Sowards v. Sowards

[Cite as Sowards v. Sowards, 2023-Ohio-2538.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PIKE COUNTY
Jeanetta Sowards, : Case No. 22CA918
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
v. : DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
Stephen Sowards, :
RELEASED 7/19/2023
Defendant-Appellant. :
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Joan M. Garaczkowski, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellant.
Jeanetta Sowards, Waverly, Ohio, pro se.1
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.
{¶1} Stephen Sowards appeals from a “journal entry of sentence for contempt of
court” issued by the Pike County Court of Common Pleas in a divorce case. Mr. Sowards
challenges the portion of the entry ordering him to pay his ex-wife for attorney fees she
incurred in filing and prosecuting her contempt motion and in defending against a
foreclosure action. His sole assignment of error asserts the court erred because the
attorney fees are “unreasonable, excessive, partially unrelated to the contempt itself,” and
have not been paid by Ms. Sowards. For the reasons which follow, we overrule the
assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1 Ms. Sowards did not file an appellee’s brief. On March 29, 2023, our magistrate issued an order which
granted her leave to file a motion showing good cause for extending the time for the brief no later than 10
days from the filing of the order, stated that “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by the brief,” and explained
that if the motion and brief were not timely filed, “the matter will be submitted to the Court without further
participation of the appellee.” On April 10, 2023, Ms. Sowards filed a “response” to this order but did not
file a motion showing good cause for extending the time for the brief or an appellee’s brief.
Pike App. No. 22CA918 2
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} In 1981, Stephen and Jeanetta Sowards married, and in 2017, Ms. Sowards
filed a complaint for divorce in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas. In December
2018, the trial court issued a divorce decree. Relevant here, the decree stated that the
Sowardses owned real estate in seven locations, that Ms. Sowards would retain three of
the properties, and that Mr. Sowards would retain the other four properties. The decree
stated that each party was responsible for the mortgages associated with the properties
that party retained and had to “indemnify and hold” the other party “harmless against the
same.”
{¶3} In February 2019, Ms. Sowards filed a “motion to cite for contempt” alleging
that Mr. Sowards had violated the divorce decree by not paying mortgage debts to Vinton
County National Bank (“VCNB”) and WesBanco Bank, Inc. (“WesBanco”). She attached
to her motion a complaint upon cognovit note that VCNB had filed against the Sowardses
in the Ross County Court of Common Pleas and asserted that she expected that a
judgment would immediately be rendered on the complaint. Ms. Sowards asked the trial
court to order Mr. Sowards to serve a 30-day jail sentence and pay a $250.00 fine, court
costs, and her attorney fees.
{¶4} In March 2019, the trial court found Mr. Sowards in contempt based on his
admission to failing to pay the mortgage debt as ordered in the divorce decree. In April
2019, the court conducted a hearing at which the parties informed the court that they had
reached an agreement concerning disposition. The court ordered Ms. Sowards’ counsel
to submit an agreed journal entry incorporating the terms of the agreement.
Pike App. No. 22CA918 3
{¶5} At some point, VCNB obtained a judgment against the Sowardses in Ross
County, filed a certificate of such judgment with the Pike County Clerk of Courts, and then
filed a foreclosure action in the trial court seeking foreclosure of a judgment lien against
the three properties awarded to Ms. Sowards in the divorce decree. On June 20, 2019,
Ms. Sowards filed a notice in the divorce case to inform the trial court of the foreclosure
action. She asserted the foreclosure action was “seeking remedy against Plaintiff’s real
property, and not Defendant’s collateral” and reflected a “continued violation of the
Divorce Decree by the Defendant in this case, as alleged in the Plaintiff’s pending Motion
to Cite for Contempt * * *.”
{¶6} On June 25, 2019, the trial court, based on the agreement of the parties,
ordered Mr. Sowards to serve 30 days in jail for his contempt. The court suspended the
sentence and gave him an opportunity to purge the contempt by curing the default in the
loans with VCNB and WesBanco on or before July 18, 2019, at 9:00 a.m. The court
scheduled a hearing on imposition of sentence for that time and ordered the parties to file
memorandums setting forth their requests concerning the imposition of sentence. Among
other things, Ms. Sowards requested reimbursement for attorney fees “for the defense of
the foreclosure action.” Mr. Sowards asserted that he had made monthly payments to
the banks for three consecutive months, that WesBanco had stated it was satisfied with
his efforts, that VCNB had stated it was willing to mediate the foreclosure action, and that
a mediation conference was scheduled for July 25, 2019. He asked that the trial court
defer sentencing until after the mediation.
{¶7} The mediation resulted in an agreement between VCNB and the Sowardses
which the trial court incorporated into a November 4, 2019 judgment entry filed in the
Pike App. No. 22CA918 4
foreclosure action. The court added the properties awarded to Mr. Sowards in the divorce
decree to the foreclosure action and ordered that if any properties were sold in a judicial
sale, the ones awarded to Mr. Sowards in the divorce decree would be sold first, and the
property Ms. Sowards used as a residence would be sold last. The entry stated that Mr.
