Judges: ROBERT H. HENRY, Attorney General of Oklahoma.
Filed Date: 9/9/1988
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Dear Representatives Hunter,
¶ 0 The Attorney General has received your request for an official opinion asking, in effect:
Do the provisions of 74 O.S. 1813.2 (1987) violate theOklahoma Constitution's prohibition against "special laws" asembodied in Article V, Section 32, Article V, Section 46 andArticle V, Section 59?
¶ 1 Your question requires an interpretation of a statute involving the Oklahoma Department of Tourism and Recreation, i.e., 74 O.S. 1813.2 (1987), which became effective on July 20, 1987, and provides as follows:
The Department of Tourism and Recreation may contract with an advertising agency to assist the Department in carrying out the marketing duties prescribed by law. Provided, however, the advertising agency entering into such a contract with the Department of Tourism shall not at the time of the selection or at any time during the term of the contract have a contract with the Oklahoma Department of Commerce.
¶ 2 You wish to know whether the foregoing statute violates the prohibition against special laws contained in Article
¶ 3 Article
Laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State, and where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
¶ 4 The issue you present is whether 74 O.S. 1813.2 (1987) is such an unconstitutional special law. Whether a law is general or special must be judged in the context in which it operates.Oklahoma City v. Griffin,
¶ 5 Section 1813.2 facially affects all individuals or entities which presently have an advertising contract with the Department of Commerce, as well as all individuals or entities which plan to enter into such contracts in the future.
¶ 6 Generally, in considering the constitutionality of a statute, there is a presumption that the Legislature did not intend to violate the constitution. Elias v. City of Tulsa,
¶ 7 We can conceive of a rational basis on which the Legislature enacted 74 O.S. 1813.2 (1987). For example, the Legislature may have thought that different advertising points of view were necessary for the Department of Commerce and the Department of Tourism and Recreation so that one entity should not provide the same services to both agencies. There is nothing to show that the relationship between the purpose of 74 O.S.1813.2 (1987), and the restrictive classification is not legitimate. A statutory discrimination, such as the apparent class of advertisers in this case, will not be set aside if any state of facts may be conceived to justify it. Chatman v.Barnes,
¶ 8 Therefore, 74 O.S. 1813.2 is not an unconstitutional special law within the meaning of Article V, Section 32 and Article
¶ 9 It is, therefore, the official opinion of the AttorneyGeneral that the provisions of 74 O.S. 1813.2 (1987), whichrestrict the Department of Tourism and Recreation fromcontracting with advertising agencies under certaincircumstances, do not violate the provisions of Article V,Section 32, Article V, Section 46 and Article
ROBERT H. HENRY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA
KATHLYN A. RHODES ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL