DocketNumber: No. 75300.
Judges: SPELLACY, J.:
Filed Date: 12/9/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Appellant assigns the following errors for review:
I. IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ADMIT STEPHANIE WHITMORE'S TESTIMONY REGARDING APPELLANT'S PRIOR ACTS WHICH DENIED APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE
I , §10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THEFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.II. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF IRRELEVANT AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT' S PRIOR ACTS AS 404 (A) CHARACTER EVIDENCE THEREBY DENYING APPELLANT EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.III. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF IRRELEVANT AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY CONCERNING APPELLANT'S POSSESSION OF GUNS AND RIFLES CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S RULE 29 MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL.
V. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST A LIMITING JURY INSTRUCTION CONCERNING THE PROPER USE OF 404 (A) CHARACTER EVIDENCE CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.VI. DEFENDANT, WHO WAS CHARGED WITH MURDER, WAS PREJUDICED BY HIS COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION ON VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AS SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT.VII. APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS OF MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
VIII. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO VARIOUS INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WAS UNREASONABLE, IMPROPER AND CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Finding the appeal to lack merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The night of April 14, 1998, began pleasantly for both appellant and the victims. Cleveland Police Officer David Smith and Edward Wright went to the Black Shield Club, arriving before 10:00 p.m. The club is a place frequented by police officers. The two men stayed there approximately an hour and a half before driving to the Theatrical Bar in downtown Cleveland. After forty-five minutes, Smith and Wright decided to go to the Office Lounge, arriving after midnight. Smith dated Bridget Jackson, one of the dancers at the Office Lounge. Jackson joined Smith and Wright at their table and the three began to converse.
Appellant and his girlfriend, Stephanie Whitmore, also were out for the evening. They attended a basketball game at Gund Arena with another couple. Afterwards, the four people went to the Flats in Cleveland for a late dinner. After eating, the two couples also went to the Office Lounge. The fatal altercation between appellant and Smith began when Whitmore approached the table at which Smith, Wright, and Jackson sat. Whitmore asked Jackson to perform a "table dance" for appellant. Jackson agreed but stated she never meant to perform for appellant. Apparently, Smith made some remark about Whitmore's request. Whitmore did not hear what Smith said but thought the statement was unkind based upon the response of Smith and Wright.
Whitmore returned to the bar where she had been seated. Appellant asked what had happened. Whitmore told appellant she did not know what had been said. Appellant continued to press the issue. Whitmore left to get some air. Appellant and Smith began exchanging hostile stares. Wright walked by appellant on his way to the back of the bar. Nothing was said between the men at any point inside the Office Lounge.
Upon Whitmore's return, appellant told her he felt they should leave to avoid any problem with Smith and Wright. They only had been at the Office Lounge fifteen to thirty minutes. Practically at the same time, Smith and Wright also decided to leave to prevent a confrontation. Although Wright noticed appellant and Whitmore leaving, Smith and Wright continued with their plan to depart from the Office Lounge.
Appellant and Whitmore were on the sidewalk when they heard the music from the Office Lounge grow louder as the door opened. They turned to face the bar as Smith and Wright walked out. Wright reported that appellant asked if they had a problem with him. Appellant averred that Smith asked if he had something to say to him. Appellant further stated that he saw Smith reach for a weapon. Appellant testified he drew his weapon as Smith's gun began to clear its holster. Appellant fired at Smith, striking Smith in the heart. After a pause, appellant fired his weapon again, shooting a running Wright in the side as he frantically tried to reenter the club. Wright had run toward the Office Lounge to escape. He first pounded on the door, which was kept locked. When no one answered, Wright knocked out the plexiglass window and jumped inside where he fell to the floor, wounded. Smith died almost immediately from the gunshot which pierced his heart, diaphragm, liver, and kidney. Smith's weapon still was in his hand with a bullet in the chamber.
Appellant and Whitmore ran to their automobile and drove to their Solon home. From there, Whitmore paged Shawin Mitchell, one of the dancers at the Office Lounge. Mitchell telephoned Whitmore in response to the page. Mitchell told Whitmore that the police were at the Office Lounge and that one of the victims was not expected to live. Whitmore asked Mitchell not to tell anyone about their conversation. Instead, Mitchell gave the information to the police who traced the telephone number to appellant's home.
The police arrived at the house between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. The only light on in the residence was upstairs. The police received no response to their knocks. Finally, appellant's attorney arrived and arranged for appellant and Whitmore to surrender. Appellant and Whitmore walked outside around 10:30 a.m. and were placed under arrest.
Inside the residence, police confiscated five weapons, two handguns and three rifles. The rifles were found in a locked gun cabinet. One of the weapons seized, a Para-Ordinance .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol was determined to be the murder weapon.
