DocketNumber: No. 32520
Citation Numbers: 198 Okla. 308, 178 P.2d 106, 1947 OK 73, 1947 Okla. LEXIS 446
Filed Date: 3/11/1947
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
This is an action in ejectment brought by Charles Pfile against John Fernow, D. O. Snook and Marie F. Leith to recover possession of five acres of land.
Plaintiff in his petition deraigned title from sovereignty down to date and alleged that his immediate grantor was J. L. Morgan, who acquired title by sheriff’s deed on November 9, 1927, at execution sale held to satisfy a judgment rendered against one Rosa Vla'sák.
Defendants in their answer claimed title by adverse possession, and also pleaded laches. Defendant Snook claimed title under lease executed by Fernow and defendant Leith claimed a lien against the premises under mortgage executed by Fernow.
The trial was to the court and resulted in a judgment in favor of plaintiff awarding him possession of the premises. The judgment, also cancels defendant Snook’s lease and defendant Leith’s mortgage and quiets title in and to the premises in plaintiff.
Defendants Fernow and Leith appeal and assert that the judgment is contrary to law and is not sustained by the evidence. Defendant Snook did not ap-péal.
The record discloses that plaintiff claims title Under warranty deed obtained from Morgan on the < 6th day of August, 1930, and that' Morgan acquired his title by sheriff’s deed and immediately placed the same of record.
The land was unimproved except that it was fenced in on all sides. The evidence shows that on the date of the execution sale Clyde Wright was in possession of and farming the land as the tenant of Mrs. Vlasak; that Mr. Wright was present at the time the premises were sold on execution; that in a few days thereafter he entered into an oral agreement with G. D. Graves, agent of Morgan, whereby he rented the land for the year 1928 and held over under the agreement for the year 1929. He paid the rent agreed upon to Mr. Morgan for the year 1928 but failed to pay the rent for the year 1929. He kept possession and farmed the land during that year as the tenant of Morgan. Graves paid the taxes as the agent of Morgan for the years 1927, 1928, and
Possession, to be’ adverse, must be open, notorious, hostile, exclusive, continuous, under claim of ownership and in order to ripen into title must be uninterrupted for the full statutory period of 15 years. 12 O. S. 1941 § 93, subd. 4; Anderson v. Francis, 177 Okla. 47, 57 P. 2d 619; Huseman v. Rauch, 159 Okla. 296, 15 P. 2d 60. Defendant did not offer any evidence tending to show that Mrs. Vlasak at any time after the execution sale claimed title to or possession of the premises other than on June 6, 1930, when she conveyed the premises to defendant Fernow. She at no' time made any effort to rent the premises or to collect the rents or pay the taxes and in no manner exercised or attempted to exercise any control or dominion over the premises. There is no evidence in the record from which the conclusion can be drawn that she claimed ownership or claimed to be in the possession of the premises or that she held possession in hostility to the title and claim of Morgan.
Counsel for defendant Fernow, how
It is generally held that a tenant may attorn to the purchaser of his landlord’s interest at execution sale. 35 C. J. p. 1248, § 608; 10 R. C. L. p. 655, § 142; Sumpter v. Hot Springs Sav. Co., 190 Ark. 91, 216 S. W. 311; Bowman v. Goodrich, 94 Neb. 696, 144 N. W. 240; Hartzog v. Seeger Coal Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 163 S. W. 1055. In the case of Gray v. Whitla, 70 Okla. 288, 174 P. 239, we held: ,
“Where a lessee, to prevent being actually expelled from the demised premises, yields the possession thereof and attorns, in good faith, to one having a paramount title to his lessor, and a right to immediate possession, it is equivalent to an actual ouster.”
Applying the above principles of law to the evidence, we think it sufficient to justify the conclusion that Morgan was in possession through his tenant Wright at the' time Mrs. Vlasak conveyed the premises to defendant Fernow.
The doctrine of laches is discussed by counsel in their brief. This doctrine has no application under the evidence in this case. In the case of Phelan v. Roberts, 182 Okla. 202, 77 P. 2d 9, we held:
“The question of whether a claim is barred by laches must be determined by the facts and circumstances in each case and according to right and justice. Laches, in legal significance, is not merely delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another and causes change of condition or relation during the period of delay.”
The evidence wholly fails to show that defendant Fernow in any way suffered any disadvantage by reason of the delay in bringing the suit" or that he in any manner changed his position by reason' thereof. The defense of laches must therefore fail. The evidence amply supports the judgment.
Affirmed.