Judges: W.A. DREW EDMONDSON, Attorney General of Oklahoma
Filed Date: 1/26/2001
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Dear Senator Taylor,
¶ 0 This office has received your request for an officialAttorney General Opinion in which you ask the followingquestions: 1. May an Oklahoma State agency enter into a contract limitingthe liability of a private vendor providing goods or services forthe State of Oklahoma? 2. If the answer is yes, may such a limitation of liability benegotiated by a State agency with a successful vendor, assumingprovision for the negotiation was included in the solicitation bythe State agency?
¶ 1 Your questions involve the Oklahoma Central Purchasing Act (the "Act"), 74 O.S. 85.1 — 74 O.S. 85.44C (1991-2000), which requires State agencies (through the Purchasing Division ofthe Department of Central Services) to solicit bids from vendors when contracting for goods or services. Your letter says that "major vendors with great potential exposure may be reluctant to bid or propose on solicitations for projects in Oklahoma if faced with unlimited liability." Letter from Stratton Taylor, President Pro Tempore, Oklahoma State Senate, to W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General (Dec. 7, 2000) (on file with the Attorney General Office of Oklahoma). Some vendors have proposed that their liability in any contract be limited to a specific amount, such as the amount of the contract. You first ask whether a State agency may so limit a vendor's liability in a procurement contract; you then ask whether negotiating such a limitation may take place after the contract is awarded to a particular vendor, provided that the bid solicitation allowed for such negotiation.
¶ 3 The type of limitation of liability provision you propose is one which would, like the clauses in Opinion 78-256, hold a private entity (a vendor) harmless for his actions and limit the State's legal rights by capping the amount the State could receive as damages due to a vendor's negligence to the amount specified in the contract. For purposes of this Opinion, we will refer to such a limitation of liability provision as an "exculpatory" clause.
¶ 4 There are two types of exculpatory clauses: those that grant a party complete immunity from liability and those that only partially limit liability. "Courts have made a distinction between clauses that seek to exempt a contracting party from his own negligence and those that seek to limit the liability ofthe contracting party." Elsken v. Network Multi-Family Sec. Corp.,
¶ 5 Contracts which completely shelter a party from the consequences of its negligence are disfavored in cases of ordinary negligence; moreover, in cases of gross or wanton negligence, or where a clause exempts a party from liability for intentional or fraudulent acts, Oklahoma law holds such clauses invalid and unenforceable. See 15 O.S. 212 (1991); Schmidt v. United States,
¶ 6 When determining the validity of a limited exculpatory clause, Oklahoma courts apply the test found in Schmidt. Schmidt requires: (I) that the clause's language clearly and unambiguously state the parties' intent to limit liability; (2) that the parties have equal bargaining power; and (3) that enforcement of the clause would not violate public policy. Seeid. at 874. An exculpatory clause violates public policy when it would "(a) be injurious to public health, public morals or confidence in administration of the law or (b) so undermine . . . individual rights . . . to personal safety or private property."Id.
¶ 7 From the above cases and statutes we see that exculpatory clauses which limit (but not exempt) liability and satisfy the elements of the Schmidt test may be valid and enforceable under Oklahoma law, at least in contracts between private parties. Additional considerations apply, however, when the State is one of the contracting parties. We must now determine whether other provisions of law prohibit the State from limiting a vendor's liability with an otherwise valid exculpatory clause in a procurement contract.
¶ 9 Article X, Section 23 states in pertinent part:
"The state shall never create or authorize the creation of any debt or obligation . . . against the state, or any department, institution or agency thereof, regardless of its form or the source of money from which it is to be paid, except as may be provided in this section and in Article X, Section 24 and Article X, Section
25 of ArticleX of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma."Any department, institution or agency of the state operating on revenues derived from any law or laws which allocate the revenues thereof to such department, institution or agency shall not incur obligations in excess of the unencumbered balance of cash on hand."
Id. 23, 23(5) (emphasis added).
