DocketNumber: Case No. 99CA3.
Judges: EVANS, J.
Filed Date: 6/30/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Appellant appeals this decision, arguing the trial court is in error in its allocation of parental rights because the court failed to consider that she was the primary caregiver of the children. We find this claim to be without merit and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the trial court.
Appellee, with his answer, moved for temporary custody of the children. When appellant moved the children to Lancaster in February 1999, appellee renewed his motion for temporary custody, arguing that it would be in the best interest of the older children to continue to attend their same school. On March 23, 1998, the trial court conducted a hearing on the matter of temporary custody. By an entry of April 3, 1998, the court designated appellee as the residential parent of all five children, pending further order of the court, and awarded liberal visitation to the appellant.
The court conducted the final hearing in the divorce on August 21, 1998. On August 28, 1998, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, summarizing the testimony of the witnesses and the parties. The trial court made a preliminary division of marital property, but ordered a further inquiry into a business operated by appellee's father, Carl Wesselhoeft, called "C.W. Farms." The purpose of this further inquiry was to determine whether appellee and his father operated this business as a partnership, and, if so, whether appellant had a marital interest in this partnership.
The court also issued preliminary findings on the matters of child support and spousal support. The court proposed to designate appellee as the residential parent, finding the following:
A) The parents wishes are opposite for the custody of the boys;
B) The children were not interviewed in chambers for final hearing;
C) The children have a great deal of healthy interaction with each other, and their parents, and relatives on both sides;
D) The children are adjusted to both homes;
E) None of the children or parties have significant mental or physical health problems;
F) Neither parent has ever failed to pay court-ordered support;
G) Neither parent has ever committed an offense constituting abuse or neglect.
On February 8, 1999, the trial court entered a "Decree of Divorce," designating appellee as residential parent, and continuing previous orders of visitation for appellant. In this entry, however, the court noted that a further hearing on the "C.W. Farms" business was scheduled. Hence, when appellant filed her notice of appeal on March 10, 1999, this entry did not constitute a final, appealable order because of these unresolved property division issues. See Civ.R. 75 (F). On March 22, 1999, appellee filed his notice of cross-appeal. On April 7, 1999, the trial court issued an entry entitled "Second Part of Final Decree of Divorce," resolving these remaining property division issues.
Appellant presents a single assignment of error for our review:
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOCATION [sic] THE PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE CONRAD WESSELHOEFT, AS THIS RULTNG IS CONTRARY TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES.
"The term `abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983),
Furthermore, an appellate court must be guided by a presumption that the findings of the trial court are correct, since the trial court is in the best position to view the witnesses and weigh the credibility of the proffered testimony. Hill v. Hill (July 20, 1995), Pickaway App. No. 94CA22, unreported, citing Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990),
However, before we commence our review of appellant's assignment of error, we are confronted with the absence of any transcript of the final divorce hearing. Upon appeal of an adverse judgment, it is the duty of the appellant to ensure that the record, or whatever portions thereof are necessary for the determination of the appeal, are filed with the court in which she seeks review. See Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams
(1988),
Appellant argues an abuse of discretion by the trial court as she claims the evidence adduced at trial does not support the decision of the trial court. The proceedings of a lower court are deemed correct unless error affirmatively appears on the face of the record. Makranczyv. Gelfand (1924),
Pursuant to App.R. 9(C), if no report of the proceedings was made or a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings which must be submitted to the appellee, then submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval. State ex rel.Fant v. Trumbo (1986),
The trial court rejected appellant's proposed App.R. 9(C) statement. Appellant reports that she submitted a proposed App. R. 9(D) statement to appellee, but appellee refused to agree to the submission of that statement.
The official court reporter for the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas filed an affidavit with this court stating that she received a praecipe for the preparation of a trial transcript in this action. However, the reporter states further that she was advised by counsel for appellant not to prepare this transcript, because appellant had not made financial arrangements for the cost of this transcript. The reporter also states in her affidavit that appellee declined to assume the cost of the transcript.
Instead, appellant supplied us with a statement of evidence signed only by counsel. Such a statement is insufficient to meet the requirements of App.R. 9(C). King v. Plaster (1991),
To find an abuse of discretion, we must find that the evidence, or the law, does not support the decision of the trial court. Without a transcript of the proceedings or a statement of the evidence, an appellate court cannot consider assignments of error arguing that a finding is against the weight of the evidence or is unsupported by that evidence. See App.R. 9(B), and Tyrrell v. Investment Assoc.,Inc. (1984),
In 1990, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 3 (effective April 11, 1991), which changed the substance and terminology of Ohio's custody statutes. Under R.C.
In determining the child's best interest, the court is directed, by statute, to consider all relevant factors, including, the child's wishes, his relationship with his parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests, and his adjustment to his home, school, and community. R.C.
Ohio has not adopted the primary caretaker doctrine. Roth,
Nor was the trial court in error in finding the parties on equal footing as to the question of custody. Under R.C.
Hence, we find no error of law in the decision of the trial court. Appellant has failed to supply us with the portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of her assigned error based on an abuse of discretion. We have no choice, therefore, but to presume the validity of the trial court's proceedings and affirm. Ratchford v. Proprietors' Ins.Co. (1995),
Accordingly, we OVERRULE appellant's sole assignment of error. The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, J., and Kline, P.J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
_____________________ DAVID T. EVANS, Judge
Makranczy v. Gelfand , 109 Ohio St. 325 ( 1924 )
Holm v. Smilowitz , 83 Ohio App. 3d 757 ( 1992 )
Dilworth v. Dilworth , 115 Ohio App. 3d 537 ( 1996 )
Smith v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. Corr. , 104 Ohio App. 3d 210 ( 1995 )
Tyrrell v. Investment Assoc., Inc. , 16 Ohio App. 3d 47 ( 1984 )
Venable v. Venable , 3 Ohio App. 3d 421 ( 1981 )
King v. Plaster , 71 Ohio App. 3d 360 ( 1991 )
Ratchford v. Proprietors' Ins. Co. , 103 Ohio App. 3d 192 ( 1995 )