In re B.C.

[Cite as In re B.C., 2022-Ohio-1298.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: :
:
B.C., : Case No. 21CA18
:
Adjudicated Delinquent Child. :
:
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Lauren Hammersmith, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for
Appellant.
Kelsey R. Riffle, Washington County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Marietta, Ohio, for Appellee.
Smith, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, B.C., appeals the trial court’s decision that (1)
committed him to the legal custody of the Department of Youth Services
(DYS) for a minimum period of 12 months and a maximum period not to
exceed his attainment of the age of 21, and (2) placed him on probation as a
community control condition. Appellant raises three assignments of error.
First, Appellant argues that the juvenile court imposed a void dispositional
order. Appellant alleges that the juvenile statutes do not allow juvenile
courts to enter a dispositional order that both commits a child to DYS and
Washington App. No. 21CA18 2
that places the child on court supervised probation as a community control
condition. Alternatively, Appellant contends that the trial court plainly erred
by committing him to DYS and by placing him on probation as a community
control condition. Appellant asserts that the trial court plainly erred by
determining that the juvenile dispositional statutes permitted it to impose
both a DYS commitment and a term of court supervised probation as a
community control condition. Last, Appellant argues that he did not receive
the effective assistance of counsel. Appellant claims that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the court’s dispositional order that
imposed both a DYS commitment and a term of court supervised probation
as a community control condition. After our review of the record, we do not
agree with any of Appellant’s arguments. Accordingly, we overrule
Appellant’s three assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTS
{¶2} On June 24, 2021, a complaint was filed that alleged Appellant
to be a delinquent child for engaging in conduct that would constitute the
following criminal offenses, if committed by an adult: (1) rape, in violation
of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), a first-degree felony; (2) rape, in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b), a first-degree felony; and (3) gross sexual imposition, in
violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 3
{¶3} Appellant later admitted the allegations of the second count of
the complaint, rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), and the trial court
dismissed the two remaining counts.
{¶4} On September 23, 2021, the court held a dispositional hearing.
At the start, the probation officer stated that he believes that committing
Appellant to DYS for one year with a recommendation that he receive
treatment at Paint Creek “is probably the best disposition” to rehabilitate
Appellant. The state likewise asked the court to commit Appellant to DYS
and stated that it “would support the recommendation that [Appellant] go to
Paint Creek as well.” Appellant’s counsel indicated that he did not “have
anything to add.” Additionally, neither Appellant’s father nor Appellant
stated that they had anything to say.
{¶5} The court then stated: “Well, the Court in this matter, having
discussed it along the way at the various hearings with counsel for the state
and defense, is going to honor the agreement that was reached prior to
[Appellant] entering an admission to count two.” The court announced that
it would commit Appellant to DYS for a minimum period of one year and a
maximum period not to exceed the age of 21. The court additionally
recommended that Appellant be placed in a sex offender rehabilitation
program at Paint Creek. The court informed Appellant that the treatment
Washington App. No. 21CA18 4
program ranges from 12 to 18 months and that Appellant’s release date
would depend upon his treatment progress. The court further stated that it
will place Appellant “on community control including probation” upon his
release. The court explained that it will “place him on it now, but it won’t
be in effect really until you’re released.” The court advised Appellant that
when he is released, Appellant will “have a parole officer and a probation
officer assigned to you, to monitor you, make sure you’re following the
rules, and staying out of trouble.”
{¶6} The court asked the parties whether they had anything further to
add, and Appellant’s counsel, Appellant, and Appellant’s father stated that
they did not have anything to add or any questions to ask.
{¶7} The court subsequently journalized its dispositional order that
committed Appellant to DYS’s legal custody for an indefinite term
consisting of a minimum period of 12 months and a maximum period not to
exceed the age of 21. The court also placed Appellant on community
control by placing him “on probation until further order of the Court subject
to the general supervision and control of the Washington County Juvenile
Probation Department.” The court further recommended and “approve[d]”
Appellant for the “sex offender program at Paint Creek.” This appeal
followed.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 5
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE JUVENILE COURT EXCEEDED ITS
STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND UNDERMINED
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHEN IT COMMITTED
B.C. TO DYS AND PLACED HIM ON A TERM OF
COURT PROBATION FOR THE SAME CHARGE.