¶ 10 In the situation you raise, a vendor exculpatory clause requires the State, in effect, to pay the difference between the limited amount it could recoup from a vendor in a negligence action and the actual total damages. While the contract would not require the State to pay anything directly to the vendor if the vendor's negligence resulted in damages exceeding the amount specified in the contract, the State would have to pay other sources, or otherwise itself absorb, the amount required to correct the results of the vendor's negligence. Vendor negligence may or may not occur in any given contract, and result in damages; the State's potential costs are therefore a contingent liability.
¶ 11 The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether contingent liabilities are obligations under the Constitution inWyatt-Doyle Butler Engineers, Inc. v. City of Eufaula,
¶ 12 The Authority paid to a certain point and subsequently filed for bankruptcy. The City also failed to pay, saying the contract created a debt of the City which violated Article X, Section 26 (which parallels Section Article X, Section 23 but applies to municipalities) of the Oklahoma Constitution. Wyatt-Doyle argued that a contingent obligation was not a debt for purposes of Section 26 because the obligation did not arise unless the contract stated a sum certain to be paid within a specified period of time. See id. at 477.
¶ 13 The Court disagreed, saying that even though an obligation is based on some contingent event, the contract results in an unconstitutional debt unless an appropriation exists for that purpose to pay it. See id. at 479 (citing Anadarko FuneralHome v. Scarth,
¶ 14 As noted above, Article X, Section 26 applies to cities and other subdivisions of the State, while Article X, Section 23 is the companion provision which applies to State agencies. Therefore, the Court's reasoning in Wyatt-Doyle also applies to contingent obligations arising against the State under Article X, Section 23.
¶ 15 Although the facts in Wyatt-Doyle differ slightly from the situation you raise, the Court's reasoning regarding contingent obligations applies. In Wyatt-Doyle, although the time of payment was indeterminate (because the City could not know when or if the Authority would default), the City was liable to pay the vendor a definite amount (that which was unpaid at the time the Authority defaulted). Since no money had been appropriated to cover such an expenditure, the contract violated Article X, Section 26. ¶ 16 In the situation you raise, the contingency is more remote because the obligation is an implicit result of the exculpatory clause rather than a term expressly bargained for. Nevertheless, the effect is the same as in Wyatt-Doyle — the State ends up with a contingent obligation for which no appropriation has been made.
¶ 17 When a contract contains a vendor exculpatory clause and the vendor acts negligently resulting in damages the State must pay (although not to the vendor, as in Wyatt-Doyle) or absorb the amount of damages exceeding the contract limitation. Such a contract would therefore create a contingent obligation. A contingent obligation would violate Article
Only in this way could an agency prevent an obligation from arising "in excess of the unencumbered balance of cash on hand," the situation prohibited by Article 10, Section 23(5).
¶ 18 Making such appropriations is impracticable, however. It is impossible to predict what funds to appropriate for a contingent obligation because the amount payable, as well as the time of payment, are indeterminate. Therefore, a State agency may not enter into a procurement contract limiting the liability of a private vendor, because a contingent obligation would arise for which no appropriation had been made, violating Article
¶ 20 Adding a limitation of liability clause after a contract was awarded would change the material terms of the contract. Therefore, a limitation of liability clause cannot be negotiated by a State agency with a successful vendor after a contract has been awarded, even if the bid solicitation so provided.
¶ 21 It is, therefore, the official Opinion of the AttorneyGeneral that:
1.A vendor exculpatory provision creates an obligationprohibited by Article
W.A. DREW EDMONDSON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA
DEBRA SCHWARTZ ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
"A debt, payable in the future, is obviously no less a debt than if payable presently; and a debt payable upon a contingency, as upon the happening of some event, . . . is some kind of a debt, and therefore within the constitutional prohibition. If a contract or undertaking contemplates, in any contingency, a liability to pay when the contingency occurs, the liability is absolute; the debt exists, and it differs from a present unqualified promise to pay only in the manner by which the indebtedness was incurred. . . . In such cases the debt is created when the contract is made."
State ex rel. Woods v. Cole,