DocketNumber: No. 06-CA-00040.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 5681
Judges: HOFFMAN, P.J.
Filed Date: 10/31/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 3} On January 13, 2006, appellant requested a continuance of the court date due to a work conflict. The trial court granted the request on January 20, 2006, and scheduled appellant to appear in court on February 1, 2006. Appellant appeared before the trial court on February 1, 2006, and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. The trial court scheduled the matter for bench trial on February 15, 2006. On February 13, 2006, the State filed a Motion to Continue due to the unavailability of a witness. The trial court granted the State's motion and rescheduled the trial for March 29, 2006. The trial court journalized the continuance on February 28, 2006.
{¶ 4} On March 10, 2006, appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon speedy trial violations. Via Judgment Entry filed March 14, 2006, the trial court denied appellant's motion. The matter proceeded to bench trial on March 29, 2006, with the trial court finding appellant guilty as charged and entered sentence accordingly.
{¶ 5} It is from this conviction appellant appeals, raising as his sole assignment of error:
{¶ 6} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS."
{¶ 8} The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the
{¶ 9} As relevant to the instant action, R.C.
{¶ 10} "The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, * * * may be extended only by the following:
{¶ 11} "* * *
{¶ 12} "(C) Any period of delay necessitated by the accused's lack of counsel, provided that such delay is not occasioned by any lack of diligence in providing counsel to an indigent accused upon his request as required by law;
{¶ 13} "(D) Any period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the accused;
{¶ 14} "(E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused;
{¶ 15} "(H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused's own motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused's own motion * * *"
{¶ 16} Speedy trial statutes are to be strictly construed against the State. State v. Miller (1996),
{¶ 17} Appellant maintains the State was required to bring him to trial on or before February 24, 2006, which was four days prior to the trial court's entry which granted the State's motion for a continuance. Appellant submits the time should be calculated as follows: 01/13/06 — 01/19/06, seven days; 01/20/06 — 02/01/06, zero days as appellant requested a continuance; 02/02/06 — 02/28/06, twenty-seven days, for a total of thirty-four days. We disagree with appellant's calculations.
{¶ 18} Appellant was served with his summons on January 12, 2006. The speedy trial time began to run on January 13, 2006. R.C.
{¶ 19} Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Hoffman, P.J. Farmer, J. and Edwards, J. concur.