II. A CONFLICT EXISTS BETWEEN THE
DISPOSITIONAL OPTIONS IN R.C. 2152.19(A) AND
2152.22(A), BUT THE SPECIFIC PROVISION IN R.C.
2152.22(A) PREVAILS, AND THE JUVENILE COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY COMMITTING B.C.
TO DYS AND PLACING HIM ON PROBATION FOR
THE SAME OFFENSE.
III. B.C. WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
ANALYSIS
FIRST AND SECOND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶8} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error involve related
issues. For ease of discussion, we consider them together.
{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial
court erred as a matter of law by committing him to the legal custody of
DYS and by placing him on court-supervised probation. Appellant contends
that after a juvenile court commits a delinquent child to the legal custody of
DYS, the juvenile court “relinquishes control with respect to the child except
for granting judicial release or juvenile sex offender classification.”
Appellant asserts that after a child completes the prescribed minimum
Washington App. No. 21CA18 6
commitment, a juvenile court can only “grant the child judicial release to
DYS supervision, not court supervision.” Appellant thus claims that a
juvenile court cannot commit a child to the legal custody of DYS and order
the child to serve a term of court-supervised probation. Appellant therefore
alleges that the trial court’s dispositional order is void.
{¶10} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that the
trial court abused its discretion by committing him to DYS and by placing
him on probation. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to “abide by the rules of statutory interpretation when
imposing [its] disposition.” Appellant asserts that committing the child to
DYS, as R.C. 2152.16 permits, and placing the child on probation, as R.C.
2152.19(A)(4)(a) permits, create a conflict.
{¶11} Appellant claims that a conflict exists because when a juvenile
court commits a child to DYS under R.C. 2152.16, R.C. 2152.22 limits the
court’s authority to impose additional orders. Appellant argues that R.C.
2152.22 does not allow a trial court to impose a term of probation upon a
child who is committed to the legal custody of DYS. Appellant therefore
contends that R.C. 2152.22 conflicts with R.C. 2152.19(A)(4). Appellant
asserts that when two statutes conflict, courts must apply the specific
provision over the general provision. Appellant contends that R.C. 2152.22
Washington App. No. 21CA18 7
is the specific provision that prevails over the general provision, R.C.
2152.19(A)(4).
{¶12} Appellant claims that once the trial court committed him to the
legal custody of DYS, the court relinquished “authority and jurisdiction to
DYS to care and provide for the child’s rehabilitation.” Appellant thus
argues that the trial court had no authority to impose a term of probation as a
community control condition under R.C. 2152.19(A)(4).
{¶13} The state asserts that Appellant failed to raise any of these
issues during the trial court proceedings and that he, therefore, forfeited the
right to raise them on appeal. The state additionally contends that Appellant
agreed to the disposition that the trial court imposed as part of a negotiated
plea deal. The state thus claims that Appellant invited any error that may
have occurred.
{¶14} The state further argues that even if Appellant had preserved
the issues for appeal, his arguments lack merit. The state notes that juvenile
courts have broad discretion when choosing among the dispositional options
and that R.C. 2152.19(A) gives juvenile courts authority to impose probation
as a term of community control, “in addition to any other disposition
authorized or required by” R.C. Chapter 2152. R.C. 2152.19(A)(4)(a). The
state therefore claims that the juvenile statutes do not prevent trial courts
Washington App. No. 21CA18 8
from ordering a delinquent child to serve both a commitment to DYS and a
term of probation for a delinquency adjudication.
VOID VS. VOIDABLE
{¶15} We initially observe that Appellant asserts that the trial court’s
dispositional order is void under void sentence doctrine. However, in 2020,
the Ohio Supreme Court overruled its sentencing cases that had held that a
sentence is void when a trial court lacks statutory authority to impose it.
State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776;
State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248,
¶ 42. Therefore, reviewing courts no longer recognize sentences as void
when imposed without statutory authority. Rather, “[a] sentence is void only
if the sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
or personal jurisdiction over the accused.” Henderson at ¶ 27. Any other
error in sentencing, including an error in applying the sentencing statutes,
renders the sentence voidable, not void. Id.{¶16} Consequently, we summarily reject Appellant’s assertion that
the trial court’s dispositional order is void for allegedly failing to comply
with the juvenile dispositional statutes. We may, however, review whether
the court’s dispositional order is voidable.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 9
PLAIN ERROR
{¶17} We note, as does Appellee, that Appellant did not raise any
objection to the court’s decision to commit Appellant to DYS and to impose
probation as a community control condition.1 Thus, during the trial court
proceedings, Appellant did not argue that the juvenile statutes prohibited the
trial court from imposing this disposition.
