Mentor v. Jarvis

[Cite as Mentor v. Jarvis, 2023-Ohio-1538.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
CITY OF MENTOR, CASE NOS. 2022-L-111
2022-L-112
Plaintiff-Appellee, 2022-L-114
2022-L-115
- vs -
Criminal Appeals from the
MICHAEL J. JARVIS, Mentor Municipal Court
Defendant-Appellant.
Trial Court Nos. 2022 CRB 01094
2022 TRD 03299 A
2022 TRD 03299 B
2022 TRD 03299 C
OPINION
Decided: May 8, 2023
Judgment: Affirmed
Lisa Klammer, City of Mentor Prosecutor, 8500 Civic Center Boulevard, Mentor, OH
44060 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Michael J. Jarvis, pro se, 2274 13th Street, S.W., Akron, OH 44314 (Defendant-
Appellant)
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Michael J. Jarvis, appeals, pro se, the judgment of the Mentor
Municipal Court, finding him guilty on various traffic charges and one charge of
obstructing official business. Appellant challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction over the
underlying matter; the trial court’s judgment denying appellant’s motion to continue; and
appellant’s allegation that the trial judge erred in failing to answer his questions relating
to his alleged bias at trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} On September 26, 2002, a Mentor Police Department patrol officer stopped
a vehicle driven by appellant. The stop was premised upon the officer’s observation that
the vehicle, belonging to appellant, had a “license plate” that belonged to no specific state
or governmental agency. The plate had a peculiar rendering of a flag resembling that of
the United States as well as a sketch of an eagle. It also bore the following statements
or advisements: “Ohio [-] American State National” and “Notice [-] Private Automobile –
Not for hire.”
{¶3} The officer approached appellant, who refused to provide identification.
Appellant additionally covered the windshield so the officer could not read the vehicle
registration number (“VIN”). After a second officer arrived on the scene, appellant exited
the vehicle and ran to the back door, opened it, and proceeded to flip various pieces of
mail over, apparently so the officers could not read the address. Appellant advised the
first officer to “mind his own business.” After appellant exited the vehicle, the second
officer on the scene was able to obtain the VIN. The VIN was run through LEADS, and
the officers determined the last registration date was December of 2021.
{¶4} On September 27, 2022, appellant was charged with Display of License
Plates, in violation of Mentor Ordinance 335.06, an unclassified misdemeanor; Expired or
Unlawful Plates, in violation of Mentor Ordinance 335.10(D), a minor misdemeanor; Use
of Illegal License Plates, in violation of Mentor Ordinance 335.11, a misdemeanor of the
fourth degree; and Obstructing Official Business, in violation of Mentor Ordinance 525.07,
a misdemeanor of the second degree. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and the
matter proceeded to a bench trial.
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Case Nos. 2022-L-111, 2022-L-112, 2022-L-114, 2022-L-115
{¶5} During trial, appellant generally objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction. The
prosecutor, however, represented it had not been served with any motion contesting
jurisdiction. The trial court proceeded to overrule the objection. Appellant then sought a
continuance, asserting he had been released from jail several days before trial and was
not prepared to proceed. The court again overruled the motion. Finally, after the state
presented its case, appellant inquired into whether the trial judge had any financial stake
in appellant’s prosecution. The trial judge stated that appellant’s question was ridiculous
and inquired into whether appellant wished to testify on his own behalf. Appellant
declined. He was found guilty on each charge, fined on each traffic violation and fined
and sentenced to a suspended jail sentence on the obstruction charge. This appeal
follows.
{¶6} Appellant does not formally assign errors for this court’s review. Instead,
he sets forth three general captions: (1) Lack of jurisdiction; (2) Denial of due process;
and (3) Bias with the judge. He also identifies the following “Issue presented for review”:
{¶7} “The trial court erred in granting judgment, where the appellees knew and
ignored the diversity jurisdictional challenges made by i the living man as well as the
blatant due process violations and the bias because there was no impartial judge
presiding over these proceedings.” (Sic.)
{¶8} Appellant’s “jurisdictional” challenge is not entirely clear. At trial, the trial
court acknowledged it received “a general motion form to determine proper jurisdiction.”
