DocketNumber: C.A. No. 21723.
Judges: BETH WHITMORE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 4/14/2004
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 3} Appellee filed an answer and counterclaim for declaratory judgment on September 25, 2001. Appellee also filed a motion for summary judgment. In the motion, Appellee contended that Appellant was not entitled to uninsured motorists benefits because she was not an "insured." Appellee argued that coverage under the insurance policy did not extend to Appellant because the policy language was no longer ambiguous after it was amended by Endorsement CA 7052. Prior to the amendment, the insurance policy provided:
"B. Who Is An Insured
"1. You
"2. If you are an individual, any ``family member."
{¶ 4} After the amendment, the insurance policy provided:
"B. Who Is An Insured
"1. The Named Insured
"2. If the Named Insured is an individual, any ``family member.'"
{¶ 5} Appellee contended that the amended language was unambiguous and that therefore Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut.Fire Ins. Co. (1999),
{¶ 6} Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment and brief in opposition to Appellee's motion on March 28, 2002. Appellant contended that her motion should be granted, and Appellee's motion denied, for two distinct reasons. First, the language contained in the insurance policy was ambiguous and thereforeScott-Pontzer applied and UM/UIM benefits extended to her because she was a family member of an employee. Second, assuming the policy was found to be unambiguous, she argued that she was entitled to UM/UIM coverage because the replacement endorsement that modified the language of the policy was improperly substituted into Summa's policy as there was no agreement between Summa and Appellee as to the insertion of this substitute endorsement.
{¶ 7} On August 8, 2003, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. The trial court found that subsequent amendments to the insurance policy were invalid pursuant to Linko v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (2000),
{¶ 8} Appellant has timely appealed, asserting one assignment of error.
{¶ 9} In Appellant's sole assignment of error, she has argued that her status as a pedestrian should not exclude her from UM/UIM coverage. This Court disagrees.
{¶ 10} As an initial matter, we note that the appropriate appellate standard of review for an award of summary judgment is de novo. Doe v. Shaffer (2000),
{¶ 11} According to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper if: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence, viewed most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, which is adverse to the non-moving party. See State ex rel. Howard v. Ferreri (1994),
{¶ 12} To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary materials that show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Dresher v. Burt (1996),
{¶ 13} Civ.R. 56(C) provides an exclusive list of materials which the trial court may consider on a motion for summary judgment. Spier v. American Univ. of the Caribbean (1981),
{¶ 14} We first note that, in construing the terms of the insurance policy at issue, the Ohio Supreme court has stated that: "[I]nsurance policies should be enforced in accordance with their terms as are other written contracts. Where the provisions of the policy are clear and unambiguous, courts cannot enlarge the contract by implication so as to embrace an object distinct from that originally contemplated by the parties." Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co.,
{¶ 15} The instant policy contains an "OHIO UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE — BODILY INJURY[,]" endorsement, which provides:
"A. Coverage
"1. We will pay all the sums the ``insured' is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or operator of:
"a. An ``uninsured motor vehicle' as defined in Paragraphs F.3.a., b. and c. because of ``bodily injury':
"(1) Sustained by the ``insured'; and
"(2) Caused by an ``accident'.
"b. An ``uninsured motor vehicle' as defined in Paragraph F.3d because of ``bodily injury' sustained by an ``insured'." (Emphasis omitted.)
{¶ 16} The term "insured" is defined in the original policy as:
"B. Who Is An Insured
"1. You
"2. If you are an individual, any ``family member.'
"3. Anyone else ``occupying' a covered ``auto' or a temporary substitute for a covered ``auto.' The covered ``auto' must be out of service because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.
"4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover because of ``bodily injury' sustained by another ``insured.'"
{¶ 17} The policy also contains an "other owned auto" exclusion, which provides:
"C. Exclusions
"This insurance does not apply to:
"* * *
"5. ``Bodily Injury' sustained by:
"a. You while ``occupying' or when struck by any vehicle owned by you that is not a covered ``auto' for Uninsured Motorists Coverage under this Coverage Form;
"b. Any ``family member' while ``occupying' or when struck by any vehicle owned by that ``family member' that is not a covered ``auto' for Uninsured Motorists Coverage under this Coverage Form; or
"c. Any ``family member' while ``occupying' or when struck by any vehicle owned by you that is insured for Uninsured Motorists Coverage on a primary basis under any other Coverage Form or policy." (Emphasis omitted.)
{¶ 18} Appellant has challenged the trial court's finding that she is not entitled to UM/UIM coverage because she was not occupying a covered auto at the time of the accident. Appellant has argued that her "status as a pedestrian cannot be utilized as the basis to deny her coverage under a policy which otherwise has been held by the trial court to provide [her] with $1 million of [UM] coverage." Relying on the "other owned auto exclusion" contained in its policy and this Court's prior decision in Mazzav. Am. Continental Ins. Co., 9th Dist. No. 21192, 2003-Ohio-360, affirmed (2003), In re Uninsured Underinsured MotoristsCoverage Cases,
{¶ 19} Before addressing Appellant's arguments, this Court finds it necessary to note that although the trial court never specifically concluded that Scott-Pontzer applied to the instant policy, it is apparent from the analysis conducted by the trial court that Scott-Pontzer was, in fact, applied. This is evidenced by the trial court's statement that "[i]t is not disputed that the uninsured motorist provision of the policy, as originally issued, contains language identical to that found inScott-Pontzer." After addressing Appellee's argument thatEzawa v. Yasuda Fire Marine Ins. Co. of Am. (1999),
{¶ 20} After reviewing the relevant policy language, this Court finds, as did the trial court, that the definition of "insured" contained in the instant policy is ambiguous. However, this Court need not attempt to conduct a Scott-Pontzer analysis or determine whether the "other owned auto" exclusion applies to Appellant because of the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision inGalatis.
{¶ 21} In Galatis, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed "Ohio's law regarding whether uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance issued to a corporation may compensate an individual for a loss that was unrelated to the insured corporation."Galatis,
"[A]n employee's activities outside the scope of employment are not of any direct consequence to the employer as a legal entity. An employer does not risk legal or financial liability from an employee's operation of a non-business-owned motor vehicle outside the scope of employment. Consequently, uninsured motorist coverage for an employee outside the scope of employment is extraneous to the general intent of a commercial auto policy."Galatis,
{¶ 22} Additionally, the Galatis court held that the decision in Scott-Pontzer was correct "to the extent that it held that an employee in the scope of employment qualifies as ``you' as used in [the employer's insurance policy], and thus, is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage." (Alterations added.)Galatis,
{¶ 23} This Court notes that "the general rule is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former was bad law, but that it never was the law."Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers (1955),
Judgment affirmed.
Carr and Slaby, JJ., concur in judgment only.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
Exceptions.