DocketNumber: No. 86589.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 1587
Judges: PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.:
Filed Date: 3/30/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
"I. The trial court committed reversible error when it limitedits award of attorney's fees [sic] under R.C.
{¶ 2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we reverse and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The apposite facts follow.
{¶ 3} Jarmon sued appellee Friendship Auto Sales, Inc. ("Friendship"), claiming numerous violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA), the Ohio Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA), and conversion of Jarmon's vehicle. At trial, the jury found that Friendship violated RISA by failing to provide notice of repossession and disposition of Jarmon's car, violated the CSPA in so doing, and, in addition, converted Jarmon's car. The jury awarded Jarmon $2,500 in compensatory damages.
{¶ 4} The trial court held a separate hearing to determine the amount of treble damages and attorney fees. The trial court awarded treble damages in the amount of $7,500. Although Jarmon requested $12,831 in legal fees, the court awarded her fees in the amount of $3,549.50.
{¶ 6} R.C.
{¶ 7} In Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc.1 the Ohio Supreme Court stated the following considerations apply in considering the reasonable amount of attorney fees to award in a consumer case:
"When awarding reasonable attorney fees pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 8} When making the fee award under R.C.
{¶ 9} Although Friendship contends there is no evidence the trial court disregarded the fees attributed to the law clerks, we conclude the record is devoid of any evidence that the trial court followed Brittner and did consider the law clerks' fees. The court stated it was awarding fees "for the work completed by attorney Joseph Romano at $125.00 an hour." The trial court did not mention the fees for the law clerks. Also, at the fee hearing, Friendship's lawyer specifically asked the court not to allow any fees incurred by the law clerks. Interestingly, all of the law clerks' hours were redacted from Jarmon's affidavit, where the fees were itemized. The record strongly suggests that the trial court disregarded the law clerks' fees.
{¶ 10} This court and other courts have held, that, legal fees incurred as a result of work performed by law clerks or legal interns should be taken into account when awarding attorney fees.5 As we stated in Jackson v. Brown,6 the use of law clerks may decrease litigation expenses since they are charged at a lower rate; therefore, their use should not be discouraged.
{¶ 11} The affidavit indicates the clerks drafted the complaint, various motions, including a motion for summary judgment, and the trial brief. The trial court's award, which was $74 over the fees incurred solely by attorney Romano, fails to take into account the work performed by the law clerks. We appreciate that Jarmon recovered a relatively minor award; this does not dictate the attorney fees should be correspondingly limited. As the court in Bittner held:
"[W]e reject the contention that the amount of attorney feesawarded pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 12} Finally, we note the trial court does have discretion to limit the amount of fees it awards in relation to the work performed by the law clerk when it finds the factors listed inBittner dictate a lesser amount. Accordingly, Jarmon's sole assigned error is sustained.
Judgment reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This cause is reversed and remanded.
It is, therefore, ordered that said appellant recover of said appellee her costs herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Dyke, A.J., and Gallagher, J., concur.