State v. Rudy

[Cite as State v. Rudy, 2023-Ohio-2023.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-22-56
v.
RANDALL L. RUDY, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-22-57
v.
RANDALL L. RUDY, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-22-58
v.
RANDALL L. RUDY, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Case Nos. 1-22-56, 1-22, 57, 1-22-58
Appeals from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court Nos. CR2019 0300, CR2021 0009 and CR2019 0184
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 20, 2023
APPEARANCES:
Randall L. Rudy, Appellant
John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
MILLER, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Randall L. Rudy (“Rudy”), appeals the August
25, 2022 judgments of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas denying his
motion for a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On June 13, 2019, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Rudy on two
counts in case number CR2019 0184: Count One of aggravated trafficking in drugs
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(1)(d), a second-degree felony, and Count
Two of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(c),
a second-degree felony. Count Two included a specification for forfeiture of money
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in a drug case pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417(A). On June 20, 2019, Rudy appeared
for arraignment and entered not guilty pleas to the charges and specification.
{¶3} On July 11, 2019, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Rudy on two
counts in case number CR2019 0300: Count One of aggravated trafficking in drugs
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(1)(a), a fourth-degree felony, and Count
Two of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1),
(C)(1)(c), a third-degree felony. On July 18, 2019, Rudy appeared for arraignment
and entered not guilty pleas to the counts in the indictment.
{¶4} On January 14, 2021, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Rudy in a
third matter assigned case number CR2021 0009 charging a single count of
tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(2), (B), a third-degree
felony. He filed a written plea of not guilty on January 19, 2021.
{¶5} Rudy appeared for a change-of-plea hearing on the pending cases on
March 29, 2021. Under a negotiated-plea agreement, the State requested the trial
court dismiss Count One in case number CR2019 0184. In exchange, Rudy
withdrew his not guilty pleas and entered guilty pleas to the remaining four charges.
The parties also agreed to jointly recommend a prison sentence. The trial court
accepted Rudy’s guilty pleas, found him guilty of the offenses, and ordered a pre-
sentence investigation. The trial court filed its judgment entries of conviction on
March 30, 2021.
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{¶6} The trial court held a sentencing hearing on the pending cases on May
26, 2021 at which time it imposed the jointly-recommended sentence. With respect
to case number CR2019 0184, the trial court sentenced Rudy to an indefinite term
of five to seven and one-half years in prison on Count Two. With respect to case
number CR2019 0300, the trial court sentenced Rudy to 12 months in prison on
Count One and 24 months in prison on Count Two. With respect to case number
CR2021 0009, the trial court sentenced Rudy to 12 months in prison. The trial court
ordered all of the sentences to be served consecutively to each other for an aggregate
term of 9 to 11.5 years in prison. The following day, the trial court filed its judgment
entries of sentence.
{¶7} On July 21, 2022, Rudy filed a document styled “Motion for New
Trial[,] or in the Alternative[,] A Renewed Negotiated Plea.” In the motion, Rudy
argues his pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court
did not correctly apprise him of the timeframe for applying for judicial release. He
also alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for not realizing the trial court’s error.
After receiving a response from the State, the trial court proceeded to overrule
Rudy’s motion. From this decision Rudy filed his notices of appeal raising one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
Affirmative Misstatements of Trial Court Regarding Appellant’s
Sentence and Judicial Release Consideration Were Prejudicial to
Appellant and Contrary to Law.
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{¶8} In his assignment of error, Rudy argues the trial court misinformed him
regarding his eligibility to file for judicial release. At the change-of-plea hearing,
the trial court stated the following regarding judicial release:
[A]fter you’re done with your mandatory time, after you wait a certain
period of time, you can file for a judicial release to get out of prison
early. I would have that authority. * * * But, anyways, [the judge at
the time judicial release is filed] would have to decide whether they
let you out early or not. That’s a judicial release. You cannot file –
well, you can file all you want, but you’re not eligible for judicial
release while you’re serving mandatory time. Once you’re done with
mandatory time then the non-mandatory time would add up to one,
two, three, four years. So, you would have to wait six months into
that before you can file for judicial release. Assuming, again, that
you’re going to get out after you do your five year minimum – you do
the five year minimum on the mandatory and you do six more months
and then you can file for a judicial release. Now, it’s not a guarantee
that you get a judicial release. * * * But, you’re eligible.
