In re D.H.

[Cite as In re D.H., 2022-Ohio-986.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HANCOCK COUNTY
IN RE:
CASE NO. 5-21-27
D.H.,
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT CHILD. OPINION
IN RE:
CASE NO. 5-21-28
D.H.,
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT CHILD. OPINION
Appeals from Hancock County Common Pleas Court
Juvenile Division
Trial Court Nos. 20192195 and 201902196
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 28, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Lauren Hammersmith for Appellant
Heather M. Pendleton for Appellee
Case No. 5-21-27 and 5-21-28
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Delinquent child, D.H., appeals the July 28, 2021 judgment entries of
the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, (hereafter
“Hancock County Juvenile Court”) classifying D.H., as a tier III juvenile offender
registrant (“JOR”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} The genesis of this case is the placement of D.H. (age 16) with a relative
(i.e. his maternal uncle) for adoption.1 D.H.’s uncle resided with his fiancé and her
two daughters (Al.S. age 10 and Av.S. age 11). D.H. admittedly had sexual contact
with both Al.S. and Av.S. on different dates.
{¶3} As a result of Al.S.’s and Av.S.’s disclosures of sexual contact, two
separate complaints were filed on September 18, 2019 in Sandusky County
Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division (hereinafter “Sandusky County Juvenile
Court”). Both complaints alleged that D.H. was a delinquent child for committing
acts that if charged as an adult would constitute Gross sexual imposition (“GSI”) in
violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), third-degree felonies.2 (Case No. 20192196, Doc.
No. 2); (Case No. 20192195, Doc. No. 4).
1
D.H. was in the permanent custody of the Hancock County Job and Family Services, Child Protective
Services Unit pursuant to case number 20153007, at the time of his placement, having been voluntarily
surrendered by his mother. (See July 27, 2021 Tr. at 28); (Joint Ex. 10); (Case No. 20192196, Doc. No. 9);
(Case No. 20192195, Doc. No. 13). See also Juv.R. 38(B).
2
D.H. was on probation through Hancock County Juvenile Court, in case number 20182232 for having been
adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that if charged as an adult would constitute Felonious
assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). (See July 27, 2021 Tr. 27-28); (Joint Ex. 10) (Case No. 20192196,
Doc. No. 9); (Case No. 20192195, Doc. No. 13). The records for D.H.’s companion case is not presently
before us on appeal.
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Case No. 5-21-27 and 5-21-28
{¶4} On September 19, 2019, D.H. entered admissions to the single count in
each complaint. Thereafter, the Sandusky Count Juvenile Court adjudicated D.H. a
delinquent child. (Case No. 20192196, Doc. No. 2); (Case No. 20192195, Doc. No.
4). Then, the Sandusky County Juvenile Court transferred the case to Hancock
County Juvenile Court for disposition.
{¶5} At the dispositional hearing held on October 22, 2019, the Hancock
County Juvenile Court ordered that D.H. be committed into the legal custody of the
Ohio Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) for a minimum period of six months
to age 21 (in each case) to be run consecutively one another.
{¶6} D.H. remained in DYS until Hancock County Juvenile Court was
notified (by DYS) that D.H. was scheduled for release on July 27, 2021. Then, the
Hancock County Juvenile Court scheduled the matter for a juvenile-sex-offender-
classification hearing. Prior to the classification hearing, D.H. filed a memorandum
in support of a tier I classification, which the State opposed. Nevertheless, at the
classification hearing held on July 27, 2021, the parties agreed that D.H. is a
mandatory-juvenile-offender registrant based on his age at the time he committed
the offenses, his acts, and the time of his release from a secure facility. At the
hearing, the trial court made factual findings (as to age, acts, and the time of release
from a secure facility) and subsequently classified D.H. as a tier III JOR with
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Case No. 5-21-27 and 5-21-28
community notifications. (July 27, 2021 Tr. at 164); (Case No. 20192196, Doc. No.
29); (Case No. 20192195, Doc. No. 36).
{¶7} D.H. timely appeals the judgments of the Hancock County Juvenile
Court and raises one assignment of error in each of his two cases, which we have
consolidated for our review.
Assignment of Error
R.C. 2152.83’s allowance of harsher treatment of juvenile sex
offenders than adult sex offenders violates the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment; Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and Article I, Sections 9,
10, and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. (A-1).
