DocketNumber: No. 83238.
Citation Numbers: 2004 Ohio 2402
Judges: ANN DYKE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 5/13/2004
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} The following procedural facts are undisputed. In August of 1994, appellant filed a complaint against, among others, Dr. Stephens for medical malpractice which occurred on March 2, 1993. Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 3} In February of 1996, appellant refiled her complaint pursuant to the savings statute, R.C.
{¶ 4} During discovery, appellant learned that her expert witness no longer had a medical license. Appellant thereafter filed a "Motion for Emergency Extension or, in the Alternative, for a Dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1)(3). On November 16, 1999, the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice in the following journal entry:
{¶ 5} "Based upon plaintiff's expert recently losing his license, case is dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. (B)(3) without prejudice with ability to refile w/in 1 year. Final. VOL."
{¶ 6} In November of 2000, appellant refiled her complaint for the third time. Dr. Stephens filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied in the following journal entry:
{¶ 7} "Motion of Defendant Susan E. Stephens, M.D. for dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint is not well taken and is overruled. The Court finds that the facts of this case are distinguishable from Thomas v. Freeman (1997),
{¶ 8} On March 31, 2003, Dr. Stephens filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted in the following journal entry:
{¶ 9} "Defendant Dr. Susan Stephens' Motion for Summary Judgment is well-taken and granted. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Thomas v. Freeman (1997),
{¶ 10} It is from this ruling that appellant now appeals, asserting this sole assignment of error for our review:
{¶ 11} "I. The trial court erred to the prejudice of the plaintiff-appellant Brenda Smith (Duncan) in granting a dismissal utilizing Civil Rule 41(A)(1)(a) where the dismissal was "by order of court" pursuant to Civil Rule 41(A)(2) and Civil Rule (A)(3) contrary to the ruling of June 18, 2001 having previously denied such motion based upon the identical facts and arguments of law."
{¶ 12} Essentially, appellant's inartfully crafted assignment of error asks this court to review the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants.
{¶ 13} We employ a de novo review in determining whether summary judgment was properly granted. Grafton v. Ohio EdisonCo.,
{¶ 14} Summary judgment is appropriate where: "(1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor." Horton v.Harwick Chem. Corp. (1995),
{¶ 15} The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action is one year. R.C.
{¶ 16} "In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than on the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action at the date of reversal or failure has expired, the plaintiff * * * may commence a new action within one year after such date." R.C.
{¶ 17} The issue here is whether the savings statute can be applied to the third action where the trial court expressly "preserved" appellant's right to refile the action. We find that it cannot.
{¶ 18} In Thomas v. Freeman (1997),
{¶ 19} "The savings statute can be used only once to refile a case." citing Hancock v. Kroger Co. (1995),
{¶ 20} Thomas did not present the issue of whether the savings statute could be used only once, however. The holding of Thomas was that a trial court's dismissal for failure to prosecute, due to failure to obtain service on the defendant, was a dismissal other than on the merits. The Court noted that the defendant who had not been served was not subject to unlimited refilings, because the savings statute could be applied only once.
{¶ 21} A number of appellate cases have directly held that the savings statute can be used only once. Hancock v. Kroger
(1995),
{¶ 22} We stated in Iglodi, supra:
{¶ 23} "Even where a claim is involuntarily dismissed, subsequent refilings are prohibited. * * * This prohibition is premised not on the nature of the dismissal ('otherwise than upon the merits'), but because the refiling of the action was after the expiration of the statute of limitations and the prior case was not filed `in due time' under R.C.
{¶ 24} Therefore, we find that the trial court was without authority to enlarge the savings statute under R.C.
{¶ 25} "[A]ppellant is "conclusively presumed to be aware of the requirements of the rules under which [he] chose to proceed."Payton, supra,
{¶ 26} Furthermore, a party may not take advantage of an error that the party induced the trial court to make. State exrel. The V. Cos. v. Marshall,
{¶ 27} The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Corrigan, A.J., and Gallagher, J., concur.
It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.