(Mar. 29, 2021 Tr. at 13-14).1
{¶9} Rudy contends that, contrary to the trial court’s explanation, prison
officials interpret R.C. 2929.14(C)(10) and the Ohio Administrative Code to require
him to serve his non-mandatory determinate sentences prior to serving his
mandatory indeterminate sentence. Rudy complains this makes him ineligible to
file for judicial release until after he serves nine years of his sentence. Because of
this alleged error by the trial court, Rudy filed his motion titled “Motion for New
Trial[,] or in the Alternative[,] A Renewed Negotiated Plea.”
1
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court reiterated the same timing of Rudy’s eligibility to file for judicial
release. (May 26, 2021 Tr. at 16).
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{¶10} As an initial matter, we note that although Rudy styled the filing as a
motion for a new trial or motion for renewed plea negotiations, the crux of Rudy’s
argument is that his guilty pleas were not knowing because the trial court
misinformed him of the timeframe of his eligibility to file for judicial release.
Accordingly, the trial court recast his filing as a postsentence motion to withdraw
guilty pleas. See State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, ¶ 12 (“Courts
may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and
establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged.”). In his appellate brief,
Rudy again argues the trial court’s misrepresentations regarding the timeframe of
his eligibility for judicial release resulted in his pleas not being knowingly entered.
Accordingly, our analysis will likewise focus on whether the trial court’s Crim.R.
11 colloquy rendered his pleas knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Discussion
{¶11} Appellate review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
Cartlidge, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-21-06, 2021-Ohio-3787, ¶ 8. An abuse of
discretion suggests the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980).
{¶12} A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by Crim.R. 32.1,
which provides:
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A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only
before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit
the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.
A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty or no-contest plea after sentencing bears
the burden of demonstrating a “manifest injustice.” State v. James, 3d Dist.
Hancock No. 5-19-30, 2020-Ohio-720, ¶ 11, citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d
261 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[A] postsentence withdrawal motion is
allowable only in extraordinary cases.” Smith at 264. The Supreme Court of Ohio
has defined the manifest injustice standard as a “clear or openly unjust act.” State
ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208 (1998). “‘A defendant is not
entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has
been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the
likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action.’” State v. Kimpel, 3d Dist.
Shelby No. 17-17-12, 2018-Ohio-2246, ¶ 16, quoting Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1473 (1970).
{¶13} Crim.R. 11, which outlines the procedures the trial court must follow
when accepting pleas, “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial
court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his
plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” State v.
Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio
St.2d 163, 168 (1975). “If the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and
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voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional.” Id. at ¶ 10. Crim.R.
11(C)(2), which applies specifically to a trial court’s acceptance of pleas in felony
cases, provides as follows:
(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or
a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest
without first addressing the defendant personally * * * and doing all
of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily,
with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible
for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at
the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the
court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury
trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to
require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify
against himself or herself.
{¶14} “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on
appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trial-
court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13, citing
State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, ¶ 14-15; Crim.R. 52. Generally,
to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant would have to establish that “his plea would
not have otherwise been made.” Dangler at ¶ 24.
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{¶15} There are limited exceptions to the prejudice requirement in the
criminal-plea context. “When a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights
that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, we presume that the plea
was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is
required.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748,
¶ 31 and State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, syllabus. The
“constitutional” rights are set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) above. See Dangler at ¶
14. When a trial court fails to fully cover “nonconstitutional” rights in Crim.R. 11,
“a defendant must affirmatively show prejudice to invalidate a plea.” Dangler at ¶
14, citing Veney at ¶ 17.
