DocketNumber: No. 98 C.A. 106.
Judges: DONOFRIO, J.
Filed Date: 12/17/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The events giving rise to appellant being charged with assault took place on April 6, 1997. Saed Atway and his girlfriend, Rhonda Altalosh, went to a nightclub known as the Silver Dollar, located in Austintown Township, Mahoning County, Ohio. At closing time, Atway, Altalosh, and appellant began to exit the club. As they were exiting the club, appellant made some comments to Altalosh which she found to be offensive. In response, Atway threatened to break appellant's jaw. Appellant responded by punching Atway in the mouth, knocking out his two front teeth.
On April 9, 1997, Atway signed a criminal complaint charging appellant with assault. Specifically, Atway alleged that appellant knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to him. The case proceeded to a bench trial on January 22, 1998.
At trial, appellant acknowledged striking Atway in the face, but claimed that it was in self-defense. In addition to the threat by Atway, appellant also claimed that Atway shoved him. Atway admitted to threatening appellant, but denied shoving him. Other witnesses testified that they saw Atway shove appellant.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that appellant had not established self-defense and found him guilty of assault. On May 14, 1998, the court sentenced appellant to a 30 day suspended jail sentence and a $250 fine plus costs, $150 of which was suspended. The court also placed appellant on 12 months of probation, ordered him to have no contact with Atway, and ordered appellant to make restitution and pay Atway's medical bills. Pursuant to appellant's request, the court issued findings of facts and conclusions of law. This appeal followed.
In appellant's first assignment of error, he maintains that the trial court's verdict is erroneous since the weight of the evidence established that he acted in self-defense.
In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a court of appeals must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. See State v. Thompkins (1997),
Self-defense is an affirmative defense in Ohio and the criminal defendant must demonstrate the appropriate elements of that defense by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Seliskar
(1973),
The greater amount of credible evidence offered at trial fails to demonstrate that appellant has proven any of the elements of self-defense. Appellant's claim of self-defense is based on (1) Atway threatening to break his jaw prior to the punch, (2) Atway allegedly shoving him just prior to the punch., (3) a history of Atway allegedly threatening and bullying him, and (4) the size discrepancy between he and Atway.
Concerning appellant's claim that Atway had threatened him, it has been recognized that mere verbal harassment does not constitute provocation entitling a defendant to defend himself. See Bucyrus v. Fawley (1988),
Appellant cites to State v. McLeod (1948),
Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record does not demonstrate that the trial court lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice by finding appellant guilty of assault and finding that appellant had failed to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is without merit.
In appellant's second assignment of error, he maintains that the trial court had no authority to order restitution for the victim's medical expenses.
Appellant's conviction in this case was for a misdemeanor of the first degree. See R.C.
Appellant also cites State v. Wohlgemuth (1990),
In the present case, we construe the trial court's entry as ordering restitution of the victim's medical bills as a condition of his probation. Although the trial court's entry could have been clearer in this regard, a reading of the entry in its entirety leads us to this conclusion. The determination of the amount of restitution was also referred to the probation department. Therefore, this case is distinguishable fromWohlgemuth and other cases that prohibit the payment of medical expenses as restitution.
Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
Vukovich, J., Waite, J., concurs.
APPROVED: _________________________ Gene Donofrio Judge