{¶18} It is well-settled that a party may not raise any new issues or
legal theories for the first time on appeal. Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland, 41
Ohio St.2d 41, 43, 322 N.E.2d 629 (1975). Thus, a litigant who fails to raise
an argument before the trial court forfeits the right to raise that issue on
appeal. Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Executive, 142 Ohio
St.3d 125, 2014-Ohio-4650, 28 N.E.3d 1182, ¶ 30 (stating that “an appellant
generally may not raise an argument on appeal that the appellant has not
raised in the lower courts”); State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-
Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 21 (explaining that defendant forfeited his
constitutional challenge by failing to raise it during trial court proceedings);
Gibson v. Meadow Gold Dairy, 88 Ohio St.3d 201, 204, 724, N.E.2d 787
1
We note that the state also argues that Appellant invited any error associated with the dual disposition by negotiating an agreement
with the state and by agreeing to the disposition. The dispositional hearing transcript suggests that the parties and the court engaged in
some off-the-record discussions regarding the disposition of the case. The record does not clearly indicate, however, whether
Appellant agreed to the DYS commitment with the sex-offender treatment recommendation plus the probation term, or whether
Appellant only agreed to the DYS commitment with the sex-offender treatment recommendation. For this reason, we do not consider
whether the invited error doctrine prevents Appellant from challenging the trial court’s dispositional order.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 10
(2000) (concluding that party waived arguments for purposes of appeal
when party failed to raise those arguments during trial court proceedings);
State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 175,
177, 602 N.E.2d 622 (1992) (explaining that an appellant cannot “present *
* * new arguments for the first time on appeal”). Accord State ex rel. Jeffers
v. Athens Cty. Commrs., 4th Dist. Athens No. 15CA27, 2016-Ohio-8119,
fn.3 (stating that “[i]t is well-settled that failure to raise an argument in the
trial court results in waiver of the argument for purposes of appeal”); State v.
Anderson, 4th Dist. Washington No. 15CA28, 2016-Ohio-2704, ¶ 24
(explaining that “arguments not presented in the trial court are deemed to be
waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal”).
{¶19} When an adjudicated delinquent child “forfeits the right to
assert an error on appeal by failing to bring it to the trial court’s attention in
the first instance, an appellate court applies plain error review.” State v.
Jones, 160 Ohio St.3d 314, 2020-Ohio-3051, 156 N.E.3d 872, ¶ 17,
citing State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860,
¶ 21-22; State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d
784, ¶ 49 (determining that criminal plain error standard also applies to
juvenile delinquency appeals); State v. Perry, 4th Dist. Pike No. 16CA863,
2017-Ohio-69, ¶ 14 (failure to object to during trial court proceedings
Washington App. No. 21CA18 11
forfeits sentencing issues absent plain error). Under the plain error standard
of review, an appellant must demonstrate each of the following: (1) an error
occurred; (2) the error was “ ‘an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings’ ”;
and (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, i.e., a reasonable
probability exists that the error affected the outcome of the trial court
proceedings. State v. LaRosa, 165 Ohio St.3d 346, 2021-Ohio-4060, 179
N.E.3d 89, ¶ 40 (noting that appellant bears burden to demonstrate plain
error); State v. Kirkland, 160 Ohio St.3d 389, 2020-Ohio-4079, 157 N.E.3d
716, ¶ 71 and ¶ 72, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759
N.E.2d 1240 (2002) (stating that a “plain” error is an “obvious” error); State
v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22
(concluding that error affects substantial rights when reasonable probability
exists that error affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings).
{¶20} Even when an appellant establishes all of the elements
necessary to demonstrate plain error, appellate courts are not required to
correct the error. Rogers at ¶ 23. Instead, appellate courts have discretion
when deciding whether to correct plain error. Jones at ¶ 17. The Ohio
Supreme Court has “admonished [appellate] courts to notice plain error
‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27,
Washington App. No. 21CA18 12
quoting State v. Long 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph
three of the syllabus.