Sowards would market properties awarded to him for private sale and list them with a real
estate agent assigned by VCNB. The entry also provided that if the sale proceeds and/or
payments made to VCNB were sufficient to cure the default, the foreclosure action would
be stayed as long as regular monthly payments were being made. In addition, the entry
provided that any sentence imposed on Mr. Sowards for contempt in the divorce case
would be stayed for 150 days.
{¶8} In September 2020, the trial court conducted a status conference at which
VCNB represented that the realtor had informed it that Mr. Sowards was unwilling to list
his properties for sale. VCNB indicated it intended to file a motion requesting the court to
order judicial sales of the subject properties. Evidently after this conference, Ms. Sowards
paid the balance owed to VCNB under the mistaken belief that her residence would be
sold if she did not do so, and on March 4, 2021, VCNB filed a notice of voluntary dismissal
of its claims in the foreclosure action.
{¶9} In June 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the imposition of
sentence on Mr. Sowards for contempt. Afterwards, the court issued a journal entry
finding that as part of the sentence, Mr. Sowards “should be required to contribute toward
the reasonable attorney fees incurred by” Ms. Sowards “in her defense of [VCNB’s]
foreclosure action” and “in the prosecution of her motion to cite for contempt of court in
the present action, if an itemization of those attorney fees can be obtained and submitted
Pike App. No. 22CA918 5
for the Court’s consideration.” The court set deadlines for Ms. Sowards to file itemized
statements and for Mr. Sowards to respond.
{¶10} Initially, Ms. Sowards filed a receipt and two timesheets. Mr. Sowards filed
a response arguing that the receipt related to a contempt motion he had filed against Ms.
Sowards and that the court had already held each party was responsible for their own
attorney fees in connection with that motion. He argued that the timesheets were not
“verified, notarized, or attested to,” that there was “no indication” of where they came from
or who authored them, and that Ms. Sowards provided “absolutely no verification of actual
[a]ttorney fees expended by her.” Therefore, he asserted that the trial court should not
award attorney fees based on her filing.
{¶11} The trial court found that the timesheets may support a finding that Ms.
Sowards’ counsel expended 18.9 hours on the matters about which the court had
inquired. However, the timesheets did not “contain anything, such as a letterhead,
signature, etc., identifying the source of each of those documents, and neither of those
documents show the Court whether any of the sums shown were actually billed to
Jeanetta Sowards, or, if billed, whether such bills were paid or whether the sums or a
portion thereof are still owed to Jeanetta Sowards’ counsel.” The court stated that “[i]f an
oral hearing on this issue is to be obviated,” Ms. Sowards had to supplement her
submissions to provide those details. The court set deadlines for Ms. Sowards to “file
supplemental material addressing these deficiencies” and for Mr. Sowards to respond to
her filing.
{¶12} Ms. Sowards then filed two itemized statements from Price Davis Law, LLC,
which indicated that she was billed for $2,092.50 in attorney fees in connection with her
Pike App. No. 22CA918 6
motion to cite for contempt, that she was billed for $2,497.50 in attorney fees in connection
with the foreclosure action, and that those amounts were still due. Mr. Sowards filed a
response asking the court to deny Ms. Sowards’ request for attorney fees. He asserted
that R.C. 2705.05 governs penalties for contempt and does not include attorney fees, so
the trial court did not have authority to award them under that section. He observed that
there are specific sections of the Ohio Revised Code which provide for attorney fees in
conjunction with a contempt finding related to child support, parenting time, and spousal
support but asserted those sections did not apply. He also asserted that under those
sections the fees awarded must arise in relation to the act of contempt and that the trial
court did not have authority to award attorney fees “for a separate Court action,” i.e., the
foreclosure action, “which has now been dismissed in its entirety.” In addition, he
asserted that it was “clear from Plaintiff’s own filing she has paid zero ($0.00) [a]ttorney
fees related to the two (2) actions in question.”
{¶13} On November 10, 2022, the trial court issued a “journal entry of sentence
for contempt of court.” The court stated that it had considered the itemized statements,
Mr. Sowards’ response to them, and “the history of the case and relevant facts.” The
court observed that Mr. Sowards did “not refute” that Ms. Sowards “has incurred the
attorney fees shown in the itemized statements” filed by her, that the fees “are directly
related to” her defense of the foreclosure action and prosecution of her motion to cite for
contempt, or “the reasonableness of such attorney fees.” The court stated that “[t]he sole
defense asserted by the Defendant is that the Court does not have authority to award
attorney fees as a sanction for the Defendant’s contempt.” However, he cited “no case
law in support of his asserted defense,” and his defense appeared to be “contrary to a
Pike App. No. 22CA918 7
large body of case law.” The court ordered Mr. Sowards to serve a jail term of 30
consecutive days, pay a $250 fine, pay court costs related to the motion to cite for
contempt, pay Ms. Sowards “the sum of $2,092.50, as and for attorney fees incurred by
the Plaintiff directly related to the filing and prosecution of the Motion To Cite For
Contempt filed in this action by the Plaintiff,” and pay Ms. Sowards “the sum of $2,497.50,
as and for attorney fees incurred by the Plaintiff directly related to the Plaintiff’s defense
of the foreclosure action * * *.” The court deferred the jail term and fine to give Mr.