At trial, appellant testified that he acted in self-defense in shooting Smith and Wright. The jury rejected this affirmative defense and convicted appellant of murder and attempted murder.
A trial court has broad discretion in imposing limits on the scope of cross-examination. State v. Cobb (1991),
Evid.R. 608 (B) states in pertinent part:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Evid.R. 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
Effective cross-examination demands that some allowance be made to inquire about prior instances of misconduct if the behavior directly relates to the truthfulness of the witness. State v.Williams (1981),
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Whitmore a series of questions regarding a dispute appellant had with another man in which the police were contacted. When questioned by the police at her place of employment, Whitmore falsely denied knowing appellant or where he lived. Whitmore testified she did not want to discuss the matter in front of her customers. Another altercation between Whitmore and appellant again led to the police being contacted. On the stand, Whitmore denied that appellant assaulted her although Whitmore had told the police that he had.
These instances of Whitmore's deception to the police clearly were probative of her truthfulness. In the one incident, Whitmore, whatever her motivation, sought to deceive and thwart the police investigation of the altercation between appellant and another man. In the second instance, Whitmore testified that she lied to the police about appellant allegedly assaulting her. The prosecutor could inquire about these instances of misconduct under Evid.R. 608 (B).
Appellant argues that, even if the evidence was admissible under Evid.R. 608, it should have been excluded under Evid.R. 403 (A) which provides that relevant evidence must be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Appellant submits that the jury could have been made aware of Whitmore's less than forthcoming behavior without reference to specific acts.
"Relevant evidence" is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Evid.R. 401. The evidence in question related directly to Whitmore's deception to the police and her own admission that she falsely accused appellant of a crime. Appellant's entire defense consisted of the testimony of Whitmore and appellant. Whitmore's veracity was directly in issue in the instant case. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the state to cross-examine Whitmore concerning the past incidents.
Lastly, appellant argues that the evidence of his prior acts should have been excluded under Evid.R. 404 (A) (1). That rule states:
(A) Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, subject to the following exceptions:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same is admissible; however, in prosecutions for rape, gross sexual imposition, and prostitution, the exceptions provided by statute enacted by the General Assembly are applicable.
Appellant argues that the state could not have offered any evidence regarding a particular character trait of his until appellant put his character in issue.
Evid.R. 404 (B) provides that evidence of other acts is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident. The evidence is relevant if it tends to show any of these purposes.State v. Lowe (1994),
Evidence adduced at trial showed that appellant and Whitmore engaged in an argument while at the Office Lounge. The bartender, a waitress, and one of the dancers all testified that Whitmore and appellant were arguing. Appellant's response in situations where he and Whitmore previously had argued or engaged in disputes was relevant to prove that he may have acted out of anger or jealousy when he shot Smith and Wright. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence under Evid.R. 404 (B).
Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington (1984),
In appellant's first assignment of error, it was determined that the trial court properly admitted the evidence at issue. Further, defense counsel did object to the admission of the evidence and an extensive sidebar conference was held on the issue.
Appellant's second assignment of error is meritless.
Appellant relies on State v. Smith (1985),
Appellant was charged with a crime which involved the use of a weapon. The police officer testified about the weapons seized from appellant's home. The officer stated that, at the time the search was conducted, the police were not aware of what type of weapon had been used in the shooting. The police seized two handguns, a shotgun, an assault-type weapon, and a .458 magnum caliber rifle with a scope. Defense counsel elicited the testimony from the officer that appellant's father was the title owner of the home and that the shotgun, assault weapon, and rifle were found unloaded and secured in a locked gun cabinet.
Some limited testimony regarding the weapons seized was admissible because the police initially were not aware of which weapon was used to kill David Smith. However, the police may have been aware, even at the time the search was conducted, that it was unlikely Smith was shot by either an assault weapon or a rifle described as capable of bringing down large animals. The prosecutor should not have dwelt upon the capabilities of these weapons.
To demonstrate prejudice, appellant must show that the outcome of the trial would have been otherwise had his attorney either objected or filed a motion to suppress. Here, the jury was aware that appellant carried a loaded weapon concealed upon his person when he entered the Office Lounge that night. Appellant admitted to carrying the weapon in his automobile that night. Whitmore testified that appellant often secreted a loaded weapon upon his person. She also contradicted appellant's testimony that he only carried the handgun into the Office Lounge that night. Whitmore stated that she felt the weapon upon appellant's person throughout the evening. The testimony about the additional firearms was not so inflammatory that its exclusion would have likely led to appellant's acquittal on the offenses charged.
Appellant's third assignment of error is overruled.