{¶21} In the case at bar, we do not believe that Appellant has
established that the circumstances require us to correct a plain error. First,
Appellant has not shown that an obvious error occurred. Appellant has not
cited any previous cases that have held that a juvenile court cannot impose
both a DYS commitment and a term of community control consisting of
court supervised probation that takes effect upon the child’s release from
DYS. In fact, the Third District Court of Appeals has rejected the same
arguments that Appellant raises in this appeal. In re A.F., 3rd Dist. Defiance
No. 4-20-06, 2020-Ohio-4622, ¶ 39, appeal not allowed, 161 Ohio St.3d
1410, 2021-Ohio-106, 161 N.E.3d 694; In re L.R. 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-
19-19, 2020-Ohio-2990, ¶ 10 (rejecting argument that trial court’s
dispositional order that imposed a five-year term of court probation and
committing him to DYS was “contradictory” and created “a conflict within
the juvenile code”).
{¶22} Moreover, we do not believe that the juvenile statutes
obviously prohibit juvenile courts from committing a child to DYS’s legal
custody and imposing community control in the form of court supervised
probation. Juvenile courts have broad discretion to craft dispositions in
Washington App. No. 21CA18 13
order to ensure that the child is rehabilitated. In re D.S., 148 Ohio St.3d 390,
2016-Ohio-7369, 71 N.E.3d 223, ¶ 20 (“A judge enjoys a great deal
of discretion in sentencing, particularly a juvenile court judge in fashioning a
rehabilitative disposition.”); In re Caldwell, 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 159, 666
N.E.2d 1367 (1996) (noting that predecessor statute to R.C. 2152.19(A)(8)
gave juvenile court “discretion to take ‘any’ steps * * * necessary to fully
and completely implement the rehabilitative disposition of a juvenile”).
Indeed, “[t]he principle underlying the juvenile justice system is to ‘combine
flexible decision-making with individualized intervention to treat and
rehabilitate offenders rather than to punish offenses.’ ” In re Anderson, 92
Ohio St.3d 63, 65, 748 N.E.2d 67 (2001), quoting Rossum, Holding
Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America’s ‘Juvenile Injustice System’, 22
Pepperdine L.Rev. 907, 912 (1995).”
{¶23} To that end, R.C. 2152.19(A) gives juvenile courts broad
authority to impose “any” of the dispositional orders listed in the statute, “in
addition to any other disposition authorized or required.” R.C.
2152.19(A)(4)(a) and (b) allow a court to impose basic or intensive
probation, respectively, as a community control condition. In addition, R.C.
2152.16 grants juvenile courts the authority to commit a child to DYS.
Nothing in R.C. 2152.19(A) nor R.C. 2152.16 prohibits a juvenile court
Washington App. No. 21CA18 14
from imposing both a DYS commitment and one of the dispositional
alternatives listed in R.C. 2152.19(A), such as probation as a community
control condition.
{¶24} We recognize Appellant’s argument that R.C. 2152.22 limits a
juvenile court’s authority over a child when the court commits the child to
DYS’s legal custody. Appellant asserts that after a court commits a child to
DYS’s legal custody, any release made after the prescribed minimum
commitment is to be subject to DYS, not court, supervision. However, we
do not agree with Appellant that R.C. 2152.22 obviously prevented the trial
court from committing Appellant to DYS and also subjecting him to court
supervised probation upon his release.
{¶25} R.C. 2152.22(A) begins by stating that “[w]hen a child is
committed to the legal custody of the department of youth services under
this chapter, the juvenile court relinquishes control with respect to the child
so committed, except as provided in divisions (B), (C), (D), and (H) of this
section or in sections 2152.82 to 2152.86 of the Revised Code.” Divisions
(B), (C), (D), and (H) specify the conditions under which the court may
release a child from DYS. R.C. 2152.82 to 2152.86 contain the statutes
regulating juvenile sex offender classifications.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 15
{¶26} The next paragraph of R.C. 2152.22(A) prevents DYS from
releasing or discharging a child before the prescribed minimum term of
commitment expires or before “the child’s attainment of 21 years of age,
except upon the order of a court pursuant to division (B), (C), or (D) of this
section or in accordance with section 5139.54 of the Revised Code.” R.C.
5139.54 contains provisions that authorize a medical release from DYS.
