DocketNumber: No. 86702.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 2593
Judges: MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J.:
Filed Date: 5/25/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 11} I respectfully dissent. For the reasons below, I would find that the trial court erred in allowing Lewis to testify as to the results of the lab report prepared by Miller which concluded that the crack cocaine weighed 5.19 grams. Therefore, I would reverse and remand because without evidence that the crack cocaine weighed 5.19 grams, the state would be unable to prove an essential element of its case.
{¶ 12} Appellant concedes that trial counsel failed to continue to object to the testimony of Lewis as to the conclusion of the report prepared by Miller ("Miller Report").1
Therefore, Appellant has waived all but plain error. Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), plain errors or defects which affect substantial rights may be grounds for reversal even though they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. Notice of plain error, however, applies only under exceptional circumstances to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Long
(1978),
{¶ 13} In the instant matter, it is undisputed that Miller did not testify as to the conclusions of the Miller Report. Instead, Lewis testified that the report concluded that the substance was crack cocaine and that it weighed 5.19 grams. She admitted under oath that she did not prepare the Miller Report. It is well-settled that in the absence of a court appearance by the preparer of the report, a laboratory report prepared by a qualifying agency or accredited institution of higher learning may nevertheless be admissible as prima facie evidence of content, identity, and weight, or the existence or number of dosages of the substance tested, so long as the parties comply with certain procedural requirements proscribed in R.C.
{¶ 14} R.C.
{¶ 15} In the instant matter, the Miller Report does not meet one of the mandates proffered in R.C.
{¶ 16} Without the admittance of the Miller Report, I would conclude that the trial court could not permit Lewis to testify as to the conclusion of the report because she did not have any personal knowledge as to its contents. In State v. Crager,
Marion App. No. 90-4-54,
{¶ 17} "While he did perform the technical review of [the preparer's] work in this case, it seems that review merely involved checking her notes, to make sure that she followed correct procedures and came to a reasonable conclusion. He did not observe or supervise her work. * * * Additionally, throughout [the witness's] testimony the DNA conclusions he gives come solely from [the preparer's] report, which should not have been admitted into evidence." Id.
{¶ 18} The court held that, where the report is inadmissible, the mere review of the report, absent any independent testing, does not qualify the witness to testify to conclusions in the report. Id. See, also, State v. Jarrett, Auglaize App. No. 2-05-37,
{¶ 19} As in Crager, the testimony of Lewis in this case reveals that she did not have personal knowledge as to the conclusion of the Miller Report. Lewis testified that while her initials are upon the Miller Report, she did not conduct the test, nor did she observe Scott Miller perform the test. She merely recalls being present in the lab on that day, although she cannot recall the day that Miller conducted the test.2 As such, Lewis was not qualified to testify as to the conclusions in the Miller Report. Accordingly, I would conclude that, because the Miller Report was inadmissible and Lewis did not prepare the report or have personal knowledge of its conclusions, any mention by Lewis that the crack cocaine initially weighed 5.19 grams was improper and should have been excluded. Likewise, the trial court should have excluded any explanation by Lewis regarding the weight differences in the Miller Report and her report.
{¶ 20} Having decided that the trial court should have excluded Lewis' testimony as to the conclusions in the Miller Report and the differences between the Miller Report and her report, because Appellant's counsel failed to continue to object to the admission of such evidence, one must still determine whether a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the improperly admitted evidence. In so doing, one must decide whether, but for the error, the outcome of the trial would have clearly been otherwise. State v. Moreland (1990),
{¶ 21} Furthermore, the determination as to Appellant's second assignment of error would render moot Appellant's remaining assignments of error pursuant to App.R. 12(A). Accordingly, I would reverse and remand.