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, D.H. argues that trial court’s
classification of D.H. as a tier III JOR pursuant to the provisions set forth in R.C.
2152.83 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and state
constitutions since an adult convicted of the identical offenses under R.C.
2907.05(A)(4) could only be classified as a tier II offender under Chapter 2950.
Standard of Review
{¶9} We review the determination of a statute’s constitutionality de novo.
State v. Hudson, 3d Dist. Marion, 2013-Ohio-647, ¶ 27, citing Akron v. Callaway,
9th Dist. Summit, 2005-Ohio-4095, ¶ 23 and Andreyko v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist.
Hamilton, 2003-Ohio-2759, ¶ 11. “De novo review is independent, without
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deference to the lower court’s decision.” Id., citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util.
Comm. of Ohio, 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147 (1992).
Analysis
{¶10} The only issue before this court is whether the Hancock County
Juvenile Court’s tier III JOR classification of D.H. constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. However, the record reveals that D.H. never raised a cruel-and-
unusual-punishment argument in the trial court. Notably, when D.H. filed his
memorandum in the trial court, his focus was on the trial court’s tier classification
offering merely a passing reference that a juvenile classified at a higher tier than an
adult for a similar offense may constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
(See Case No. 20192196, Doc. No. 25); (Case No. 20192195, Doc. No. 32). Indeed,
D.H.’s prayer for relief in the trial court did not test the constitutionality of this
juvenile-sex-offender-registration statute (i.e., R.C. 2152.83), but rather, a tier I JOR
classification. (Id.); (Id.). Importantly, at the classification hearing, D.H.’s trial
counsel objected to D.H.’s tier III JOR classification based upon his memorandum,
not on Eighth Amendment Constitutional grounds. (July 27, 2021 Tr. at 173).
{¶11} “The question of constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised
at the first opportunity * * * in the trial court.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120,
122 (1986), limited by, In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149 (1988), syllabus. If a party
fails to object to a constitutional issue at trial, an appellate court need not consider
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the objection for the first time on appeal. Id., paragraph one of the syllabus. Here,
the record suggests that D.H. did not raise this constitutional argument in the trial
court and now raises this argument for the first time on appeal. Nevertheless, we
note that it is within our purview to exercise our discretion and review the trial
court’s JOR classification for plain error. See In re L.N., 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-
16-043, 2018-Ohio-3982, ¶ 10; In re N.Z., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-100, 2014-
Ohio-157, ¶ 10. See also In re C.P., 4th Dist. Athens No. 12CA18, 2013-Ohio-889,
¶ 10, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002); accord State v.
Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 16. Where error is not
preserved in juvenile-delinquency proceedings, we apply the same plain-error
standard that we apply to criminal proceedings. See State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio
St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, ¶ 48-49 (citations omitted).
{¶12} To establish plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), the party claiming error
must establish: (1) that an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule, occurred; (2) that
the error was an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings; and (3) that this obvious
error affected substantial rights, i.e., the error must have affected the outcome of the
trial. See id. at ¶ 36. See also In re C.N., 3d Dist. Hardin Nos. 6-17-16 and 6-17-
23, 2018-Ohio-2442, ¶ 9, citing Morgan at ¶ 55. “‘The standard for plain error is
whether, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding clearly would have been
otherwise.’” (Emphasis added.) State v. Taflinger, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-20,
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Case No. 5-21-27 and 5-21-28
2018-Ohio-456, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Hornbeck, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2003 CA
13, 2003-Ohio-6897, ¶ 16. Significantly, the defendant (here the delinquent child,
D.H.) bears the burden of establishing that his substantial rights were prejudiced.
State v. Davis, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-30, 2017-Ohio 2916, ¶ 23. “[S]peculation
cannot prove prejudice.” Morgan, supra, at ¶ 54. Notice of plain error is taken
“only to ‘prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Davis at ¶ 23, quoting State
v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. The burden to
demonstrate plain error falls upon the party seeking to assert it. Quarterman at ¶
16. Importantly, D.H. did not raise any plain-error argument on appeal. See State
v. Hahn, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-21-02, 2021-Ohio-3789, ¶ 10. Consequently, we
decline to fashion one for him. Id.{¶13} Accordingly, D.H.’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶14} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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