{¶27} R.C. 2152.22(B)(1) governs judicial release during the first half
of a child’s prescribed minimum term or, if the court committed the child to
DYS until the child reaches the age of 21, during the first half of the
commitment beginning on the child’s first day of commitment and ending on
the child’s 21st birthday. The statute provides:
Unless the court grants judicial release under division
(D)(1)(b) of this section, the court that commits a
delinquent child to the department of youth services may
grant judicial release of the child to court supervision
under this division during the first half of the prescribed
minimum term for which the child was committed to the
department or, if the child was committed to the
department until the child attains twenty-one years of age,
during the first half of the prescribed period of
commitment that begins on the first day of commitment
and ends on the child's twenty-first birthday, provided any
commitment imposed under division (A), (B), (C), or (D)
of section 2152.17 of the Revised Code has ended.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 16
{¶28} R.C. 2152.22(C)(1) applies when a court grants judicial release
during the second half of a child’s DYS commitment. The statute reads as
follows:
Unless the court grants judicial release under division
(D)(1)(b) of this section, the court that commits a
delinquent child to the department of youth services may
grant judicial release of the child to department of youth
services supervision under this division during the second
half of the prescribed minimum term for which the child
was committed to the department or, if the child was
committed to the department until the child attains twenty-
one years of age, during the second half of the prescribed
period of commitment that begins on the first day of
commitment and ends on the child’s twenty-first birthday,
provided any commitment imposed under division (A),
(B), (C), or (D) of section 2152.17 of the Revised Code
has ended.
{¶29} R.C. 2152.22(D)(1) contains additional provisions that allow a
court to grant a child judicial release from DYS. The statute provides that
the court:
may grant judicial release of the child under this division
at any time after the expiration of one of the following
periods of time:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (D)(1)(b) of
this section, if the child was committed to the department
for a prescribed minimum period and a maximum period
not to exceed the child’s attainment of twenty-one years,
the court may grant judicial release of the child at any time
after the expiration of the prescribed minimum term for
which the child was committed to the department.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 17
(b) If the child was committed to the department for both
one or more definite periods under division (A), (B), (C),
or (D) of section 2152.17 of the Revised Code and a period
of the type described in division (D)(1)(a) of this section,
all of the prescribed minimum periods of commitment
imposed under division (A), (B), (C), or (D) of section
2152.17 of the Revised Code and the prescribed period of
commitment of the type described in division (D)(1)(a) of
this section shall be aggregated for purposes of this
division, and the court may grant judicial release of the
child at any time after the expiration of one year after the
child begins serving the aggregate period of commitment.
(2) If a court grants a judicial release of a child under
division (D)(1) of this section, the release shall be a
judicial release to department of youth services
supervision, if the release is granted during a period
described in division (C)(1) of this section, and the second
and third paragraphs of division (C)(3) of this section
apply regarding the release. In all other cases, the release
shall be a judicial release to court supervision, and the
second paragraph of division (B)(3) of this section applies
regarding the release.
{¶30} While little case law exists explaining the precise contours of
R.C. 2152.22(D), the author of Ohio Juvenile Law states that judicial release
following the expiration of the prescribed minimum term ordinarily “is to
court supervision.” Salvador, Ohio Juvenile Law, Section 22:4 (2021). The
statutory language contained in R.C. 2152.22(D)(2) supports the author’s
assertion. As written, the statute states:
If a court grants a judicial release of a child under division
(D)(1) of this section, the release shall be a judicial
release to department of youth services supervision, if the
release is granted during a period described in division
Washington App. No. 21CA18 18
(C)(1) of this section, and the second and third paragraphs
of division (C)(3) of this section apply regarding the
release. In all other cases, the release shall be a judicial
release to court supervision, and the second paragraph of
division (B)(3) of this section applies regarding the
release.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶31} Reading the statute in proper context shows that the judicial
release is to DYS if the court grants the child release during the period
defined in R.C. 2152.22(C)(1). If the court does not grant judicial release
during the period defined in R.C. 2152.22(C)(1) ― i.e., “[i]n all other cases”
― then “the release shall be a judicial release to court supervision.” As
indicated above, R.C. 2152.22(C)(1) governs judicial release during the
second half of confinement.