{¶16} The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized one other exception to the
prejudice requirement: “a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of
Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.” (Emphasis
sic.) Dangler at ¶ 15, citing State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶
22. However, “[a]side from these two exceptions, the traditional rule continues to
apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he
was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of
Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).
{¶17} Rudy argues he suffered a manifest injustice because the trial court
failed to properly advise him of the correct maximum penalties at his change-of-
plea hearing. Specifically, Rudy argues the trial court misinformed him at both his
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plea and sentencing hearings of the maximum time he would have to serve before
becoming eligible to file for judicial release.
{¶18} The “trial court is generally not required to inform a defendant about
judicial release during the plea colloquy.” State v. Foster, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
C-170245, 2018-Ohio-4006, ¶ 24. However, “[i]t is well settled * * * that where a
trial court gives a defendant ‘misinformation regarding judicial release,’ it may
invalidate the plea.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.
106676 and 106980, 2018-Ohio-4863, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Williams, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga Nos. 104078 and 104849, 2017-Ohio-2650, ¶ 15. See also State v.
Ealom, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91455, 2009-Ohio-1365, ¶ 26-28; State v. Hendrix,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-12-265, 2013-Ohio-4978, ¶ 32-33; State v. Sherman,
5th Dist. Richland No. 2009-CA-132, 2010-Ohio-3959, ¶ 41. The rationale behind
the principle is “[w]hen a defendant is induced to enter a guilty plea by erroneous
representations as to the applicable law, the plea has not been entered knowingly
and intelligently.” State v. Mitchell, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2004-T-0139, 2006-
Ohio-618, ¶ 15, citing State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 528 (1996). Yet,
“misinformation regarding judicial release does not always invalidate the plea.”
Robinson at ¶ 25. See State v. Cvijetinovic, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81534, 2003-
Ohio-563.
{¶19} After reviewing the record and Rudy’s arguments on appeal, we find
Rudy has failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the trial court’s statements
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regarding the timeframe of his eligibility for judicial release. Even assuming the
trial court was incorrect in its explanation regarding judicial release, we do not find
that Rudy was induced to enter his plea because of the statements or was prejudiced
by them. Judicial release was not one of the terms of the parties’ agreement.
Notably, the parties’ change-of-plea documents are silent with respect to any
agreement relating to judicial release. Likewise, the plea negotiations stated on the
record pursuant to Crim.R. 11(F) do not indicate any assurances regarding Rudy’s
applying for judicial release. For instance, the State did not make assurances to not
oppose a judicial release motion. The record does not indicate that Rudy’s
eligibility for judicial release was a consideration of Rudy’s plea such that a
misstatement regarding the timeframe of his eligibility induced him to change his
plea. Rather, the record indicates Rudy was induced to change his plea based on the
terms of the plea agreement, including the parties’ agreed sentence
recommendation, which was less than the maximum terms available, and the State’s
agreement to recommend dismissal of Count One in case number CR2019 0184.
Moreover, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the relevant count
and imposed the parties’ agreed sentence. Accordingly, Rudy actually received the
benefit of the bargain.
{¶20} Importantly, the trial court was careful not to make any guarantees
regarding a judicial release motion. While Rudy may have been hopeful that he
could be released after serving the mandatory time and six months of his non-
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mandatory sentence, this was not a guarantee such that Rudy was prejudiced by the
trial court’s explanation. Because Rudy has not demonstrated that he was
prejudiced by the trial court’s explanation of the timing for judicial release
eligibility, we do not find that he suffered a manifest injustice.
{¶21} Rudy’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶22} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the Allen County Court
of Common Pleas.
Judgments Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN and EPLEY, J.J., concur.
** Judge Christopher B. Epley of the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting
by Assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
/jlr
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