C. had failed to participate in any follow-up sexual offender
treatment after leaving DYS custody—a recommendation made not only by Summit Psychological
Associates, but also by Dr. Gazley, and Mr. Spohn. We conclude, therefore, that P.C. has not
shown that the juvenile court’s determination that he should be classified as a juvenile tier III sex
offender is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. See Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219.
{¶39} P.C.’s third assignment or error is overruled.
III.
{¶40} P.C.’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina County
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
18
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
CALLAHAN, P. J.
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
LAUREN HAMMERSMITH, Assistant State Public Defender, for Appellant.
S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.