Sowards an opportunity to purge himself of the contempt by paying the attorney fees to
Ms. Sowards “at the former law office of Paul F. Price” and filing proof of payment on or
before January 12, 2023, and by paying the court costs on or before that date. The court
stated that if Mr. Sowards did not purge himself of the contempt, his service of the jail
term and payment of the fine would “not relieve the Defendant of his obligation to pay to
the Plaintiff the attorney fees” and that he “shall remain obligated to pay such attorney
fees * * *.” This appeal followed.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶14} Mr. Sowards presents one assignment of error: “The trial [c]ourt errored
[sic] in awarding [a]ttorney fees against Appellant which were unreasonable, excessive,
partially unrelated to the contempt itself, and none of which have been paid by Appellee.”
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶15} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Sowards contends that the trial court
erred in ordering him to pay attorney fees which were unreasonable, excessive, partially
unrelated to the contempt itself, and not paid by Ms. Sowards. Mr. Sowards asserts that
the attorney fees are “unreasonable and excessive” because: (1) “[a] review of the
Pike App. No. 22CA918 8
transcript reveals it is void of any testimony or evidence regarding [a]ttorney fees and/or
reasonableness thereof,” (2) “[t]he first set of ‘timesheets’ ” Ms. Sowards submitted was
“not verified, notarized or attested to, nor was there any indication where said ‘timesheets’
came from or who authored same,” and (3) “[t]he second set of ‘timesheets’ ” Ms. Sowards
submitted “indicated that they came from Price Davis Law, LLC (a firm which is no longer
in existence), and clearly show Appellee has not incurred/paid any of the fees at issue.”
Mr. Sowards also asserts that “where [a]ttorney fees are statutorily provided for * * *, they
are to have arose [sic] in relation to the [c]ontempt.” He maintains that the attorney fees
related to the foreclosure action “did not arise in relation to the [c]ontempt. While said
case did deal with then marital property at issue, said case has long been
dismissed/settled including Appellee’s cross-claim against Appellant (which was
dismissed by the Court).”
{¶16} “The imposition of sanctions for contempt, including reasonable attorney
fees, is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Weinsziehr v. Weinsziehr,
4th Dist. Hocking No. 20CA1, 2021-Ohio-1568, ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion is “an
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or * * * a view or action that
no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.” State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375,
2008-Ohio-4493, 894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23.
{¶17} Mr. Sowards has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion.
It is true that the only transcript in the record, which is from the June 2022 hearing, does
not contain testimony or evidence regarding Ms. Sowards’ attorney fees. However, after
that hearing, the trial court determined the contempt sentence should include such fees,
gave Ms. Sowards the opportunity to file itemized statements of those fees, and gave Mr.
Pike App. No. 22CA918 9
Sowards the opportunity to respond. Mr. Sowards did not object to this procedure at the
trial level and has not challenged it on appeal.
{¶18} The adequacy of the timesheets Ms. Sowards initially filed is immaterial as
the trial court did not rely on them in sentencing Mr. Sowards; the trial court relied on the
itemized statements Ms. Sowards subsequently filed. Mr. Sowards is correct that the
itemized statements show that Ms. Sowards has not yet paid her attorney fees. However,
that does not mean she did not incur the fees, i.e., that she is liable for them. See
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incur (accessed July 13,
2023) (incur means “to become liable or subject to: bring down upon oneself”). At the
trial level, Mr. Sowards did not argue that Ms. Sowards did not incur the fees in the
itemized statements. The itemized statements suggest that she did as they set forth the
time counsel expended and the hourly rate, indicate that Ms. Sowards was provided with
a copy of the statements, and state the amounts due. Mr. Sowards cites no legal authority
which supports the position that the trial court could not order him to pay Ms. Sowards for
attorney fees she incurred but has not yet paid. He directs our attention to statutes
involving contempt related to child support payments (R.C. 3105.21 and R.C. 3109.05),
parenting time (R.C. 3109.051), and spousal support (R.C. 3105.18) which do not apply
in this instance or even state that courts in such matters cannot require a contemnor to
pay an adverse party’s attorney fees unless that party has already paid them. And though
Mr. Sowards asserts that the itemized statements came from “a firm which is no longer in
existence,” he did not raise that issue in the trial court, and his appellate brief does not
articulate why the continued existence of the firm is significant.
Pike App. No. 22CA918 10
{¶19} Mr. Sowards also cites no legal authority which supports the position that
the trial court erred by ordering him to pay Ms. Sowards for attorney fees she incurred in
defending the foreclosure action. He again cites to the previously mentioned statutes
which do not apply in this instance. Moreover, he disregards the fact that his contempt
resulted in VCNB filing the foreclosure action.
{¶20} Mr. Sowards has not demonstrated that the trial court erred by awarding
attorney fees against him which were unreasonable, excessive, partially unrelated to the
contempt, and unpaid by Ms. Sowards. Accordingly, we overrule the sole assignment of
error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Pike App. No. 22CA918 11
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pike County
Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of
this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________________
Michael D. Hess, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.