A trial court is required to grant a motion for acquittal made pursuant to Crim.R. 29 if the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for the offense. State v. Pickett (1996),
Sufficiency is a legal standard which is applied to determine whether the evidence admitted at trial is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law. State v. Thompkins
(1997),
An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Jenks (1991),
R.C.
Appellant's position is that the evidence adduced at trial showed he acted in self-defense after Smith followed appellant out of the Office Lounge and pulled out a weapon. Appellant states that he acted to defend his own life and that of Whitmore but had no other reason to harm Wright or Smith.
The state produced evidence at trial proving that a hostile exchange of looks took place between appellant and the two victims. Wright, Whitmore, and appellant all averred that they left the Office Lounge to avoid a confrontation. The parties met outside and exchanged some sort of statement. Smith and appellant both drew weapons although the evidence was not clear as to who did so first. Appellant testified that Smith's weapon had cleared its holster before appellant reached for his own gun. Appellant still managed to draw his own weapon, aim at Smith, and fire the gun, striking Smith in the heart. Although appellant testified he fired both shots at Smith, the second gunshot struck a running Wright in the side. Appellant's ability to strike two different victims in their torsos shows that appellant did not wildly fire but purposely aimed at two men with a weapon which is manufactured to inflict just the sort of harm suffered by the two victims.
Appellant raised self-defense at trial.
To establish self-defense, the following elements must be shown: (1) the slayer was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) the slayer has a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force; and (3) the slayer must not have violated any duty to retreat or avoid the danger.
State v. Robbins (1979),
Appellant's fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Appellant's fifth assignment of error is not well-taken.
A criminal defendant has the right to expect that the trial court will give complete jury instructions on all issues raised by the evidence. State v. Willifford (1990),
R.C.
The trial court must determine, as a matter of law, whether evidence of reasonably sufficient provocation caused by the victim is present in the case to warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Shane, supra. First, the trial court must apply an objective standard to determine if the provocation was reasonably sufficient to have brought on a sudden passion or sudden fit of rage. If the answer is in the affirmative, then a subjective standard is used to determine if that defendant was actually under the influence of the sudden passion or fit of rage. Id. at 634.
Appellant argued he acted in self-defense when he shot Smith and Wright. Appellant testified he was frightened but never mentioned any feelings of sudden rage or passion. "Fear alone is insufficient to demonstrate the kind of emotional state necessary to constitute sudden passion or fit of rage." State v. Mack
(1998),
Generally, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel's failure to request an instruction on lesser offenses is a matter of trial strategy. See State v. Griffie (1996),
Appellant's sixth assignment of error lacks merit.
To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence:
The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.
Thompkins, supra, at 387, citing State v. Martin (1983),
As stated above, evidence admitted at trial negated appellant's stance that he acted in self-defense. The jury was free to believe the prosecution's witnesses and discount the testimony of appellant and Whitmore. This is hardly the exceptional case where the evidence weighs heavily against appellant's conviction. The jury did not lose its way and convict appellant against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Appellant's seventh assignment of error lacks merit.
A prosecuting attorney's conduct during trial does not constitute a ground for error unless the conduct deprives the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Apanovitch (1987),
The remarks to which appellant objects occurred during closing argument. The test regarding prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is whether the remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the defendant.State v. Smith (1984),
Prosecutors should not express their personal beliefs or opinions regarding a defendant's guilt or allude to matters not supported by admissible evidence. State v. Lott (1990),
Toward the beginning of his closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
Because if you believe — for argument's sake, let's assume that once outside of the Office Lounge, that the victim, David Smith, did in fact go for a gun first — certainly I don't believe that happened — but if he did go for a gun first, and if this man was not illegally armed with a weapon that he had in his pants, would we be here today?
(Tr. 1500). Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor also stated:
So, let's assume that he even went for his gun, which didn't happen as far as I am concerned.
(Tr. 1501). Later, the prosecutor commented on Whitmore having cried during her entire direct examination. The prosecutor stated that he thought it was an act.
These comments reflected the prosecutor's personal beliefs regarding the credibility of the witnesses and were improper. After reviewing the entire closing argument of the prosecutor, the isolated comments were not prejudicial. As noted in Dunlop v.United States (1897),
The reference to evidence not supported by the evidence came when the prosecutor stated that Smith was permitted to carry his service weapon concealed upon his person. Appellant's counsel pointed out during his argument that this statement was not supported by any evidence admitted at trial.
Appellant's attorney did not object to any of the above statements. The failure to object alone is not enough to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Objections tend to disrupt the flow of the trial and can be considered technical and bothersome to a jury. State v. Davie (1997),
Appellant's eighth assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue "out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
The Defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
TERRENCE O'DONNELL, P.J. and ANNE DYKE, J., CONCUR.
_______________________________ LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE