DocketNumber: Nos. 05COA062, 05COA063.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 6559
Judges: <italic>FARMER, J.</italic>
Filed Date: 12/7/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} A jury trial commenced on November 23, 2005. The speeding charge was tried to the bench. At the conclusion of the state's case-in-chief and again at the conclusion of the trial, appellant moved for a Crim.R. 29 acquittal. The trial court denied the motions. The jury found appellant guilty of the operating a motor vehicle under the influence and possession of a controlled substance charges, and not guilty of the possession of drug paraphernalia charge. The trial court found appellant guilty of speeding. By journal entries filed December 23, 2005, the trial court sentenced appellant to ninety days in jail on the operating a motor vehicle under the influence conviction and sixty days in jail on the possession of a controlled substance conviction, suspended his driver's license for eighteen months and imposed fines.
{¶ 3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for consideration. Assignments of error are as follows: I
{¶ 4} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TROOPER AND CRIMINALIST TO TESTIFY ABOUT THE WARNING LABEL ON A PILL BOTTLE FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT."
{¶ 8} The admission or exclusion of evidence lies in the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Sage (1987),
{¶ 9} First, appellant argues the warning label on the prescription bottle constituted hearsay in violation of Evid.R. 801(C) because it was "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." We disagree.
{¶ 10} The prescription bottle of Vicodin was found in appellant's vehicle during the inventory search, and it listed appellant's name on the label.1 T. at 73. Appellant admitted to Trooper Gable that he had consumed a malt liquor and "had taken two Vicodin that day for pain." T. at 63, 76. Trooper Gable read the warning on the prescription bottle which stated, "Do not drink alcoholic beverages when taking this medication. * * * Also, that it may cause drowsiness and that alcohol may intensify this affect. Use care when operating a car or dangerous machinery." T. at 77-78.
{¶ 11} Mr. Yingling testified he analyzed the contents of the prescription bottle and it contained Vicodin, a Schedule III drug. T. at 177-179. Mr. Yingling also testified to the warning label on the bottle, stating "I believe the warning on there says do not drink alcohol while * * * taking this medication." T. at 180.
{¶ 12} The prescription bottle was marked as evidence and received as Exhibit 8. T. at 191. During oral argument, appellant's counsel attempted to move for an App.R. 9(E) correction of the record. Counsel argued an objection was made to the prescription bottle's admission, but it was omitted from the record. Although defense counsel objected at each mention of the warning label, there is no specific assignment of error on the prescription bottle's admission into evidence; therefore, we find the App.R. 9(E) request to be irrelevant.
{¶ 13} The prescription bottle was seized during appellant's arrest and qualified as relevant and admissible evidence under Evid.R. 401. Appellant admitted to taking the Vicodin and it was in his possession during his arrest. T. at 76. We therefore conclude the references to the warning label did not constitute hearsay and were relevant.
{¶ 14} Second, appellant argues the trial court erred in permitting Trooper Gable and Mr. Yingling to testify on the effects of mixing Vicodin with alcohol.
{¶ 15} Trooper Gable testified based upon his experience, "Vicodin is a central nervous system depressant and it cannot be * * * cannot be mixed with alcohol." T. at 77. Mr. Yingling testified Vicodin is a "pain management drug" and the warning label about mixing alcohol and Vicodin is "put on there because they can have additive effects." T. at 180-181. Mr. Yingling stated, "like any drug, it [Vicodin] can be abused." T. at 179.
{¶ 16} We find Mr. Yingling's testimony regarding the schedules and drugs of abuse are part of his routine duties and therefore he was qualified to testify as to the "addictive effects" of mixing schedule drugs with alcohol. T. at 178-179. We concur with appellant that Trooper Gable was not qualified to give his opinion. However, we find his testimony constitutes harmless error. Harmless error is described as "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Crim.R. 52(A). Overcoming harmless error requires a showing of undue prejudice or a violation of a substantial right.
{¶ 17} The complained of testimony was already in evidence via the warning label on the prescription bottle and Mr. Yingling's testimony on "additive effects."
{¶ 18} Assignments of Error I and II are denied.
{¶ 20} Crim.R. 29 governs motion for acquittal. Subsection (A) states the following:
{¶ 21} "The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's case."
{¶ 22} The standard to be employed by a trial court in determining a Crim.R. 29 motion is set out in State v. Bridgeman (1978),
{¶ 23} "Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
{¶ 24} Appellant argues the evidence presented was insufficient to establish he was under the influence of alcohol and/or a drug of abuse. Appellant argues his blood alcohol level "was below the legal limit of .08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath" and "there was no credible or admissible evidence to show that the Vicodin was a drug of abuse" or that appellant was under the influence of the Vicodin. Appellant's Brief at 13.
{¶ 25} R.C.
{¶ 26} " (1) Any drug to which either of the following applies:
{¶ 27} "(a) Under the `Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,'
{¶ 28} "(b) Under Chapter 3715. or 3719. of the Revised Code, the drug may be dispensed only upon a prescription."
{¶ 29} Mr. Yingling testified Vicodin is a Schedule III drug and "like any drug, it can be abused." T. at 179.
{¶ 30} Trooper Gable testified he observed appellant speeding, eighty-seven m.p.h. in a sixty-five m.p.h. zone, and when signaled to pull over, appellant violated the marked lane. T. at 58, 60. When Trooper Gable approached the vehicle, he detected an odor of alcohol. T. at 62. Trooper Gable stated appellant admitted to the consumption of alcohol (malt liquor) and the taking of two Vicodin pills that day. T. at 63, 76.
{¶ 31} When Trooper Gable conducted the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, appellant demonstrated six of six clues for impairment. T. at 64. On the One Leg Stand test, appellant demonstrated three of four clues for impairment. T. at 68. On the Walk and Turn test, appellant demonstrated four of eight clues for impairment. T. at 69.
{¶ 32} We conclude the evidence was sufficient to overcome the Crim.R. 29 motions for acquittal.
{¶ 33} Assignment of Error III is denied.
{¶ 34} The judgment of the Municipal Court of Ashland County, Ohio is hereby affirmed.
By Farmer, J. Gwin, P.J. and Boggins, J. concur.