The record does not include an obvious motion that challenged the municipal court’s
jurisdiction. Moreover, the prosecutor stated she was not served with any filings made
on appellant’s behalf. The record does, however, include an assortment of unusual
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documents that are not formally notarized, but instead bear the stamp of “The Ohio
Assembly Land and Soil Jurisdiction.” One document vaguely indicates that appellant is
a “Foreign Sovereign” from the state of Ohio. Another suggests that although appellant
is a “citizen of the United States,” he never “desired nor intended nor willingly or voluntarily
entered into” such citizenship. In the same document, appellant purports to renounce
such citizenship. Given the lack of argumentation and the peculiar nature of appellant’s
posture during trial, we presume his jurisdictional argument is premised upon his
purported renunciation of citizenship as well as his apparent membership or tie to a group
which identifies as “The Ohio Assembly Land and Soil Jurisdiction.”
{¶9} Initially, appellant did not dispute the prosecutor’s representation that she
was not served with the motion. Crim.R. 49(B) provides:
{¶10} “Whenever under these rules or by court order service is required or
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made
upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service
upon the attorney or upon the party shall be made in the manner provided in Civil Rule
5(B).”
{¶11} Civ.R. 5(B)(4) provides:
“The served document shall be accompanied by a completed
proof of service which shall state the date and manner of
service, specifically identify the division of Civ.R. 5(B)(2) by
which the service was made, and be signed in accordance
with Civ.R. 11. Documents filed with the court shall not be
considered until proof of service is endorsed thereon or
separately filed.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶12} The document which we are treating as appellant’s jurisdictional challenge
did not include proof of service endorsed by appellant. And no such proof was separately
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filed. As a result, the trial court was not permitted to consider the filing. In this regard,
even though the trial court stated on the record the filing was unfounded and without
merit, appellant’s failure to follow the rules of service permit this court to disregard his
argument.
{¶13} Even had appellant followed proper procedure, his filing would still be
meritless. United States Federal courts and courts of Ohio have rejected jurisdictional
challenges of those claiming personal sovereignty. See Speed v. Mehan, E.D. Mo. No.
4:13CV1841, 2013 WL 5776301, *2 (Oct. 25, 2013) (Status as a Moorish-American
citizen does not enable a party to violate state and federal laws without consequence.);
United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 14-15 (2d Cir.1984) (defendant’s alleged status
as “Vice President and Minister of Justice of the Provisional Government of the Republic
of New Afrika” did not entitle him to immunity from contempt prosecution); State v. Wyley,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102889, 2016-Ohio-1118, ¶ 12 (not acknowledging the Moorish
nation as a sovereign state); State v. Tucker, 2016-Ohio-1354, 62 N.E.3d 893, ¶ 9 (9th
Dist.) (observing that Moorish-American sovereign-citizen arguments have been
characterized as “gibberish”). We recognize that appellant does not claim to be a
“Moorish-American” or an alleged member of the “Provisional Government of the
Republic of New Africka”; still, his claimed status as a “Foreign Sovereign” or a “sovereign,
non-resident alien” echoes the same arguments advanced by the parties in those cases.
Those cases stand for, among other things, the proposition a party cannot unilaterally
bestow sovereignty or sovereign immunity from prosecution upon him or herself to escape
the jurisdiction of criminal courts, whether in Ohio or elsewhere in the nation. In short, as
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long as the court asserting jurisdiction possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the person, it may lawfully proceed. The Mentor Municipal Court possessed both.
{¶14} “A municipal court in Ohio has jurisdiction over misdemeanors occurring
within its territorial jurisdiction. R.C.1901.20(A)(1).” State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325,
2011-Ohio-2880, 951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 11. There is no dispute the offenses at issue
occurred in Mentor, Lake County, Ohio. And each of the charges were misdemeanors.
Thus, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction.
{¶15} Further, the Mentor Municipal Court possessed jurisdiction over appellant’s
person. Article 18, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution affords municipalities the authority
to exercise all powers of local self-government, which includes police power to enforce
the various municipalities’ regulations. See State v. Galluzzo, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
25913, 2014-Ohio-4854, ¶ 8. Since municipal courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanors
committed within their territorial limits, there is no question that the Mentor Municipal
Court had jurisdiction over appellant for committing a traffic offense within the territorial
limits of the city of Mentor. Id. at ¶ 8-9.
{¶16} Appellant’s jurisdictional challenge lacks merit.
{¶17} Next, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying his oral motion to
continue on the day of trial. We do not agree.
{¶18} “The grant or denial of a continuance is a matter that is entrusted to the
broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.” State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, 423
N.E.2d 1078 (1981). “An appellate court must not reverse the denial of a continuance
unless there has been an abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 67. An abuse
of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-
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making.’” State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62,
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004).