{¶32} In the case at bar, the trial court did not grant Appellant judicial
release during the second half of his confinement. Instead, the court
committed Appellant to DYS for a minimum term of one year to a maximum
period not to exceed the age of 21. The court also indicated that upon
Appellant’s release from DYS, Appellant would be subject to court
supervision. R.C. 2152.22(D)(2) permits a court to order a child to be
subject to court supervision upon release from DYS when the child’s release
occurs after the period of minimum confinement has expired. Here, the
court ordered Appellant to be subject to court supervision at a yet-to-be-
Washington App. No. 21CA18 19
determined time after the period of his minimum commitment expires.
Thus, Appellant’s assertion that R.C. 2152.22(D) prohibited the juvenile
court from placing him on court supervised probation is without merit.
Instead, as outlined above, the statute authorizes a juvenile court to release a
child from DYS subject to court supervision if the release occurs after the
child’s minimum period of confinement expires. We therefore are unable to
find that the trial court plainly erred by imposing a DYS commitment
followed by a period of court supervised probation after his release from
DYS.
{¶33} Furthermore, even if we agreed with Appellant that the trial
court plainly erred by not ordering that he be released to DYS supervision
after his prescribed minimum commitment, we are unable to conclude that
the error results in a manifest injustice. Instead, the court’s disposition
appears designed to fulfill the overall goal of the juvenile code: “the goal of
the juvenile code is to rehabilitate, not to punish, while protecting society
from criminal and delinquent acts during rehabilitation.” Caldwell, 76 Ohio
St.3d at 158; accord R.C. 2152.01(A) (stating that the overriding purposes
for juvenile dispositions “are to provide for the care, protection, and mental
and physical development of children subject to this chapter, protect the
public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender’s
Washington App. No. 21CA18 20
actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender”). We do not
believe that the court’s decision to commit Appellant to DYS, followed by a
period of court supervised probation, is manifestly unjust. Rather, the
juvenile court reasonably could have determined that this type of disposition
would have the best chance of rehabilitating Appellant while protecting
society from additional delinquent acts during rehabilitation. Given the
rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile system, we are unable to conclude that
any error the trial court may have committed would result in a manifest
injustice.
{¶34} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule
Appellant’s first and second assignments of error.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶35} In his third assignment of error, Appellant contends that he did
not receive effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Appellant asserts
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s
dispositional order that committed him to DYS and that placed Appellant on
probation as a community control condition. Appellant contends that if trial
counsel had objected, then the trial court would have chosen to impose either
a DYS commitment or a community control sanction rather than imposing
both.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 21
{¶36} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
delinquent child must establish (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e.,
performance falling below an objective standard of reasonable
representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See
e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Allen, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 19CA31, 2021-
Ohio-648, ¶ 21. “In employing this standard we apply ‘a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.’ ” State v. Day, 149 N.E.3d 122, 2019-Ohio-4816, ¶ 27 (4th
Dist.), quoting Strickland at 689. “The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result.” Strickland at 689.
{¶37} Moreover, when addressing an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the reviewing court should not consider what, in hindsight, may have
been a more appropriate course of action. State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio
St.3d 467, 2014-Ohio-1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 153; State v. McKnight, 4th
Dist. Vinton No. 07CA665, 2008-Ohio-2435, ¶ 70. Rather, the reviewing
court “must be highly deferential.” Strickland at 689. As the Strickland
Washington App. No. 21CA18 22
court stated, the party challenging counsel’s effectiveness “must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might
be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. at 689.
{¶38} In the case at bar, we do not believe that Appellant has
demonstrated that trial counsel performed deficiently or that any deficient
performance affected the outcome of the proceedings. As we stated in our
discussion of Appellant’s first and second assignments of error, the juvenile
statutes gave the trial court broad discretion to craft an appropriate
disposition aimed at rehabilitation. We further determined that the trial
court’s disposition does not contravene the governing statutes. Therefore,
even if counsel had objected, the trial court still may have determined to
impose both a DYS commitment and a term of court supervision as a
community control condition. Consequently, even if counsel’s failure to
object constituted deficient performance, Appellant cannot establish that
counsel’s failure to object affected the outcome of the proceedings.
{¶39} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule
Appellant’s third assignment of error.
CONCLUSION
{¶40} Having overruled Appellant’s three assignments of error, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 23
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 24
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED. Appellee shall
recover any costs from Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Washington County Common Pleas Court – Juvenile Division, to carry
this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J. and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
_________________________
Jason P. Smith
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.