{¶19} Appellant asserts he was denied due process by the trial court when it
denied his request for a continuance on the day of trial. The charges against appellant
were filed on September 27, 2022. Trial was held on October 31, 2022. Appellant
claimed he was released from jail two and one-half days before trial, but had only one-
half day to prepare. Appellant offered no explanation why he failed to prepare for trial in
late September or, assuming he could not prepare at all while confined in jail, even the
full two and one-half days after his release.
{¶20} Moreover, appellant’s apparent defense was the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over him due to his proclaimed sovereign status. He asserted this defense
and the trial court summarily and properly overruled the claim. The charges were
straightforward (three of which dealt with appellant’s improper license plate and one
obstructing official business in the course of the traffic stop which led to the charges).
And, as such, the evidence supporting the charges was neither intricate nor convoluted.
It is unclear how additional time would have helped appellant prepare to defend the
charges, and appellant has not established how he was clearly prejudiced (especially
because it appears, given the “motion” or documentation he filed, he wished to rest his
primary defense on his claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction). Under the
circumstances, a continuance would only serve to unnecessarily delay the proceedings.
We therefore hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s oral
motion for continuance.
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Case Nos. 2022-L-111, 2022-L-112, 2022-L-114, 2022-L-115
{¶21} Appellant’s final argument asserts the trial judge erred by refusing to answer
questions relating to any financial interest he might have in the proceedings. Appellant
contends this created a bias and the matter should be reversed on this basis. We do not
agree.
{¶22} Initially, the judge in this matter sat as the trier of fact and was not a party
subject to sworn examination. Moreover, appellant’s question regarding whether the
judge had a “financial interest” in the underlying case was completely unrelated to
appellant’s defense or the prosecutor’s evidence; as such, it was not relevant to the
proceedings. We therefore fail to see any reason that the judge was required to answer
the question or conduct a discussion with appellant on the issue.
{¶23} Further, appellant’s question had no obvious basis other than his arguable
frustration with the way in which the proceedings unfolded. The judge overruled
appellant’s jurisdictional challenge and also overruled his motion for a continuance.
These legal rulings, however, do not set a foundation for judicial bias. “[A] party’s
disagreement or dissatisfaction with a court’s rulings of law, without more, does not
demonstrate bias or prejudice.” In re Disqualification of Hurley, 113 Ohio St.3d 1228,
2006-Ohio-7229, 863 N.E.2d 630, ¶ 4. Appellant’s presumption that the court was
somehow biased against him not only has no foundation, but is completely unrelated to
the substance of the proceedings.
{¶24} With these problems in mind, it would appear the remedy appellant seeks
is recusal of the trial court judge. Even if appellant had a plausible foundation for his
claim, this court lacks authority to enter such an order.
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Case Nos. 2022-L-111, 2022-L-112, 2022-L-114, 2022-L-115
{¶25} If a municipal court judge is alleged to have a bias or prejudice for or against
any party to a proceeding pending before the judge, or be otherwise disqualified to preside
over the proceeding, any party to the proceeding may file an affidavit of disqualification
with the clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court. R.C. 2701.031. “R.C. 2701.031 provides the
exclusive means by which a litigant may claim that a municipal court judge is unduly
interested, biased, or prejudiced.” (Citation omitted.) Columbus Checkcashers, Inc. v.
Guttermaster, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-106, 2013-Ohio-5543, ¶ 33.
{¶26} In order to proceed with an allegation of bias, a party must comply with the
procedures set forth under R.C. 2701.03(B) (setting forth the necessary criteria for filing
the affidavit) and R.C. 2701.03(E) (explaining that if the clerk of the Supreme Court of
Ohio accepts the affidavit, how the Chief Justice or another Justice appointed by the same
shall address the affidavit). See R.C. 2701.031. No affidavit of disqualification was filed
with the clerk of the Supreme Court and thus the Chief Justice or designated Justice was
not presented with the opportunity to review appellant’s potential concerns. As appellant
failed to follow the proper procedural channels to have his concerns addressed, and R.C.
2701.031 and R.C. 2701.03(B) and (E) are the sole mechanisms to address a municipal
court judge’s alleged bias, we lack jurisdiction to address appellant’s argument. See
State v. Jones, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2008-P-0018, 2008-Ohio-6994, ¶ 16.
{¶27} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, each of the issues raised by
appellant lack merit. The judgments of the Mentor Municipal court are therefore affirmed.
JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
concur.
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Case Nos. 2022-L-111, 2022-L-112, 2022-L-114, 2022-L-115